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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the use of equity and its principles in the field of public law.  It 
asks whether the relationship between local authorities and their service users can 
properly be understood as being a fiduciary relationship.  In considering this question 
the thesis examines the extent to which the relationship is analogous to trusteeship or 
whether it is some other sui generis category.  This requires exploration of core 
elements of trust and loyalty and analysis, within a local government context of the 
debate as to whether fiduciary duties are confined to having a proscriptive role or 
whether, as some advocate they have a wider prescriptive function. 
                      The relationship between local authorities and their service users is not 
considered to be a fiduciary relationship within the traditional class of relationships so 
classified. Notwithstanding, there are instances within that relationship where the 
characteristics resemble in part application of a sui generis label. For example, in the 
realm of local authorities and their interaction with the elderly, child care and youth 
counselling services it is possible to apply a quasi - trusteeship role.  This 
categorisation cannot however be extended to the majority of interactions between 
local authorities and their service users which usually fall within a contract or tortious 
setting. 
                   The main reason in not being able to identify the relationship between 
local authorities and their service users as fully fiduciary is the inability to point to a 
central core of loyalty between the parties which is so necessary for a finding of the 
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existence of a fiduciary relationship. The loyalty inhibitor is the polycentric essence 
of much of local authority decision making, which is made in a very diverse 
community group often with different complex needs and aspirations all clambering 
for attention. Further, as local authorities are public bodies they must accommodate 
the ‘public interest’ in any decision making process and outcome. These factors 
combine to make a very different decision making environment than the way 
fiduciary obligations can be exercised in private law and makes the hurdles higher for 
an exercise of translation to the public law sphere. 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore whether the roving commission of 
equity has any application to the public law field.  Has equity died and shrivelled, or 
does equity still have the ability to flourish and accommodate new situations and 
changes in social morals and norms, ‘yet maintain its core values and norms, 
without which no society can survive, let alone flourish.’?1 
                 Notwithstanding, these hurdles this author considers that equity still has a 
role to play in public law, none more so than in the day to day decision making of 
local authorities as well as in judicial review proceedings. Equity can bring a 
contextual approach so necessary when substantive review is applied. Equity has 
proved to be a robust flexible adaptable tool, even in a complex modern environment.  
For example, the remedies it has fashioned of injunctions, declaratory relief and 
freezing orders to mention a few , as well as aiding the common law in its application 
of trust principles to a deserted wife’s equity, where the title was in one party’s sole 
name. 
                                                             
1
 Professor Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century‘(2011) 91 BULR 
1289, 1290 
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This author espouses a principle of stewardship which can be applied as an additional 
substantive review tool in the judicial tool box, along with Wednesbury and 
proportionality. Structuring substantive review is a major current debate in public law 
both judicially and academically: there is no valid reason why ethical principles such 
as stewardship-of person, place, property and purpose should not be a valid 
contributory player. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Topic of this Thesis – the research question, and its 
importance  
 
The prime question being asked in this thesis is: can equitable principles have a 
greater role to play in administrative law, with particular reference to the relationship 
between local authorities and their service users in England and Wales? 
A major concern with any form of legal authority is the reach of its 
application.  It is therefore crucial to identify who has legal authority, its extent and 
who is subject to those duties under the law.  The main aim of this thesis is to explore 
whether equity has a role to play in public law with specific reference to the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users and to ask what 
identifying designation or label does the law attach to that relationship?  Throughout 
this thesis the term ‘service users’ will be used, so as to encompass use of the old 
term ‘ratepayer’, 2 found in earlier case law, and to cater for local authorities’ wide 
                                                             
2
 A person who is liable to pay any rate or tax in respect of property entered in any valuation 
list. Rates are levied on both domestic and non-domestic property. There are domestic and 
business rates. Domestic rates are based on the property valuation and placed in a valuation 
band. Business rates are presently fixed by central government on all non-domestic 
properties, which includes village halls. Rates were abolished in England and Wales in 1990 
and replaced by a community charge (‘poll tax’) a fixed tax per head that was the same for 
everyone. This was replaced by the Council tax, a system based on the rateable value of 
domestic property and on rental values for business properties  
Receipts for national non-domestic rates for local authorities in England by financial quarter- 
1.4.2015 –31.3.2016,   £22,867,606 
1.4.2016 to date           £23,177,394 
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modern service delivery remit, which includes a wider range of individuals, whether 
they are council tax payers, residents, or those that come into a local authority area 
for the purposes of health, work leisure or other reasons, (including those seeking 
protection). 
3
 
1.2 The relevance of the research 
A cogent articulation of how and to what extent fiduciary obligations apply in a local 
government setting is required for three main reasons. 
First, a local authority has tremendous powers within its defined locality.  It 
has over 1200 statutory functions ranging from diverse services for the elderly, 
children and those with learning disabilities, to the more mundane responsibilities for 
road maintenance and refuse collection.
4
  Local authorities have a revenue income 
from various sources,
5
 (see Table A in appendices) including central government 
grants and subsidies and council tax collected from residents and local businesses. 
From these statistics alone it can be seen local authorities are powerful players in the 
service market.  In addition, the funding arrangement of local authorities is 
significantly changing, for example, in relation to business rate retention.
6
 Further, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(Table 3 online statistics, Department for Communities and Local Government - updated 29
th
 
June 2016) 
3
 For example, asylum seekers or unaccompanied children; Local authorities have duties to 
support all children ‘in need’ in their area. The basic scheme is found in Part III of the 
Children’s Act 1989. Subsequent legislation, case law and guidance has further clarified local 
authorities’ obligations. See especially, the Children (Leaving Care) (England) Act 2000 and 
the Children’s Act 2004 
4
  The powers of local authorities are conferred by statute and include: 
Mandatory powers - such as providing social work services 
Permissive powers - such as economic development, recreational services; and 
Regulatory powers - such as trading standards and environmental health; issuing licences for 
taxis and public houses 
5
 Department for Communities and Local Government, Local Government Financial 
Statistics England (No 26, 2016) < https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-
government-financial-statistics-england-2016> accessed 27 September 2016 
6
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget, March 2016, HC Deb,16 March 2016, cols 951-968. 
A consultation document has been issued entitled ‘Self-sufficient local government; 100% 
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these changes can clearly be seen by comparing sources of funding in 2010/11 and 
projected sources of funding in 2019/20.   The Local Government Association 
(‘LGA’) 7 indicates that, by the end of this decade, the proportion of income from 
centralised grants will fall. Local authorities will be able to use capital receipts from 
the sale of assets for revenue (subject to circumstances to be announced).  New 
figures show that England’s 444 local authorities hold £22 billion in non-ring fenced 
reserves.
8
 The LGA has stated: ‘Government has recognised our argument that local 
government should have autonomy in deciding how to spend its reserves. We have 
long argued that councils need to be able to make financial decisions based on local 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Business Rates Retention consultation Document’, published 5 July 2016 whereby the 
Department for Communities and Local Government seek comments by 26
th
 September 
2016. See, Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Self-sufficient local 
government; 100% Business Rates Retention consultation Document’ (5 July 2016) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/self-sufficient-local-government-100-
business-rates-retention> accessed 27 September 2016 
See also, Local Government Association, ‘Rewiring Public Service’ (December 2013), p1: 
On 1
st
 April 2013 a new system of business rates retention began in England. Before that date 
all business rates collected by councils formed a single, national pot, which was then 
distributed by government in the form of formula grant. Through the Local Government 
Finance Act 2012, and regulations that followed, the Government gave local authorities the 
power to keep up to half the business rate growth in their area by splitting business rate 
revenue into the ‘local share’ and the ‘central share’. The central share is redistributed to 
councils in the form of revenue support grant in the same way as formula grant.’ 
Note - The Local Government Association was created by local government to be its national 
voice in England and Wales. The purpose of the LGA is to support, promote and improve 
local government: a major focus being to represent local government through their public 
affairs team and appear in front of Parliamentary select committees and work with 
parliamentarians to amend legislation, ask parliamentary questions and to speak in debates. 
See further, The Local Government Group, ‘The LGA quick guide to local government’ 
(April 2011) < http://www.local.gov.uk/health/-
/journal_content/56/10180/3510763/ARTICLE> accessed 27 September 2016. 
7
 The Local Government Association, ‘Future Funding outlook for councils 2019/20: Interim 
2015’ (June 2015) < http://www.local.gov.uk/futurefunding/-
/journal_content/56/10180/7379688> accessed 27 September 2016 
8
 The Rt. Hon Greg Clark MP, Department for Communities and Local Government, 
‘Councils have over £22billion in reserves’ (19 November 2015) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/councils-have-over-22-billion-in-reserves> accessed 
27 September 2016 
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circumstances.’9 These changes, and pressure for greater autonomy, highlight the 
need to determine the relationship between local authorities and their service users. 
Secondly, it seeks to understand how the relationship of local authorities and 
their service users is regarded in law and explores the way in which notions of 
‘stewardship’, including management of local needs and expression of community 
aspirations and expectations could be engaged. It is important to understand how 
notions of fairness, impartiality, trust and loyalty can be conceptually harnessed in a 
public sphere where administrative decisions are taken that affect the daily lives of 
citizens. 
Thirdly, the need for clear labelling of the relationship between a local 
authority and its service users is overdue.  Under company law, for example  
fiduciary obligation has been embodied in statute
10
 and there is no valid reason why 
local government legislation cannot similarly establish a fiduciary duty on local 
authorities, by incorporating words that better define the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users. Improved relational labelling will ensure that 
ensuing obligations are better understand and applied.
11
 
A local authority is a statutory corporation, with a Parliamentary birthright, 
but this designation needs further unpacking: how we label relationships in law is 
significant, because we ascribe rights and duties by the way we allocate such labels.  
Like the labelling function on products, labels inform the public about what to expect.  
                                                             
9
  Local Government Association, ‘Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015: On the 
Day Briefing’ (25 November 2015) < http://www.local.gov.uk/spending-review-2015> 
accessed 27 September 2016 
10
  See Companies Act 2006, s 175. This provision incorporates the long standing common 
law rule that directors, like any other person who has fiduciary responsibilities, must respect 
the trust and confidence placed in them 
11 A call for a legislative infrastructure enforcing stewardship principles; this could be 
achieved by constitutional recognition in the preamble to a statute dealing with duties and 
powers imposed on local authorities 
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For example, when we say a person is an agent or executor, the layman may not 
understand what the role technically means or involves, but will certainly expect a 
bundle of rights and obligations to arise.  It is central to understanding local 
government law that being a creature of statute, a local authority can only do that 
which its governing statute and delegated legislation permits.  If a local authority acts 
outside its statutory powers, duties or discretion then it will have acted unlawfully.  
This limitation of action is termed the ‘ultra vires’ doctrine.  An object of this thesis is 
to contend that in addition to a local authority’s statutory existence their duties and 
powers are overlaid with not only common law and public law principles, but also 
equitable fiduciary principles. 
This thesis explores whether, and if so, how a trusteeship paradigm ‘fits’ with 
the statutory nature of local authorities, and their local government environment. Can 
this relationship be understood in terms of trusteeship or is it some other sui generis 
category, such as a community service model that is a fixed fiduciary categorisation? 
Such a model focusses on the local authority as a service delivery vehicle, with 
emphasis on a public service ethos to its locality, rather than being profit orientated.  
This author advocates a local community service model which incorporates some 
fiduciary elements, replacing duty of care with a wider stewardship ethic of care. This 
thesis, therefore, considers alternative paradigms which include a fiduciary 
framework that centres the most vulnerable interests within a non-property based 
relationship. 
Determination of the relationship between local authorities and their 
ratepayers has come before the courts on a number of occasions.  This thesis will 
20 
 
consider, in particular, Roberts v Poplar Borough Council,
12
 Prescott v Birmingham 
Corporation
13
 and Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council and 
Another,
14
 as illustrative of narrow judicial conceptions of the fiduciary nature of 
public law, in particular its emphasis on the protection of property rate payers, as 
opposed to the wider class of service users. 
These seminal cases are instructive because they provide an insight into the 
way judges approach challenges to the way in which a local authority has used its 
discretionary power. Some of their Lordships in the Poplar case
15
 considered the 
relationship between a council and its ratepayers, to be ‘somewhat akin to’ or similar 
to the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary.  Such analogical reasoning has 
not however identified the precise relational label involved, albeit references to a 
trustee-like role infers some form of comparable fiduciary type relationship, since the 
trustee-beneficiary relationship is firmly established as a status member of the 
conventional group of fiduciary relationships per se.  Their Lordships may, therefore, 
have had some type of sui generis relationship in mind that would fit into an ad hoc 
fiduciary classification, as the relationship of local authorities and their service users 
is not typically recognised as a fiduciary relationship per se, although the courts have 
used language that suggests that it may be akin to a fiduciary relationship. Indeed, 
since the Bromley case, the courts have accepted that local authorities may, in certain 
circumstances, owe fiduciary obligations to their service users.  This is illustrated in 
chapter six where there is clear evidence of a judicial overlay of a fiduciary duty on 
local authorities when they dispose of land under their statutory powers. 
16
  
                                                             
12
   [1925]  A.C. 1 
13
   [1955]  Ch 210 
14   [1983]  A.C. 768 
15
   [1925]  A.C. 1 
16
 Local Government Act 1972 , s 123 
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Identifying whether the relationship involves fiduciary obligations between 
local authorities and their service users is extremely important to both parties, since it 
maps out the content and scope of such obligations, and aids certainty as regards what 
is expected from a local authority in the exercise of its public powers.  
There has been much valuable and informative academic work on the 
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, their content and scope of operation in a 
variety of areas.
17
 However, with the exception of Professor Martin Loughlin,
18
 
Professor Davina Cooper
19
 and a number of American and Commonwealth scholars, 
20
 who have focussed on state public fiduciary relations, academics have not 
specifically addressed the object of this thesis, which aims to build upon this broader 
body of work to argue that the relationship between local authorities and their service 
users may be a fiduciary-like relationship. We shall see however, that there are 
serious obstacles to overcome if the relationship is deemed to fall within an ad hoc 
                                                             
17
 For example, Stuart Richie QC and Andrew Stafford QC (ed), ‘Fiduciary Duties, Directors 
and Employees’ (2nd  ed,, Jordon Publishing 2015) 
18
 Martin Loughlin, ‘Legality and Locality’ (Clarendon Press 1996) 203-262 (chapter 4 
‘fiduciary duty in public law’) also published online March 2012 
19
 Davina Cooper, ‘Fiduciary government: Decentering property and the tax payer’s 
interests’, 6(2) Social and Legal Studies, pp 235-257.; https:/Kar.Kent.ac.uk/id/reprint/1516. 
20
 See, Paul Finn, ‘The Forgotten ‘Trust’: The People and the State’, in Malcom Cope (ed) 
‘Equity: Issues and Trends: the Importance and Persuasiveness of Equitable Principles’ 
(Federation Press 1995), p131; Paul Finn, ‘A Sovereign People, A Public Trust’ in Paul Finn 
(ed) ‘Essays on Law and Government (vol 1, Law Book Co 1995); Lorne Sossin, ‘Public 
Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts, and the Equitable duty of Reasonableness in 
Administrative Law’ (2003) 66 SASR L Rev 129-82; Paul Finn,‘Public Trust and Public 
Accountability’ (2004) 3 Griffith L Rev  224; Evan J Criddle, ‘Fiduciary Foundations of 
Administrative Law’, (2005) 54 UCLA L Rev 117; Evan Fox-Decent, ‘The Fiduciary Nature 
of State Legal Authority’ (2005) 31 Queen’s Law Journal 259-310; Evan Fox-Decent and 
Evan Criddle, ‘The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights’ (2009) 15 Legal Theory 301; 
Evan Fox-Decent and Evan Criddle, ‘A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens’ (2009) 34 Yale 
Journal of International Law 331; Evan J Criddle, ‘Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking 
Popular representation in Agency Rulemaking’(2010) 88 Tex L Rev 441; Evan Fox-Decent, 
Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford University Press 2011); David L 
Ponet and Ethan J Leib, ‘Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy’ (2011) 91 
Boston University Law Review 1207-20; Ethan J Leib, David L Ponet and Michael Serota, 
‘Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law’ (2013) 126 Harv Law Rev F 91 
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fiduciary classification and, if that was the case, identifying the scope of the fiduciary 
obligation arising, would also cause difficulties. 
A major objective of this thesis is to examine the indicators used to establish 
whether a fiduciary relationship exists, and to test the relevance of these indicators in 
a local authority setting.  Courts have confirmed that the list of currently accepted 
relationships that qualify as fiduciary relationships is not closed, but the problem of 
identifying the necessary elements of a fiduciary relationship where novel 
relationships appear is still an issue, particularly where the potential fiduciary is 
entrusted with non-economic interests, for example, the relationship between a 
counsellor and his client. Boundaries have been pushed in the Canadian courts
21
 by 
their willingness to consider the fiduciary nature of relationships outside those of a 
conventional fiduciary relationship. Such an approach aids this thesis, in so far as a 
new conception of the public trust doctrine, as applied to the relationship between 
local authorities and their service users and based on community stewardship and an 
ethic of care is a very real possibility. 
Identifying the true relationship between local authorities and their service 
users necessarily triggers an enquiry into the nature and scope of the consequential 
duties that arise.  Judges and academics alike struggle, not only in defining fiduciary 
relationships with sufficient conceptual certainty, but also, once established, the scope 
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of the fiduciary duties that necessarily arise.  A further objective is, therefore, to 
delineate with clarity the core nature of fiduciary duties and to examine whether such 
duties are owed by local authorities to their service users.   
It should be noted that not all duties of a fiduciary will be of a fiduciary 
nature.  Fiduciary obligations fall into two distinct classes; those which are 
traditionally proscriptive, as exemplified by the Keech v Sandford  
22
 line of 
judgments; and those which are both proscriptive and prescriptive in nature and 
which are adopted in the modern approach. It will be argued that the prescriptive 
classification may best apply to local authorities in their service delivery role.  
This author does not consider that categorising duties of good faith or a duty 
of care as singularly fiduciary is appropriate, save where such duties form part of our 
understanding of fiduciary loyalty.  To do so, hinders a coherent approach. A 
common misconception has been to assume that once a fiduciary relationship is 
established, all duties transform into duties of a fiduciary nature: this is not the case.
23
 
The Trustee Act 2000 
24
 now determines the duty of care applicable in respect of 
investments.  In this thesis the virtues of loyalty and trust will be singled out for 
analysis within a fiduciary context: how they could operate in a local government 
environment will be explored.  
Conceptions of the public trust doctrine have been known in history and 
occupied the minds of renowned thinkers, such as Plato, Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke.  In more modern times, the concept has been used as a protective mechanism 
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for indigenous populations, such as the Aboriginals in Australia and in the field of 
natural resources.
25
  The only attempt so far to define a public trust is by Jennifer 
Kreder. 
26
This thesis explores the use of public trusts in this jurisdiction by historical 
reference to the turnpike trust movement in England and Wales. 
Attempts to translate principles of equity into public law are, therefore, not 
new, but the challenge of this thesis is to examine whether the trust concept as 
understood in private trust law is an appropriate model to use in public law, or 
whether a public trust concept built on an ethical model of stewardship is more 
appropriate?  This thesis will argue that the stewardship model of a public trust of 
property, place, person and purpose, better suits, the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users. The foundation of this author’s thesis is that public 
office is an office of public trust, and that fiduciary architecture can assist us in 
determining how political power should be exercised legitimately. As Leib, Ponet and 
Serota state: ‘part of the appeal of conceiving the political relationship between 
representative and represented in fiduciary terms is that it regards politics in more 
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realistic and textured ways-as a constellation of power relationships in a web of trust 
and vulnerability-rather than as a mere social contract no one ever signed.’27 Thinking 
of local authorities as public fiduciaries tells us much about the relationship between 
the governed and their governors. 
This thesis examines the core nature of fiduciary principles and explores the 
meaning of virtues, such as trust and loyalty; it considers, how (if at all) such virtues 
‘fit’ in a public law setting. In doing so major problems of translation may be 
exposed, which emphasise that the exercise of transposing equitable principles into 
the public law sphere may not be a straightforward or desirable one.  The interplay of 
the diversity of the composition of the beneficiary service user class, and the 
involvement of complex polycentric issues create real hurdles to surmount.  A local 
authority’s ‘public’ is not as easily identifiable, as that of beneficiaries under a fixed 
trust where there is certainty of object and a clear separation of legal and equitable 
interests. Beneficiary identification is blurred by the shifting nature of the 
‘beneficiary’ class, a feature later analysed in detail. 
As fiduciary principles are equitable in nature they have a different focus to 
public law, with its emphasis on legality and form rather than context and substance. 
Such matters are contentious in public law.
28
  Thus a major theme of this thesis is to 
explore the unique qualities of equity, particularly its inherent functional quality in 
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bringing a more fact-sensitive and context-specific approach to deliberations.
29
  In 
this respect the notion of fairness in equity and how it may differ from how fairness is 
understood in administrative law is discussed, by reference to the doctrine of 
substantive legitimate expectation, using the seminal Coughlan
30
 case as a central 
reference point.  By analysing substantive legitimate expectation challenges the 
courts are drawn into an examination of substance and therefore the merits of actions 
taken by a local authority.  Such matters cannot be understood as being purely 
procedural.  This author acknowledges that equity does not have a monopoly on 
‘fairness’ in the widest meaning of the term. Notions of fairness are clearly present in 
public law principles.
31
  
Analysing the relationship between local authorities and their service users is 
a valuable exercise because it emphasises the importance of understanding the 
constitutional position of a local authority.  As a democratic institution, with its own 
regulatory space fixed largely within its locality, a local authority must be cognisant 
of the wider public interest, as part of the ‘other regarding’ consideration when 
making discretionary decisions; but, as a creature of statute, a local authority must 
abide by the terms of its statutory authority and, in this respect, it is understandable 
that notions of fairness in public law are somewhat inhibited.  Notions of the ‘public 
interest’ and potential tensions between the need to further the public interest and thus 
fulfil ‘fiduciary’ duties are therefore explored. 
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The altruistic and utilitarian nature of fiduciary doctrine will be explored by 
examining the moralistic bias of fiduciary obligations.  Two opposing schools of 
thought will be examined: the traditional approach which attributes a prophylactic 
quality to fiduciary relationships, and the other school of thought, known as 
contractarian that attributes no moral impetus to fiduciary obligations viewing it as 
simply a contractual term.  Where judges apply the traditional approach, court 
judgments contain high moral rhetoric based on the notion that fiduciary duty is a 
default mechanism that exists to prevent opportunism by the fiduciary.  In this way, it 
can be regarded as very sterile and negative with no other function than as a deterrent, 
described by one academic as a ‘sledgehammer.’32  A doctrine of ‘perfectability’ may 
be a better descriptor, since it proceeds on the basis that it is possible for self to be 
negated in all conflicted situations; allowing no bias tendency, other than that directed 
towards the total interests of the beneficiary, who has entrusted their property and 
interests to the fiduciary.  Liability of the fiduciary is strict and no pleaded excuse- 
either that no harm came to the beneficiary or that a profit ensued for the beneficiary 
from the conflicted transaction is accepted by the courts. The court’s focus is entirely 
on the opportunistic conduct of the fiduciary. This protective societal overlay of 
fiduciary law, understandable from its early origins of action of conscience and the 
influence of clerics in Chancery, does however have its critics.  
The second school of thought considers that the fiduciary concept has no 
moral impetus and is simply a contractual term, with no more significance than other 
terms.  The concept can thus be amended or deleted by the autonomous will of the 
contracting parties.  
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1.3 Methodology 
This thesis considers the above issues using a mixed methodology of traditional 
doctrinal analysis, historical, and philosophical approaches, and case studies. 
1.3.1. Doctrinal Analysis: 
Throughout this thesis, the author has used a combination of research methods. First, 
this thesis engages traditional ‘black letter’ methodology,33 which takes its name from 
the tendency of legalistic approaches to concentrate solely on the ‘letter of the law.’  
The object of this approach will be to identify the current rules and law in relation to 
fiduciary obligations and to consider the extent to which such obligations could be 
utilised in an administrative law context.  
Watkins and Burton
34
 have criticised the black letter approach to legal 
analysis for a number of reasons: its focus on technicalities, its repetition of existing 
knowledge, and its failure to connect law to life by assessing the real world 
consequences of doctrinal frameworks.  This thesis will, however, evaluate the 
potential applicability of equitable doctrines to the work of local authorities, so 
connecting law to life in a practical manner, considering the real world context in 
which local authorities operate.  
Second, local authorities are subject to statutory duties and discretions in their 
service delivery, and service users (a body of users that includes not only residents of 
a locality, but also persons and groups who come to work, travel or visit the locality). 
An alternative methodology involving, in part, a social dimension that looks at the 
law in action is therefore required.  This author is keen to extol the important social 
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role that equity has to play in modern society. ‘Equity is a response to human needs 
and aspirations’.35 
Third, a socio legal approach with its emphasises on the context and practice 
of law, as well as the impact of law, appeared best suited to the research under 
review, and allowed for this author’s experience as a legal practitioner to inform the 
thesis.  
The philosophical dimension of this thesis is illustrated by reference to 
fiduciary obligations as a default mechanism to prevent the fiduciary from being 
tempted to breach his position of trust and loyalty.  Translating the moral duties of 
loyalty and trust into a command of political morality involves a philosophical 
approach. 
1.3.2 Case Study approach 
 A case study methodology has been adopted. Although attempts have been made to 
define the term ‘case study’, there appears no agreed definition of what a case study 
is.
36
  Different methods of filtering have been employed, circumscribing the area of 
research to the specific relationship of local authorities to their service users, and not 
including other public bodies.  The case studies considered in this thesis draw on, and 
are confined, to the local authority as an institution and not individual officers in local 
government.  
The case trilogy in chapter five selected itself, not only because of the 
involvement of local authorities and the clash of ratepayers and wider service user 
interests, including the public interest, but also because these cases illustrate the 
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theoretical similitude of public and fiduciary obligations, enabling judicial 
conceptions of the fiduciary nature of public law over a fifty year time span to be 
examined.  The fifty year period was considered sufficiently contained and long 
enough to avoid a too generalised approach.
37
 The case study approach also showed 
that, far from being a purely theoretical construct, notions of public law as inherently 
fiduciary have been considered in history far back as 1898
38
 , when Lord Chief 
Justice Russell affirmed the non-self-seeking role of public bodies in contrasting 
public representative bodies, entrusted by Parliament with delegated authority, to 
private bodies who do not act only in the public interest. 
This thesis advances knowledge in the field of fiduciary relations and public 
trusts through the multiple dimensions along which the research is undertaken, 
including its historical, philosophical and practical dimensions.  The historical 
dimension demonstrates that the public trust doctrine has been known from antiquity, 
evidenced by the writings of Aristotle
39
, Plato
40
 Cicero
41
  to those of Thomas 
Hobbes
42
 and John Locke
43
 and in the modern work of Professor Robert L Natelson.
44
  
                                                             
37
 Robert E Stake, ‘The Case Method Study in Social Enquiry’ in Martyn Hammersley and 
Roger Gomm, ‘Case Study Method ‘(Sage 2009) 21 
Stake points out that they ‘have not yet passed the empirical and logical tests that characterise 
formal (scholarly, scientific) generalisations.’ 
38
 Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91, 99, Kent County Council prohibited singing in any 
public place within 50 yards of any dwelling-houses, after being requested by an inhabitant or 
police officer. The appellant sought to have the by-law quashed on the grounds of 
unreasonableness. The validity of the by-law was upheld. Lord Russell CJ drew a distinction 
between by-laws made by railway and dock companies, which carry on their business for 
profit, and by-laws made by public representative bodies 
39
 P D Chase (tr), ‘The Ethics of Aristotle’ (E P Dutton & Co 1950) 
40
 Plato, ‘The Republic’ (H D P Lee (tr) 1961 (1955) 
41
 Marcus Tullius Cicero, ‘De Officiis’ (Walter Miller (tr), Loeb ed 1956) 
42
 Thomas Hobbes wrote several versions of his political philosophy, including The Elements 
of Law, Natural and Politics, (also under the title Human Nature and the De Corpore Politico 
(De Cive 1642) published in English as ‘Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government 
and Society’ in 1651. See further, C Finkelstein (ed), Hobbes on Law (Ashgate 2005). 
43
  John Locke, ‘Of Civil Government’ (2nd treatise 1690, Russell Kirk (intro) 1955) < 
http://constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm> accessed 27 September 2016.  
31 
 
Natelson advocates that fiduciary obligations originated in English law in the Middle 
Ages when the common law dealt with many complaints against ‘feoffees’, persons 
who held title for the benefit of another in a proto-trust.  Eventually with the heavy 
involvement of the early chancellors, who were a succession of clergymen, equity 
drew heavily on civil and canon law and took fiduciary duty under its wing.  To some 
extent therefore public law owes its genesis to mixed foundations of both common 
law and equity.  This grafting of principles from each body of law, adapted to its 
particular setting, adds to the richness of the legal system in England and Wales. 
45
 
1.3.3 Comparative Analysis 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis, where necessary to illustrate or highlight 
differences, as well as similarities, between approaches taken by other jurisdictions to 
fiduciary concepts.  By ‘comparative’ the author means comparisons between 
different fields of doctrine within a single jurisdiction i.e. equitable and common law 
doctrine within English law.  This comparative perspective is valuable when 
exploring the circumstances in which fiduciary duties arise in an administrative 
setting, and may help to de-mystify assumptions that the concept only has value in 
private civil trust and fiduciary law matters, with no quality of translation to the 
public law realm.   
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This thesis incorporates an extensive literature drawing on the considerable 
body of academic work in the USA and Commonwealth countries, such as New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada as well as England and Wales, including judgments 
and extra-judicial writings. This author adopts the approach of Paul Finn who states: 
‘Looking at these jurisdictions…provides important points of comparison and 
contrast-as well as valuable commentaries by judges, academics, and practitioners-
from which to gather further information about the fiduciary concept.’46  
The caveat by Professor Conaglen is acknowledged when he states ‘It is, therefore, 
important to be careful with accounts of equity which draw their sources from different 
jurisdictions without acknowledging the differences between those jurisdictions. That does 
not mean that comparative analysis of equity is futile: on the contrary there is much to be 
learned by looking at how equity is done in other places 
47
 
 
1.4 Thesis Overview - The structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises the present chapter and seven further chapters, the contents of 
which are now summarised. 
Chapter Two 
A major concern with any form of legal liability is the reach of its application.  It is 
therefore critical to properly identify the types of relationships that are subject to 
fiduciary obligations.
48
  Chapter two explores the kaleidoscope of fiduciary theories 
advanced by academics and judges, with a brief critique of each.  The function of the 
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chapter is to identify the key elements of a fiduciary relationship and to examine their 
value and extent to which such relational indicators may overlap. 
Chapter Three  
Chapter three examines the extent of fiduciary obligation, once a fiduciary 
relationship is established, recognising that not all of the functions of a fiduciary are 
fiduciary in nature. Having identified core notions of trust and loyalty in a fiduciary 
relationship, the concluding part of the chapter addresses these in the context of a 
local government framework.  
Chapter Four 
The question of ‘fit’ in translating a private law theory to a public law sphere is 
examined.  Specific hurdles such as size of beneficiary class, polycentric 
considerations and loyalty between a diverse class of beneficiaries, with their often 
conflicting and complex needs and expectations are considered. The question of 
whether fiduciary government, in the context of service delivery by a local authority, 
is a false dream is addressed. 
49
 The chapter is structured so that all three models: 
private trusts, public trusts (the notion of a public trust is examined and historical 
reference is made to the use of the trust mechanism in toll trusts) and stewardship are 
explored in one chapter. This chapter considers alternative paradigms, including the 
implications of developing a fiduciary framework which centres the most vulnerable 
interests within a non-property based relationship. It advances the author’s alternative 
public trust model which is based on a community ethical stewardship concept. 
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Chapter Five 
Three seminal public law cases are considered. Focusing on the judicial language 
used; this analysis supports an examination of the relationship between local authority 
and their service users.  
Chapter Six 
This chapter considers the stewardship model advanced in chapter 4 as a better model 
for identification of the relationship between local authorities and their service users 
in the context of local authorities’ use of their land disposal powers under section 123 
of the Local Government Act 1972.  It achieves this by reference to the way in which 
local authorities apply an ethic of stewardship to land disposal, and in addition 
judicial recognition of the concept of stewardship by local authorities as applied to 
interpretation of section 123 is analysed. 
Chapter Seven 
Chapter seven considers the equitable theme of ‘conscience’ in relation to notions of 
fairness in the context of public law adjudication and asks whether notions of fairness 
in equity are different from notions of fairness in public law; if so, how far equitable 
principles of fairness and conscience assist judicial outcomes in public law 
proceedings.  Reference is made to procedural and to substantive fairness, but the 
chapter focusses on matters of substance, where a local authority has resiled from a 
promise made.  The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is analysed; its 
characteristics and the loyalty between local authorities as executive organs of 
government and their local citizens is considered. The case of R v North East Devon 
35 
 
Health Authority 
50
 is used as a pivot for this analysis. The chapter considers the 
courts’ approach pre Coughlan, Coughlan itself, and developments thereafter.  The 
limitation of applying equitable estoppel principles in administrative law is 
considered.  As a correlative issue, this chapter also examines whether the dominance 
of the public interest in public law jurisprudence stunts the roving commission of 
equity.   
Chapter Eight 
The conclusion to this thesis summarises the contributions and the value of the thesis 
to academic literature in the field of fiduciary and administrative law, with particular 
reference to the relational status and discretionary decision making activity of local 
authorities with and for their service users.  The thesis concludes by suggesting 
further fruitful areas of research. 
1.5 Limitations of the research 
This thesis does not analyse remedies specific to breach of fiduciary duties, such as 
disgorgement of profits, or their potential application in the public law sphere. Nor 
does it deal with the release of fiduciary duties.
51
 
While this thesis focusses mainly on English law cases and articles, it does for 
sake of completeness make reference to academic studies and case law in the USA 
and in the Commonwealth jurisdictions of New Zealand, Australia and Canada.  It 
does so, for example, by reference to Canadian law to highlight the Canadian courts’ 
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progressive approach to the expansion of the fiduciary doctrine to protect non-
economic interests. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Fiduciary Doctrine 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the theoretical underpinnings of the fiduciary doctrine and the 
main fiduciary theories advanced by academics and the judiciary.  A central aim of 
this thesis is to explore whether the relationship between local authorities and their 
service users can be understood as a fiduciary relationship, so imposing correlative 
fiduciary duties on a local authority.  To do this, a theoretical appreciation of the 
nature of the fiduciary relationship is needed.  This and the following chapter present 
a general overview of fiduciary relationships-their nature and rationale-before 
explaining the key relational characteristics used by the courts to determine whether a 
fiduciary relationship exists.  This approach will aid an examination in chapter 3 of 
the content and scope of fiduciary duties.  
This author’s central thesis investigates the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users, and examines whether  the label ’fiduciary’ fits 
that relationship or whether it falls within another classification, such as a hybrid 
form of quasi-trust or within its own unique classification.    
It is oft-acknowledged that the fiduciary doctrine is an elusive
1
 or enigmatic 
concept
2
.  Despite being acknowledged as a difficult animal to tame there has been a 
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steady increase in litigation against local authorities, incorporating claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty.  Such claims have, however, become something of a ‘catch all’- 
pleaded, for example, in cases where other claims are meritless, or no other cause of 
action exists, or the main argument is weak and needs support. This has done the 
doctrine and its development no favours.
3
  
Further, the courts have been guilty of misapplication of the doctrine by 
applying the descriptive label of ‘fiduciary’ to a relationship, simply to allow recourse 
to tracing or restitution of unauthorised profits made by a fiduciary. In doing so, the 
courts have resorted to labels without fully appreciating the consequences of their 
actions.
4
  The American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes stated over one hundred years 
ago ‘it is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encrusted in phrases and 
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analyses’.5 It is to this analysis that 
the chapter now turns. 
The notion of fiduciary obligation is a useful tool for regulating socially 
valuable or necessary relationships, whether in a commercial or business setting. 
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object in attaching a fiduciary label is often to obtain the advantages of a proprietary claim 
(via a constructive trust). p.500 
4
 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch105 It has, for 
example, been argued that the relationship between the banks in Chase Manhattan was not a 
fiduciary relationship, but rather a commercial relationship involving an arms-length 
transaction 
5
 Ernest Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’, (1975) 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 
1-22, 5; Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ‘The Common Law’ (Little Brown Co 1881) 1 
39 
 
Aspects of the ambit of the social role fiduciary obligations can play in a community 
service environment, where non-economic interests are involved, will be discussed in 
chapter six.  
Fiduciary obligation has its roots in public policy, specifically society’s need 
to protect certain types of relationships, particularly those that are deemed to be 
socially valuable or desirable
6
.  The rationale is that relationships in which trust and 
confidence are reposed in one party to the relationship are deserving of greater 
protection.
7
  The interdependent nature of the fiduciary relationship with its emphasis 
on protecting the vulnerable, leads to the need for the law’s protection in a wide ambit 
of personal and business relationships and this is where the theory of fiduciary law 
interacts with the practical usefulness of fiduciary principles in everyday life. 
Arguments are advanced that since individual beneficiaries or external factors, such 
as existing social mores or regulatory authorities, cannot completely eliminate the 
potential for those in a fiduciary position to abuse their position, equity fills the gap 
through fiduciary doctrine. This aspect of fiduciary law is seen by this author as 
equity’s protective sheath. 
2.2 Categorisation of the fiduciary relationship: 
This section will first consider each relational characteristic of a fiduciary relationship 
and then consider its appropriateness to the relationship under review. 
                                                             
6
 For example, use of charitable trusts or use of trusts as a mechanism to protect pension 
funds. It can however, be argued, depending upon one’s political stance that protecting 
private assets by a trust mechanism is done to minimise tax liabilities, and in that sense not 
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7
  York Buildings Co v Mackenzie [1795] 8 Bro 42; 3 ER 432 (HL) ‘The conflict of interest is 
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that he may not be seduced by temptation and opportunity from the duty of his trust.’(my 
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The first question is: when will a fiduciary relationship arise? A starting point 
is to look at the various approaches taken to categorising the relationship, but, what 
do we mean when we speak of the terms, fiduciary, fiduciary office or fiduciary 
relationships?  John Glover regards such phrases as providing suitable shorthand. 
8
 
Broadly classification of fiduciary relationships can be contained within three major 
groupings of established, diagnostic and contextual functional. 
This chapter proceeds on the firm view that fiduciary relationships are not to 
be determined by placing an instant case into a pre-conceived category and then 
involving the duties thought to attach to that category.
9
 For example, the orthodox 
view of an employment contract is that, of itself, it does not give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship, but as Lord Woolf stated: ‘There is more than one category of fiduciary 
relationship, and the different categories possess different characteristics and attract 
different kinds of fiduciary obligation.’10 
This author considers that the best approach to categorising a relationship as 
fiduciary, or not, is to carry out a meticulous examination of the facts of the case in 
hand. 
11
 This approach is also favoured by Professor Flannigan who states ‘It may be 
preferable to detach ourselves from our remaining dependence on the status  
ascription of fiduciary responsibility, and move to a fact based limited access test for 
all cases.’12 Notwithstanding, ‘status categories are such a convenience for judges 
                                                             
8
  Professor John Glover, ‘The identification of Fiduciaries’, chapter 8 in Peter Birks (ed),   
‘Privacy and Loyalty’, (Clarendon Press 1997) 269 
9
  See statement by Professor Tamar Frankel: ‘Courts currently examine existing prototypes, 
such as agency, trust and bailment that are defined as fiduciary. Then, the courts create rules 
for new fiduciary relations by drawing analogies with those prototypes. I maintain that such a 
method of developing fiduciary law is unsatisfactory.’ Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law’ 
(1983) 71 Calif L Rev 775, 799 
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 Attorney-General v Blake [1998] Ch 439 
11 Cook v Evatt [1992] (No: 2) NZLR 676. (Fisher J) 
12
 Professor Robert Flannigan, ‘The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2004), New 
Zealand Law Review 215  
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(and the rest of us), it is unlikely that they will be discarded easily. Status 
accountability, and analogy to it, currently dominate the field.’13 
2.2.1 Established or ‘per se’   or status categories 
This category consists of traditional relationships, such as guardian and ward, trustee 
and beneficiary, solicitor and client. There is little judicial or academic argument as to 
the acknowledged fiduciary status of these relationships, although the relationships 
identified as having fiduciary status differ according to jurisdiction and jurists. For 
example, Robert Flannigan advances a more exhaustive list,
14
                              
whereas, Ernest Weinrib a more restricted one
15
 , limiting the category of established 
fiduciary relationships to trustee /beneficiary and corporate directors and their 
corporation.  Paul. B. Miller provides a useful overview.
16
 
2.2.2 Diagnostic Category 
This approach concentrates on examining the relationship between the parties and 
does not merely rely on established categorisation. Fiduciary relationships exhibit 
similar characteristics, such as power imbalance and vulnerability, which stem from a 
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 Robert Flannigan, ‘Justifying Fiduciary Duties’ (2013) 56(2) McGill L J 971, where he 
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voluntary transference of discretionary power from the beneficiary to the fiduciary. 
This approach obviously has its defects, since it is acknowledged that the search for a 
single unifying test is difficult; while of apparent practical use, on closer examination 
this categorisation may be considered to merely offer a group of overlapping indicia 
which may detract from its value as a diagnostic tool, especially in novel cases. 
2.2.3 Contextual Functional category 
This categorisation considers that fiduciary obligations perform a social public policy 
function on a number of levels: societal and personal.   This supports the analysis of 
Professor Paul Finn, who argues
17
 that fiduciary principles operate in, and as an 
instrument of, public policy. Professor Tamar Frankel considers that fiduciary duties 
are imposed when public policy encourages specialisation in particular services, for 
example, in relation to specialisation in the provision of financial services.  This 
author supports a functional approach and agrees with Professor Leonard I. Rotman 
when he states ‘using a functional approach to understanding fiduciary doctrine 
differs significantly from category-based modes of analysis.  It provides a sound 
theoretical basis for the imposition of fiduciary principles rather than resorting to a 
list of relationships previously described as fiduciary on some level.’18 
Professor Frankel’s terminology is that of ‘entrustor’ and fiduciary and she 
argues that the role of the law is to facilitate entrustors to enter fiduciary relationships 
by reducing their risk and the costs of preventing an abuse of ‘entrusted power’, and 
ensuring that quality fiduciary services are provided. Judicial enforcement of 
fiduciary duties and obligations shifts the entrustor’s costs of specifying and 
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 Paul Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed) Equity, Fiduciary and Trusts’ ( 
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monitoring the fiduciary’s functions and actions to the taxpayer.   By imposing 
fiduciary duties and obligations, the law limits the freedom of fiduciaries, but Frankel 
considers this to have a positive effect, because it increases a fiduciary’s 
marketability by endowing fiduciaries with a reputation for honesty backed by 
regulation. 
19
 This author understands the cost and risk aspects, but the marketability 
benefits only appear to exist if people are genuinely better able (or willing) to entrust 
others when they know that there is some form of protection or guarantee, whether by 
the courts, such as strict liability for breach of fiduciary duty or action taken by a 
fiduciary’s own professional organisation20 should their trust be abused. 
In considering the functional approach, Leonard Rotman states ‘An advantage 
of this approach is that acknowledging an underlying purpose for the imposition of 
fiduciary obligations promotes the flexible development of fiduciary law within a 
contextual framework’.21  Moulding fiduciary obligations to the individual 
circumstances of each case enables a consistent approach to be taken in a range of 
situations where non-economic interests, as well as economic interests, are present.  
For example, in counselling relationships there is a heightened sense of non–
economic vulnerability, where an individual’s dignity may suffer emotional, sexual or 
psychological harm. The extension of fiduciary duties to cover non-economic 
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 Professor Tamar Frankel, definition of ‘fiduciary duties’ in The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law (Vol 2 Palgrave XXXX) 128 
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interests is supported by the work of Professor Richard Joyce,
22
 who argues that the 
question of whether fiduciary law can cover non-economic interests should be 
separated from the debate on the proscriptive/prescriptive models of fiduciary law.  
This is an important aspect in relation to the counselling services provided by local 
authorities, and will be covered in chapter three when the nature and scope of 
fiduciary duties are examined. 
2.2.4. Summary: 
Juridical examination tended to focus on whether the relationship under scrutiny 
belonged to an established list of relationships that were understood to be fiduciary in 
nature, such as trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward.  Because of this restricted 
approach, the nature of the particular relationship or the interaction of the parties 
involved became of secondary concern; accordingly no established guidelines existed 
for determining what could constitute a fiduciary relationship.
23
  This conclusion is 
confirmed by academics, such as Professor Eileen Gillese, who states: 
In times gone by we really were not troubled by the absence of a coherent definition.  
When pushed to answer the question of who a fiduciary is, we simply rattled off the 
standard categories of fiduciaries: trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal; director-
company; guardian-ward and solicitor-client.  The traditional approach was that 
although we could not define ‘the beast’ we could recognise one when we saw it so 
lack of definition was not a problem 
24
  
 
 It may be that fiduciary liability is entirely fact-based and that, to quote 
Flannigan, ‘status fiduciary liability is over-inclusive and should be cast from the 
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 Richard Joyce, ‘Fiduciary Law and Non–economic Interests’ (2002) 28(2) Monash 
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jurisprudence.’  In the context of this thesis, however, this author comes with no fixed 
view as to the categorisation of the relationship between local authorities and their 
service users.  In a similar vein, Professor Leonard Rotman states:  
The most vital aspect of fiduciary doctrine, and what ought to receive the bulk of 
juridical attention, is its focus upon the specific characteristics of individual 
relationships.  Its own milieu, the basis of judicial theory is quite general and 
deliberately so  
25
 (original emphasis) 
 
This author’s opinion is that a more theoretical basis for such a socially 
valuable doctrine is needed, and the author therefore advances a situation specific 
approach coupled with acceptance that, if categorisation is used, then such 
categorisation is not treated as closed, but remains open ended.  These two aspects 
will be discussed in further detail. 
2.3. THEORETICAL FEATURES OF THE FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP 
2.3.1 Situation – Specific Approach 
The theoretical basis of this approach is that the fiduciary nature of a relationship 
arises from circumstances peculiar to that relationship and to the interaction of the 
parties, and not merely because the relationship belongs to an already established 
fiduciary category. La Forest J made a similar observation, and stated: ‘The 
imposition of fiduciary obligations is not limited to those relationships in which a 
presumption of such an obligation arises.  Rather, a fiduciary obligation can arise as a 
matter of fact out of the specific circumstances of a relationship.’  26  
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 This demands a case by case examination of all the facts to determine 
whether a fiduciary relationship exists.  Further, the functional approach leads to an 
open-ended categorisation: in other words, that the categories of relationships which 
may be described as fiduciary should be viewed as ‘open-ended’.  
This author supports Professor DeMott’s approach that ‘fiduciary principles 
cannot be properly implemented unless they are first understood in a general fashion 
and then given contextual application through their adaption to individual 
relationships.’27 Because of its implementation on a case-by-case basis, the fiduciary 
doctrine is most appropriately described as situation-specific; context is all important.  
What this means is that a fiduciary relationship, with its concurrent duties and 
obligations, will not be imposed unless there is regard for the context within which it 
is to operate. For these reasons, any attempt to create a taxonomic definition of 
fiduciary relations in the absence of context is impossible or at very least, unwise.  
The situation-specific approach stresses that the fiduciary doctrine cannot be 
boiled down into a simplified theory, capable of precise and identical application to 
all relationships.  A ‘one cap fits all’ philosophy however, is not acceptable, because 
fiduciary principles are equitable in origin and a ‘one size fits all’ approach would 
destroy the very essence of equity: its flexibility. According to Professor Jeffrey 
Berryman, the methodology employed in the Courts of Equity did not distinguish 
between fact and law, resulting in an approach characterised as ‘pragmatic, robust and 
highly contextualised. ’28 
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DeMott argues that fiduciary obligations developed through a jurisprudence of 
analogy rather than principle,
29
 insisting that ‘the law of fiduciary obligation is 
situation-specific’.  She further argues that the characteristics of even the standard or 
conventional fiduciary relationship ’are too variable to enable one to distil a single 
essence or property that unifies all in any analytically way.’  This author concurs with 
the view held by Professor DeMott that qualities, such as trust and loyalty have 
serious claims to unify the doctrine, and their presence in many judicial 
determinations provides cogent evidence that they are key elements of the fiduciary 
relationship.  
The situation-specific approach does not rule out the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship between local authorities and their service users, even though the 
relationship may not be traditionally understood as fiduciary.  The problem may lie in 
other problems of ‘fit’, which are discussed later in this thesis. 
Fiduciary obligations have their origin in equity, with the consequence that 
they bear equity’s hallmarks of situation-specificity and flexibility.30 Professor 
DeMott attributes the inability to find a comprehensive definition of a fiduciary 
relationship to the fiduciary concept itself, and to its genesis in equity and states: 
‘moreover as equity developed to correct and supplement the common law31, the 
interstitial nature of Equity’s doctrines and functions made these doctrines and 
functions resistant to precise definition.’ 32 
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 Deborah A DeMott, ‘Beyond Metaphor: An analysis of Fiduciary Obligation’ (1988) 879 
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2.3.2 THE CATEGORICAL OPEN-ENDED APROACH  
The open-ended nature of the fiduciary doctrine holds that no relationship should be 
precluded from being classified as fiduciary, simply because it does not fit into an 
established class of fiduciary relationships. As Professor Tamar Frankel states, ‘this 
area of law has existed for centuries because it is open ended’.33 
The open-endedness of fiduciary categorisation is well recognised in 
Canadian jurisprudence 
34
 and in English authorities such as Tate v Williamson, in 
which the court determined that the relationship between an impecunious intestate 
young man and a cousin was fiduciary in nature. Lord Chelmsford L C said:  
The jurisdiction exercised by Courts of equity over the dealings of persons standing 
in certain fiduciary relations has always been regarded as one of a most salutary 
description.  The principles applicable to the more familiar relations of this character 
have been long settled by many well-known decisions, but the Courts have always 
been careful not to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its 
exercise.  Wherever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, 
confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which naturally grows 
out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, or the 
influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the 
person so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the 
advantage 
35
 
 
Cases such as Tate v Williamson
36
 although 150 years old, still assist to 
illustrate equity’s approach, as do judicial statements in the earlier case of Billage v 
Southee.
37
 Billage involved the setting aside of a promissory note obtained by a 
doctor from his poor patient in respect of excessive fees.  This case is important, not 
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because of its factual content nor because the parties fell within an accepted category 
of fiduciary relationship (doctor and patient), but because of the way in which Sir G J 
Turner VC cogently expressed the role of a Court of Equity in dealing with such 
matters.  He said: 
38
 
no part of the jurisdiction of the Court is more useful than that which it exercises in 
watching and controlling transactions between persons standing in a relation of 
confidence to each other; and in my opinion this part of the jurisdiction of the Court 
cannot be too freely applied, either as to the persons between whom, or the 
circumstances in which, it is applied. The jurisdiction is founded on the principle of 
correcting abuses of confidence, and I shall have no hesitation in saying it ought to be 
applied, whatever the nature of the confidence reposed or the relation of the parties 
between whom it has subsisted.  I take this principle to be one of universal 
application, and the cases in which the jurisdiction has been exercised-those of 
trustees and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, surgeon and 
patient-to be merely instances of the application of the principle (Emphasis added) 
 
 
This statement is very important, not only because it endorses the fact that the 
categories of fiduciary relationship are not closed, but also because it emphasises the 
way in which a Court of Equity sees its core role in such matters: as one of preventing 
abuse of confidence.  
As Professor Henry E. Smith states: ‘Like equity generally, fiduciary law 
features a constrained residuum of open-endedness to deal with the new and creative  
ways of being opportunistic, but, as with equity as a safety valve, this open-endedness 
in fiduciary law is limited. It is in personam, here in the sense of only targeting those 
who have taken on certain duties known to have this quality, as well as certain other 
actors in very special situations, like parents.’ 39 
It is argued that a relationship is fiduciary because of its actual (rather than 
presumed) characteristics.  It is the facts of the case that drive the analysis, rather than 
status or established categories of fiduciary relationships.  It is, of course, the need to 
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settle on how to establish a fiduciary relationship that causes difference of opinion.  
Commonly cited characteristics, however, include loyalty, trust, power, vulnerability, 
inequality and confidence.  To that extent, fiduciary liability is formally structured, 
even if we cannot fully define the formal properties of the kind of relationship on 
which fiduciary obligations are built. 
Professor E. J. Weinrib 
40
 states that: 
The existence of a list of nominate relations dulls the mind’s sensitivity to the 
purposes for which the list has evolved and tempts the court to regard the list as 
exhaustive and to refuse admittance to new relations which have been created as a 
matter of business exigency. 
As Sachs J observed in Lloyds Bank Limited v Bundy41, fiduciary relationships ‘tend to arise 
when someone relies on the guidance or advice of another, where the other is aware of that 
reliance and where the person upon whom reliance is placed obtains, or may well obtain, a 
benefit from the transaction or has some other interest in it being concluded.  
42 
It may be concluded that established heads of fiduciary relationships are not 
exhaustive. As stated by Dickson CJ in Guerin v R:
43
 ‘It is sometimes said that the 
nature of fiduciary relationships is both established and exhausted by the standard 
categories of agent, trustee, partner, director and the like. I do not agree. It is the 
nature of the relationship, not the specific category of actor involved that gives rise to 
the fiduciary duty.’ 44 (Emphasis added)  
There must, however, be a word of warning.  Not every example of a 
relationship of trust or confidence creates a fiduciary relationship. Fletcher-Moulton 
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L J in Re Coomber
45
 pointed out ‘that fiduciary relations are of many different types; 
they extend from the relation of myself to an errand boy who is bound to bring me 
back my change up to the most intimate and confidential relations which can possibly 
exist between one party and another where one is wholly in the hands of the other 
because of his infinite trust in him’.  His Lordship recognised that there are levels of 
relationship and only some merit the label fiduciary; this is further explained by 
statements, such as that made by Sachs J in Lloyds Bank v Bundy which captures the 
specific nature of a fiduciary relationship:  
Everything depends on the particular facts, and such a relationship has been held to 
exist in unusual circumstances as between purchaser and vendor, as between great 
uncle and adult nephew, and in other widely differing sets of circumstances. 
Moreover, it is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt closely to define the 
relationship, or its characteristics, or the demarcation line showing the exact 
transition point where a relationship that does not entail that duty passes into one that 
does…46 
 
Professor Weinrib, when speaking of this situation-specific quality, stated ‘the 
tremendous importance of this characteristic is reflected in the notion that a 
relationship ought to be described as fiduciary only if its nature, as well as the 
circumstances under which it exists, warrants its classification as fiduciary.’47 
 
 2.3.3 A Functionalist Approach 
A functional approach to understanding fiduciary relationships differs significantly 
from category-based modes of analysis.  This approach provides a sound theoretical 
basis for the imposition of fiduciary principles, rather than resorting to a list of 
relationships previously described as fiduciary on some level.  Using a functional 
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approach provides solid guidelines for determining the application of fiduciary 
principles to specific relationships, as well as parameters for the application of 
fiduciary principles to relationships at large.  This assists us in translating fiduciary 
principles to a public law setting.  Fiduciary law has its origins in considerations of 
public policy,
48
 and its social purpose is to prevent opportunism and exploitation in 
situations where a person has entrusted property or interests to another.
49
 
It must be understood, however, that parties to a relationship may have a 
duality of roles and while aspects of the relationship might be properly described as 
fiduciary for some purposes, this designation may not be appropriate for other 
aspects; aspects within a relationship may well combine obligations of a fiduciary 
nature and obligations of a non-fiduciary nature.  
2.4 Misapplication of Fiduciary Doctrine 
There are, of course, valid reasons to limit the categorisation of fiduciary 
relationships, not least because of certainty under the rule of law, but also on remedial 
grounds, where the penalties imposed on fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duty are 
onerous.  Applications of fiduciary ‘loyalty’ should not be haphazard, but rather 
should be corralled under a functional umbrella; they should be based upon a careful 
consideration of the particulars of the relationship at hand and imposed only where 
necessary, not simply where their application would provide a convenient resolution 
to a problematic solution.  The court’s inability to use the principle of unjust 
enrichment resulted in the artificial creation of a fiduciary relationship in order to 
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provide a remedy. This is illustrated by Sinclair v Brougham.
50
 The basis of the 
court’s finding was explained by necessity rather than by the actual existence of a true 
fiduciary relationship.  Perhaps the prime example of judicial creation of a fiduciary 
relationship in an attempt to right an obvious wrong occurred in the case of Reading v 
Attorney-General.
51
  In this case, an army sergeant used his service uniform to enable 
use of lorries smuggling spirits and drugs to pass through army checkpoints.  The 
House of Lords held that the sergeant was a fiduciary and therefore had to account to 
the Crown for monies received from the smugglers.  Yet Sergeant Reading was not 
given the mandate or empowered to act in such a dishonest way: he would have had a 
duty to act with fidelity to his employers, but could not be considered a fiduciary in 
the traditional sense. 
Misapplication of the fiduciary doctrine is relevant because its effect is to 
undermine the search for a coherent classification of what relationships are fiduciary.  
Professor Rotman identifies this as a results orientated approach and, referring to the 
Chase Manhattan case, states ‘Goulding found a fiduciary relationship to exist 
merely to substantiate his imposition of a constructive trust.  The problem with this 
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entrustment, property, reliance and trust, but not voluntary assumption of the fiduciary role, 
which was of course something not taken upon by Reading.  
This decision has received much academic criticism. Paul Finn criticised the finding of a 
fiduciary relationship on the basis that someone holding public office would be better 
regulated by public law at 215; Professor Gareth Jones, ‘Unjust Enrichment and the 
Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty’ (1968) 84 Law Quarterly Review has argued that it was 
unnecessary to impose the fiction of a fiduciary relationship in Reading in order to achieve 
the remedy of account of profits and considers the case better understood as one of unjust 
enrichment: p.472. 
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practice is that it uses fiduciary principles where the indicia of a fiduciary relationship 
are absent.’52   
 
2.5 FIDUCIARY THEORIES 
2.5.1 Overview 
It is now necessary to examine a range of doctrinal theories advanced in respect of 
fiduciary relationships and obligations.  The purpose is to see whether it is possible to 
identify an appropriate theory and indicators of ‘fiduciariness’, which would allow 
the elusive animal of fiduciary relationships to be defined, but not caged.  The 
essence of the theories is recognition of the ethic of altruism over individualism, 
where self-interest is negated in favour of the interests and welfare of others.  
Altruism has its roots in culture, religion and ethics and enjoins us to make sacrifices 
for others on a personal, collective or political stage.  Major issues raise their heads 
when considering the extent of loyalty and obligations owed by local authorities to 
their service users, and whether it is possible to conceptualise such matters within 
fiduciary doctrine.  
The derivation of the word fiduciary may help us.
53
  The traditional definition 
of fiduciary is derived from Latin; the words ‘fiducia’, which means trust like and 
reliance, and ‘fiduciarius’, which roughly translates as entrusting or giving something 
to someone in trust.  Importantly these two words are derivations of the verb ‘fido’ 
which means ‘to trust’.  There has always been a close association of fiduciary duty 
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   Leonard I Rotman, ‘Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 921, 929 - -reference is to Goulding J. 
53   Professor Len S Sealy, ‘Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligation’, (1963) Cambridge Law 
Journal 119. He considered the term ‘Fiduciary’ of limited use and not definitive of single 
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with virtues of trust and trust like obligations
54
 and reliance on such moral virtues. 
Indeed, in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew, the virtues of trust and loyalty 
were explicitly referenced by Millett LJ: ‘A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken 
to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter on circumstances which give 
rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a 
fiduciary is loyalty (Emphasis added) 
55
 
The primary methods of determining the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
are reasoning by analogy and reasoning from key relational indicators.  This chapter 
will consider the key relational indicators that may lead to a conclusion that a 
fiduciary relationship is triggered between the parties.  
The main theories that will be explored in this chapter are those of 
entrustment, contract, power and vulnerability; in addition, a few subsidiary theories 
(which are more descriptive and illustrative of elements found in judicial reasoning, 
such as reliance and inequality) will be considered.  Examining such relational 
indicators will show how the undoubted similarity of purpose in some theories 
overlaps with other theories in the relationship under review.  For example, over-
reliance, may lead to power dependency, which in turn leads to vulnerability on the 
part of one party to the relationship.  It is necessary to state that fiduciary 
relationships are notoriously difficult to pin down: they are elusive. Some 
commentators have attempted to define them through taxonomy. Others argue that a 
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55
   [1998] Ch 1, 18 (Millett LJ) 
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fiduciary relationship cannot be encapsulated, but may be rendered specific by class 
reference. 
56
  
Fiduciary doctrine is seen by some commentators as a bundle of unrelated 
principles which have been improperly grouped together for the sake of convenience 
of jurisprudential inequality theory.
57
 
58
  One reason for the vagueness of the fiduciary 
concept is that any attempt to contain the ephemeral and shifting notions of loyalty, 
good faith and trust is difficult, because of the variety of relationships to which a 
fiduciary label might be attached.  Lastly, there are, commentators, including 
Professor Rotman and this author, who consider that the fiduciary doctrine cannot be 
understood in the absence of context.  This is because the word ‘trust’ implies other 
qualities and virtues, such as utmost good faith, candour, fidelity and integrity. These 
stem from the core dynamics of a fiduciary relationship, whereby one party (the 
principal) places trust in the other (the fiduciary) that their interests are paramount. 
Professor Frankel does not use the terms ‘agent’ and ‘principal’ (with their 
association to a purely contractual economic business relationship), nor does she use 
the terms ‘trustee’ and ‘beneficiary’. Instead, she prefers to use the terms ‘entrustor’ 
and ‘entrusted’. The label we use may, of course, emphasise our own point of view.  
Professor Frankel’s terminology emphasises her view, that entrustment is essential in 
any fiduciary relationship.  
                                                             
56
   See, S M Beck, ‘The Quickening of Fiduciary Obligation: Canadian Aero Services v 
O’Malley’ (1975) 53 Can Bar Rev 771 
The reader will be aware that within this thesis the author looks at the parallel paths of 
fiduciary doctrine and the local authority service user relationship in the United Kingdom, in 
an attempt to awaken debate of fiduciary obligation in the context of public law and more 
specifically the local government sphere 
57 Professor P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed) ‘Fiduciaries and Trusts’ 
(Toronto: Carswell 1989) 2 
58
 Professor Len S Sealy, ‘Fiduciary Relationships’, (1962) Cambridge L J 69 
57 
 
Theories may be organised into a number of theoretical categories, which will 
now be analysed.  In the context of this thesis, the categories should be treated as a 
broad classification providing different points of emphasis as to when a particular 
relationship might be described as fiduciary. 
2.5.2.  Voluntary Assumption theory 
This theory can usefully be classified as centring on the importance of the fiduciary 
undertaking itself. Its focus is on the fiduciary, not the beneficiary. Professor Austin 
W. Scott, a leading exponent of fiduciary law, commenced an article on fiduciary 
principles
59
 with reference to the stewardship principle, as represented by the parable 
of the unfaithful steward in St Luke’s Gospel chapter 16: 1-8.  In this parable, the 
steward was accused of manipulating his position to curry favour with his master’s 
debtors, and to the detriment of his master’s financial interests. Scott stressed the 
voluntary nature of a fiduciary relationship, where the fiduciary is aware of the risks 
of office, yet voluntarily undertakes to carry out a role in which self is to be negated 
in favour of the principal.  Scott considered it immaterial that the undertaking was in 
contractual form or otherwise, remunerated or unpaid.  The essence of this theory can 
be summed up by justifying the imposition of fiduciary obligation and all it entails 
through the fiduciary’s voluntary assumption of the role.  Professor Finn, however, 
disagrees with this voluntary assumption approach and states that: ‘A fiduciary 
relationship, ultimately, is an imposed not an accepted one.  If one needs an analogy 
here, one is closer to tort law than contract; one is concerned with an imposed 
standard of behaviour.’ 60 
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 Professor Austin W Scott, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ (1949) 37(4), Article 1, California 
Law Review.pp.539-555 
60
 Professor Paul Finn, The Fiduciary Principle in T G Youdan (ed) ‘Equity, Fiduciaries and 
Trusts’ (Carswell 1989) 54. 
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At the heart of fiduciary relationships lies an undertaking by the fiduciary to 
perform the mandate given to him by the principal.  It signifies that fiduciary 
obligation is triggered voluntarily.  The law will only impose a fiduciary duty on 
those who have expressly or impliedly undertaken to act for, or on behalf of, another 
to the exclusion of other interests, including their own.   The person labelled the 
‘fiduciary’, therefore, goes into the relationship with his eyes open as to what is 
expected of him and what the strict remedial consequences will be should he breach 
his fiduciary duties.  
James Edelman, Justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia recently 
reviewed 
61
the necessity for an undertaking in fiduciary law.  He focuses on 
Australian law
62
, but the voluntary assumption approach is also evident in Canadian 
63
 and English case law.
64
 Edelman’s argument is that although not all undertakings 
involve fiduciary duties, a fiduciary duty will not be imposed upon a person without 
an undertaking. He states ‘at the heart of the fiduciary duty lies an undertaking.’65An 
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 Justice James Edelman, ‘The Importance of the Fiduciary Undertaking’ (Conference on 
fiduciary law, University of New South Wales 22nd March 2013). 
See further James Edelman, When do fiduciary duties arise? Law Quarterly Review 2010 
62
 Hospital Products v USSC [1984] 156 CLR 41, 96-97 (Mason J): ‘The critical feature of 
these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the 
interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the 
interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense.’ 
63
 See Pilmer v The Duke Group (in liq) [2001] 207 CLR 165. The joint judgment of 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ: ‘it is the pledge (undertaking) by one party to 
the other which makes fiduciary relationships distinct from other relationships.’ 
64
 See critical analysis of the ‘undertaking test’ and the decisions of the English courts in 
Yukong Line v Rendsburg Investments Corp [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 113, Ultraframe (UK) Ltd 
v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) and Vivendi S A v Richards [2013] EWHC 3006 (Ch); 
Colin R Moore, ‘Obligations in the Shade: The Application of Fiduciary Directors’ Duties to 
Shadow Directors’ SLS Conference, Nottingham 2014 ( c.r.moore@kent.ac.uk). The author 
examines the scope of shadow directors and whether the application of general equitable 
principles results in shadow directors owing fiduciary duties to the relevant company. 
See further, Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 271 (Millett LJ) and 
White v James [1995] 2 AC 206 (HL) 271 
65
 Justice James Edelman, ‘The Importance of the Fiduciary Undertaking’ (Conference on 
fiduciary law, University of New South Wales 22nd March 2013)  
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undertaking is clearly a necessary component of the fiduciary relationship, but is not 
constitutive of one. Edelman considers that it is the construction of the undertaking 
that determines the scope and extent of the fiduciary duty. 
66
  He clearly sees the 
undertaking as an essential component of a fiduciary relationship, and one which 
shapes the content of that duty.  Construing the undertaking is therefore of utmost 
importance.  A fiduciary relationship may be founded on a contract and, if so, the 
contractual undertaking is determinative.  This approach is clear in a number of cases, 
including Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, where Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
67
 said 
that if a contract exists between the parties, the extent and nature of the fiduciary 
duties inter se are determined by reference to that contract.
68
 
Justice Edelman, however, points out that the ‘need to construe fiduciary 
undertakings in order to determine the content of fiduciary duty is not confined to 
undertakings which arise in a contractual context.’69  This assumption of 
responsibility may occur outside of a purely contractual nexus, for example in a trust 
instrument: Buss J A said in Elovalis, ‘where a fiduciary relationship arises out of a 
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  Justice James Edelman, ‘The Importance of the Fiduciary Undertaking’ (Conference on 
fiduciary law, University of New South Wales, 22
nd
 March 2013) p1 
67
 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] UKHL 5; 1995 2 AC 145, 206 (Lord Keith, 
Lord Goff, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill and Lord Nolan) This case involved a 
claim by underwriting members at Lloyds (‘Names’) against their managing agents in an 
attempt to recoup heavy losses they had suffered (for the period 1979-1985) due to 
catastrophic events, mainly in the USA, which had led to unprecedented insurance claims. 
68
 ibid, 543-544 (Lord Goff): ‘The extent and nature of the fiduciary duty owed in any 
particular case, falls to be determined by reference to any underlying contractual relationship 
between the parties. The existence of a contract does not exclude the co-existence of 
concurrent fiduciary duties (indeed, the contract may well be the core.)’ 
See Mathew Harding, Fiduciary Undertakings , chapter 3 in ‘Contract, Status and Fiduciary 
Law’ Paul B Miller and Andrew S Gold ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, publication 
date 17th November 2016  
69
Justice James Edelman, ‘The Importance of the Fiduciary Undertaking’ (Conference on 
fiduciary law, University of New South Wales 22nd March 2013).  p.7 (Edelman J) 
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trust instrument, the terms of the trust instrument must be examined to determine the 
nature and extent of the fiduciary’s undertaking.’70 
Justice Edelman usefully focused on the historical pedigree of the use of 
undertakings, declaring that they are not a novel concept: indeed, the use of 
undertakings ‘has deep historical foundations at common law as well as in equity.’71 
This author argues that administrative law is based on equitable principles and that 
fiduciary law itself partakes of both an equitable and common law genesis. Edelman’s 
analysis starts from Lord Devlin’s judgement in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Limited,
72
 in which the assumption of responsibility as an express or implied 
undertaking was considered a relationship ‘equivalent to contract’ where, but for the 
lack of consideration, there would be a contract.  Edelman reasons from the early 
form of action for assumpsit and states
73
  ‘The notion of an assumption of 
responsibility, or probably much more accurately, an objective undertaking, was 
probably borrowed by Sir Roundell Palmer from the form of action of assumpsit 
which claimed that the defendant ‘undertook and faithfully promised.’74 
There are, however, instances where it is difficult to determine the precise 
nature of the party’s ‘undertaking’.  This author agrees with Professor DeMott who, 
after considering the usefulness of an undertaking as a prerequisite to establishing a 
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Edelman, ’When do fiduciary duties arise’? Law Quarterly Review 2010, states: ‘We have 
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fiduciary relationship, states: ‘A search for the party’s dispositive ‘undertaking’ of 
fiduciary obligation will only waylay analysis of the party’s relationship.  Surely the 
appropriate enquiry is broader and encompasses whether the relationship was 
characterised by mutual trust and confidence.’  75 
The need for an undertaking as a pre-condition to the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship is dispensed with by Professors Smith and Conaglen.  Both involve 
fiduciary relationships being imposed by law in circumstances where no undertaking 
(express or implied) has been given; it follows, therefore, they do not involve 
construction of an undertaking. Conaglen’s argument is that there is an alternative 
way of understanding fiduciary duties, which explains just as well (and, in a number 
of cases, actually explains better) a number of facets of fiduciary doctrine which 
Justice Edelman argues can only be understood by treating fiduciary duties as 
expressed or implied undertakings. In other words, the argument that this is the only 
way of understanding fiduciary duties is incorrect. The essence of Conaglen’s thesis 
is that fiduciary duties are not determined by an undertaking, but instead, exists to 
protect non-fiduciary duties, and argues that there are a number of inherent dangers in 
treating fiduciary duties in the way Justice Edelman advocates.
76
  Edelman considered 
the approaches of Professor Smith and Professor Conaglen and said:  
Even on the assumption that we could liberate the law from the weight of authority 
concerning undertakings which those theses appear to require, these two approaches 
considered in this paper suggest new, and different, conceptions of the fiduciary duty, 
but each of these approaches has analytical difficulties to overcome before they can 
be accepted as an overarching thesis of fiduciary law.
77
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Professor Robert Flannigan considers that, as the beneficiary has allowed 
access to his assets on the basis of the fiduciary’s undertaking, ‘It is that access, and 
not the nominate undertaking per se, that exposes the other party to the opportunism 
mischief.’78  Flannigan’s argument is that limited access arrangements79, whereby one 
acts in the sole interests of another
80
 give rise to fiduciary obligations because the 
fiduciary will ‘invariably acquire access to the assets (and opportunities) of their 
beneficiaries.  The mischief associated with that access is that the value of the assets 
will be diverted or exploited for self-interested ends.’ 81 Flannigan considers that 
.opportunism is a generic mischief and it attracts a generic regulation across all 
limited access relations. Where there is limited access, the proscription on self-regard 
is engaged.’82 
This author’s view is that whilst in the majority of cases there will be a 
voluntary undertaking, there is no reason why fiduciary obligations could not attach 
to non-voluntary relationships.  As Professor Gregory Klass
83
 states ‘Edelman is 
probably wrong to claim that all fiduciary relationships originate in the fiduciary’s 
consent or agreement.  Courts have held, for example that parents owe a fiduciary 
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 Professor Robert Flannigan, ‘The Core Nature of Fiduciary Accountability’, [2009] NZLR 
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obligation to their children.’84  Klass refers to the way a person can become an 
executor or trustee de son sort
85
, who does not necessarily consent to that role-it is 
imposed by the court. Edelman did acknowledge that there are many obligations 
which are imposed upon people without any manifest undertaking, giving examples 
of such duties  as ‘not to defame another person, not to trespass, not to convert goods, 
not to imprison falsely, not to commit battery and so on.’86 His view was that they 
cannot meaningfully be described as fiduciary.
87
This author considers that Professor 
Criddle identifies correctly fiduciary entrustment when he states: ‘Even in the 
absence of express or implied consent courts superimpose the fiduciary concept.’88 
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 See, for example, M (K) v M (H) [1992] 3 SCR 6 (Australia). In that case a 28 year old 
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2.5.2.1  Voluntary Assumption theory in a Local Government context 
The challenge is analysing whether there is any distinction between undertakings 
given by governmental actors and undertakings given by private actors.  We have 
seen that the undertaking may be found in the parties’ relationships, through a 
statutory imposition of responsibility, or under an express agreement.  Fiduciary 
application, is in this author’s view, hampered and ‘at odds’ with the very nature of 
local government’s role to act in the best interests of all of its service users.  Thus, a 
broad responsibility to act in the public interest will no doubt mean that there are few 
circumstances in which a local authority will owe an exclusive duty of loyalty to a 
particular person or particular group.
89
  To act in the best interests of an individual 
service user is clearly a lesser formulation of the duty of loyalty expected from 
fiduciary relationships, an approach supported by the Supreme Court of Canada.  The 
problem is that the phrase ‘best interests’ is entirely ‘open-ended’, and can mean 
different things to different people in different situations.  As Professor Lionel B 
Smith
90
 states ‘in Kantian terms, the duty is a very wide one, like the duty of 
beneficence, and for this reason it could only be a duty of virtue and not a duty of 
right.’  
Mutual consent usually forms the basis of a fiduciary relationship but, as 
Miller states, ‘More rarely a fiduciary relationship may be established through 
unilateral undertaking by the fiduciary’, for example, voluntary assumption of 
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fiduciary power or by decree through legislation or by court order. 
91
 On this basis, it 
may be possible to argue that the duties imposed by local government legislation 
create a fiduciary relationship between local authorities and their service users in 
respect of the statutory discretionary powers granted.  There is an implied 
undertaking that local authorities will exercise their statutory duties and powers in a 
fiduciary-like manner, with the interests of their service users paramount. 
 
2.5.3 Entrustment theory 
The main academic proponent of this theory is Professor Tamar Frankel.
92
  She 
emphasised the significance of entrustment stating ‘All definitions of fiduciaries share 
three main elements; entrustment of property and power; entrustor’s trust of 
fiduciaries, and risk to the entrustor emanating from the entrustment.’93  The essence 
of the entrustment theory is that property is ‘entrusted to its holder, subject to judicial 
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constraint.’94 95  In trust law the concept of entrustment appears to be an established 
causal element in finding a fiduciary relationship has arisen. 
96
  
This theory does, however, fail to explain why some relationships, such as 
that in Reading v Attorney General
97
, are categorised as fiduciary.  It is unrealistic to 
conclude that Sergeant Reading’s principal, the Crown, ‘entrusted’ to their employee 
the power to extract bribes from third parties.   
2.5.3.1   Entrustment theory in a Local Government context 
Local authorities are entrusted with statutory power by a democratically 
elected Parliament and are given a mandate for their policies by electors in local 
government elections which are held every four years. It is, however, a conditional 
form of entrustment, in the sense that a local authority in exercising their lawful 
duties and discretions is bound by legislative boundaries and must observe public law 
principles. To this end Professor Michael Taggart compiled a list to include the rule 
of law, fairness (usually procedural, but occasionally substantive); impartiality; 
constancy; rationality; stability of practice, accountability, transparency and of course 
human rights. 
98
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Entrustment in a government context operates on two levels; Firstly, that of 
entrustment by local voters that their elected councillors will carry out their powers 
for the well-being of the locality and secondly in national parliamentary elections 
entrustment that the elected body will exercise its law making powers in a responsible 
way. Professor Finn captures this power entrustment when he states:  
Where the public’s power is entrusted to others for the purposes of civil governance, 
the institutions and officials who are the repositories of that power hold it of the 
people to be exercised for the people. They are trustees. ….Those entrusted with 
public power are accountable to the public for the exercise of their trust  
99
 
 
2.5.4 Incomplete Contract theory/Contractarian Theory  
This theory is based on an economic model of fiduciary law, best described as an 
incomplete contract approach.  The main proponents of a contract analysis of 
fiduciary obligations include Judge Easterbrook and Professor Daniel E. Fischel, 
100
whose main thesis is that fiduciary obligations do not stand alone, but are simply 
part of a contractual arrangement between two or more parties.  According to this 
contractarian theory, fiduciary obligations are an implied term in the contract and are 
used by the court to achieve justice in a given situation.  This school of thought 
would, therefore, be better referred to as an incomplete contract theory. Such theorists 
are often referred to collectively as contractarians. 
The contractarians’ view is that the fiduciary obligation acts as a ‘plug’ to 
remedy a contractual gap. Easterbrook and Fischel state that:  ‘the law is designed to 
promote the parties’ own perception of their joint welfare.  That objective calls for 
filling gaps in fiduciary relations the same way the courts fill gaps in other contracts.  
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The subject matter may differ, but the objective and therefore the process is 
identical.’ 101  
 This theory only operates where the terms of the contract made between the 
parties offer insufficient protection to one contracting party.  The essence of this 
approach is that if the contracting parties had given thought to such matters they 
would have included a clause dealing with the fiduciary aspects of their relationship, 
but as they did not the court will do so.  The court considers its role is not to rewrite 
the contract, but simply to give effect to the assumed intention of the parties.  It is not 
difficult to understand, therefore, that this approach is also termed the ‘hypothetical 
contract’ theory. 
Contractarian theory does not give any elevated status to fiduciary obligations, 
which are treated as mere contractual terms (and are more akin to duties of good 
faith), between bargaining parties.  The Hon J .R. M. Gautreau 
102
 says ‘there is no 
difference in principle between contractual duties of care based on Hedley Byrne 
principles and fiduciary duties. They involve the same elements. The difference is 
only in degree.’ The duty of loyalty is simply seen as replacing or supplementing 
detailed contractual terms; somewhat akin to adding a fidelity clause into the contract.  
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This approach asserts that fiduciary duties are not special duties
103
: they have no 
moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same 
way as other contractual undertakings.  Applying contract law labels to fiduciary 
obligations may be an attempt to attach them in a more concretised way to established 
principles of contract law. The analogy has, however, some rather obvious flaws: 
contract law requires offer and acceptance, supported by consideration, for formation 
of a contract, whereas a fiduciary relationship may arise in situations which are 
devoid of such formal requirements and in situations where one of the parties is a 
volunteer.  
We continue the theme of outlining the major differences between the classic 
elements of a contract and fiduciary engagement.  Courts proceed on the basis that a 
contract does not preclude one party owing fiduciary duties to the other, but finding a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties represents ‘obligations of a different 
character from those derived from the contract itself.’ 104 There is no need for 
elements of intention to be present to create legal relations in a fiduciary relationship, 
although there will often be a legal nexus between parties.  Professor Scott Fitzgibbon 
states, ‘when the parties’ expressions of agreement are scant, courts may refuse to 
recognise a contract.  Fiduciary law is readier to recognise a binding relationship than 
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is contract law’, 105 because the courts will look to whether the arrangements formed 
by the parties meets the criteria for classification as fiduciary, not whether the parties 
intended the legal consequences for such a relationship.
106
 Indeed Lord MacNaghten 
stated in Lyell v Kennedy: ‘Nor … can it make any difference whether the duty arises 
from contract or is connected with some previous request, or whether it is self-
imposed and undertaken without any authority whatsoever.’107 
There is a fundamental difference, however, between contract law and 
fiduciary law: in the former, it is the contract or agreement that is the centre of 
judicial focus, whereas fiduciary law places greater emphasis on the relationship 
between the parties and the degree of reliance by the beneficiary on the fiduciary; a 
relational emphasis.  Contract law monitors the activities of all parties to the contract, 
whereas fiduciary law focuses its attention solely on the actions of the fiduciary.  In 
this respect, contract law may be considered ‘to concern itself with transactions while 
fiduciary law concerns itself with relationships.’108 
The parties to a fiduciary relationship or a contractual arrangement have 
different perspectives, since there is more capacity in a fiduciary relationship to 
accommodate changes as the relationship develops, whereas contracting parties 
encapsulate their agreement at the moment of the contract’s inception. Daniel 
Markovits astutely notes this difference and comments:  
..moreover, contract sharing so understood is not simply less other-regarding than 
altruism, but rather differently other-regarding.  The altruist must adjust open-
endedly to the interests of the other as circumstances develop ex post.  But the 
contractual promisor properly looks not to the changing interests of her promise ex 
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post but rather to the contract.  Contract sharing is thus ex ante. It takes the terms of 
the contract as its loadstar.
109
 
 
Ideological underpinnings are also fundamentally different.  Contract law is 
closely tied to the morals of the market place and its emphasis on profit and 
commercial dealing, freedom and sanctity of the contract are paramount; the parties 
must be free to make their own bargain.  This unfettered notion of contract was 
captured by Jessell M R in Printing & Numerical Registering Co v Sampson
110
when 
he said:  ‘If there is one thing which more than any other policy requires is that all 
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of 
contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be 
held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice.’  Statute and commercial 
standards of reasonableness, as well as market pressures, impact on the unfettered 
notion of freedom of contract.  Control is no longer purely in the hands of the 
contracting parties: for example, unconscionable bargains can be upset by notions of 
undue influence; unfair terms can be rendered voidable by the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977.  
Fiduciary law, however, is based upon morals higher than the market place, to 
use the phrase of Lord Justice Cardoza in the US case of Meinhard v Salmon,
111
 
where he clearly stated that the fiduciary standard is the mirror image of contract’s 
reliance upon party’s self–interest.  Professor D Gordon Smith emphasises a major 
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difference of approach between the fiduciary relationship and relationships of a 
purely commercial nature, stating ‘the fiduciary must refrain from self-interested 
behaviour, whereas contracting parties may act in a self-interested manner even 
where the other party is injured, so long as such outcomes are reasonably 
contemplated by the contract.’112 
Where a fiduciary relationship exists, however, the interests of the fiduciary 
are subsumed by the interests of the principal. As Professor Frankel states:  
In the world of contract, self-interest is the norm, and restraint must be imposed by 
others.  In contrast, the altruistic posture of fiduciary law requires that once an 
individual undertakes to act as a fiduciary, he should act to further the interests of 
another in preference to his own  
113
  
 
Professor Daniel Markovits is supportive of this ‘go the further fiduciary mile’ 
approach,
114
 asserting that ‘a contract promisor….must honour her contract but go no 
further, while a fiduciary must take the initiative on her beneficiary’s behalf.’115 
Whilst a hypothetical contract approach may assist in ascertaining the parties 
manifest intentions,’ 116 ‘contract sharing and fiduciary sharing proceed qualitatively 
differently, and contract and fiduciary relations display different structures.  Fiduciary 
law thus cannot be understood on the contractarian model.’117  Further, 118  ‘Because 
of the significant differences between contract and fiduciary principles, it is suggested 
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that the former’s usefulness as a tool to aid an understanding fiduciary doctrine is 
outweighed by the dangers inherent in its use. Consequently, the use of contract 
principles, even in the limited form of analogy, ought to be abandoned’.  
The arguments against, and dangers of, absorbing fiduciary principles into 
contract law is succinctly put by Professor Frankel:  ‘The consequences of the sub-
categorisation of fiduciary law into contract is not only to reduce the duties of 
fiduciaries to the contractual level (and the mercy of the parties’ ability to exclude the 
fiduciary duty), but also to water-down the remedies of their breach-avoiding punitive 
damages and lift the stigma that is attached to a breach of trust (a stigma attached to a 
thief that was trusted).  Finally, an important reason to treat fiduciary law as a distinct 
body of law is the growing need for regulating fiduciary relations.  After a long 
period of negation, recognition of the importance of singling out fiduciary 
relationships is emerging again.’ 119 This author joins Professor DeMott when she 
states
120
 ‘even considering the obligation’s elusive nature, descriptions drawn 
exclusively from contract principles are surely mistaken.’ 
 
 
2.5.4.1   Hypothetical Contract theory in a Local Government context 
Applying the contract approach described above would suggest that the relationship 
between local authorities and their service users is not fiduciary, as it is not possible 
to point to a contractual nexus. Further, the local authority’s obligations may be seen 
as fundamentally statutory and public law based.  In an age of contractualisation, 
however, many local authority functions are now being performed under contract, and 
contract theories may suggest ways in which outsourced services involving a greater 
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number of parties than would normally be found might create fiduciary type 
relationships with concurrent fiduciary obligations being imposed on the outsourcee.  
Further exploration of this topic is, however, outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
2.5.5 Property theory 
This theory has its basis in property ownership.  For a fiduciary relationship to arise 
there must be some property or proprietary element involved.  This is illustrated by 
the archetypal fiduciary relationship of trustee and beneficiary, whereby the legal 
estate in the trust fund is held by the trustees, subject to the equitable interests of the 
beneficiary (s) which take effect ‘behind the curtain’.  
The property theory of fiduciary law holds that a fiduciary relationship exists 
only where a person possesses de facto or de jure control of property belonging to 
another person or body.  The trustee and beneficiary relationship exemplifies a classic 
de facto ownership situation; de jure control is illustrated by the fiduciary relationship 
between a director and his company, whereby the director does not have de facto 
ownership of a company’s assets, but does have considerable management power 
under corporate law to deal with them. Professor Larry Ribstein subscribed to the 
view that, where there is separation of ownership from control, fiduciary duties are 
necessary to prevent the fiduciary from using the property entrusted to it for a 
personal benefit. 
Both Professor Cooter and Professor Freedman, describe a fiduciary 
relationship as arising in any situation where ‘a beneficiary entrusts a fiduciary with 
control and management of an asset.’121  The property based fiduciary theory is 
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helpful because it draws a clear line in determining whether a fiduciary relationship 
exists or not: if there is no property interest in the traditional common law 
understanding, then there can be no fiduciary relationship.  Property theory is the key 
starting point for most economic analyses of fiduciary doctrine.  
The term ‘property’ is, however, dropped by Professor Paul B Miller in favour 
of the term ‘practical interests’.  That phrase replaces ‘property’ in his definition of 
discretionary authority: ‘to have fiduciary power is to enjoy authority over the 
practical interests of another.’122  This approach is not to be understood, however, as 
not requiring a property interest, rather that the term ‘practical interests’ is used as a 
substitute and broader conception of the term ’property.’ 
2.5.5.1 Property theory in a Local Government context  
The issue is whether property justifications alone are adequate for justifying the 
existence or otherwise of a fiduciary relationship between local authorities and their 
service users. In the Canadian case Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society,
123
 
McLachlin CJ referred to a legal or substantial ‘practical interest’ of the beneficiary.  
This wide property definition is informative to this thesis in its exploration of the type 
of relationship that exists between local authorities and their service users, as it may 
be difficult to point to any specific property interest of the service user. What is the 
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‘substantial practical interest of the service user’?  On purely financial grounds 
service users have quite a weak position in proving a property interest, since a local 
authority’s revenue source derives from not only council tax-domestic and 
commercial
124
 - but, also contributions from central government grants and subsidies. 
It could be forcefully argued that council tax payment is in return for council services, 
a form of implied service contract, and does not entitle council tax payers to build up 
some beneficial interest in council assets.  Further, not all service users in a locality 
pay council tax in that locality.  It would be difficult, therefore, to identify any 
property interests with precision and particularity.  This author’s view is that where 
property rights are absent, judges may be reluctant to extend the existing categories of 
fiduciary relationships.  This may have serious consequences for service users in a 
vulnerable category following the increase in contracted out services by a local 
authority, where imposing a fiduciary duty between a private service supplier and 
user would be extremely difficult.  As a consequence, many people would find 
themselves vulnerable and without legal protection, especially if their service contract 
excludes a fiduciary duty.  Contractual clauses in the outsourcing contract between 
the local authority and the outsourced supplier may be inadequate to give the service 
user sufficient protection against abuse in what is a fiduciary type relationship, for 
example, an elderly resident in outsourced nursing home.
125
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The requirement that a council tax payer or service user holds a property 
interest (legal or equitable) may therefore cause difficulty in a local government 
context, since at any given moment they will be unable to establish equitable 
ownership in a local authority’s assets, whether in whole or in part, to the degree 
necessary. Atkin L J in Roberts v Scurr stated: ‘For the proposition that there are any 
equitable rights in the ratepayers as such, which can be enforced by the inference of a 
court of equity with the honest administration of affairs, I know of no authority.’ 126  
Professor Patrick Parkinson, 
127
 however, suggests that rather than 
characterising trusts in the traditional manner, as a form of property ownership (A 
holds property on behalf of B, with the legal estate vested in A and the equitable 
interest in B), the law of trusts is better conceptualised as a species of obligation.
128
  
He states ‘It is enough that the trust obligation is defined with sufficient certainty that 
a court can decide, in the event of a dispute, how much money or property is held on 
trust or should be devoted to the purposes of the trust’.129 (Emphasis added) 
A local authority’s assets will include real and personal property, and will 
rarely be kept in designated funds unless required by the terms of, for example a 
development agreement or statutory accounting requirements; instead, the assets will 
consist of a fluctuating mass
130
 leading to an obvious difficulty in the ability of any 
service user to identify ‘their’ asset, or share thereof. 
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Parkinson’s work on emphasising the obligatory nature of trusteeship 
certainly aids this thesis argument, as ‘classification of the trust in terms of obligation 
rather than ownership also opens up fruitful lines of enquiry.’131  This author supports 
an obligations-approach as does the work of Nicholas McBride.
132
  Such an approach 
‘would allow for the orderly exposition of equitable obligations with respect to 
property which takes account of cases which might otherwise be regarded as 
anomalous’133, such as the position of local authorities. 
2.5.6 Reliance theory 
Reliance theorists emphasise that a fiduciary relationship exists where one person 
reposes trust and reliance in another.  It is the easiest fiduciary theory to understand 
and is often relied upon to establish a fiduciary relationship, in conjunction with 
elements of other theories.  Such theorists use the terms ‘entrustor’ and ‘entrustee’ for 
the principal and fiduciary respectively, and argue that the fiduciary relationship 
arises where the entrustor’s trust is placed in the entrustee.  Reliance is not, however, 
the sole province of protection by fiduciary law, as reliance forms the basis of other 
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independent heads of civil obligation: for example, in the law relating to negligent 
misrepresentation, which is not a part of fiduciary doctrine. 
134
 
Calibration is a problem where reliance becomes a factor.  There will, of 
course, be different levels of reliance in any relationship, fiduciary or not, and it is 
difficult to determine from case law what level of reliance is needed to conclude that 
a fiduciary relationship exists.  It is true that, coupled with the purported vulnerability 
indicia, reliance can be an important factor in determining whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists. It also emphasises the prophylactic nature of fiduciary law: 
protection against abuse of reliance that has been legitimately placed in another.  The 
reliance theory seems to rest on a dual moral and public-policy orientation. In this 
author’s opinion, however reliance should more properly be viewed as important 
indicia, but not a determinant.  
2.5.6.1 Reliance theory in a Local Government context 
Reliance plays a major element in the relationship between local authorities and their 
service users.  Service users place trust in their local authority to provide services at a 
competent and adequate standard, not only for services of importance to specific and 
often vulnerable sections of the community, (day centres for the elderly and infirm, 
housing for the homeless and children’s services), but also for services that serve the 
needs of the citizenry more generally (refuse collection).  All such services are 
necessary for the well-being of a locality. Reliance as a fiduciary indicator is 
therefore easier to identify in the relationship of local authorities and their service 
users than other indicia.  
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2.5.7 Power theory: inequality and vulnerability 
It can be argued that fiduciary obligations arise in relationships that involve one party 
exercising some measure of control over the other party; it is the power relationship 
that triggers the fiduciary relationship and the fiduciary actor is a power holder. 
Tamar Frankel states that all fiduciary relations give rise to the problem of abuse of 
power….the purpose of fiduciary law should be to solve the problem. 135 Professor 
Gary Ribstein states that it is ‘open ended delegation of power that characterises a 
fiduciary relationship.’136 Commentators like Professor L Rotman refer only to an 
inequality theory, preferring to include references to a beneficiary’s vulnerability 
where appropriate. It is the power base that may result in inequality and vulnerability, 
if the discretionary mandate given to the fiduciary is not monitored.   
The essence of the inequality theory is that the balance of power between the 
fiduciary and the beneficiary is unequal: the weight of power is in the hands of the 
fiduciary.  As a consequence, that power is open to abuse by opportunism and 
therefore requires the protective element of fiduciary law, which tempers this power 
imbalance.  It does so by imposing in very strict terms a duty on the fiduciary to act 
solely in the interests of the beneficiary.  No deviation from the self-negation 
principles is tolerated by the courts, as illustrated by the severe penalties for breach, 
including disgorgement of profits (if any) and liability imposed even where no harm 
has been caused to the beneficiary.  
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A criticism of this theory is the notion that all fiduciary relationships exist 
between dominant and subservient parties.  This approach needs to be unpacked. It 
may be true, for example, in a relationship of guardian and ward or the relationship 
between a medical practitioner and patient, but this may not be the case in a 
commercial partnership or in the relationship between a sophisticated experienced 
investment client and his broker, 
137
 where there is no obvious power imbalance.  The 
premise that there must always be a dominant actor is, therefore, not correct in every 
case. This author agrees with Rotman’s suggestion that insistence on inequality ‘may 
be due to excessive judicial categorisation of acceptable classes of fiduciary 
relationships.’ 138  
Even taking the most established fiduciary relationship of all, that of trustee 
and beneficiary under a trust, there may be a minimal imbalance of power, since the 
trustee deals with day to day administration of the trust and yet the trustee’s position 
may be weak. For example, the trust fund may be substantial, such that the 
beneficiaries, particularly under a bare trust, will occupy a powerful position in their 
own right. Indeed, beneficiaries have, in certain circumstances, the right to demand 
that the trust be terminated and the legal estate be transferred to them.
139
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The position is of course different in relation to discretionary trusts. This is 
the established position under Gartside v IRC
140
 and Sainsbury v IRC
141
 that   
beneficiaries under a discretionary trust have no actual proprietary interest in the 
fund, merely a ‘right’ to be considered as a potential beneficiary by trustees.  The 
relationship between local authorities and their service uses under any trust analogy 
may better be considered under a discretionary purpose trust heading and is discussed 
in chapter four. 
In order to be a beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship a person need not be 
‘vulnerable’.  As explained by Professor Frankel, 142 ‘even entrustors who are in a 
strong bargaining position before they enter the relationship become vulnerable 
immediately after they entrust power or property to their fiduciaries’.  The power 
imbalance can lead to vulnerability, and in some cases, over-dependency on the 
fiduciary. Inherent in the fiduciary’s position is the ability to influence positively or 
negatively the interests of the beneficiaries, by virtue of the mandate granted to the 
fiduciary.  
Whilst there is divergence of opinion, it is acknowledged by many judges
143
 
and commentators 
144
that vulnerability is an important factor in fiduciary interactions, 
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but vulnerability alone is not conclusive of the fiduciary character of the 
interaction:
145
 something additional is necessary.  This author views vulnerability as a 
corollary of dependence. The degree of vulnerability faced by the beneficiary might 
be controlled in various ways (for example, by monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms or limitation of the discretionary mandate granted to the fiduciary).  
There is a susceptibility of the beneficiary to some risk of adverse influence by the 
fiduciary in the exercise of his powers.  
Power arises from the grant of some form of discretion, whether limited or 
unlimited; the greater the discretion, the greater the power that can be exercised by 
the fiduciary. Paul. B Miller has expounded what he calls his ‘substituted power-
based theory of fiduciary liability’. 146 After stating that fiduciary relationships 
comprise both definitive properties and structural properties, Miller examines the 
exercise of power relative to the beneficiary.  Miller concludes that power is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
In Murray v Murray (1995) 119  DLR (4th) 47, 54, McClung JA stated, ‘Central to any 
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conceptually ambiguous and may mean authority, dominance, control, influence or 
strength over another person or their property, concepts which are, in turn, 
ambiguous.  According to Miller, Hohfeld’s  147 definition of legal power will not 
suffice, for it does not capture the kind of legal power wielded within the fiduciary 
relationship. Miller is keen to distinguish fiduciary power from other types of power 
and states:  
fiduciary power is distinguishable from other varieties of power by virtue of the fact 
that it is a form of authority ordinarily derived from the legal personality of another 
(natural or artificial) person.  The fiduciary, by virtue of the power vested in her, 
stands in substitution for the beneficiary or a benefactor in exercising a legal capacity 
that is ordinarily derived from the beneficiary or benefactor’s legal personality. 148  
 
Power passes from the beneficiary to the fiduciary giving the fiduciary power 
to act within the terms of the mandate granted in the name of the beneficiary. Miller’s 
central thesis contends that fiduciary power is derived from the personality of another 
and/or is expressly devoted to the ends of another.  Instead of a property type theory 
he uses the expression ‘discretionary power over the ‘significant practical interests’ of 
another.  Such ‘Practical interests include matters of personality, welfare, or right 
pertaining to persons or their causes.’  
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Miller concentrates on the power of the fiduciary and yet there is a further 
power dimension involved, namely that of third parties.  Another compelling feature 
of powers is that they can change legal relations between people other than the holder 
of the power.  For example, a fiduciary agent may enter into a contract on behalf of 
his principal.  This creates a right-duty contractual arrangement affecting the principal 
and the third party.  In Hohfeldian terms, the agent has at least two powers in this 
kind of situation: a power as against his principal and a power as against the third 
party.  The principal has a correlative liability as does the third party.’149 
2.5.7.1 Power theories in a Local Government context 
The power imbalance between local authorities and their service users would seem to 
be self-evident. Local authorities have wide-ranging statutory powers. Seth Davis 
states that ‘Fiduciary theorists focus upon the vulnerability of citizens that arises from 
a public official’s discretion.’150 Professor Evan Criddle, a supporter of fiduciary 
government states: 
Public officials serve as fiduciary representatives for persons subject to their power, 
because all agents and instrumentalities of the state…are vested by law with 
discretionary administrative powers’ for the public, who ‘is uniquely vulnerable to 
officers’ inept or unreasonable misuse of administrative power 151 
 
The ‘power’ of the taxpayers and of service users is limited to influencing 
council decisions where there is a community involvement agenda, but ultimately it is 
for the local authority to make the decisions.  This is not an absolute power, since it is 
constrained by public law principles and subject to challenge in the courts, and 
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arguably by local government elections.  Whist the exercise of democratic power give 
local authorities legitimacy to act, its real power is granted by Parliament.  
Vulnerability of one actor alone, whilst a powerful recurrent characteristic in finding 
a fiduciary relationship, will not on its own be sufficient to support a fiduciary 
relational nexus in a local government context.  Vulnerability of a person or class will 
be difficult to establish, but the unique vulnerability of the local government service 
user is captured by Professor David M Lawrence, who states: ‘the corpus of the local 
government fiduciary relationship is created by the actions of the fiduciary, with no 
necessary participation or consent by the principal or anyone acting on the principal’s 
behalf.’ 152 He illustrates this by reference to the fact that a shareholder contributes to 
the corpus of the business corporation by buying shares, but the ‘corpus of the local 
government is created largely by taxation, a process that is often under the complete 
control of the fiduciary with no consent necessary from the council taxpayer.’153 
This author considers that there are two problems associated with the concept 
of vulnerability.  Firstly, it may be too broad to be useful in identifying a fiduciary 
relationship, because elements of vulnerability are, to a lesser degree, found in many 
commercial and non-commercial transactions that are not fiduciary.  The second 
problem is that vulnerability is also a distinctive feature in other private law doctrines, 
such as duress and undue influence.  It is therefore unclear how the vulnerability 
relevant to fiduciary relationships is specific to fiduciaries.  In conclusion it is 
suggested that the better view is that vulnerability may or may not be present, but is 
clearly not decisive. 
                                                             
152
 David Lawrence, ‘Local Government Officials as Fiduciaries: The Appropriate Standard 
(1993-1994) 71 U Detroit Mercy L Rev 1- 30, 23 
153
 ibid, 23-24 Professor Lawrence, further states: ‘But a person becomes a principal of a 
local government fiduciary by action of the law, without any voluntary action … however, 
the state decides whether there will be a local government in that location and the type of 
government.’ 
87 
 
2.5.8 Discretionary theory 
It is argued by some
154
 that the feature which qualifies or determines the scope and 
content of the ‘power’ requirement of a fiduciary relationship is discretion. 
Discretionary theory is the theoretical complement of reliance theory, in the sense 
that the nature and scope of the discretionary mandate granted to the fiduciary 
determines its power and can result in inequality and vulnerability.  Central to this 
theory is the need for some form of discretion to be granted to the fiduciary. Professor 
Weinrib states ‘the hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that the relative legal positions 
are such that one party is at the mercy of the other’s discretion.’ 155 In any co-
operative relationship, it is inevitable that one party will hold some amount of 
discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that can affect the welfare 
of the other party, but the greater the discretion given to the fiduciary, the greater is 
the temptation for the fiduciary to abuse his position through self-interest and 
opportunistic behaviour.
156
 Professor Weinrib considers that fiduciary obligation is 
the law’s ‘blunt tool for the control of…discretion’ 157Discretionary authority is 
captured thus by Professor Paul. B. Miller: ‘To have fiduciary power is to enjoy 
authority over the practical interests of another….the discretionary character of 
authority means that the fiduciary has scope for judgement in determining how to act 
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under that authority.  The scope of the authority, and thus the ambit of rightful 
conduct, is broader than would be the case if authority were fixed.’158  
The concept of fiduciary power, must however, be disambiguated from other 
forms of power.  Miller 
159
 considers that such power can be distinguished from other 
varieties of power by virtue of the fact that it is a form of authority ordinarily derived 
from the legal personality of another, whether a natural or artificial person.  Miller’s 
substitutionary approach is echoed by Professor Evan J Criddle when he states:  
‘Fiduciaries stand in as stewards with discretion over an aspect of their beneficiaries’ 
welfare.’ 160 (Emphasis added) 
This author considers the reference to ‘stewards’ as important and that 
stewardship is the very essence of fiduciary principles and this will be examined 
further in chapter six, when stewardship, its content and application in the context of 
the relationship between  local authorities and their service users- will be analysed. 
2.5.8.1 Discretionary theory in a Local Government context 
Miller’s power substitution approach does, however, present problems with the range 
of principals found in a local government setting.  How can a local authority adopt the 
corporate personality of its taxpayers or service users?  Professor Evan Fox-Decent 
addresses the issue of power within an administrative context.  He says: 
The kind of power a fiduciary exercises is more than a simple possessory or 
dispositive control over another party’s interests.  It is a complex of powers the 
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incidents of which are best captured and thematically unified by the idea of 
administration.  Administration implies a capacity to exercise discretion on behalf of 
a principal in respect of certain interests, and vis-à-vis third parties  
161
 
 
In this author’s opinion, whilst a discretionary element is present in a large 
body of fiduciary case law, the discretionary theory is overstated.  For example, a 
judge may, in certain circumstances, possess wide discretionary power over civil 
litigants, but the judge’s position vis- a-vis those parties does not entail a finding that 
a fiduciary relationship exists between judge and litigant. 
More importantly, in public law, constraints on the decision-maker are not as 
dependent on its relationship with the person challenging the decision: they are 
usually determined externally by matters, such as statutory construction and 
departmental guidance.  Professor Jonathan Evans captures this major difference 
when he states that ‘The limits on its discretion are not determined by the nature of 
the framework with the affected member of the public, or the immediate factual 
context, but rather on the overall framework in which the power is established’ 162 
Nonetheless, the idea of ceding power is important in our context.  A useful 
comparison may be drawn from Justice Binnie’s identification of ‘discretionary 
control’ as the essential characteristic of the fiduciary relationship in an aboriginal 
rights case
163
 where he stated that the relationship between the Crown and the 
aboriginal peoples is recognised as fiduciary ‘to facilitate supervision of the high 
degree of discretionary control gradually assumed by the Crown over the lives of 
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aboriginal peoples.’164  This will be considered further in chapter five, when the 
public trust doctrine is examined. 
2.5.9 Utility theory 
Utility theory is a theory related to the underlying purpose of fiduciary law. Its 
approach is functional and purposive, emphasising that courts will uphold 
relationships of a fiduciary nature where there is a determined need to protect the 
integrity of particular types of relationship.  The protective element may arise due to 
the relative status of the parties, such as guardian and ward, or because of a perceived 
commercial utility, for example to prevent director(s) or employees seizing corporate 
rewards by unfair means.  Thus the focus is on the utility of the relationship and the 
public interest in ensuring that such aberrant behaviour is not tolerated.  Millett L J 
stated that fiduciary relationships exist to protect persons ‘subject to disadvantage or 
vulnerability.’165 This need to deter fiduciary misfeasance is very common in 
fiduciary literature. Robert Flannigan uses the graphic term ‘sledgehammer’ to 
emphasise the courts’ approach to fiduciary liability and the need to eliminate any 
possibility of opportunistic manipulation of the beneficiary’s interests. 166 The late 
Professor Gareth H Jones stated that ‘policy may demand a public sacrifice of the 
fiduciary’s profit’ even where a fiduciary has been honest and did not cause a loss to 
his beneficiaries,
167
 as illustrated by Boardman v Phipps.
168
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2.5.9.1 Utility theory in a Local Authority context 
Utility theory is of importance to this thesis, since it impacts on the 
relationship between elected councils and their constituents; it has a societal 
perspective.  This is captured by Lady Justice Arden who, in referring to fiduciary 
liability, said ‘equity imposes stringent liability on a fiduciary as a deterrent…’ 169. Its 
commercial utility is shown by the FHR decision,
170
 where Lord Neuberger stated: 
‘secret commissions are also objectionable as they inevitably tend to undermine trust 
in the commercial world….one would expect the law to be particularly stringent in 
relation to a claim against an agent who has received a bribe or secret commission.’171 
Although Lord Neuberger speaks of the need for trust in the ‘commercial’ world, has 
we have demonstrated trust is a vital component of the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users-we trust that they will abide by their statutory 
powers and the trust placed in them. 
This author agrees with Professor Scott FitzGibbon when he says that ‘social 
fiduciary relationships are supported by traditional virtues such as loyalty, civility, 
self-sacrifice, vocational excellence, and high standards of honesty’. 172 The problem 
with the utility theory is that it does not provide an answer as to how and to what 
extent socially valuable relationships are indeed fiduciary; the fact that a relationship 
is socially useful does not necessarily render it fiduciary.  It may be argued that the 
promotion of social goals is not an intrinsic aim of private law, but a task better suited 
to other social sciences or branches of law.  Ultimately, of course, there will be 
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diverse and conflicting views of what activities and services are considered to fall 
within the phrase ‘socially useful’; this will, in part, be determined by a wide range of 
indeterminate factors, including social class, background, cultural, social and political 
leanings, to mention a few. 
2.5.10  Descriptive theories 
The theories of dependency, vulnerability and inequality referred to above, are more 
descriptive than analytical; their sole purpose is to explain the law’s motivation for 
intervening to regulate the relationship between the parties. 
Another theory that comes within this descriptive grouping is that of ‘unjust 
enrichment’.  This theory addresses the issue of fiduciaries who take advantage of 
their position or status within the relationship in a way that is contrary to the welfare 
and interests of their principal.  Unjust enrichment theory is remedy-driven: it focuses 
on the remedial consequences of a fiduciary taking advantage of the inequality of 
power and their dominance over the beneficiary, namely forfeiture of any profits 
made by the fiduciary.  This theory does not, however, help us to identify the 
circumstances in which a particular relationship will be considered fiduciary in 
nature. 
173
Professor L.S. Sealy 
174
 considers that the unjust enrichment theory 
espoused by Fry J in Re West of England and South Wales District Bank, Ex parte 
Dale and Co 
175
 ‘is really not a definition at all: although it describes a common 
feature, it does not teach us to recognise a fiduciary relationship when we meet one.’  
Academic writing has shown that the unjust enrichment theory is, in essence, circular 
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in reasoning - as stated by Judge F H Easterbrook and Daniel E Fischel ‘the 
description can fit any rule while predicting no outcomes.’ 176 
There is a continuing debate about unjust enrichment and whether it is a 
stand-alone concept or merely part of the law of restitution. 
177
 This debate is outside 
the scope of this thesis, but the body of work on this theory contains interesting 
comments on competing taxonomies and attempts to explain why trusts cannot stand 
outside the common law taxonomy.  Unjust enrichment as a factor is just that: its 
presence does not necessarily indicate that a fiduciary relationship exists; it merely 
indicates that a person or body has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another. 
This leads to the conclusion that ‘because of the ideological proximity of actions 
based upon fiduciary doctrine and those based upon unjust enrichment, the use of 
unjust enrichment theory within the ambit of fiduciary doctrine requires careful 
monitoring so that situations of unjust enrichment which do not give rise to fiduciary 
relations are kept within their own independent sphere’. 178 Unjust enrichment, like 
concepts of reliance, is illustrative rather than indicative of the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. 
2.5.11 Cognitive theory of Fiduciary Relationships 
For the sake of completeness, mention should be made of the cognitive theory of 
fiduciary relationships.
179
 This theory concentrates not on the relationship between 
the parties, but rather on judicial reasoning in determining whether a relationship is 
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fiduciary or not. Professor G S Alexander focusses on the behavioural claim that 
‘cognitive factors lead courts to analyse fiduciary relationships, at least those that are 
property based, differently than they evaluate contractual relationships.’180 Alexander 
takes a non-contractarian viewpoint. 
181
 Cognitive theory emphasises the extent to 
which schemas influence our inferences and our causal explanations. Schemas are 
knowledge structures that are comprised of assumptions, expectations, and generic 
prior understandings.
182
  Alexander’s concern is that judge’s schemas influence their 
determinations of whether a fiduciary relationship exists in a given situation. 
2.5.11.1   Cognitive theory in a Local Government context 
In this author’s opinion Professor Alexander’s work has value in the context of local 
authorities and their service users, because its aim is to explore whether there is 
anything special or distinctive about fiduciary relationships in general, or whether 
‘the term is nothing more than a label that obscures rather than clarifies’.183 This is 
achieved by concentrating on the different roles we assign to relational roles 
according to hierarchical or non-hierarchical categories. Professor Atkinson states:  
For example, friends, business partners, and co-workers relate to each other 
nonhierarchically, which means that they hold positions of relative equality of power 
and knowledge. Doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and parent-child relationships, by 
contrast, tend to be hierarchically structured relationships in which one party 
occupies a role of dominance and responsibility for the other 
184
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 Such an approach helps us to place the relationship between local authorities 
and their service users in a hierarchically structured relationship, especially when 
related to the relational indicators discussed of power and dependency. 
 2.5.12 Instrumental description 
Instrumentalism assumes that the law is created with a particular result or goal in 
mind.
185
  Viewed from an instrumental perspective, fiduciary obligation is a legal 
device that enables a court to respond to a range of situations in which a person’s 
discretion, entrusted to another, ought to be controlled and regulated because of the 
very characteristics of that relationship. This approach is related to the functional 
utility purpose of fiduciary law referred to above.  As stated by Professor De Mott: 
186
 
‘described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is a device that enables the law to 
respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one person’s 
discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person’s 
relationship with another
.’
  
2.6 Conclusion 
Analysis of the fiduciary theories set out above not only illustrates the range of 
theories (and evidences to an extent, why a commonly agreed definition of the 
fiduciary relationship cannot be found), but also illustrates the divergence of 
academic and judicial views.  None of these theories, however, fully capture the 
myriad applications of fiduciary relationships. Joining Professor J C Shepherd, this 
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author feels it may be more accurate to speak of relationships having a fiduciary 
component rather than speak of fiduciary relationships as such.
187
 This chapter 
concentrated on identification of a fiduciary relationship i.e. how do you ‘spot’ the 
circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship arises. It is clear that, although 
fiduciary theorists appear to agree on a general set of norms, such as that no single 
theory is dominant-they provide different conceptual points of emphasis. Further, no 
single theory identified in and of itself provides a satisfactory basis for complete 
understanding of the fiduciary doctrine, or is able to address the multifarious 
relationships that ought properly to be considered as fiduciary 
The fiduciary relationship is indefinable; as Sealy states, ‘the word 
‘fiduciary….is not definitive of a single class of relationships to which a fixed set of 
rules and principles apply….the mere statement that John is in a fiduciary relationship 
towards me means no more than that in some respects his position is trustee-like.’ 188 
One can do no better than quote Professor Paul D Finn, 
189
 whose comments have 
general application to all the indicia discussed in this chapter. He states: 
It is obviously not enough that one is in an ascendant position over another; such is 
the invariable pre-requisite for the unconscionable principle.  It is obviously not 
enough that one has the practical capacity to influence the other; representations are 
made, information is supplied (or not supplied) as of course with the object of, and in 
fact, influencing a host of contractual dealings.  It is obviously not enough that the 
other party is in a position of vulnerability: such is the almost inevitable state in 
greater or lesser degree of all parties in contractual relationships.  It is obviously not 
enough that some degree of trust and confidence are there: It is ….not enough that 
there is dependency by one party upon another: Indeed elements of all the above may 
be present in a dealing-and consumer transactions can illustrate this-without a 
relationship being in any way fiduciary 
190
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These theories are, at best, a set of loosely-fitting aids which function by 
coming together in various different contextual situations; they operate as a guide, or 
‘blueprint for the protection and continued efficacy of independent social relations.’ 
191
 Terms such as fiduciary, fiduciary office or fiduciary relationships provide suitable 
shorthand, 
192
 but only take us so far in discovering the core nature of fiduciary 
relations or the core duties of a fiduciary.  
A number of the theories appear to be relevant to the relationship between a 
local authority and their service users. For example, by virtue of their democratic 
rights local citizens entrust power to their local authorities, which involves, in some 
instances wide discretionary power granted by statute. Those statutory powers often 
encompass service users who may not be voters, but are vulnerable in the sense that 
they rely on local authorities to carry out their statutory role, in a way that seeks to 
protect that vulnerability-entrustment of power can lead to vulnerability; it is not only 
the old, infirm, disabled or economically disadvantaged who fall within that 
‘vulnerability’ category, but also asylum seekers and children needing protection. 
Proceeding on the basis that the relationship between local authorities and 
their service users may fall within its own special fiduciary categorisation, the next 
question is to discover what the ensuing fiduciary duties would look like. 
                                                             
191
 Professor D A DeMott, ‘Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation’ (1988) 5 
Duke LJ 879  
192
 As suggested by John Glover, ‘The Identification of Fiduciaries’ in Peter Birks (ed) 
‘Privacy and Loyalty’ (Clarendon Press 1997) 269. 
 
 
98 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Defining Fiduciary obligations within the legal framework of local 
government 
 
   The phrase ‘fiduciary duties’ is a dangerous one, giving rise to a mistaken assumption that 
all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances. This is not the case 
1
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two examined the main theories that identify the circumstances in which a 
fiduciary relationship might arise in English law.  The object of this chapter is to 
extend the analysis beyond the relational context to consider the nature of fiduciary 
duties and obligations that arise when such a relationship exists. This is essential, 
because it identifies the scope of fiduciary duty imposed on local authorities should 
they in given circumstances be in a fiduciary relationship with their service users. 
This is not merely academic, but very important since recognition of a duty as 
fiduciary can lead to the availability of particular remedies, but also possibly in terms 
of causation, remoteness and limitation.
2
 
It must first be recognised that even where a relationship is deemed 
‘fiduciary’, this does not mean that all obligations arising will be fiduciary in nature: 
some obligations may be contractual
3
 or tortious
4
, as in such situations established 
contract law and tort law will provide the guiding principles.  It is not unusual in a 
relationship to have a blending of both fiduciary and non-fiduciary obligations.  
                                                             
1
 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, 206 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) 
2
 J D Heydon, ‘Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill fiduciary?’ in 
Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds) ‘Equity in Commercial Law ‘(Law Book 
Company of Australasia 2005) 185, 189 
3
 Contractual liability can arise, for example with a local authority contracted with printers for 
stationery supplies, or computer supplies for new software programmes. 
4
 Tortious liability can arise from injury suffered by tripping up on defective pedestrian 
flagstones 
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This chapter will first consider whether fiduciary duties are purely 
proscriptive in nature or whether they are comprised of both proscriptive and 
prescriptive duties.  The narrower view confines fiduciary duty to a proscriptive role, 
exemplified in the no conflict, no profit rule.  This is the conventional and historical 
based understanding of the extent of the duties involved when a fiduciary voluntarily 
holds property for the benefit of another.  The broader view comprises a set of 
prescriptive duties, which includes the traditional no conflict of interest rules, but, it 
has been argued extends to include duties such as the duty of good faith, the duty of 
care and the duty of confidentiality.  For the sake of clarity, each approach will be 
analysed separately.  Recent case law and scholarship has reignited debate about 
whether fiduciary obligations are purely proscriptive in character.
5
 Kelvin F.K. Low 
states: ‘the wider content of fiduciary obligations continues to elude us. Whilst we 
know that fiduciaries are expected to avoid unauthorised profits and conflicts of 
interests, whether any fiduciary duties exist beyond this core remains controversial.’6 
Some cases suggest the prescriptive nature of fiduciary obligation
7
, some courts
8
 and 
academics,
9
 fiercely defend the proscriptive nature of fiduciary duties. Professor 
Flannigan defends the orthodox proscriptive view based on historical grounds and the 
difficulty of the courts’ practical task of policing fiduciary accountability.  
                                                             
5
 See, Darryn Jenson, ‘Prescription and Proscription in Fiduciary Obligations’ (2010) 21(2) 
Kings Law Journal; (University of Queensland, Beine School of Law, Research Paper No 10-
29) 
See also, Rebecca Lee, ‘Rethinking the content of the fiduciary obligation’ [2009] Conv 3, 
236-253 who has suggested that fiduciary obligations have a prescriptive and ‘directional’ 
dimension 
6
 Kelvin F K Low, ‘Fiduciary duties: the case for prescription’ (2016) 30(1) Tru L I 3-25, 1.  
7
 In England, see Knight v Frost [1999] 1 BCLC 364, 374; Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 
BCLC 80, 120; GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch), 85 
In Australia, see Westpac Banking Corp v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (2012) 270 FLR 1. 
In USA, see In Re Trados Inc Shareholder Litigation 73 A 3d 17 (Del 2013) 
8
 Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71,  cf. Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] 
Ch 1 
9 See, eg, Professor Mathew Conaglen, ‘The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty’ 
(2005) 121 LQR 452; Robert Flannigan, ‘The Adulteration of Fiduciary Doctrine in 
Corporate Law’ (2006) 122 LQR 449 
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Having analysed the arguments presented on both sides, the chapter will 
proceed to apply them to a local government setting, specifically in relation to the 
duties owed by local authorities to their service users.  This chapter will demonstrate 
that only a proscriptive view of fiduciary duty offers sufficient certainty to both 
fiduciary and beneficiary; it is historically and doctrinally sound.  However, in the 
context of the relationship between local authorities and their service users, the 
chapter will acknowledge that the prescriptive approach offers greater scope for 
imposing accountability upon local authorities.  
  It is important to consider whether fiduciary duty is confined only to 
economic interests or whether it can or should encompass non-economic interests.  
This issue is highly relevant to this thesis, since a local authority’s service delivery 
function is not always concerned with purely financial implications: for example, the 
provision of children and vulnerable adult services, where welfare factors may be 
seen as more important than fiscal considerations.
10
   
For the purpose of this thesis, by non-economic interests this author means 
interests in physical and emotional health, as opposed to financial or property 
interests.  Richard Joyce states: 
In seeking to exclude the application of fiduciary law in relation to non-economic 
interests, one approach open to the courts is to place the relationship in which non-
economic interests are at stake outside the range of relationships in which fiduciary 
obligations exist.  Another approach is to take a broad view of the relationships that 
                                                             
10
 A further example is the provision of youth offending services. This ordinarily consists of 
Youth Offending teams which are multi-agency organisations, supervising children and 
young people aged 10-17, including key partners to children, young people and their families 
to support them in moving away from offending behaviour and achieve more positive 
outcomes, such as Health, Education, Police, Probation and Social-Care and were set up by 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Each local authority must have at least one Youth 
Offending Team, which tackles issues associated with youth crime. Local authorities must 
also ensure that an annual Youth Justice plan is available to outline how such services will be 
delivered. The non-commercial activity involves a wide range of interventions 
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may give rise to fiduciary obligations, but to define the scope of fiduciary obligations 
so as to exclude non-economic interests 
11
  
 This author sees no justification for limiting claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty to economic loss only, for to do so may well lead to injustice, particularly in the 
context of local authority decision-making. 
3.2 The Nature of ‘Fiduciary Duty’ 
The moral foundation of fiduciary obligation provides a protective sheath 
against abuse by the fiduciary.  Moralistic elements are prevalent in the conceptual 
framework of fiduciary duty and also in judicial pronouncements about fiduciary 
duty.  This is largely due to fiduciary law being a creature resting heavily on 
principles of conscience: a different focus to the common law. Professor Tamar 
Frankel has said: ‘The Courts regulate fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of 
morality upon them.’12 As Frankel further says, ‘the moral standard is not left to the 
fiduciary or custom. The courts do consider the parties expectations and professional 
customs; but, in the last analysis it is the function of the court to determine the 
standards. This moral theme is an important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, 
faith and honour form its basic vocabulary.’13  Similarly, John C Coffee Jnr 14 has 
stated: ‘Fiduciary law is deeply intertwined with notions of morality and the desire to 
preserve a traditional form of relationship’, and Professor Austin Scott relied on 
                                                             
11
 Richard Joyce, ‘Fiduciary Law and Non-Economic Interests’ (2002) 28(2) Monash 
University Law Review, 239-267. Joyce contrasts the Australian and Canadian approach to 
recognition of fiduciary duty extending to non-economic issues, but notwithstanding the 
comparative limitation this article contains useful information on contrasting courts’ 
approaches in different jurisdictions 
12
 Professor Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law’ (1983) 71 Calif L R 795, pp.830-831. 
Professor Frankel discusses the moral dimensions of fiduciary law. 
For work on the judges’ role, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Judges as moral reasoners’ (2009) 
International Journal of Constitutional Studies 2 
13 Professor Tamar Frankel, ‘Fiduciary Law’, (1983) 71 Calif L R 795, 830 
14
 John C Coffee Jnr, ‘The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the 
Judicial Role’ (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 1618, 1658 
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philosopher Josiah Royce to conclude that loyalty, properly defined, ‘is the fulfilment 
of the whole moral law.’15 
Fiduciary obligation has a double-sided approach.  This author means it has a 
negative and a positive side.  The negative side is represented by acting to purge 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the fiduciary and, at the same time, has a 
positive side, in that it coerces the fiduciary to act with loyalty towards the 
beneficiary.  This author therefore considers fiduciary obligation to be dualistic in 
essence: it is concerned with consequences of both the bad behaviour of the fiduciary 
and the trusting approach of the beneficiary. 
3.2.1 Proscriptive Duties 
Proscriptive duties are expressed in negative terms; 
16
 they ensure that a fiduciary 
avoids any situation where their duty to their principal and their own self-interest 
might conflict. 
17
 
There is dispute as to whether these proscriptive duties are fourfold, threefold, 
twofold or comprise one single obligation.  The rules are: the ‘no-conflict rule, the 
‘no-profit rule, the ‘no self-dealing’ rule and the ‘fair dealing’ rule.  It may be helpful 
to illustrate briefly how each duty is engaged.  The ‘no conflict’ rule is an all-
encompassing rule and states that a fiduciary is not allowed to place themselves in a 
position or circumstances where their own personal interest might clash with the 
interests of their principal.  
                                                             
15
 Josiah Royce, ‘The Philosophy of Loyalty’ at 15, cited in Austin Scott, ‘The Fiduciary 
Principle’ (1949) 37:4 Cal L Rev 539, 540 
16
 Charles Harpum describes fiduciary obligations as ‘negative principles’: Charles Harpum, 
‘Fiduciary Obligations and Fiduciary Powers: Where Are We Going?’ chapter 7 in P Birks 
(ed) ‘Privacy and Loyalty’ (Clarendon Press 1997) 145, 147. See also, Nolan (1998) 12 and L 
S Sealy (1989) 268 
17
 A clear example would be the purchase by the fiduciary of trust property at a market 
undervalue 
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The ‘no-profit’ rule is self-explanatory: the fiduciary must not retain any 
unauthorised benefit or property that has arisen from their fiduciary position.  The 
principle is enunciated in Bray v Ford 
18
  ‘It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity 
that persons in a fiduciary position are not, unless otherwise expressly provided, 
entitled to make a profit.’ It remains the case as Lord Thurlow stated in Forbes v 
Ross,
19
 that: ‘there is no one more sacred rule of a Court of Equity than that a trustee 
cannot so execute a trust as to have the least benefit to himself.’  
The no ‘self-dealing’ rule renders voidable by the beneficiary any dealing by 
the fiduciary of entrusted property, even if there has been complete honesty on the 
part of the fiduciary.  The severity of this rule is illustrated by Lord Eldon LC in Ex p 
James  
20
 where he said:  ‘This doctrine as to the purchase by trustees, assignees and 
persons having a confidential character, stands more upon general principle than upon 
the circumstances of any individual case.  It rests upon this: that the purchaser is not 
permitted in any case, however honest the circumstances; the general interests of 
justice requiring it to be destroyed in every instance.’ See further judicial statements 
by Arden MR in Campbell v Walker and extra judicial comments by B H McPherson 
J. 
21
Some doubt about the application of the no self-dealing rule was expressed by the 
                                                             
18
 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51 (Lord Herschell) 
19
 Forbes v Ross [1788] 2 Cox 112, 116; 2 Bro C C 430  
This was a probate case involving a trustee, with his co-trustee’s consent, borrowing estate 
monies at interest of 4%. Ross had borrowed money from the testator during his lifetime at 
rate of 4%. The will stated that monies lent should be at such a rate as the two trustees 
thought reasonable. The court held that the matter was different where a trustee was 
concerned, he could not bargain for himself, so as to gain an advantage and a 5% rate was 
ordered to be paid 
20
 [1803] 9 Ves 337, 344 
21
 Campbell v Walker [1800)] 5 Ves 678, 680 (Arden MR) ‘Any trustee purchasing the trust 
property is liable to have the purchase set aside, if in any reasonable time the beneficiary of 
the trust chooses to say, he is not satisfied with it’. 
See further, comments by Hon Mr Justice B H McPherson J, ‘Self-dealing Trustees’ in 
Oakley, ‘Trends in Contemporary Trust Law’ (Oxford : Oxford University Press 1996) 135-
152 
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Court of Appeal in Holder v Holder
22
, where Sacks LJ considered that it should only 
be considered a rule of practice.
23
  The strict approach was, however, affirmed in 
Kane v Radley-Kane
24
 by Sir Richard Scott V-C,
25
 who said it is ‘a general and 
highly salutary principle of law that a trustee cannot validly contract with himself and 
cannot exercise his trust powers to his own advantage.’ 
The ‘fair-dealing’ rule links with the self-dealing rule and means that a 
purchase by the fiduciary of a beneficial interest from one or more beneficiaries will 
be voidable, unless the fiduciary can show the transaction was entirely fair and was 
carried out with the beneficiary’s informed consent.26  Jessell MR stated that 
‘informed consent is only effective if it is given after ‘full disclosure’.27The rationale 
for a slightly more relaxed approach in dealings between a trustee/fiduciary and a 
beneficiary is that negotiations would have taken place between the fiduciary and 
beneficiary and there is less risk, therefore, that a trustee might exploit his position.  
If for our initial discussion a core element of loyalty is accepted in a fiduciary 
relationship it is not difficult to identify the existence of a breach of loyalty in each of 
the four situations described above.  To quote Richard Nolan: ‘Fiduciary obligations 
promote loyalty by prohibiting disloyalty, and activity that might lead to disloyalty: 
                                                             
22
 [1968] Ch 353 
23
 ibid, (Sacks LJ) 
24
 [1998] 3 All ER 753, a case involving an intestate estate where the widow and sole 
administatrix appropriated private shares valued at death of £50,000 to herself in satisfaction 
of her statutory legacy under section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 as 
amended. Later those shares were sold for £1,131,438. The appropriation was set aside under 
the self-dealing rule 
25
 ibid, 757 
26
 Thomson v Eastwood [1877] 2 App Cas 215 (HL), Lord Cairns stated courts of equity 
would ‘ascertain the value paid by the trustees, and will throw upon the trustee the onus of 
proving that he gave full value, and that all information was laid before the beneficiary when 
it was sold.’ The Privy Council confirmed this approach in Wright v Morgan [1926] AC 788, 
when they set aside a sale even though the trustee had an independent valuation carried out.  
27 Dunne v English [1874] LR 18 Eq 524, 533 
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fiduciary obligations are proscriptive in nature, and do not encompass the positive 
duties laid on those described as fiduciaries……loyalty is the goal.’ 28 
The absence of any conclusive determination as to the relationship between 
these rules is illustrated by the different views that have been expressed as regards the 
no conflict rule and the no profit rule. For example, Snell’s Equity29 and Underhill & 
Hayton,
30
 and the decisions in Boardman v Phipps
31
 and Swain v The Law Society, 
32
treat the no-profit rule as part of the wider no-conflict rule, whereas the editors of 
Lewin 
33
 argue persuasively that it is better to speak of two distinct, though allied, 
rules.  
There has been much debate whether these rules are autonomous and distinct 
or simply one rule with several facets of application.  This author subscribes to the 
latter approach adopted by Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps 
34
 where he says: ‘A 
fundamental rule of equity is that a person in a fiduciary capacity must not make a 
profit out of his trust which is part of the wider rule that a trustee may not place 
himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict.’  
                                                             
28
 Professor Richard Nolan, ‘Conflicts of Interest, Unjust Enrichment, Wrongdoing’ in W R 
Cornish, Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones’ (Hart 
Publishing 1998) 87-89 
29
 John McGhee QC, ‘Snell’s Equity’ (33rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2014)  
30
 David Hayton, Paul Mathews and Charles Mitchell, ‘Law of Trusts & Trustees’ (18th ed, 
Butterworths Law , 2010) 
31
 (1967) 2 AC 46 (HL) 
See, Bryan, ‘Boardman v Phipps 1967’ in Mitchell and Mitchell (eds) ‘Landmark Cases in 
Equity’ (Hart 2012) 
32
 (1983) 1 AC 598  (HL) 
33
 Lynton Tucker, Nicholas Le Poidevin and James Brightwell (eds) ‘Lewin on Trusts ‘(19th 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2014). They point out that the Boardman case applied the no profit rule 
and yet there was no conflict of interest present 
See further, statement by Assistant Professor Rebecca Lee, ‘Having shown that the no-profit 
rule is subsumed under the wider no-conflict rule (i.e. there is only one single negative duty 
to conflict.)’ Rebecca Lee, ‘Rethinking the content of the fiduciary obligation’ [2009] Conv, 
236 
34
 [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL), 123, this case illustrates how rigorously English courts interpret the 
scope and ambit of a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty 
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Similar debates have taken place on the conceptual independence or otherwise 
of the ‘dealing’ rules.  This author considers that all of these rules stem from one 
source, namely to prevent conflict of interest. In Re Thompson’s Settlement 35 
Vinelott J stated: ‘It is clear that the self-dealing rule is an application of the wider 
principle that a man must not put himself in a position where duty and interest 
conflict or where duty to one conflict with his duty to another.’ 
Whether the rules are seen as independent or interdependent, it does not alter 
their prophylactic nature, and scholars and judges alike agree that there is strict 
liability for breach of any or all of them.
36
 
3.2.2 Prescriptive duties 
A prescriptive fiduciary duty is framed in a positive way: it is a duty to be exercised 
by the fiduciary in the interests of the beneficiary. Item Software UK Ltd v Fassihi , 
37
 
which involved imposing a positive duty on a company director to disclose 
information, is sometimes used as an example of a fiduciary being under a positive 
                                                             
35
 [1986] 1 Ch 99, 115 
See comments of Deane J in Australian case Chan v Zacharia [1984] 154 CLR 178, 198-199 
where Lord Upjohn’s reasoning in his dissenting judgment in Boardman v Phipps was relied 
upon that the reasonable man must perceive a real personal possibility of conflict between the 
fiduciary’s interest and duties before liability is imposed 
36
 Keech v Sandford  [1726] Sel Cas Ch 61, a trustee was unable to renew a lease of a market 
in Romford for the infant beneficiary and therefore renewed it in his own name and for his 
own purposes. Lord King said he ‘should rather have let it run out, than to have had the lease 
to himself. The trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have the lease … the 
rule should be strictly pursued.’ The reasoning is to have allowed an exception in this 
instance would have created problems in like or comparable circumstances and would have 
weakened the strict nature of the no conflict rule 
See generally, Mathew Conaglen, ‘A Re-Appraisal of the Fiduciary Self-Dealing and Fair 
Dealing Rules’ (2006) 64 CLJ 366 
37
 [2004] EWCA Civ 1244 
Arden LJ’s use of a director’s general duty to act in the interests of the company to derive a 
particular duty to confess his own wrongdoing has proven to be somewhat controversial - see 
Alan Berg, ‘Fiduciary Duties: A Director’s duty to Disclose his own Misconduct’ (2005) 121 
LQR 213; Adam Cloherty, ‘Directors’ Duties of Disclosure’ [2004] JBL 252 
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duty. In this case, Arden L J held that failure by a director to disclose an intention to 
compete with his company would be evidence of disloyalty. Fassihi was further 
analysed in Shepherds Investments Ltd v Walters
38
 by Etherton J, who considered that 
there was no independent duty of disclosure and that the case represented a straight 
conflict of interest situation between the director’s personal interest and that of his 
company. 
39
` 
3.2.3 Fiduciary duties as both Proscriptive and Prescriptive duties 
The premise of the prescriptive approach is that the fiduciary obligation is not to be 
regarded as a project of restraint, but as a more liberating application.  ‘A prescriptive 
duty requires action by the person owning it; a proscriptive duty requires restraint.’40 
Professor Paul Finn,
41
 for example, considers that fiduciary obligation can be 
identified as a generic notion and split into eight segments that include not only the 
negative, proscriptive rules outlined above, but also positive duties, such as, a the 
duty of good faith, duty of fidelity, duty of care, duty to treat beneficiaries fairly, duty 
of candour, duty of confidentiality, and a general duty to grant beneficiaries access to 
information.  However, as Professor Devdeep Ghosh states ‘a high burden of proof 
                                                             
38
 [2006] EWHC 836 (Ch); [2007)] 2 BCLC 91, 63-68. Mr F, a director, hence a fiduciary of 
his company sabotaged his company’s efforts in negotiating the renewal of a contract with its 
chief suppliers in order to improve his prospects of securing the business 
39
 Paul S Davies and Graham Virgo, ‘Equity & Trusts’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2013) state ‘Etherton J’s interpretation of Fassihi maintains the idea that fiduciary duties are 
proscriptive only. Admittedly, the Court of Appeal in Fassihi did not clearly adopt this 
analysis, but it is the preferable approach and consistent with logic and orthodoxy.’ 
40
 Harold Ford, W A Lee and others, ‘The Law of Trusts’ (3rd ed LBC 2012) 9.1000. 
See also, Vicki Vann, ‘Causation and Breach of fiduciary duty’ (Monash University research 
paper No 2006/60) 67 
41
 Paul Finn, ‘Fiduciary Obligations’ (Law Book Co 1977) 
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must be imposed on he or she who seeks to import prescriptive duties into a fiduciary 
relationship.’42 
This approach, can, however, be criticised as these positive duties may also 
apply to a wide spectrum of non-fiduciary actors.
43
The positive duties listed by Paul 
Finn are, in this author’s view, useful, provided they are linked to a central core of 
devotion to the beneficiary and are not taken as independent duties.  For example, 
compliance with a duty of good faith may be viewed as equivalent to compliance with 
an overall duty of loyalty to one’s beneficiary.  This interpretation accords with 
Millett L.J’s reference to the duty of good faith in Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew (t/a Stapley & Co): 
44
  
 A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a 
particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and 
confidence.  The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of 
loyalty…..This core liability has several facets.  A fiduciary must act in good faith; 
he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position 
where his duty and his interest may conflict.  He may not act for his own benefit or 
the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal.  This is not 
intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary 
obligations.  They are defining characteristics of the fiduciary….he is not subject to 
fiduciary obligations because he is a fiduciary; it is because he is subject to them that 
he is a fiduciary 
45
   
 
                                                             
42
 Devdeep Ghosh, ‘Fixing the Fiduciary Obligation: The Prescription-Proscription 
Dichotomy’ (2012) 11(1) Canberra Law Review 24-32, 32 
43
 Paul Finn, ‘The Core Nature of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2009) New Zealand Law 
Review 375, Fn 2. The author supports Professor Robert Flannigan when he states, ‘it is not 
often clear for example, whether terms such as trust, confidence, faithfulness, good faith, 
loyalty, or fidelity are used as synonyms for conventional fiduciary duty or as labels for 
distinct duties in novel, and invariably undeveloped taxonomies.’ 
44
 [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 
45
 [1998] Ch 1 (CA), 16, a solicitor incompetently failed to notify his building society client 
when sending in his requisition on title and cheque of knowledge that the borrower was 
proposing taking out a second loan on the residential property concerned. The borrower 
defaulted and the building society sued the solicitor for breach of duty and damages for their 
loss. In an important judgment Millett LJ dealt with fiduciary obligations and the issue 
whether this error was a breach of a solicitor’s fiduciary obligation. Held - where a person 
tries their incompetent best they are not in breach of their obligation of good faith 
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This author’s view is that good faith demands consideration, but not an over 
emphasis of single attention.  
Millett LJ’s statement clearly links the traditional (proscriptive) rule of no 
conflict with a positive (prescriptive) duty of good faith, illustrating the proscriptive 
and prescriptive obligations of a fiduciary.
46
  Support for this approach can also be 
found in Canadian law in the statement of Laskin J in Canadian Aero Service Limited 
v O’Malley: ‘A fiduciary relationship…in its generality betokens loyalty, good faith 
and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self-interest’ ,47 and in a recent Scottish 
Appeal Court case
48
 where fiduciary duty was declared as a duty to ‘…act in good 
faith in the interests of (the principal), to act for a proper purpose, and not to 
allow….personal interests to conflict with those of the principal.’ 
Assistant Professor Rebecca Lee 
49
 re-examined the orthodox content of 
fiduciary obligation and concluded ‘that the heart of the fiduciary obligation does not 
merely rest on the two proscriptive no-conflict and no-profit rules, which upon closer 
analyses do not exhaust the content of the fiduciary obligation’. 50  Lee, like this 
author, considers that the no-profit rule is subsumed under the no-conflict rule, but 
emphasises the fact that fiduciary obligations also have a positive and directional 
aspect.  By directional she means that the fiduciary has a positive duty to act towards 
                                                             
46
 See, Australian case, Bell Group Limited (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) 
[2009] 70 ACSR 1 4552, where Owen J reviews fiduciary obligations and questions the 
traditional model of labelling the fiduciary obligation as strictly proscriptive 
47
 [1974] SCR 592, 606 
48
 Dryburgh v Scotts Media Tax [2014] CSIH, 45 
 The liquidator brought proceedings against two directors for breach of fiduciary duty in 
depriving the company of £750,000 in relation to a dividend payment when the company had 
insufficient distributable assets to justify it. 
49
 Rebecca Lee, ‘Rethinking the content of the fiduciary obligation’, [2009] Conv 3, 236-253 
50 ibid, 237 
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promoting and enhancing the interests of their principal.
51
  This formulation frees the 
court from constraint by the predominant no-conflict rule; it allows the court to 
consider the extent to which the fiduciary has enhanced the principal’s interests.  
Lee considers that exclusively proscriptive content is inadequate, stating that 
‘the fiduciary who is told not to conflict has not been told what his obligation of 
loyalty entails or what he should do….on the contrary, once we have a positive duty, 
the notion of negation can help us devise all the proscriptive rules.’52  Lee maintains 
her formulation of fiduciary obligation as both positive and directional and, in support 
of her position, refers to Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver,
53
  where the duty imposed on 
the directors was positive and directional in nature.
54
 Lee’s conclusion is that it is ‘the 
directional nature of the fiduciary obligation which is its core content and which 
distinguishes it from other non-fiduciary obligations.’55 
3.3. Duty of loyalty 
At the core of fiduciary duty is loyalty.
56
 As Professor Paul B. Miller states: ‘The 
boundaries of fiduciary obligation are poorly defined, but there is consensus on its 
                                                             
51
 ibid, 245 ‘Thus, when a fiduciary acts, it triggers a positive duty to act solely towards the 
enhancement of the beneficiaries interests.’ 
52
 ibid, 239 
53
 [1967] 2 A.C. 134 (HL) 
54
 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew (t/a Stapley & Co) [1998] Ch 1 (CA), 18 
(Millett LJ): ‘single-minded loyalty means that loyalty can only be directed solely towards 
the person to whom loyalty is owed’. 
See Rebecca Lee’s definition of directional - A directional approach to the content of the 
fiduciary obligation proposes that although the content of the fiduciary obligation does not 
mandate a positive duty to advance the beneficiary’s interests in the first place; if the 
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the other party. ‘Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation’ (1988) 37:5 Duke 
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essence…whatever else fiduciary law might require of fiduciaries, it undeniably 
demands that they act faithfully toward beneficiaries.’57 
In this author’s opinion, whatever fiduciary theory is adopted, whether singly 
or in combination, there will still be a significant space for loyalty.  It is, therefore, 
important to understand what is meant by loyalty in the context of fiduciary law.  
This will be especially true when we look at the relationship between local authorities 
and their service users and discuss whether a fiduciary relationship exists between 
those parties.  Demonstrating ‘loyalty’ in such circumstances may be impossible, 
unless loyalty is conceived as loyalty to a purpose, rather than as loyalty to a person 
or a legal entity. 
Professor DeMott states ‘Many connections tie duties of loyalty to other 
duties owed by a fiduciary’58 ; she illustrates this point by reference to the solicitor’s 
advice in Nocton 
59
that self-interest may bias or affect how other duties are 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Professor Ethan Lieb, states: ‘the core fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, a duty of 
unselfishness’. Ethan Lieb, ‘Friends as Fiduciaries’ (2009) 86:3 Washington University Law 
Review 665, 673; Professor Ernest E Weinrib, stated that the duty of loyalty is ‘the 
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‘A fiduciary owes a duty of ‘loyalty’ to his principal, which is a higher standard of conduct 
than a party in an ‘arm’s length’ transaction.’   
57
 Professor Paul B Miller, ‘Justifying Fiduciary Duties’ (2013) 58(4) McGill Law Journal, 
969-1023, 976 
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 Professor Deborah DeMott, ‘Beyond Metaphor; An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation’ 
(1988) 37 Duke L J 939 
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 Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932, a solicitor, Norton, was held liable for bad 
advice given during a fiduciary relationship with a client. 
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performed. In this respect, she supports the views of Professor Mathew Conaglen 
60
 
when he contends that the role of ‘loyalty’ is to ensure performance by the fiduciary 
of his other obligations.  Conaglen attributes an insulating role to loyalty: that its role 
is ‘to insulate fiduciaries against situations where they might be swayed from 
providing such proper performance’. 61The same approach is taken by Professor 
Steven Elliott. 
62
 
As Millett L J points out in Mothew, the duty of loyalty has been expressed in 
the form of a number of more particular duties, concerning profits, conflicts of 
interest and transactions with the principal’s property.  Sceptics, like Professor James 
Penner, have, however asked whether ‘loyalty properly characterises the relationship 
of the fiduciary to his principal concluding that it ‘is actually doubtful.’63  Most 
fiduciary scholars do, however, identify loyalty as the paradigmatic fiduciary 
obligation. Professor Lionel Smith states: 
64
 ‘data suggest that a requirement of 
loyalty is found in all fiduciary relationships, and is essential to their categorisation as 
such’.  
The fiduciary duty of loyalty has recently attracted significant academic 
attention.  It is usually viewed as loyalty specifically related to a person or group who 
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 Professor Lionel Smith, ‘Fiduciary Relationships; ensuring the loyal exercise of judgment 
on behalf of another’, (2014) LQR 2 
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claim a right to receive the fiduciary’s loyalty.  This section will examine the role of 
fiduciary duty in a local government setting and question whether loyalty can be 
extended beyond persons or groups to loyalty toward abstract purposes.  This author’s 
research has been greatly helped by the recent article of Paul B. Miller and Andrew. 
S. Gold 
65
 where they examine the structure of fiduciary liability and conclude that 
there are two types of mandate, governance and service mandates.  Their extended 
definition of the fiduciary relationship emphasises their view that all fiduciary 
mandates are purposive, although the purposes specified for some mandates are 
defined in terms of the interests of determinate persons, as is the case with ordinary 
trusts, whilst others are abstract in that they are defined so as to transcend the interests 
of determinate persons. 
This section addresses three questions that naturally arise, if, as this author 
argues loyalty is the central core of a fiduciary relationship.  Firstly, is loyalty a 
defining characteristic of fiduciary duty?
66
  There are dissenting voices.
67
  Secondly, 
what is the core nature of loyalty and what is meant by,’ loyal’, ‘loyalty’, and 
‘loyally’ in academic, judicial and laymen’s terms?  Thirdly, to what extent is the 
virtue of loyalty relevant to the concept of fiduciary obligations, particularly in a local 
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government setting?  In other words to avoid using the words in question loosely and 
vaguely, it is necessary to be clear about what is meant by loyalty.  For the purposes 
of this thesis, it is not necessary to engage in a full philosophical analysis of loyalty 
and what it means, but it is nevertheless essential to understand what is meant by 
‘loyalty’ in judicial terms.  Regrettably the courts have not defined the word ‘loyalty’ 
in the context of a fiduciary relationship.  The word loyalty is often used without any 
specific definition of its meaning. It has, therefore, been left to academics to 
determine a meaningful definition of loyalty in the context of fiduciary relationships.  
One truism, however, is that opinions as to what loyalty is per se, are divergent.  As 
Professor Eileen Scanlen, says:  ‘loyalty is almost as difficult to define as the concept 
itself.’68  It is sometimes said, without much elaboration or specificity, that fiduciary 
law is concerned with ensuring that fiduciaries behave morally.
69
  It will benefit our 
enquiry to briefly enquire what leading contemporary philosophers have said about 
the nature of loyalty in order to understand how fiduciary obligation with its emphasis 
on notions of loyalty, might fit with day to day administrative decision making by 
local authorities. 
To accomplish our aims, we must first identify who is the object of loyalty in 
a local authority setting.  Is loyalty owed to council tax payers as a determinate class 
of objects or, as argued by this author, to a wider group of service users?  What can a 
person, group, organisation or local authority express loyalty towards?  In attempting 
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to address these questions we immediately encounter disagreement among those who 
have written on the subject of loyalty.  Perhaps, as a matter of logic, one could talk 
about being loyal to oneself - ‘to thine own self be true’, said Polonius to Laertes in 
Hamlet.
70
  As a matter of usage, however, that is exactly what loyalty is not: it is 
defined as the antithesis of self-interest. Josiah Royce, a turn of the century American 
philosopher wrote an entire book about loyalty, and is used as a starting point for an 
enquiry into loyalty and its characteristics.
71
 Loyalty in Royce’s terms is illustrated by 
examples of devotion to, for example, a patriotic cause, and loyalty includes ordinary 
expressions of loyalty, such as between family, work colleagues or club or union 
affiliations. 
Loyalty, therefore, involves some element of association with others.  It is part 
of the make-up of society and the relationships that are formed between people and 
groups of people. Josiah Royce considered loyalty a primary virtue: ‘the heart of all 
the virtues’, the central duty amongst all duties.  Royce presents loyalty as the basic 
moral principle from which all other principles can be derived, and argues that loyalty 
is ‘The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause’.72  
According to Royce the cause has to be an objective one; it cannot be one’s personal 
self. The devotion is active, a surrendering of one’s self will to the cause that one 
loves’.  From this definition, Royce constructs a moral framework based on loyalty 
and concentrates on devotion to a cause.  
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Other contemporary thinkers, such as Andrew Oldenquist  
73
 and Ladd, 
74
 
differ from Royce as to the object of loyalty.  Far from having as its objects 
impersonal causes, Ladd considers loyalty interpersonal.  Historically, and in our 
ordinary moral language, loyalty is taken to refer to relationship between persons: for 
example, historically between a lord and his vassal, a parent and child, and between 
friends. Thus, the object of loyalty is ordinarily directed towards a person or group of 
persons. Ladd also states that loyalty is specific:  ‘A man is loyal to his Lord, his 
father, his comrade, his employer’.75  These observations are extremely important 
because, in this author’s opinion they emphasise that loyalty above all is relational in 
context; it does not exist in a vacuum. 
In the context of fiduciary obligations loyalty is considered by many as the 
‘cement’ that holds the fiduciary relationship together.  This author adopts this view 
and considers it appropriate to consider the bond between the fiduciary and 
beneficiary a form of ‘loyalty bond’.  The fiduciary must show undivided loyalty 
towards his beneficiary; if he fails, he will be liable for breach of fiduciary duty.  It is 
important to remember that fiduciary loyalty can be both proscriptive and 
prescriptive:
76
 proscriptive in the sense that loyalty requires a fiduciary to refrain 
from actual or potential conflicts of interest, and prescriptive in the sense that the 
fiduciary must demonstrate loyalty through some affirmative conduct; prescriptive 
loyalty requires more than avoidance of conflicts or other sources of bias. 
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Conceptually, it is impossible to be loyal to people in general (to humanity) or 
to a general principle, such as justice or democracy.  This creates a very real issue in 
the context of local authorities and their service users because, although a local 
authority may want to be loyal to an idea of, for example, ‘green’ environmental 
policies within their locality, considerations of other interests, local or national may 
impinge on their ability to be loyal to the ideology in implementing appropriate 
policies.  Oldenquist joins Ladd in rejecting Royce’s view that ideals can be the 
object of loyalty.  He makes it clear that the issue is a deep one, involving much more 
than the simple question of how we should use the term loyalty.  Ladd’s view is that 
one must be loyal to a group of people.  Royce considers that loyalty is displayed not 
to a person, or to a group or an organisation, but that it is loyalty to a particular call; 
yet the ‘cause’ with which he associates loyalty is ultimately articulated in terms of 
devotion to a community.  
Miller and Gold emphasise the difference between loyalty to persons and 
loyalty to abstract purposes.  They state: 
In our view, loyalty to purpose differs from loyalty to persons in the specification of 
the object of the duty of loyalty.  Whereas the object(s) of fiduciary loyalty under 
service-type mandates are beneficiaries, the objects of loyalty for governance type 
mandates are the abstract purposes for which a particular mandate has been 
established. Generally speaking, a fiduciary will demonstrate loyalty to the 
purpose(s) underlying her mandate by exercising discretionary powers exclusively 
with a mind to advancing those purposes.  In our view, loyalty to purposes can be 
demonstrated more concretely in ways that parallel forms of loyalty to persons
77
  
 
They are supported by Royce, who emphasised that demands made by loyalty 
are for a single-minded pursuit of a goal.  This approach contributes to this author’s 
argument that a preferred way to look at loyalty in a local government context is to 
regard notions of loyalty as compliance with the statutory purpose, rather than  
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loyalty to any individual or group. This author terms this ‘directional loyalty of 
purpose. 
Another feature of loyalty relates to partiality.  Exercising partiality can result 
in a discriminatory approach: for example, acting on behalf of some particular 
person(s) or a group, can lead to the exclusion of other people or groups.  Putting 
partiality on one side, we note another feature of acting loyally: acting on behalf of 
parties, not because the parties necessarily deserve it, but because they were promised 
it.  Further, an approach of ‘blind loyalty’ may lead to irresponsible choices and 
behaviours on the part of a fiduciary without concern as to the possible consequences 
of such actions.  The real danger is that loyalty may require us to set aside good 
judgment.
78
 Moral philosophers are aware that factors, such as pride and self-interest, 
can a seriously affect one’s conscience and cause an inability to discern good from  
bad.  
The real issue is how does society construe notions of loyalty in such difficult 
and complex situations? This is the crux of applying fiduciary and trust like 
obligations to the relationship between local authorities and their service users.    This 
issue will be addressed in chapter four when the problem of translating fiduciary 
concepts to local government will be explored, with specific reference to 
conceptualising loyalty and its application to ‘polycentric’ decision-making as and 
between a diverse class of beneficiaries. It may be as Evan Fox-Decent states: ‘In the 
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multiple beneficiary contexts typical of public law, loyalty manifests itself as fairness 
and reasonableness.’79 His view is supported by Professor Paul D Finn.80  
Loyalty is thus a strong word.  It connotes ‘obligation’ and involves a strong 
sense of allegiance. It therefore slots nicely into the civil obligation of fiduciary duty, 
with its emphasis of negation of self-interest and total interest of the ‘beneficiary.’  
This section has confirmed that legal and extra-legal conceptions of loyalty 
often diverge in fiduciary law, and as challenged in an article by Professor Andrew S 
Gold,
81
 our moralistic view of fiduciary loyalty may need to be reappraised. 
3.4. Duty of Good Faith 
The requirement to act in good faith has been judicially acknowledged to be a key 
requirement of fiduciary doctrine.
82
 Professors Mathew Conaglen and Richard Nolan 
83
 regard good faith as an independent fiduciary duty.
84
  This approach is justified on 
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the basis that good faith ‘is a quality that must be shown in the performance of a 
fiduciary undertaking’.85  They draw a distinction between ordinary good faith and 
fiduciary good faith.  They illustrate this difference by a specific example of a sale by 
a mortgagee, involving a mortgagor taking possession of a borrower’s property and 
selling it.  Mortgagees have limited powers to the borrower’s property of possession 
and sale of the mortgaged property to recover their debt.  The mortgagee does not 
owe a fiduciary duty to the borrower with regard to the exercise of these powers, 
because they are never clothed with any fiduciary duty.  However, whilst the 
mortgagee owes a duty of good faith to the borrower to exercise his power of sale 
fairly, he is entitled to regard his own interests.  In this context, the mortgagee must 
not exhibit bad faith, but obtain the best price possible for the mortgaged property.
86
 
While this illustration is helpful, it should be mentioned that the relationship between 
a mortgagee and mortgagor is not fiduciary.
87
 
Conaglen and Nolan face the problem that while good faith is said to be 
central to fiduciary obligations, and a core duty of a fiduciary in the execution of their 
duties, it is equally true that duties of good faith apply to non-fiduciaries.  They argue 
that good faith can apply to persons who are not fiduciaries, meaning that good faith 
must be something unique when applied in the context of a fiduciary relationship.
88
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The question immediately raised is what is the determinate for deciding levels of 
ordinary good faith and unique good faith for fiduciary purposes?  
Parties in a contractual relationship, for example, may well try to show good 
faith to each other, but considerations of good faith are not central to their 
relationship. Fiduciaries, on the other hand, owe a specific duty of good faith to their 
principal that acts to regulate the fiduciary’s actions or inactions. Conaglen and Nolan 
capture this important point stating ‘it is about prohibiting any intended use of those 
powers that is not directed to the furtherance-the future development of the 
principal’s interests. That is the key to distinguishing fiduciary good faith from other 
usages of that term.’89 
This author considers that unless ‘good faith’ has some other particular 
meaning for fiduciaries - a meaning that is separate and distinct from understandings 
of what good faith is in other spheres of law there appears to be no justification to 
attributing a special meaning that is only applicable to fiduciaries: good faith is 
simply a component (not an independent or distinct) part of the duty of loyalty.  
Further, it is incorrect to assume that good faith does not play an integral part in other 
legal relationships. 
90
 Identifying good faith as a component of a fiduciary duty does 
not, however, contribute much to the analysis of the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users: good faith is a public law principle that binds a 
local authority in their decision making. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
fiduciary context, because it qualifies the fiduciary’s unique undertaking to advance the 
interests of the principal.’ 
89
 ibid, 331 
90
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In Fassihi, Lady Justice Arden acknowledged that ‘good faith’ was expressed 
in very general terms, but felt this was one of its strengths.  She extolled the flexible 
and dynamic quality of equity and its capacity to apply in cases where it had not 
previously been applied. Professor Melvin Eisenberg
91
 considers that the duty of 
good faith provides a principled basis for courts to articulate new specific fiduciary 
obligations, which may be regarded as appropriate and responsive to changes in 
social and business norms and cannot be easily accommodated within the core 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.  There is, therefore, a growing body of opinion that the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other 
recognisable fiduciary conflict of interest: it also encompasses cases where the 
fiduciary in some way fails to act in good faith.  This author agrees with Conaglen 
and Nolan, who state that: ‘Good faith is too vague a concept to direct and judge 
action with any acceptable degree of predictability.  It is impossible to say with any 
clarity what behaviour is mandated by good faith alone.’ 92  
Notwithstanding extensive literature on good faith, no consensus exists on 
precisely what a duty of good faith means.
93
 
The contractarian view discussed in chapter two is that good faith and 
fiduciary duties share the same function as contract gap fillers, but they lie at different 
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points of a continuum.
94
 Mariana Pargendler also shares this view, drawing a gap-
filling classification between fiduciary duties as untailored gap-fillers, whilst good 
faith’ mandates the application of a tailored gap-filling method.95 They are essentially 
frameworks to help solve contracting problems, rather than means to impose 
inflexible moral standards on business parties or to accommodate other public policy 
considerations.
96
 
This author concludes that the duty of loyalty is wider than an obligation of 
good faith, and that good faith is not a separate, free standing fiduciary duty, albeit a 
fundamental component of the core duty of loyalty.
97
  Fiduciary duty is more than an 
untailored default gap-filling provision.
98
 This author joins with Rebecca Lee when 
she states ‘good faith’ is not a proper consideration of English fiduciary law, however 
it is defined’99 Lee goes on to state that ‘introducing an element of ‘good faith’ into 
the fiduciary obligation may risk conflating fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties.’100  
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Kelvin Low states: 
  A duty of loyalty necessarily entails that the obligor act in good faith, but a duty of 
good faith does not necessarily entail loyalty on the part of the obligor. In a fiduciary 
relationship the fiduciary’s loyalty is to consider the beneficiary’s exclusive interests in 
carrying out his duties, whereas ‘outside the fiduciary context, a duty of faith requires the 
obligor to balance his interests with those of the oblige….such a duty of good faith seems to 
be significantly less onerous than that owed by a fiduciary. Put more plainly, a duty to act in 
good faith is measurably different from a duty to act in good faith in another’s interest  
101
(original emphasis) 
 
3.5. Duty of Care 
 
We have seen that proponents of the prescriptive nature of fiduciary obligations have 
advocated widening the traditional proscriptive role to include a positive duty of care. 
Duty of care has an affirmative content.  In relation to the duties owed by a local 
authority, this author considers questions of duty of care are adequately covered by 
the existing law and that to include that duty as a component of fiduciary obligation 
would be to weaken fiduciary duty as a meaningful independent concept.  It is 
stretching the traditional no conflict obligation too far.  Fiduciaries commonly have a 
duty of care, but this is independent of, and separate to, their fiduciary duty of good 
faith.  As Larry Ribstein states ‘…a fiduciary duty substitutes relinquishing gain for 
submitting to judicial evaluation of services rendered.  The duty of care is generally 
an implied term concerning the manner of a contract’s performance for professional 
services or agency relationships.’  102 Professor Melanie B Leslie103  lists the duty of 
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care and the duty of loyalty as ‘the two most basic duties of trust law.’ There is now a 
statutory duty of care imposed on trustees by the Trustee Act 2000.  If local 
authorities are to be regarded as trustees then it follows that they would fall within 
these statutory provisions.
104
  .  
To what extent is a duty of care in a fiduciary relationship different to non-
fiduciary duties of care?  The predominant view across common law jurisdictions is 
that a duty of care is not a duty specific to fiduciaries;
105
  the law in England and 
Wales has long recognised that trustees owe a duty of care.  This duty, although it has 
its origins in equity is not a fiduciary duty.
106
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And Lewin on Trusts (18th ed 2012) para 34-01 
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‘Fencing Fiduciary Duties’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review, 899, 908. 
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2014) 53 
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A contrary view is expressed in the United States, where it is customary to 
include a duty of care as a fiduciary duty per se.  Professor William A Gregory 
criticises this contrary view and considers that the problem of conflating the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty is not merely semantic, but threatens to obfuscate legal 
reasoning. 
107
 This author agrees and considers that it is misleading to identify a duty 
of care as fiduciary per se, since it is not a fiduciary duty, but a tort concept and ‘quite 
unlike the duty of loyalty.’108  As Peter Cane recognised, ‘fiduciary obligations are 
different from any obligation imposed by tort law.  As a general rule, tort law does 
not require people to act for the benefit of others and to ignore their own interest, but 
only to avoid causing ‘dis-benefit’ to others.’109   
Supporters of this approach argue that the fiduciary standard of care is 
different from the duty of care imposed by ordinary tort law. It appears that the 
essence of difference is one of degree, rather than kind.
110
 In this author’s opinion, it 
is very difficult to suggest that the substance of the fiduciary duty of care relates to a 
higher standard of care, than in ordinary negligence cases, unless one relates that duty 
of care to the core notion of fiduciary loyalty, with its emphasis on strict moral 
compliance.  If duty of care is to be a distinct and separate part of a fiduciary duty, a 
relevant question of calibrating the necessary level of care arises.  This is particularly 
relevant in a local authority setting, where certain sections of the local ‘public’ are 
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more vulnerable than others-for example, children in care or elderly persons subject 
to care in their home or nursing homes.  It is unclear, if local authorities are regarded 
as being in a fiduciary relationship with such persons, whether a higher duty of care is 
owed to such persons than to other service users-for example, to their ordinary 
liability in negligence to a child who trips and is injured from a badly fitted street 
paving stone. 
Millett LJ in Mothew separated the prescriptive duties of due diligence and 
prudence in management from the proscriptive duties of loyalty, retaining the more 
stringent rules and equitable remedies for the latter. Yet ‘other voices doubt the 
appropriateness of severing the equitable duty of care from the category of fiduciary 
duties as propounded in Mothew and the proposed assimilation of the common law 
and equitable rules in breach of duty’.111  
This author re-affirms the view that whilst a duty of care is undoubtedly a 
vital part of a fiduciary obligation, it is not promoted to a stand-alone factor
112
; rather, 
it is related to and part of the dominant loyalty factor, which must be present before a 
fiduciary relationship is triggered and thus receives special judicial treatment.  Evans 
L J in Swindle v Harrison 
113
stated that duties imposed by equity on a fiduciary go far 
beyond the common law duties of skill and care.  This author considers that this view 
better reflects the predominant view across common law jurisdictions, and is 
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supported by English courts and scholars.
114
  Professor Kelli A. Alces 
115
 states: ‘An 
obligation to exercise care is not the same as undertaking a fiduciary obligation, 
because one does not give rise to the other, and because a party may owe a duty of 
care without having a fiduciary relationship’. Ribstein’s view was that the duty of 
care is not a fiduciary duty even though it is a duty to which all fiduciaries are 
bound.
116
 The debate reaffirms this author’s view that extending the proscriptive role 
of fiduciary obligations, not only causes fiduciary duty to lose potency by trespassing 
into other areas of tort and contract law, but unleashes an animal difficult to tame.  
Advocating a prescriptive dimension to fiduciary obligation means that its 
social function occupies a prominent place on the platform of analysis, particularly 
regards a local authority’s service delivery function and care for children, the elderly 
and other vulnerable groupings in their locality.  In order to protect such persons the 
scope of fiduciary duty must be moulded to the circumstances of each individual case 
and therefore challenges the exclusivity of contract and tort law as only being capable 
of dealing with non-economic interests.  Professor David Hayton 
117
 emphasises the 
‘good man’ philosophy of equity which prevents a defendant subject to a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty claiming that he was a good man and did what he did in the interests 
of his beneficiaries. 
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This is, of course, a contractarian-economic based viewpoint, but nevertheless 
it does illustrate the value society places on such fiduciary relationships, as well as its 
social benefits.  This leads to the conclusion by Rotman that ‘Relationships, not 
individuals, are the prime concern of fiduciary law’118.  In this author’s view, this is a 
limited interpretation of the role and scope of fiduciary law in society, as it 
undoubtedly has wider application, for example, in the applications of protecting 
social and environmental benefits.  The issue of whether fiduciary duty is confined 
only to economic interests is highly relevant to this thesis, since a local authority 
engages in delivery of services, where non-financial considerations may be 
paramount: the provision of child and vulnerable adult services where welfare 
considerations are greater than fiscal considerations.  Such welfare considerations 
may be far higher on the scale of relevant ethical stewardship than cost considerations 
alone.   
3.6. Trust and obedience 
Virtues of loyalty, trust and obedience arise in any discussion on the content of 
fiduciary duties, whether conducted academically or in a courtroom.  Loyalty, as both 
a concept and a duty, was considered above; it will be helpful to this thesis to also 
consider ‘trust’ and ‘obedience’ in order to emphasise the various strands of morality 
running through the fiduciary doctrine. 
3.6.1 Trust 
Trust features heavily in determining whether a fiduciary relationship is established. 
It is, of course, from the basic position of trust that strands of reliance and 
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vulnerability emerge.  Professor Tamar Frankel develops the notion of trust by 
identifying the close relationship between trust and reliance.  Both qualities are 
socially valuable, especially where there is reliance in, and trust that, the other actor 
in the relationship will carry out what they promise to do. Professor Frankel defines 
trust as ‘a reasonable belief that the other party will tell the truth and perform its 
promises. ’.119 The essence of this definition will be particularly relevant in chapter 7 
when a promise is made to service users by local authorities trigger legitimate 
expectations, from which later the local authority resiles.  
Professor Austin Scott emphasised the element of trust in fiduciary 
relationships by referring to the parable of the unjust steward in St Luke’s Gospel 16: 
1-8.
120
 A steward was asked to give account of his stewardship to his employer, 
because there had been accusations that he had wasted his employer’s goods. As he 
was about to dismissed he called in the employer’s debtors and reduced the purchase 
bill for 100 measures (8/9 gallons each) of oil from 100 to 50, and the other debtor’s 
purchase bill of 100 measures (twelve bushels each) of wheat from 100 to 80. This is 
a difficult parable to analyse, but its teaching is clear that we naturally expect that a 
servant entrusted with a master’s possessions and given critical tasks would be 
faithful in fulfilling the trust the master placed in the servant. The biblical truth is that 
we must give an account of our stewardship on earth.  Drawing an analogy with local 
authorities and those in authority must also exercise governance on stewardship 
principles and not in their own interests. Some philosophers have suggested that to 
trust is to rely on the goodwill of a trustee to perform their task.  As Professor 
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Annette Baier, for example states ‘When I trust in another, I depend on her goodwill 
toward me.’121  Professor Karen Jones takes a similar approach,122  whilst others, such 
as Professor Richard Holton view the act of trusting as a reactive stance: treating a 
failure to honour entrustment is not just a disappointment, but is also a betrayal, and 
grounds for resentment.
123
 We have normative expectations of trust with the people 
and organisations we interact with.
124
 This author concurs with Richard Holton when 
he states ‘there may well be some truth in all of them: trust may be better seen as a 
cluster concept, not as a term with simple definition.
125
  
 Trust, along with notions of loyalty, may be seen as the foundation of the 
fiduciary doctrine.  In this author’s opinion, however, the law concentrates more on 
protection of the beneficiary; the function of fiduciary duty is more proscriptive than 
prescriptive.  The actions of the beneficiary are discounted; the sole concern of the 
court is whether the fiduciary has breached his or her fiduciary duties (in failing to act 
                                                             
121
 Annette Baier, ‘Trust and Antitrust’ in Moral Prejudices (1986) 96 Ethics 231, 235 
122
 Karen Jones, ‘Trust as an Affective Attitude’ (1996) 107 Ethics 4, 4-5. ‘This way of 
seeing the other, with its constituent patterns of attention and tendencies of interpretation, 
explains the willingness of trusters to let those trusted get dangerously near the things they 
care about.’ 
123 Professor Richard Holton, ‘Fiduciary Relations and the nature of Trust’, 91, BUL, Rev, 
991, (2011), ‘In cases where we trust and are let down, we do not just feel disappointed, as 
we would if a machine let us down, we feel betrayed’ p. 993 
124
  See, Professor Sandford Goldberg, ‘The Philosophy of Trust: Key Features’ and ‘When 
expectations clash’, research conducted at the Trust Project, Northwestern University, 
<kellog.northwestern.edu/trust-project/contributions/sandford-goldberg.aspx. Professor 
Goldberg is a Professor of philosophy and this is a video link to three of his contributions to 
the Project-When Trust Expectations Clash; The Philosophy of Trust: Key Findings and The 
Nature of Trust: A philosopher’s Perspective. 
125
 Richard Holton, ‘Fiduciary Relations and the nature of Trust,’ (2011), 91 B U L Rev, 991, 
993. In this article Holton comments on reference to trust in Tamar Frankel’s book Fiduciary 
Law, at xvi (2011): ‘trust is reserved for other actors - mainly for people, and perhaps, by 
extension, for corporate of government bodies.’ 
See also Phillip Pettit, ‘The Cunning of Trust’ (1995) 24(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
202, 202, where he states: ‘For a society where people are disposed to be trusting, and where 
trust is generally well placed, it is almost certain to work more harmoniously and fruitful than 
a society where trust fails to appear or spread. If we are not clear about the good reasons why 
people might trust one another, we are in danger of designing institutions that will reduce 
trust or even drive it out.’ 
132 
 
in the sole interests of the beneficiary) rather than with the degree of trust placed in 
the fiduciary by the beneficiary. 
126
 
3.6.2 Obedience-a trinitarian alternative   
 In order to do justice to the depth and diversity of academic literature on the 
foundation of fiduciary duty, reference must be made to the work of Professor Rob E. 
Atkinson. Jnr 
127
  Atkinson locates two forms of obedience in four kinds of 
relationships: profit making corporations, private trusts, charitable trusts and 
charitable corporations; he questions the twin pillars of duty of care and duty of 
loyalty.  He argues that a third duty, obedience, is more basic and is the foundation on 
which the duties of care and loyalty ultimately rest. His aim, drawing analogy with 
physics is ‘to reduce all the relevant phenomena to a single, unifying principle.’128     
In place of the prevailing dualistic theory of fiduciary duty, Atkinson therefore offers 
a Trinitarian alternative; ‘As the Trinitarian metaphor implies, the claim here is that, 
properly understood, three identifiably different elements are functionally distinct yet 
essentially one.’ 129 This author disagrees with inclusion of the duty of care and 
accorded separate status, as discussed above, but finds Professor Atkinson’s reference 
to the duty of obedience compelling.  Atkinson distinguishes two forms of the duty of 
obedience, the strong and the weak.  By the ‘strong’ form of the duty of obedience he 
means the principal’s control of trust assets is not just within a generation of 
beneficiaries, but also across generations.  This is usually called ‘dead hand control.’  
                                                             
126
 Justice James J Edelman ‘When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise? (2010) Law Quarterly 
Review 13 
127
  Rob E Atkinson Jnr, ‘Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty’, (2008), 34 Journal 
of Corporation Law, 1 
128  ibid, 45 
129
  Rob E Atkinson Jnr , ‘Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty’, (2008), 34 
Journal of Corporation Law, 1 
133 
 
The ‘weak’ form of the duty of obedience, on the other hand, is essentially nothing 
more than the ordinary law of contracts and agency.
130
 
Although Atkinson does not specifically consider the relationship between 
local authorities and their service users, his approach is nevertheless helpful, since he 
illustrates that the duty of obedience is more extensive than the duties of care and 
loyalty.  He states ‘that the duty of obedience is, ‘deeper, broader and longer.’ 131 He 
constructs a triangle at the base of which is obedience. His premise is that the duty of 
obedience is often overlooked and is absorbed into other heads of fiduciary 
obligation.  Seen from this perspective, duties of loyalty and care are derived from, 
and grounded upon, the more fundamental duty of obedience.
132
  
Using Professor Atkinson’s analysis it may, therefore, be more appropriate to 
identify the fiduciary duty of local authorities to their service users as involving 
obedience to the letter and intent of their statutory purposes, rather than attributing 
their duty of loyalty directly to service users.  
3.7 Conceptualising Notions of Loyalty, Trust and Obedience in a 
Local Government Setting  
3.7.1 Loyalty and Polycentric decision-making 
It is necessary to consider loyalty in relation to the utility of fiduciary obligation in 
the local government setting. How comfortable is its application to the public law 
field? Loyalty is a requirement that governs the exercise of judgment and is integral 
to all fiduciary relationships; can we say that local authorities are clothed with duties 
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of loyalty?  Local authorities owe a duty to their council taxpayers and to their service 
users to conduct their affairs and decision-making carefully and with due diligence, 
but local authorities have a vast range of sectional and community interests to take 
into account, which may make it impossible to act with loyalty to all conflicting and 
conflicted interests.  
Loyalty in this context is a difficult concept to apply and it may be that a 
proper conception is to view the loyalty of a local authority as being towards its 
statutory purposes, rather than towards a person or group of persons.
133
   
Fiduciary obligation, with its emphasis on the core element of loyalty, 
technically means that there would a breach of fiduciary duty to the person or group 
that ‘loses out’ in the final decision.  The assumption is that, no matter how fair are 
the procedures in place for making decisions, loyalty can never be satisfied where the 
class of beneficiaries is wide, with conflicting and competing interests. Professor Seth 
Davis, an opponent of using fiduciary principles in the public sphere, concludes that 
undivided loyalty
134
 in a local government context cannot be completely satisfied, 
even where a detailed set of fair procedures have been set in place.  Fiduciary 
obligation, with its core duty of loyalty, means that it cannot have a place in the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users, unless the duty of 
loyalty is reduced to a ‘best interests’ duty.  This author is, however, against a 
‘watering down’ of the fiduciary duty in this way, as there are other legal conceptions 
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that do not rely on duties of absolute loyalty and may better ‘fit’ the relationship 
between local authorities and their service users.  Such conceptions include the 
community stewardship role of a local authority which is discussed in chapter four. 
3.7.2 Loyalty as prioritising interests 
Some philosophers emphasise that to be loyal to something is to have special concern 
with its interests. Professor Philip Pettit,
135
 for example, states that ‘to be loyal is to 
be dedicated to a particular individual’s welfare’:  R.E. Ewin continues this theme by 
suggesting that loyalty is, at least in part, ‘the bonding of oneself preferentially to the 
interests of a certain group or individual.’ 136 and that loyalty is a willingness to ‘take 
the interests of others as one’s own.’137 Professor Simon Keller138 suggests that ‘there 
are ways of expressing loyalty that do not come down to prioritising the interests of 
loyalty’s object; there are expressions of loyalty other than loyalty in concern.’139 
Keller’s conception of loyalty supports the argument for attributing a fiduciary duty 
to local authorities in their relationship with service users, because it is possible to 
prioritise something or someone’s welfare without being loyal to it; conversely, you 
can be loyal to something or someone without prioritising their interests.  Keller’s 
views stem from his belief that the notions of loyalty (as a concept, value or virtue), is 
not suited to any foundational theoretical role.
140
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3.7.3 ‘Sole’ or ‘Best Interests’ 
Some
141
 have argued that reference to ‘sole’ interests should be replaced by reference 
to ‘best’ interests so as to alleviate the strictness of the no conflict, no profit rules 
which applies, even where the fiduciary has caused no loss to his or her principal 
(and, indeed, has even made a profit for them.)
142
 Significant academic criticism has 
however, been levelled at the ‘best interests’ approach, describing it as ‘unhistorical, 
simplistic, true in part only and misleading.’ 143  
 With the ‘sole interests’ approach, protection is clearly aimed at preventing 
the fiduciary exploiting their position; it does, however, go further, illustrating a 
coercive legal approach by effectively saying to the fiduciary that if you are disloyal 
by direct misappropriation of trust funds or you place yourself in situations where 
your personal interest conflict with those of your beneficiary, then you are in breach 
of your fiduciary duty and the penalties are onerous.  This ‘sole interest’ is widely 
regarded as a most fundamental rule of trust law. Equity’s approach is that it is better 
to strike down all disloyal acts rather than trying to separate the harmless and the 
harmful by permitting the trustee to justify his representation of two interests.  
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It may be that conceiving loyalty as working in the ‘best interests’144 of a 
beneficiary, as opposed to their ‘sole’ interest, may better fit the relationship between 
local authorities and their service users, whilst accepting that it is a lower standard.  A 
‘best interest’ approach is advocated by Professor John H Langbein, who argues that 
the duty of loyalty should be reformulated to prefer the best interest, rather than the 
sole interest of the beneficiary.  His premise is that sometimes beneficiaries are better 
off when a transaction also benefits the trustees. 
Professor Lionel L. Smith
145
 is also supportive of a ‘best interests’ approach.  
He analyses fiduciary concepts of loyalty as prescribing how a fiduciary should 
exercise judgement: decision making should be made in an entirely subjective way, 
with an emphasis on what the fiduciary perceives to be the best interests of the 
beneficiary. This approach recognises that different decisions may be made by 
different fiduciaries in essentially the same circumstances. Professor Smith states:  
the importance of the subjective nature of the duty of loyalty is that the duty 
evaluates, not whether the fiduciary has done their job well, but whether they have 
done it loyally, that is with an eye solely on what they perceive to be the best 
interests of the beneficiary 
146
  
 
This author considers that such an approach may, however, create problems in 
adjudication, as enquiries into the subjective motives of a fiduciary may prove 
difficult evidentially and might also produce distorted decisions by the courts.  
Breach of the straightforward conflict of interest rule produces greater certainty, 
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or Best interest?’ 114 Yale L J, 929, where he argues that a present strict liability approach in 
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albeit accepting that in some circumstances it may penalise a well-intentioned 
fiduciary. 
Translating a ‘best interest’ approach to the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users, presents problems, not least because the phrase is 
very imprecise; undoubtedly decisions made by a local authority on the basis of the 
best interests of a section of service users to the exclusion of others is a recipe for 
challenge. If ‘best interest’ is used as a guide, it must not be at the expense of strict 
compliance by the local authority in fulfilling its statutory purpose. 
3.7.4 Loyalty-Trust and Expectations 
There is a clear nexus between loyalty and expectations. In the context of fiduciary 
relationships expectations arise on both sides: it is a form of a double sided 
transaction.  The analogy of the simple double entry accounting system is very apt.  
Fiduciary obligation is often seen as a one sided relationship, but this is totally 
incorrect.  The fiduciary will be expected to look to the interests of the beneficiary at 
every turn; the fiduciary will expect trust from the principal such that he will be 
allowed to make choices within the scope of the discretionary power granted to him.  
These are both realistic expectations of loyalty towards one another.  
Fiduciary relationships are typically marked by strong interpersonal trust 
between the beneficiary and the fiduciary. Indeed, some regard trust as the central 
characteristic of a fiduciary relationship.  Trust, in and of itself, is not sufficient for 
finding a fiduciary relationship. 
147
  It is, however, useful to discuss trust in the 
context of the relationship between local authorities and their service users.  This 
                                                             
147 Professor J C Shepherd, ‘Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships’ (1981), 
97 LQR 51, 59 ‘It is patent that people go around trusting others all the time, without 
necessarily creating a fiduciary relationship as a result.’ 
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author agrees with Laing 
148
 that the existence of interpersonal trust between parties 
does not inevitably entail a fiduciary obligation of loyalty, but rather is a common 
characteristic of many relationships in private law.  Shepherd argues that it is 
foolhardy to think we are capable of ‘neatly tagging and labelling the various facets’ 
of trust relevant to fiduciary liability.
149
  This author concurs, and has difficulty in 
seeing how trust can function as a legal standard.
150
 
In the relationship between local authorities and their service users there are 
clear expectations of persons, groups and associations that the local authority will act 
in their best interests.  This may not, however, be possible at all times and in all 
circumstances and the expectations of one group may come into conflict with those of 
another.  If the conflict is resolved by giving preference to one group over another, it 
does not necessarily follow that there is disloyalty to the other.  It is preferable to 
view the situation, not from an aspect of disloyalty, but rather from the perspective of 
the local authority acting in the public interest and for the general good and welfare of 
all its service users. 
If expectation is brought into the equation, then it becomes necessary to draw 
lines of demarcation, in order to identify circumstances that should justify 
expectations of loyal conduct.  This may be because past dealing between the parties 
demonstrates sufficient grounds of expectation, although if it is evident that loyalties 
owed by the actor are orientated elsewhere, an expectation of loyalty is unlikely to be 
justifiable. Expectation in the context of local government arises from trust placed in 
the administrative promise-maker that they will be loyal to their promises.  Emphasis 
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on expectations, and realisation of these expectations, is central to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation (procedural and substantive) which is analysed further in 
chapter seven.  
Society, through the agency of the courts, clearly sees breach of loyalty as a 
part of the prophylactic nature of fiduciary duty and wishes to cleanse society from 
what it conceives as a form of unconscionable behaviour.  A review of the case law 
relating to breach of fiduciary duty identifies loyalty as being present and central to 
the finding of a fiduciary relationship.  This author agrees with Professor DeMott 
when she states: ‘Focusing on loyalty as fiduciary duty’s distinctive and animating 
force also lends some analytic structure to cases in which the question is whether an 
actor should be subject to a fiduciary duty outside the conventional or typical 
fiduciary categories.’151  
Society obviously sees value in fiduciary law for both human and business 
relationships.  Professor Paul. D. Finn captures this by stating ‘The true nature of the 
fiduciary principle…originates, self-evidently, in public policy.  To maintain the 
integrity and utility of relationships in which the (or a) role of one party is perceived 
to be the service of the interests of the other, it insists upon a fine loyalty in that 
service’.152 Professor Finn did not explain what he meant by his adjectival use of the 
word ‘fine’ but one can draw infer that he was espousing loyalty of more than a 
vague, or emotional, or casual nature.  ‘Fiduciary interactions rank amongst the most 
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valuable in society by enhancing productivity and knowledge, facilitating 
specialisation, and creating fiscal and informational wealth.’ 153 
 This is echoed in Parks of Hamilton Holdings Ltd v Colin Campbell, where 
Lady Dorian
154
 said of a commercial fiduciary actor: ‘Society expects that fiduciary 
to answer to the highest ethical standards…without such a requirement, the restraints 
which could be placed on the fiduciary nature of the relationship would be diluted and 
uncertainty introduced into mercantile dealings.’ 
Fiduciary law subordinates the individual interests which are emphasised in 
areas of contract and tort to broader social and economic goals that are consistent 
with the construction and preservation of social and economic interdependency.  This 
may be illustrative of the different emphasis held by equity as compared to the 
common law. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is much disagreement amongst judges and 
academics as to the correct duty or set of duties that arise when a fiduciary 
relationship is created.  The difference of approach and emphasis between different 
schools of thought is clear.  There are doctrinal differences, as well as specific 
consequences that flow from supporting one approach rather than another.  As we 
have seen the proscriptive school is very traditional and negative concentrating on 
combating conflicted interests, whereas the prescriptive approach is wider and 
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 Paul D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in Timothy Youdan (ed), ‘Equity, Fiduciaries and 
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includes positive duties of good faith and care.  It may be the case that the 
prescriptive approach better suits the relationship between local authorities and their 
service users, because it emphasises the positive active role of a local authority, as 
democratically elected public servants carrying out their service mandate.   
This chapter has shown that the duties of care and good faith are not unrelated 
to the duty of loyalty; in fact duties of care and good faith can be viewed as part of an 
overall concept of fiduciary loyalty.  What does such a conclusion mean in the 
context of local authorities and their service users? Professors David L Ponet and 
Ethan J Lieb
155
 illustrate the merit of including duties of care and good faith within 
their conception of public fiduciaries by using deliberative democratic dialogue as an 
example. In this conception duty of care is understood ‘as an obligation to consult 
with, and deliberately engage, constituents as part of the process of rationally 
considering their preferences and assessing the full panoply of potential causes of 
action within the fiduciaries’ authorisation. 156 Ponet and Leib state that good faith 
requirement in fiduciary law ‘underscores the fact that preferences and interests are 
not fixed in time but can undergo revision and reformulation….the political 
relationship between ruler and ruled is ongoing and extends beyond bookend election 
days. ‘157 
This author is, however, concerned that going further down the path of 
prescriptivism will ultimately lead to the incorporation of duties unrelated to the 
original public policy purpose of catching conflicted conduct by a person who has 
accepted fiduciary office, whether expressly or impliedly; for example, by including a 
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duty of candour, as a separate head of fiduciary liability, unless that duty is subsumed 
under the central fiduciary characteristic of loyalty.  As a consequence, fiduciary duty 
will be watered down by accommodating obligations that are best suited to other 
areas of law, such as contract or tort law. 
Identifying loyalty within a relationship will certainly help in legally 
classifying that relationship, and will also assist in viewing the obligations that arise. 
Loyalty, however, is not seen as a key factor by some, such as Professor Nolan,
158
 
who sees loyalty not as a positive obligation the breach of which can be enforced by 
equitable remedy, but as merely ‘a goal to which fiduciaries are encouraged to 
aspire.’  This author supports Professor Robert Flannigan when he states: ‘it is not 
always clear whether terms, such as trust, confidence, faithfulness, good faith, loyalty 
or fidelity are being used as synonyms for conventional fiduciary duty or as labels for 
distinct duties in novel and undeveloped taxonomies.’ 159 
In this author’s opinion, by focussing on the classification of fiduciary 
relationships we may have discarded, or at best given scant attention, to the very 
important personal element of the nature of a fiduciary obligation.   This element is 
often found in fiduciary relationships, such as doctor and patient, trustee and 
beneficiary.  There are of course notable exceptions, such as the relationship between 
a company and its shareholders, which may lack the intense personal element found 
in other relational contexts yet still fall within a recognised fiduciary relationship.  
Certainly common characteristics of loyalty and trust reinforce the personal relational 
nexus. In jurisdictions such as Canada, the fiduciary doctrine has been applied to 
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novel situations, where the personal element is clearly present, for example, between 
counsellor and client.  It is this author’s opinion that the potential dynamism of the 
fiduciary concept must not be stunted by the search for its structural characteristics.  
Fiduciary doctrine is not merely a set of loosely-fitting or entirely unrelated rules 
functioning in an ad hoc fashion. Rather, it is a blueprint for the protection and 
continued efficacy of interdependent societal relations,
160
 not least the relations 
between local authorities and their service users. 
Twenty one years ago Professor Rotman highlighted the exciting nature of 
fiduciary law ‘whose potential is only beginning to be’, 161 yet fiduciary law in the 
context of the relationship between local authorities and their service users is an area 
that has not yet been explored.  This thesis attempts to address this gap by exploring 
how fiduciary theories might be translated into local government. These issues are 
now discussed in chapter four.   
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               CHAPTER FOUR 
Concept translation: can concepts of equity be transferred into 
public law? 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter two we examined the way in which fiduciary relationships are formed and 
considered the relational indicators used by the courts to identify such relationships. 
Chapter three analysed the content and nature of the fiduciary duty and concluded 
that trust and loyalty were the key elements of the relationship, as identified by judges 
and scholars alike.  This does, however, present real practical problems in translating 
private law fiduciary duties to public law which are explored in this chapter. The 
main reason for this, as noted in chapter three, is that a local authority’s ‘loyalty’ to 
one section of a community invariably means that other persons and groups may feel 
‘left out’. A related problem is the multitude of discretionary decisions that a local 
authority must take in relation to a wide range of issues and interested parties. Such 
factors suggest that fiduciary duty seems to have limited application in a local 
government setting: if that is so, the private law trust model has a role to play in 
public law, but not in its present form.  
Commissioners for Local Authority Accounts in Scotland v Stirling D C
1
  
illustrate that some jurisdictions find the concept of a local authority as a fiduciary 
                                                             
1
 In Commissioners for Local Authority Accounts in Scotland v Stirling DC [1984] SLT 
Reports, 442 (The Lord President (Lord Emslie), Lords Cameron and Avonside) 
A good example of the overlay of an implied fiduciary duty in central government activity is 
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inappropriate on the facts. In this case the duty imposed on the council was one of 
reasonable regard for the interests of the ratepayer; it was not conceptualized as a 
fiduciary duty; indeed, Lord Avonside stated that he did not ‘find a close examination 
of the word ‘fiduciary’ at all helpful and felt that an ‘inordinate amount of time (had 
been) spent on questions of a fiduciary nature.’2 Lord Cameron reserved giving any 
opinion on fiduciary duty, but was not dismissive.
3
 The Lord President, Lord Emslie, 
was more supportive of the fiduciary argument put to him by counsel, and stated: ‘I 
have no doubt that the council had a duty in the terms in which counsel for the 
controller expressed it.’4The courts conclusion was not because the court had failed to 
refer to the three cases of Roberts v Hopwood
5
, Prescott v Birmingham Corporation
6
 
and Bromley LBC v GLC 
7
  (discussed in the next chapter) because Lord Emslie did, 
but, that their review of those English cases did not lead them to conclude that a 
fiduciary relationship arose on the facts of the instant case.    
This author’s sense is that the Scottish Court considered fiduciary duties as 
too narrow and insufficiently accommodating of wider public interests.  This author 
adopts a similar approach and considers that, although the private trust model may 
provide a general framework, it does not lie easily in the public service sphere, where 
it is perhaps more appropriate to regard a local authority as a ‘steward’ of local 
community resources and interests, rather than as a trustee.  In using a stewardship   
concept, there would be lesser emphasis on loyalty, which is so central to the 
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fiduciary model.
8
  A stewardship approach might be more accommodating of 
situations faced by local authorities who have to achieve a difficult balance in their 
decision making, especially in the present climate of austerity (see Table 4.1).  
A great deal of work in understanding the fiduciary foundations of public 
authority has been carried out by Professor Theodore Rave.  In Politicians as 
Fiduciaries 
9
 he draws an analogy between private and public fiduciaries, and 
concludes that the analogy is appropriate.  Rave primarily deals with election law, 
and draws on the corporate analogy where the principals are the shareholders who 
elect the company board of directors to manage the corporate entity; whereas, - in 
public law the principals are the citizens who elect the local councils to run their local 
government. Rave’s reasoning is that these two superficially dissimilar bodies of law 
are thus unified by the same regulatory dilemma of diverse groups.  Lieb, Ponet and 
Serota, however, claim that ‘public law is not unitary in how it identifies relationships 
and imposes duties, a fact not made clear by Rave’s too direct transplantation of 
private law concepts into the redistricting domain.’ 10  This author agrees, and feels 
that ‘a straightforward importation of private law duties into the unique relationship 
between represented and representative is not appropriate.’11  This chapter will 
consider why a simplistic transfer of the private fiduciary duty and trust mechanism 
does not fit easily in public law. Indeed Lieb, Ponet and Serota state: ‘we need a 
deeper appreciation of the particularities of political relationships so that we can 
calibrate the fiduciary principle and related enforcement mechanisms to this sui 
generis public domain.’  In discussing Rave’s work they note ‘ Rave’s analysis would 
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benefit from engaging hard questions about who is really best identified as the public 
fiduciary, who is the actual beneficiary, and what are the right ways to enforce the 
constraints of the sui generis fiduciary relationship in the political sphere. ’12 These 
are the issues to which this author will now turn. 
4. 2 Problems of ‘Fit’ 
Professor Seth Davis, for example states: 
The problem of fit robs fiduciary government of the resolving power necessary for a 
creative reinstatement of public law. To make the fiduciary account of government 
fit, it is necessary to draw a thin comparison between private fiduciaries and public 
officials.  Taken as a modest analogy between private fiduciaries and public officials-
both, after all, are delegated powers by others- the theory of fiduciary government 
simply restates perennial problems in public law 
13
   
 
For purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on whether local authorities as 
institutions are public fiduciaries, and not the officials of local authorities. Davis 
seems to have no quarrel with the basic premise of fiduciary law that places emphasis 
on protection of the vulnerable (in this case of citizens), rather his concern relates to 
the substantive issues of fit, such as doctrinal issues, standing, taxonomic and 
remedial issues.  He states: ‘The problems of fit, intent and function, highlight the 
difficulties of translating between public and private law.’14Issues of standing are 
outside the remit of this thesis, although we may note that Davis argues that the 
modern doctrine of standing is also inconsistent with the fiduciary analogy. 
15
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4.2.1 Doctrinal borrowing 
Doctrinally, Davis raises the ‘old chestnut’ of there being no universally acceptable 
and comprehensive definition of what constitutes a fiduciary.  He states ‘…..the 
possibilities of translating private fiduciary law into public law are limited,
16
 
particularly, in the light of how, quoting Leib and others who state: ‘little headway 
has been made in delineating fiduciary-beneficiary relationships in the public 
context.’17  This author, however, supports (in part) the view expressed by Leib, 
Ponet and Serota, who argue strongly for a sui generis classification of the 
relationship between public institutions and their service users, on the basis of the 
morphological similarity between private and public agency problems.
18
  This chapter 
will, however illustrate that shared similarities may not be enough. 
4.2.2 Remedial problems 
Professor Davis also notes that the difficulty of transposing private law fiduciary 
remedies
19
 into public law ‘are a far cry from the prospective injunction that is part 
and parcel of modern public law litigation.’20  Whilst Davis is talking about American 
law, his comment does find resonance with the use of injunctions in English 
administrative law, which are after all an equitable remedy.  Davis further states ‘It 
requires also a theory for equilibrating jurisdictional and remedial doctrines in public 
law to the fiduciary model.  That theory has not been forthcoming.  When stripped of 
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its characteristic remedies, it is unclear how fiduciary law would function as a source 
for public law doctrines.’21  His view is that remedial restrictions are necessary 
because of the interplay of balancing individual rights against competing public 
interests.
22
  In reply, it is true that public law litigants cannot typically obtain 
damages, much less disgorgement in successful challenges to alleged abuse of local 
government powers.  However, there is no justifiable reason why public law 
adjudication cannot use and adapt such remedies as they see fit, a practice they have 
achieved successfully with other equitable remedies, such as injunctions and 
declaratory relief.  This is a very contentious area and, while the use of monetary 
remedies in public law has been the subject of recent Law Commission reports
23
 it is 
not discussed further in this chapter, as to do so would deflect from our discussion of 
exploring translating equitable principles into public law.  Notwithstanding, it is 
prudent to note that remedies are certainly a relevant issue and their type and content 
would need further exploration, if fiduciary duty and trusts is translated to the public 
sphere. After all, transposing concepts from private law to public law will have no 
value as such, unless it leads to recourse to wider remedial relief. 
Davis concludes that: 
Fiduciary government cannot, however, fulfil the promise made in its name.  
Politicians and bureaucrats are not like private fiduciaries.  They do not serve discrete 
classes of beneficiaries, and they are subject to demands that cannot be distilled into a 
discrete maximand.  To translate private fiduciary law into public law results either in 
resort to general principles that provide no helpful guidance or fiduciary doctrines 
that are an ill fit for public law problems 
24
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Davis’s objections need to be taken seriously, as do judicial remarks against 
pressing too far the analogy between what the law requires of trustees in their 
decision making and of decision-makers in the public sphere
25
.  The purpose of the 
next section is therefore to consider the issue of ‘ill fit’ specifically in relation to the 
nature of local authorities, identifying the beneficial objects
26
 and the difficulties of 
dealing with polycentric decision-making. 
4.2.3 Identifying the Nature and functional scope of local authorities as 
statutory corporations  
A local authority is a statutory corporation owing its origin to an Act of Parliament or 
Royal Charter.  The consequence of such a birthright means that a local authority can 
only do that which it is statutorily permitted to do; features of its corporate 
governance, such as a discretionary power, fall to be determined by interpretation of 
the enabling statute.  The relationship of local authorities with their service users is 
that of a public authority governed by proper construction of the relevant statutes. 
Whether literal or purposive techniques of statutory construction or a combination of 
both are used, the central aim of the court is to elicit Parliament’s intention.  If we 
view a local authority as a trustee, it may be correct to consider the founding 
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legislation as some form of trust deed.  The upshot is that, apart from any overlay of 
equity’s fiduciary obligation, the powers of a local authority will always be defined 
by the empowering statute and common law principles. 
Lord Templeman in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough 
Council and Others
27
  stated: ‘a local authority, although democratically elected and 
representative of the area, it is not a sovereign body and can only do such things as 
are expressly or impliedly authorised by Parliament.’ 28 It made no difference that the 
local authority had been incorporated by Royal Charter;
29
 they were also subject to 
any statutory limits imposed. Hazell involved the legality of speculative transactions 
totalling £390 million pounds conducted through a London capital market fund.  This 
borrowing was to fund major capital development that had taken place in the 
borough.  The council would benefit if interest rates fell, but lose if interest rates rose.  
The expenditure was challenged by the Auditor appointed by the Audit Commission.  
The sole question for the court was whether the council was authorised 
expressly or impliedly to enter into what were termed ’swap contracts’.  The court 
concluded that there was no authority to enter into such arrangements, as there was no 
express statutory authority under the local government legislation nor was there 
implied authority as an arrangement incidental to their borrowing function. The 
definition of ‘functions’ in the governing legislation at that time, Section 111 of Local 
Government Act 1972, was ‘the sum total of the activity Parliament had entrusted to 
it’.30  It was suggested31 that the court itself could sanction a transaction that resulted 
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in a breach of trust (through analogy to a breach of trust by a trustee)
32
 Lord 
Templeman rejected such an approach, stating ‘while the court has jurisdiction to 
sanction any transaction which the settlor could have authorised and with all 
beneficiaries being sui juris could sanction, the court had no jurisdiction to extend the 
powers on a corporation by Parliament or to approve an unlawful transaction by a 
corporation.’   33 The actions of the local authority were outside the totality of activity 
permitted by the statute. 
4.2.4 Commercial Functions 
This section addresses the extent (if any) commercial consideration should be 
a factor in their decision making of local authorities that affect their service users. In 
Hazell, Lord Templeman developed his analysis of the legal status of a local authority 
drawing a useful distinction between the status of a local authority and an ordinary 
trading company.  He said a local authority ‘is not a trading or currency or 
commercial operator with no limit on the method or extent of its borrowing powers to 
speculate.’34  He emphasised the position of a local authority, in this case 
Hammersmith and Fulham, as a public authority dealing with public monies. He 
considered that a local authority ‘which borrowed in reliance on future successful 
swap operations would be failing in its duty to act prudently in the interests of 
                                                             
32
 A court has the statutory power to give relieve a trustee under section 61 of the Trustee Act 
1925 for a breach of trust. There are, however, stringent requirements that need to be satisfied 
before the court will grant relief. These involve honesty, reasonableness and fairness. See Re 
Stuart [1897] 2 Ch 583, and Maugham, ‘Excusable Breaches of Trust’ [1898] LQR 159, 
stating that the wrongdoing trustee must prove that he or she deserves the ‘dubious 
prerogative of mercy’ vested in the court 
33
 [1922]  A.C. 1  para 
34
 [1922] A.C. 1 [31] (Lord Templeman) 
Peter Scott QC counsel for the local authority acknowledged that ‘the fundamental distinction 
between a local authority and banks is that the local authority does not exist for the purposes 
of trade but to provide local services as stipulated by Parliament.’ 
154 
 
ratepayers.’35  This is a clear judicial example of the principle of stewardship 
espoused by this author.
36
  Lord Templeman recognised the source of a local 
authority’s funds and that a local authority had controlled powers of borrowing, both 
short-term and long-term; he considered that ,with the latter, fairness dictated that 
expenditure be spread over future generations of local council taxpayers, and not 
imposed entirely on those who pay when the expenditure is incurred.  Lord 
Templeman concluded that the swap transactions involved were a speculative method 
of raising money in the hope of reducing the burden of interest accruing on money 
already borrowed.  The swap activity could not be considered as an incidental 
function covered under section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 to the 
statutory borrowing power, because it was a distinct and separate activity.
37
 Michael 
Barnes QC argued that due regard for local tax payers’ interests was a ‘fiduciary 
duty’ of the local authority and was part of the requirement of public law duty to act 
reasonably.  Fiduciary obligation was, in his view, a component of an existing ground 
of judicial review. 
Hazell is particularly important because of its discussion of the functions of a 
local authority and its statutory nature.  It continues the judicial stewardship approach 
displayed in Attorney Gen v Belfast,
38
 a case referred to in chapter 5, where the Irish 
Chancellor said ‘Boroughs are now mere functionary institutions-trustees of public 
funds.’39 In Hazell, Lord Templeman recited some of the key functions of a principal 
                                                             
35
 [1922] A.C. 1 (Lord Templeman) 
36
 Stewardship principles were clearly broken as the auditor produced statistics showing that 
77 local authorities out of 450 principal local authorities entered into 400 swap transactions 
between 1987 and 1989. 10 councils had entered into more than 10 transactions and 18 into 
more than five swap deals. Hammersmith & Fulham had entered into a staggering 592 swap 
transactions of a notional principal sum of £6,052m. 
37 [1922] A.C. 1,See paras 21G-22A, 29E-30A, 31F, 33H-34A, 37C, 44E, 46F-G,47 E-F 
38
 [1855] 4 IR Ch 119, 141-142 
39
 ibid, 141-142 
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local authority
40, which have been ‘extended under many statutes to public health, 
housing, planning and highways and other environmental matters and to education, 
housing and social welfare services including the care and protection of children, the 
sick and the elderly.’41 
Hazell conveys a clear message that a local authority does not exist for the 
purpose of trade, but to provide local services as stipulated by Parliament.
42
  On this 
approach, a local authority is foremost a service vehicle; that public service ethos may 
now be changing, from a provider of goods and services to one of an enabler. The 
defining characteristic of ‘enabling’ as argued by Leach & Davies,43 is that the 
‘enabling authority’ redefines the primary purpose of any local council: away from 
that of a provider of services to that of a purchaser of goods. The strategic function of 
an ‘enabling authority’ is to specify service requirements informed by local 
community needs, engaging with a market of external providers to deliver local 
services. This shift injunction provides further grounds for reappraising the 
classification of a local authority in law.   As local authority service delivery methods 
have changed since Hazell, from a provider to an enabler, the designation of a local 
authority as a service entity may be questioned by some. What is not open to 
challenge, however, is that a local authority must carry out its statutory purposes, not 
                                                             
40
 Local Government Act 1972, s 270, defines a principal local authority as a County Council, 
District Council or London Borough Council 
41
 [1992] 2 A.C. 1, [22] 
See case comments – ‘Tails you lose? The swaps case examined’ (1991) 12(5) Bus L R 145-
146 
‘Local authority swaps: lessons for all transactions’ (1991) 2(3) P L C 7-12 
42
 Peter Scott QC for the Council referred to Attorney-General for Ceylon v Silva [1953] AC 
461, 479, where the fundamental distinction between local authorities and banks - the local 
authority does not exist for the purposes of trade but to provide local services as stipulated by 
Parliament 
43
   S Leach., & H Davies., (1996) introduction in S Leach, H Davies and Associates 
‘Enabling or Disabling Local Government,’ Buckingham Open University Press, p.3 
See also, ’The ensuring Council: An alternative vision for the future of local government’, 
APSE (Association for Public Service Excellence), Apse.org.uk May 2012 pp.10 & 11  
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with any particular person or group in mind, but for the well-being of the community 
it governs and serves.  
4.2.5 The ‘fiduciary’ nature of local authority functions 
In Charles Terence Estates v Cornwall Council,
44
  Cranston J stated that Bromley 
contained an authoritative statement of the principle of a council’s fiduciary duties to 
its council tax payers.  In Bromley, the GLC
45
 owed a duty to the general transport 
users on the one hand (the public interest factor) and, on the other hand, a duty to its 
ratepayers; all of the interests had to be fairly balanced. Of Bromley, Cranston J said: 
This binding authority means that relevant legislation conferring a power on a local 
authority must be read subject to the fiduciary duty owed to its ratepayers.  A local 
authority cannot exercise a statutory power without regard to its fiduciary duty; if it 
purports to do so it is acting beyond its statutory powers 
46
   
 
This is significant because, although Cranston J could have relied on the ultra 
vires doctrine, he instead explicitly referred to the importance of fiduciary obligation 
in a public context and did so in direct and unambiguous language.  Cranston J 
further recognised that the fiduciary duty must be balanced with other duties
47
: in the 
present case, this required balancing Cornwall Council’s statutory duty to the 
homeless and its fiduciary duty to local taxpayers through preservation of council 
funds
48
.  
These conflicting considerations, and the need to balance a local authority’s 
fiduciary duty to ratepayers with the provision of services to its locality, were also 
                                                             
44
 [2012] EWHC 1439 
45
 [1982] 1 All E R 129 (CA & HL), this case is discussed in depth in chapter 5. 
46
 ibid, [75] specifically headed ‘fiduciary duties’. 
47
 [2012] EWHC 1439 [75] 
48 ibid. Cranston J ‘Fundamental to a public body’s accountability is the care it exercises in 
handling public moneys. In the context of local authorities this takes legal shape in the 
principle of their fiduciary duty to local taxpayers.’ [64]. 
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identified in Pickwell, where Forbes J. said ‘It is plain that a local authority owes a 
fiduciary duty to its ratepayers: it also owes a duty, laid on it by Parliament, to 
provide a wide range of services for its inhabitants, be they ratepayers, electors or 
neither.  It must therefore be involved in balancing fairly these interests which may 
frequently conflict’ 49 (Emphasis added).  Pickwell represented progression from 
earlier cases, 
50
 where the courts preferred to take the more traditional approach of 
basing their decision on pure statutory construction and ignored any fiduciary 
obligation on the part of the council. 
References in case law to the fiduciary duties of a local authority, and the 
trustee and beneficiary analogy, requires further analysis of the type of trust that 
might be adopted, if the private law trust model was transposed to the public law 
arena. 
A PRIVATE TRUST MODEL 
4.3 Identifying an appropriate private trust model 
4.3.1 Fixed trusts 
These may be a specific fixed trust, where there are only one or few beneficiaries, the 
objects of the trust.  For example X holds property on behalf of Y. A variant of the 
fixed trust is a life interest trust, where property is held by X for Y for life and 
thereafter for Z and C in equal shares absolutely. Y will be entitled to the trust income 
                                                             
49
 Pickwell v Camden LBC [1983] QB 962; (1983) WLR 583, it was claimed that the wage 
settlement made by the council with their striking workers had not exceeded their powers or 
abused them, notwithstanding the settlement was greater than that reached by the strikers’ 
national union 
50
 For example, R v Manchester CC, ex parte King [1992] A.C. 1, 37H - increased fees for 
market stall licence where the Court preferred to take the traditional approach of basing their 
decision on pure statutory construction and ignored any fiduciary obligation on the part of the 
council 
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(not capital) for life and Z and C termed are termed ‘remaindermen’ who have vested 
absolute interests after the life interest of Y ceases.  In both these cases the 
beneficiaries are identifiable and it is easy to understand notions of fiduciary 
obligations between those trust actors; virtues of trust and loyalty easily fit into such 
an arrangement. The trustees in a fixed trust are required to distribute the property in 
accordance with the trust deed; they have no discretion as to who benefits or in what 
proportion (apart from powers of maintenance and advancement). A fixed trust is 
termed ‘fixed’ because of the terms stipulated by the settlor/testator who determines 
who is a beneficiary and their share. The objects of the trust are therefore fixed and 
every beneficiary must be identifiable or the trust is invalid. More significantly, 
beneficiaries under a fixed trust have equitable proprietary interests in the assets 
(albeit their interests not always vested).  These factors make it an unsuitable vehicle 
for local authority funds because of the difficulty in pointing to a property interest of 
service users as a wide class. 
4.3.2 Discretionary trusts 
In a discretionary trust, trustees hold property on behalf of a class or group of people.  
The trustees have a discretionary power to appoint trust assets amongst the 
beneficiaries, who have no legal entitlement or proprietary interest in the fund:  this is 
a key characteristic of the discretionary trust. Although it has been argued that 
equitable title to the property is vested in the class of beneficiaries as a whole, an 
approach confirmed in Re Smith,
51
  the ‘group interest’ approach was, rejected in 
Gartside v IRC, 
52
 and subsequently.
53
 A contrary view is, however, expressed by 
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 [1928] Ch 915 
52 [1968] A.C. 553.For purposes of death duties the Inland Revenue argued unsuccessfully 
that the deceased husband had a beneficial interest in the family discretionary trust and 
therefore liable to tax. 
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Pearce & Stevens who state that the equitable interest in property does not remain 
inchoate, or ‘in the air’, but vests in the class of potential beneficiaries as a whole.’54 
For our purposes, it is sufficient to state that if local authority assets were held on a 
discretionary trust, no single service users could realistically claim a proprietary 
equitable interest in council assets. This author adopts this traditional view.  
If this argument is accepted, it is on the basis that there is a resemblance of a 
discretionary type trust relationship between local authorities and their service users, 
where objects of the trust have individual competing interests in the trust fund and 
have a mere expectation or hope that a distribution will be made to them. 
4.3.3 Non-charitable purpose trusts 
 A local authority’s role is to carry out the purposes of its statutory duties and powers 
for its locality’s well-being.  A purpose trust specifies a particular use for a trust fund: 
but, with the exception of a small group of anomalous cases
55
, such trusts are void 
because of the lack of an identifiable beneficiary ‘in whose favour the court can 
decree performance.’56 In Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts, a non-charitable purpose trust 
was held to be void, primarily because there were no identifiable beneficiaries, also 
because the stated purposes were considered too vague. In relation to the stated 
purposes Roxburgh J said ‘ …the purposes must be stated in phrases which embody 
definite concepts and the means by which the trustees are to try and attain them must 
                                                                                                                                                                              
53
 Sainsbury v IRC [1970] Ch 712, this case involved the rights of discretionary beneficiaries 
and whether or not the interests of the beneficiaries of a discretionary trust was an interest in 
possession for the purposes of assessment of estate duty purposes on the death of one of the 
beneficiaries 
54
 Pearce and Stevens, ‘Trusts and Equitable Obligations’ (6th ed, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2015) 602 
55
 Testamentary trusts of imperfect obligation; trusts for a particular animal, trusts to erect 
and maintain monuments and graves, trusts for the saying of private masses and trusts for the 
promotion of fox-hunting  
56
 Morice v The Bishop of Durham [1803-13] All ER Rep 451, 454 (Sir William Grant MR) 
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also be prescribed with a sufficient degree of certainty.’57  He went on to say that ‘the 
purposes must …be so defined that if the trustees surrendered their discretion, the 
court could carry out the purposes declared not a selection of them arrived at by 
eliminating those which are too uncertain to be carried out.’58 Despite reference to 
clarity of purpose, it must be remembered that, for a trust to be valid, it ‘must be for 
the benefit of individuals…or must be in that class of gifts for the benefit of the 
public which the courts in this country recognise as charitable in the legal as opposed 
to the popular sense of that term.’59 This is because as Roxburgh J states:  
if the purposes are not charitable, great difficulties arise both in theory and in 
practice. In theory, because having regard to the historical origins of equity it is 
difficult to visualise the growth of equitable obligations which nobody can enforce, 
and in practice, because it is not possible to contemplate with equanimity the creation 
of large funds devoted to non-charitable purposes which no court and no department 
of state can control, or in the case of maladministration, reform 
60
 
 
4.3.4 ‘People trusts’ for a purpose 
 While a trust for abstract purposes cannot be valid, if ‘the trust, though expressed as 
a purpose, is directly or indirectly for the benefit of an individual or individuals…it is 
in general outside the mischief of the beneficiary principle.’61 In other words, if the 
purpose(s) can be regarded as directly or indirectly benefiting ascertained individuals, 
                                                             
57
 Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534, 547, The owners of the Observer newspaper 
sought to create a purpose trust for i. the maintenance of good understanding between 
nations; ii. the maintenance of the independence and integrity of newspapers; and iii. The 
protection of newspapers from being absorbed and controlled by combines. The Astor’s did 
not however benefit individuals and was not charitable, nor were they suitable to build a 
purpose around being ‘void for uncertainty. The objectives were not conceptually clear. 
58
 Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534,  [548]   (Roxburgh J) 
59
 Bowman v Secular Society    [1917] A.C. 406, [441]  (Lord Parker) 
60
 Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534,  [541-2] (Roxburgh J) 
61
 Re Denley [1969] 1 Ch 373, [383-4] (Goff J) 
See generally articles on purpose trusts- 
P Lovell, Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts-Further Reflection’ (1970) 34 Conv p. 77 
J Harris, Trust, Power and Duty, (1971) 87 LQR.31  
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the trust may be valid.
62
   Re Denley involved land held by trustees for the use and 
enjoyment of employees of a particular company
63
. In this case Goff J held that, 
although the trust was expressed as a purpose (use and enjoyment) it was valid 
because it was directly or indirectly for the benefit of identifiable individuals and 
therefore did not fall within the mischief of the beneficiary principle.  His decision is 
understandable where, as here, the beneficiaries were easily identifiable and therefore 
had locus standi to apply to the court for any breach of trust.  Re Denley has been 
cited with approval 
64
 but not specifically relied upon to uphold a non-charitable 
purpose trust as valid. For our analysis the task is not so simple where the purpose is 
expressed in an abstract or impersonal way, for example, the well-being of a 
particular locality.
65
 
The decision in Re Denley has been justified on the basis that the beneficiary 
principle had not been offended because the land was held on trust for individuals 
who had a beneficial interest in the land.  This was the interpretation of  Re Denley by 
Vinelott J in Re Grants Will Trusts 
66holding that ‘the trust deed created a valid trust 
for the benefit of the employees, the benefit being the right to use the land subject to 
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 See Leahy v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1959] A.C. 457, 459; 478 where 
Viscount Simmonds delivering the judgment of the Privy Council stated the general  position 
on the validity of purpose trusts as follows: ‘A gift can be made to persons (including a 
corporation) but it cannot be made to a purpose or to an object: so also, - and these are 
important words - a trust may be created for the benefit of persons as cestuis que trust but for 
a purpose or object unless the purpose or object be charitable. For a purpose or object cannot 
sue, but, if it be charitable, the Attorney-General can sue to enforce it.’ 
63
 See Clauses 2c and 2.d of trust deed 
64
 See Lipinski’s Will Trust [1976] Ch 235, 248 where Oliver J considered Re Denley to 
accord with ‘authority and common sense.’ 
65
 See later case of R v District Auditor, ex parte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County 
Council [1986] RVR 24 
66
 Re Grants Will Trusts, [1979] 3 All E R 359. This case involved a gift to the Labour Party 
Property Committee for the benefit of Chertsey headquarters. The gift was void for breach of 
perpetuity rules, but also not construed as a gift to the members of the Chertsey branch as at 
the date of the testator’s death 
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and in accordance with the rules made by the trustees.’ 67Vinellott J did not see 
anything unorthodox about such a trust. A similar view of Re Denley was adopted by 
Collins J in Re Horley Football Club, holding that the land in Re Denley was ‘held on 
trust for the benefit of individuals.’68 
4.3.5 Charitable trusts 
Charitable trusts are not the concern of this thesis, but it is worth noting that local 
authorities have made use of this type of trust vehicle in public service delivery, 
particularly with reference to recreational facilities.  The Recreational Charities Act 
1958
69
 recognised the provision of facilities for recreational purposes as charitable. 
Use of charitable trusts as a vehicle for service delivery entails a separate charitable 
body that is exclusively charitable
70
, independent of the local authority and which 
retains its discretion in how services are delivered.   
4.4 Transposing trusts into the public sphere 
As well as the difficulty of identifying an appropriate private trust model, there are 
further specific hurdles to transposing private trusts into the public sphere. If some 
form of public discretionary trust is adopted the class of beneficiaries must be 
identified, and the diversity of issues that a local authority has to deal with must be 
considered. 
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 Ibid Vinelott J  [368]  
68
 [2006] EWHC Ch 2386; W.T.L.R.1817 where land was settled on trust for the primary 
purpose of securing a permanent ground for Horley football club 
69
 Now consolidated in the Charities Act 2011, s 5 That Act does not enlarge the definition of 
charity, but instead gives statutory confirmation of purpose already recognised as charitable. 
The provision of facilities for recreation or other leisure time occupation is charitable if the 
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 See Charity Commission Policy Paper dated 1
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 August 2000 The Recreational Charities Act 
1958.(RR4), which summarises the Charity Commission’s views on the scope of S.1 of the 
Act 
70
 See, Mark Sandford, Local government: an alternative model of service delivery (House of 
Commons Briefing Paper No: 05950, 20th May 2016) 
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Certainty of objects:- 
4.4.1 Identifying the class of beneficiaries 
Identifying the class of beneficiaries is vital, because as we have seen, in order for a 
trust to be valid there must be ascertainable and identifiable beneficiaries, or a class 
of beneficiaries, in whose favour the trust can be enforced.   
This need to identify the beneficiaries of a trust may cause problems in the 
context of a local authority. If the class was limited to the adult inhabitants of a 
district, a simple electoral voting register check would not suffice, because all adults 
may not have registered to vote, and with people moving in and out of a locality the 
register might take time to reflect these changes. If however, the class was to include 
service users more generally (for example, children and visitors to the locality) the 
task of identifying potential beneficiaries becomes more difficult.   Further, for those 
local authorities located near ports or airports
71
, there has been much litigation on the 
issue of the duties owed in terms of service provision to asylum seekers.  These 
stateless persons seeking asylum should, in this author’s view, rightfully fall within 
the class of potential beneficiaries. 
72
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 See statement by Bean J in R (on the application of ‘HA’) v London Borough of Hillingdon 
[2012] EWHC 291 (Admin) [23], involving Hillingdon’s termination of services following an 
age assessment of a ‘child’ asylum seeker. ‘I have a good deal of sympathy, for Hillingdon: 
as the local authority for Heathrow airport and Harmondsworth Immigration detention centre 
they have to bear more than their fair share of the burden of providing services to asylum 
seekers.’ 
72
 See Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 which reflects a commitment to protect 
vulnerable adults and children from harm. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of 
asylum seekers and refugees within relevant policies 
cf Professor Timothy Endicott, ‘A good public agency will not set out to further interests of 
strangers. It certainly does not have general fiduciary duties to foreign individuals or states … 
in fact, when a public authority rightly gives asylum to an asylum seeker … it will be acting 
in the discharge of its people’s duties.’ Professor Timothy Endicott, ‘Administrative 
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Professor Feldman, quoting Arden, Baker and Manning, has suggested that 
the class might be extended to national taxpayers, although the relationship is 
arguably too remote, but not to central government, notwithstanding that it provides 
most of the funding for local government.’73   
Discretionary trusts and the need for certainty of objects (beneficiaries) was 
considered by the House of Lords in McPhail and others v Doulton.
74
 The Court held 
that a discretionary trust was valid if it could be said with certainty that any given 
individual is or is not a member of the class. Lord Upjohn agreed with Lord 
Wilberforce that there were two types of ‘uncertainty’ bearing upon the objects of a 
discretionary trust: first, conceptual (linguistic or semantic) uncertainty
75
 and, 
secondly, evidential uncertainty.
76
 Lord Wilberforce identified a third form of 
‘uncertainty’, that of administrative unworkability, which is particularly relevant in 
the context of local authorities and their service users. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
behaviour: commentary’ chapter 19 in P G Turner (ed), ‘Equity and Administration’ 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 376 
73
 Professor David Feldman, ‘English Public Law’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 
para 2.4.80. 
74
 (1971) AC 424 
75
 Conceptual uncertainty: for example, funds placed on discretionary trust for ‘my nephews’ 
would be valid, but not for ‘my friends.’ 
See, Re Barlow’s Will Trust [1979] 1.W.L.R. 278. Browne-Wilkinson J had to decide the 
validity of a trust which was intended to benefit ‘old friends’. He concluded that such an 
expression was conceptually uncertain. The descriptive words, ‘old’ and ‘friends’ had so 
many potential meanings that it was impossible to say, with certainty, who were the intended 
beneficiaries 
See prior case Spafax v Dommett, The Times, July 14th, 1972 where a trust established in 
favour of ‘customers’ was invalid. The Court held that it was unclear what was meant by 
‘customers’. It may encompass all individuals who purchase items or simply browse (and 
never buy a thing) or it may be limited to those who purchase items. 
See further, P Fudakowska, ‘No Beneficiaries, No Trust (2012) J. G. L. R., 14(3), pp 331-336 
76
  Reference to the practical difficulty of ascertaining the existence or whereabouts of 
beneficiaries 
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4.4.1.1 Conceptual Certainty 
Professor Emery defines ’conceptual certainty’ in the following terms: 
 We may say that a class of potential beneficiaries is conceptually certain to the 
extent that the terms used by the settlor to define the class have precise boundaries of 
meaning: in so far as it is possible to state the criteria which it is necessary and 
sufficient for a person to fulfil in order to be a member of a class.
77
  
 
A trustee’s duty is therefore to select within the class.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, provided a service user falls within the statutory service criteria or as stated by 
a local authority within its permitted discretionary authority, then such persons or 
entities are entitled to receive service.  There are a number of academics for and 
against the certainty doctrine. For example, Dr Yuri Grbich 
78
argues that a complete 
list of beneficiaries is inappropriate, whilst Emery
79
 argues that ‘the cardinal principle 
is that the object of the trust must be defined with sufficient certainty to enable the 
trusts existence.’ 
Significantly, in McPhail Lord Wilberforce also spoke of a trustee’s duty to 
make enquiries about the range of objects, stating ‘ as to the duty of enquiry or 
ascertainment in each case the trustees ought to make such a survey of the range of 
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 C T Emery, ‘The Most Hallowed Principle - Certainty of Beneficiaries of Trusts and 
Powers of Appointment’ (1982) 98 LQR 551, 555-56 
78
 Dr Yuri Grbich, ‘Baden: Awakening the conceptually Moribund Trust’ (1974) 37 MLR 
643, 657. 
‘In making an order to allocate there is no need for the court to know, as in the case of an 
ordinary fixed trust, who all the beneficiaries are and the exact shares in which they take. The 
settlor has merely laid down an obligation that all the discretionary funds be distributed by a 
fixed date. It is enough to know with certainty that a candidate is clearly one of the defined 
class of objects.’ 
79
 C T Emery, ‘The Most Hallowed Principle - Certainty of Beneficiaries of Trusts and 
Powers of Appointment’ (1982) 98 LQR 551 
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objects of possible beneficiaries as will enable them to carry out their fiduciary 
duty.’80 (Emphasis added) 
4.4.1.2 Administrative unworkability81 
In McPhail, Lord Wilberforce gave a very important statement that is particularly 
relevant to questions of translation of trust principles in respect of a potentially wide 
class of beneficiaries. Although his Lordship expressed his reluctance to give 
examples which might prejudicially effect future litigation, he did state: ‘but perhaps 
‘all the residents of Greater London’ will serve as an example of an unworkable 
class’.82 In a similar vein , R v District Auditor No 3 Audit District of West Yorkshire 
Metropolitan County Council, ex parte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council 
83
 is extremely important for the purposes of this thesis, since Taylor J held that a 
discretionary trust of £400,000, created by a local authority for a list of purposes for 
the benefit of any or all or some of the inhabitants of the county of West Yorkshire  
(some 2.5 million inhabitants) was invalid, because it would be administratively 
unworkable to distribute such small amounts to all people, and  too difficult and 
costly for the court to administer.  Indeed Taylor J stated: ‘the class is far too 
large…..it seems to me that the present trust comes within the third case to which 
Lord Wilberforce refers. 
84
 I hope I am not guilty of being prejudiced by the example 
he gave (referred to above).  But it could hardly be more apt, or fit the facts of the 
present case more precisely.’85  
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 McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 (Lord Wilberforce) 
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 See, I M Hardcastle, ‘Administrative unworkability - a reassessment of an abiding 
problem’ [1990] (Jan/Feb) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 24 
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   McPhail v Doulton [1971] A.C. 424, 457 
83   [1986] RVR 24 
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    Taylor J was making reference to McPhail v Doulton [1971] A.C. 424 
85
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In summary, the paramount principle of English trust law is that, unlike 
charitable trusts,
86
 non-charitable purpose trusts are not valid with certain exceptions, 
as a trustee must hold property on behalf of ascertainable individuals.  Historically 
speaking in the pre- Baden (No 2) 
87
era a complete list of all beneficiaries was 
required to validate all types of trusts, including fixed and discretionary trusts. Lord 
Wilberforce in McPhail v Doulton adopting the approach of Lord Upjohn in Re 
Gulbenkian’s Settlements 88 decided that the better test for certainty was the ‘is or is 
not’ test to validate a discretionary trust.  
There is however judicial disagreement of the correct test to apply. In Re 
Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) 89represents three different judicial views. The wider 
view of Sachs L J based on conceptual certainty conforms to precedent and the House 
of Lords decision in McPhail v Doulton that ‘the court is never defeated by evidential 
uncertainty, and it is in my judgment clear that it is conceptual certainty to which 
reference was made when the ‘is or is not a member of the class’90 test was 
enunciated.  Stamp LJ was completely the opposite and required the old approach and 
wanted de facto to create a complete list of beneficiaries, whereas a middle approach 
was taken by Megaw LJ suggesting that a discretionary trust could be validated, if a 
substantial number of people can be successfully classed as beneficiaries.  This test is 
flawed, since how do we determine what constitutes a ‘substantial number.’? 91 
                                                                                                                                                                              
See further, Re Manistry’s Settlement [1973] ALL.E.R.1203, where it was held that an 
attempt to benefit the residents of Greater London would be capricious. 
86
    Charitable trusts can be enforced by the Attorney General 
87
    Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1972] EWCA Civ 10 
See, ‘Re Baden and the Third Class of Uncertainty’ (1974) 38 Conv 269 
88
   In re Gulbenkian’s Settlements [1970] A.C. 508 [71] 
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SydLawRw 3; (1980) 9(1) Sydney Law Review 58   
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    Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No 2) [1972] EWCA Civ 10 
90    [1971] A.C. 424, 20 
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    [1971] A.C. 424, ‘To my mind, the test is satisfied if, as regards at least a substantial 
number of objects, it can be said with certainty that they fall within the trust     what is a 
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Professor M Ramjohn comments that ‘the significant number test seems to be a 
variant of the outdated approach.’92  Additionally Lord Upjohn in Re Gulbenkian said 
that the class must be definite and that ‘the court cannot guess as it.’93  As Thomas 
and Hudson
94
 and Harris,
95
 argue, there is now no valid reason for a complete list of 
beneficiaries to validate a discretionary list.  This modern practical approach is 
preferred and may, of course, assist with problems of certainty of beneficiary class in 
the public context concerning disparate local authority public users coming in and out 
of an area. 
4.4.2 The shifting nature of the beneficiary user class in a local 
government context 
 
Identifying the local authority service user class is a difficult one. Local authorities at 
the start of the twentieth century were considered as being more concerned with the 
infrastructure and welfare of their locality, rather than with their ‘public.’  The 
development of the changing local authority ‘public’ will be considered in chapter 
five and the service users in Poplar compared with those in the Bromley case. 
John Stewart observes that ‘discussion of the relationship with the recipients 
of services is conspicuous by its absence.’96  To support his view, he refers to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
‘significant number’ may well be a question of common sense and of a degree in relation to 
the particular trust.’ (Megaw LJ) 
92
 Mohammed Ramjohn, ‘Cases & Materials on Trusts’, London: Cavendish, 2004) 130. He 
further states ‘in addition, this diluted approach to the given postulant test creates a class 
within a class. The class is laid down by the settlor as varied to include only a significant 
number of objects. It is questionable whether such an approach accords with the intention of 
the settlor.’ 
93 In re Gulbenkian’s Settlements [1970] A.C. 508 [71]. (Lord Upjohn). [524A] 
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 Thomas, W Geraint and Alistair Hudson, ‘The Law of Trusts’ (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press 2004) 
95 W J Harris, ‘Trust Power and Duty’ (1971), 87 LQR 31 
See also J A Hopkins, ‘Certain Uncertainties of Trusts and Powers’ (1971) 29 CLJ 68 
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 John Stewart, ‘The Nature of British Local Government ‘(McMillan Press Ltd 2000) 258 
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Professor Harold Laski’s series of essays in praise of local government,97 in which 
there is no discussion of the service user, or the ‘customer’.  A shift in focus in the 
1980’s led to a conception of the public as ‘customer’, but this change to customer-
orientation did, and does not inform what is meant by the beneficiary user.  The 
beneficiary class in relation to local authority service users is wide, diverse and 
shifting.  The make-up of the class is constantly changing and persons and groups 
may occupy more than one position in the class, which in itself is made up of inter 
relationships.  For example, a small family who are council tenants with children at 
the local school may have a rent dispute with their landlord:  at one and the same time 
they are tenants, pupils, possible litigants, pedestrians, travel users and community 
social amenity users of parks, swimming baths or libraries.  There are other important 
interest groups, such as business users (perhaps members of the local chamber of 
commerce, trade unions, and/or voluntary support groups), all with their own 
particular pressures and demands on a local authority.  As Stewart observes: ‘the 
variety and intensity of the relationship with a defined locality distinguish a local 
authority from most other organisations, whether public or private, and means that a 
local authority shapes, and is shaped by its public and through the public by the 
locality.’ 98  This author argues that a local authority, because of its unique 
constitutional position, is more than a local service provider: it is an autonomous 
political institution with emphasis on local citizenry and constituted through 
representative democracy.  
It is apparent that a modern local authority has a very wide service user class. 
Local authorities not restricted only to looking after the interests of their ratepayers.  
Individuals and groups within the user class participate in many different capacities 
                                                             
97 H Laski and W Ivor Jennings, ‘A Century of Municipal Progress 1835-1935 ‘,(Praeger 
1978) 
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   John Stewart, ‘The Nature of British Local Government’ (McMillan Press Ltd 2000) 262 
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and, inevitably those capacities will conflict with each other. Sometimes statutory 
obligations will define the beneficiary class, by reference to who should benefit.  For 
example, local authorities have a mandatory statutory duty under public library 
legislation ‘to provide a comprehensive and efficient library service for all persons’ 
desiring to make use thereof ’99, taking into account local needs and available 
resources. The ‘user class’ is identifiable, as the Act states that 100local authorities are 
not by virtue of the subsection ‘under a duty to make such facilities available to 
persons other than those ‘whose residence or place of work is within the library area 
of the authority or who are undergoing full-time education within that area.’ 
(Emphasis added) 
If we conclude that local authorities have a fiduciary duty then this may 
extend to neighbouring authority ratepayers.
101
  This author’s definition of the service 
user class may therefore need revision to include a neighbouring local authority, 
where there is some form of joint collaboration agreement.  This is certainly an 
evolving area as local authorities continue to extend their shared services. 
The beneficiary class must also include recognition of the public interest in 
any local administrative decision making. This follows from recognition of a local 
authority as a corporation designed around the public interest.  For example, planning 
decisions for a major road construction may have national implications and 
repercussions beyond the locality itself, a factor recognised by Diplock LJ in Bushell 
v Secretary of State for the Environment. 
102
  In this author’s opinion, the diversity of 
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potential beneficiaries makes it highly unlikely that a private law trust model could fit 
the relationship between local authorities and their community of voices.  In addition, 
it can be argued as, Timothy Endicott states that: ‘the legal and moral duties of public 
authorities are very diverse and are not in general fiduciary duties.’ 103 
The task of a local authority, as an elected local representative, is to reconcile 
and balance the many voices- values and interests of its citizenry and locality before a 
proposed course of action is taken-they must be ‘cognisant of different interests and 
their intensity.’104  This leads us onto the next major hurdle of fit: diversity of 
interests and the polycentric nature of many local authority decisions. 
Polycentricism:- 
4.4.3 Polycentric issues 
This section examines the concept of polycentricism, and its relevance to the 
role of a local authority and its relationship to service users. In any area of life - be it 
business, political or social - individuals and communities interact, creating potential 
both for co-operation and for conflict. Striking a balance is complex, and the 
existence of multiple interests makes contextualising the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users extremely difficult. Issues of polycentrism and the 
problems it creates in administrative English public law must be considered.  
4.4.3.1 Definitions of bi-polar and polycentric decision making 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Case held that objectors not being able to challenge expert traffic flow statistics at inspector’s 
local planning enquiry concerning new motorway link of approx. 15 mile stretch through 
rural farm areas to the South and South East of Birmingham 
103
 Professor Timothy Endicott, ‘Equity and Administrative behaviour: commentary’ chapter 
19 in P G Turner (ed) ‘Equity and Administration’ (Cambridge University Press 2016) 372 
104 Professor Jeffrey Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion (1973) PL 178, 
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A great number of administrative decisions in local government will be those 
involving a single issue such as refusal or grant of a market licence or planning 
permission, extension of a commercial shop lease or refusal of housing benefit.  The 
likelihood is that only a few people will be affected, often only the applicant or their 
immediate family network. This type of issue is termed ‘bipolar’, because they have 
very little impact beyond this limited range. Some decisions, however, may affect a 
greater range of parties and encompass a wider range of issues. For example, the sale 
of part of a school playing field for a sheltered housing project will affect many 
people and groups in different ways.  Decisions that involve such ‘polycentric’ issues 
are, by definition, much harder to make than narrower bipolar decisions. In the 
context of local authorities they lack a single principal, but instead have multiple 
agency relationships, involving moral, legal or political obligations. 
For the purposes of discussion, Kevin T Jackson’s 105  definition of the nature 
of a polycentric issue is adopted:  
that polycentric issues involve a number of distinct centres each of which 
define rights and obligations of a multiplicity of affected parties and resolving 
matters around one centre typically creates unpredictable repercussions 
around one or more of the other centres  
 
Lon Fuller
106
 , M Polyani 
107
 and Jeff King are prominent in discussions on 
polycentric issues and polycentrism.  According to Fuller, a polycentric problem 
arises where there are a number of interlocking relationships that impact on each 
other. Fuller used the graphic metaphor of a spider’s web to illustrate interacting 
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 Kevin T Jackson, ‘The Polycentric character of business ethics decision making in 
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106
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centres of diverse interests and, as noted by King, the spider’s web can be used to 
convey the idea of tensions between various parties, each pulling in different 
directions according to their own interests such that ‘pulling on one strand would 
distribute new and complicated tensions throughout all of the other strands of the 
web.’108 
Enid Campbell and Mathew Groves
109
 state that ‘bipolar’ and ‘polycentric’ 
disputes do not form a dichotomy, but rather ends of a continuum.  The degree or 
level of polycentric elements will, in some measure, depend on the person making the 
decision, as different decision-makers may be prepared to recognise a greater or 
lesser range of interests. 
Fuller did not consider a polycentric issue susceptible to solution by 
adjudication; although the subject of polycentricism was prominent in much of his 
thought, he never directly defined the term.  In addition to his spider’s web metaphor, 
Fuller also gave an additional example of a testamentary bequest of an art collection 
to be divided equally between two beneficiaries, and the problems that could arise if 
one legatee did not want a picture by a particular artist, because they already had 
some of that artist’s work. In this scenario the Personal Representative of the 
deceased would have to face making a decision involving not only the legatee who 
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made the particular request, but would also need to consider how honouring such a 
request would affect the other legatee. 
Other scholars have defined polycentrism in a variety of ways, Jeffrey Jowell, 
for example, states it is,
110
 ‘a complex network of relationships, with interacting 
points of influence. Each decision communicates itself to other centres of the 
decision, changing the conditions s that a new basis must be found for the next 
decision.’ Professor Paul Craig employs an easily identifiable sporting metaphor: the 
decision of a team captain to switch his centre-back to half-back may necessitate 
alterations to the whole team.
111
  The consequences are more sweeping than the initial 
decision (of moving player A to a different field position) might have first suggested: 
not only would the team formation be affected, but no doubt tactics to accommodate 
the new line up would need to be formulated. 
No matter what definition of polycentricism we prefer, it may be that-on a 
pluralist view-local politics is like a market place;  in that market, a proliferation of 
competing interests push, pull, grapple and horse trade their way to influence the 
local authority decision making process. Significantly, Davis observes that:  
with the pluralists, fiduciary theorists describe contemporary life as characterised by 
the tug and pull of competing interest groups. But, unlike the pluralists, fiduciary 
theorists aspire to public governance that transcends normal politics and see an 
ambitious role for the courts to hold politicians and bureaucrats, no less than partners 
or agents, to something more than market morality 
112
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It appears that ‘no single body can hope to represent the full range of interests in a 
neighbourhood, so you can’t devolve to one single group. We need other forms of 
representation for powerless groups.’ 113 
4.5 Summary-Private trust model 
To summarise, it seems clear that the private law trust model does not fit the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users. The technical aspects of 
private law trusts, particularly in relation to the beneficiary principle and to certainty 
of objects, present serious obstacles to transposing private law trusts into the public 
sphere. Delineating membership of the beneficiary class to an amorphous group of 
service users causes great difficulty. Further, this author considers that imposing 
fiduciary obligations on a local authority is also problematic: the core obligation of a 
fiduciary is loyalty and it is difficult to accord loyalty to all service users given the 
polycentric issues faced by local authorities. 
This author strongly argues that the role of local authorities has fundamentally 
changed since the early twentieth century; they have emerged as representative 
bodies, not confined to representing the interests of the taxpayers. Local authorities 
provide public services for the benefit of local inhabitants as well as for persons 
coming in and out of their locality. Their service function is not restricted to those 
who pay council tax, nor is it limited to current users. There is an undoubted 
obligation of stewardship, not just for present service users, but for those generations 
who follow. 
This author argues that, in the context of local authorities, the trust analogy 
should not be abandoned completely, but if a trust concept is applicable, it may lie in 
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the nature of a public law trust, rather than a private law trust. Public trusts have been 
used in the realm of protection of natural resources and the rights of indigenous 
peoples, and are underpinned by the notion of stewardship. This author further argues 
that the notion of ethical stewardship could be transferred to the relationship of local 
authorities and their service users. 
Moving from a private trust analyses to one focussed on trusts in the public 
sphere will be advantageous for several reasons. First, it enables fiduciary duties to 
remain as proscriptive duties, while new relational public trust classifications between 
local authorities and their service users are explored and debated. Secondly, it invites 
wider debate on the use of trusts in public law.  This author considers the community 
stewardship model more appropriate than an ad hoc sui generis fiduciary relational 
label, where sole loyalty by the fiduciary to the principal is replaced by ‘best 
community’ interest, and whose core characteristic is an ethic of care, a public service 
conception.  Ethics of care have several advantages over fiduciary duties.  
Conceptually, it is wider in scope, and can take into account more than interests of the 
principal.  
Ethics can help develop the technique and processes required to take into 
account these diverse interests.  More fundamentally, an ethic of care leads to a shift 
in emphasis from what Mike Feintuck calls ‘commodification’ to a care morality.  
The work of Professor Mike Feintuck
114
 finds affinity with this author’s overall 
approach, and is of particular relevance to the notion of stewardship. Feintuck 
emphasises the democratic significance of public services, and offers an alternative to 
viewing services through a commodity lens.  He states: 
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The agenda requires a rather different mode of thinking to that which currently 
dominates political and regulatory debate. It requires an unashamedly holistic vision 
which includes and recognises non-commodity values, which extend beyond 
economic interests 
115
  
 
Professor Donald C Langevoort, referring to fiduciary obligations identified: 
‘the difficulties that face a legal ethic of service to others…in a culture that celebrates 
personal wealth, achievement and consumption.’116 
This author agrees with Professor Finn who called the public trust a forgotten 
trust and stated that ‘the most fundamental of fiduciary relations in our society is that 
which exists between the community…and the state and its agencies that serve the 
community.’ 117 Some commentators have treated public trusts as no more than a 
political metaphor, stating that it is simply a ‘moral or political obligation’ and cannot 
be enforced by the courts.  It therefore behoves English law and particularly its 
branch of equitable jurisprudence to be progressive once again, as it has demonstrated 
in the past; its flexible quality of being able to fashion and adapt its principles and 
concept to meet the challenges of a new age of consumerism.  The author’s preferred 
view is that a better path to understanding the public trust concept in administrative 
law is not to restrict it to known formulas of the public doctrine, as applied to natural 
resources or indigenous peoples, as these are property based, but understand that 
public law deals with administrative power of public bodies in a variety of different 
areas, often involving a complex network of interacting actors and interests, including 
that of the general public.  It is controlling abuse of that power in a conceptual 
framework which is the prime challenge. 
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4.6 A PUBLIC TRUST MODEL 
4.6. Introduction    
A public trust was described several centuries ago as a trust concerning the public.
118
 
Fundamental to the public trust principle is the recognition and enforcement of social 
responsibilities that promote the stewardship ethic. As Professor Haochen Sun
119
 
states, ‘Both rights and responsibilities form the foundation of the public trust 
principle.  Moreover, these rights and responsibilities are independent of each other.’ 
The public trust doctrine is a long standing principle and relates back to the 
origins of democratic government and its seminal idea that within the public resides 
the true power and future of a society. As Professor Evan J Criddle states: 
….from Cicero’s Discourses 120On Moral Obligations to Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government 
121
  American legal rhetoric has internalised the metaphor of government 
officials and institutions as ‘agents and trustees’……..Legal historians  trace the 
fiduciary concept’s genesis to the Roman fiducia or fidei-commissia 122 
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  Can we learn lessons from an ancient concept?  As a basic definition of a 
public trust the author envisages a trust created for the promotion and delivery of 
public welfare and not for the benefit of one or a few individuals.  
In recent years, there has been much academic interest in the subject of a 
fiduciary rendering of democratic representation.
123
  Relevant literature is mostly 
from America and Commonwealth countries and is informative, albeit related in some 
instances to specific jurisdictional issues.
124
  This body of influential work does not, 
however, deal specifically with the institution of local government and the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users in England and Wales, 
which is the subject of this thesis. 
For the purposes of this chapter, this author adopts a conception of public 
power that can be better understood in terms of a public trust.  The public trust 
doctrine is a legal tool that embodies both rights-conferring and responsibilities-
imposing functions. Local authorities have wide discretionary powers conferred upon 
them by Parliament, so that they can be used in the interests of the locality and its 
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inhabitants. Public bodies, whether national or local, are in much the same position as 
they would be if they had fiduciary powers conferred upon them.  Powers are 
entrusted to them so they can exercise them on behalf of the public or a section of the 
public. The public places its trust in the public bodies to exercise their powers for the 
purposes for which they were conferred.
125
 
In chapter two we saw that fiduciary relationships may arise in a varied set of 
circumstances:  
 in which one party (the fiduciary) holds discretionary power of an administrative 
nature over the legal or practical interests of another party (the beneficiary), and the 
beneficiary is vulnerable to the fiduciary’s power, in that he is unable, either as a 
matter of fact or law to exercise the entrusted power 
126
  
 
Indicia of entrustment, discretion and power balance were very evident, albeit 
in different degrees in most of the major theories put forward for determining the 
existence of fiduciary relationships.  The fiduciary ethos is sensitive and alive to 
abuse of power and is protective of citizens who are particularly vulnerable to a local 
authority’s powers, notwithstanding their ability to exercise democratic voting rights.  
It may be argued that the state’s assumption of sovereign powers - public powers that 
private parties are not entitled to exercise - places it in a fiduciary relationship with its 
people.
127
 
This chapter does not deal with public trusts of the inter-generational 
equitable principle,
128
 concerned with the subject matter of protection of ecological 
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values, natural resources, conservation and environmental protection, as discussed by 
Professor Joseph L. Sax 
129
or with applications of fiduciary duty to indigenous 
peoples,
130
 important as they are.
131
   
To evidence that the public trust has been known in history reference will be 
made to turnpike trusts, their legal structure and considerable usage in the 18
th
 and 
19
th
 century for works of road repair and maintenance. The then inability of common 
law in practice to call local authorities and their officials to account concerning 
stewardship of non-charitable funds will be examined and the importance of the 
Dublin Corporation judgement
132
 which changed the course of judicial thinking 
regarding use of public funds by assimilating accountability of public bodies for non- 
charitable as well as charitable funds noted. Reasons for the apparent decline of 
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applied differently when the government is one of the parties involved 
131
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duties of local authorities, not least in relation to major capital infrastructure projects, for 
example road networks that have long service lives. It may forcefully be argued that current 
ratepayers and service users should not be expected to fund benefits of future users, and 
therefore the local authority in their stewardship role must ensure that there is a fair spread of 
costs across current and future users. An equally persuasive counter argument is that the 
current generation has responsibility to maintain stewardship of assets for future generations 
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equity in areas of governmental accountability is made by reference briefly to two 
important factors: firstly, the introduction of the public audit system and secondly, the 
effect of fusion of the procedural aspects (not substance) of common law and equity, 
resulting in the greater availability and use of equitable remedies in courts of common 
law jurisdiction. 
To test the validity of the proposal that a public trust doctrine can apply in a 
local authority context three seminal cases, primarily dealing with fiscal issues will be 
analysed. It will be argued that the fiduciary role of local authorities extend to issues 
beyond those of merely financial stewardship.  By an analysis of these judgments this 
thesis develops an argument that the trust principle is only used sparingly by the 
courts in the public law forum, and where it is mentioned,  it is not so much as a 
reaffirmation of the trust concept, but some legal creature like it. It is part of the core 
of this thesis that judges have underestimated the value of the trust device, in the 
context of local government and applied its principles in too limited away by focusing 
on the tax payer class, to the exclusion of other service users.  This underestimation 
may be due in part to the overuse of analogous language which can be identified as it 
creeps into the judicial vocabulary, as a mode of explaining a fiduciary relationship 
that may not fit perfectly with a private trust model.  This thesis does not propose to 
deal with analogical reasoning in depth, but will provide a summary of the pros and 
cons of such judicial use and literature reference in a footnote section.  
4.6.1.  Historical context of Public trusts  
The idea of public office holders and their institutions being regarded as fiduciaries is 
not new. It has an ancient historical pedigree going back to Plato, Aristotle, and John 
Locke. In this respect, the notion that government exercises its powers in trust has an 
impressive lineage.  State authority is quintessentially seen as fiduciary in nature, a 
183 
 
view subscribed to by this author.  The thoughts of Cicero on the subject are 
particularly instructive. He States: 
Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to 
remember two of Plato’s rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view 
that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to 
that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the 
interests of some party to betray the rest.  For the administration of the government, 
like the office of a trustee must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to 
one’s care, not of those to whom it is entrusted 133 (Emphasis added)  
 
This is altruism illustrated in a public communitarian context and resonates 
with how the author presents the relationship between local authorities and their 
council tax payers and service users, as a sui generis form of fiduciary relationship.  
Cicero also mentions ‘entrustment’, again an important element in fiduciary 
obligation, and as we saw in chapter two a central feature of the authoritative works 
of Professor Tamar Frankel who regards entrustment of discretionary power as a core 
indicia in any determination of a fiduciary relationship. 
134
  Similarly, John Locke 
saw government in terms of the people entrusting the State to certain powers on their 
behalf, 
135
so too did Disraeli.
136
 Statutory language also emphasised a public trust 
notion of public office.
137
 The possibility of fiduciary government is argued by 
Robert Natelson
138
 from the government of the Roman Emperor Trajan, and asks why 
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if it was possible in a narrowly based regime governing a multicultural empire, why it 
is not feasible today. F W Maitland over a century ago believed that the assimilation 
of the trust concept into public law was natural. 
139
 
4.6.2 Turnpike trusts 
This thesis now moves from general theoretical discussions of government seen 
through the lens of fiduciary perspective to its practical application, of which the 
turnpike trust is a good example.  The Turnpike trust was a specific purpose trust, 
illustrative of an early use of the trust mechanism and acceptance of the public trust 
principle in legislation.  The Turnpike trust was an operable legal device used in the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.  Their principal purpose was repair and maintenance of public 
highways in a specified local area.  The trust had statutory authority, created by 
private Acts of Parliament, with powers granted to the controlling trustees to collect 
tolls from road users.  At their peak in the 1830’s, turnpike trusts administered around 
30,000 miles of road, involving 1000 separate local trusts and taking tolls at 8,000 
toll-gates and side bars.  
140
   
The turnpike trust exhibited all of the characteristics of a private trust.  It had 
trustees, trust assets and beneficiaries, but it was novel, since it operated as a non-
charitable trust in the public sphere.  The basic operating principle was that the 
trustees would manage resources from the several Parishes through which the 
highway passed, augmented with tolls from users outside the parishes.  The whole 
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income was applied to the maintenance of the main highway, thus illustrative of an 
early form of localism in action.  According to historians, such as Sidney & Beatrice 
Webb 
141
 turnpike trusts increased the flow of commerce; some trusts extended their 
entrepreneurial spirit by building bridges in their locality, for example at Shillingford 
over the Thames.  This form of local public purpose trust was useful – it encouraged 
community action, resulting in commercial benefit to the locality.
142
 One historian, 
Sir George Montgomery Metham, later to be Member of Parliament for Hull 
considered all turnpikes to be for the ‘public good’.143 
The trustees appointed to a turnpike trust were usually prominent local 
gentlemen-clergy and merchants-who had been nominated as trustees.
144
  The powers 
of the trust were usually granted for a period of 21 years, after which it was assumed 
that road responsibility would pass back to the parishes: this seldom happened as the 
leases were often renewed.  Despite the impressive trustee numbers, 
145
 trusts often 
failed to raise a necessary quorum for their meetings.  This lack of interest was 
characteristic of the turnpike trust as a whole.  The feeling was that too much 
executive power had devolved to a powerful few.  The accountability of the local 
turnpike trustees to their beneficiaries left a lot to be desired, as there was no remedial 
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judicial mechanism to deal with an incompetent or dishonest Turnpike trustee.
146
  
There was no cause of action, whereby local funds that had been misapplied could be 
compulsorily made good.
147
  It caused Knight-Bruce VC to comment: 
These sums were part of a public fund in the hands of certain public officials, devoted 
to certain public purposes within a certain district to which purposes it was the duty 
of those officers to apply them.  They were in a sense trustees for that purpose; and if 
it were held that upon a misapplication of monies so circumstanced, it was not 
competent for a Court of Equity to interfere.  I am not aware of what civil remedy 
there would be in such a case 
148
 (Emphasis added) 
 
The emphasis is the author’s, as fiduciary loyalty by a local authority is 
conceptualised in a public law setting correctly as loyalty to statutory purposes. 
Notwithstanding legal enforcement problems, this use of the public trust concept and 
its structural model to manage roads was adopted throughout the British Empire.   
Turnpike trusts further resembled modern private trusts because the trustees, 
in administering the trust, had power to mortgage not only the trust assets, but also 
future contingent expected toll receipts.  This power was regrettably a contributing 
factor to the eventual downfall of the turnpike system, as many turnpike trusts over 
borrowed and owed considerable sums of money. 
The toll trustees had wide discretionary power and could levy fixed charges as 
well as discriminate price levels against their various users.
149
 Statutory 
discrimination against users from outside the area for the benefit of local inhabitants 
was, therefore, permitted. It may well be the case that those involved in the turnpike 
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trust movement would not have understood the concept of community purpose trusts 
as a species of public trusts, but may have adopted the principles of such.  On 
balance, turnpike trusts appear a good thing, but the ‘community’ involvement was 
relatively small and ultimately serving their own sectional interests, although there is 
an example of genuine community philanthropy where the local estate owner at 
Letcombe used his own resources to fund improvements where the toll income was 
not enough to pay for them.
150
  The application for a trust was usually organised by a 
local group of landed and business interests or town elders who perceived the need 
for improvement to a particular route, so it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
ultimately self-interest, rather than philanthropy was a major driver.   
It is possible to trace fiduciary principles in the working of these trusts, since 
no benefit could be obtained by the trustees; they were directly barred from benefiting 
financially from the trust.  There was, however, an indirect benefit from the fact that 
as landowners they saw lands serviced by turnpikes as increasing in rental income.  
By the end of the Victorian age, tolls were seen as an impediment to trade and 
inefficient in their use of resources; moreover some suffered from petty corruption.  
The final nail in the turnpike trust coffin was however the advent of the railways. By 
the 1870’s, Parliament had begun to close down the trusts, so that an unacceptable 
financial burden was not left on local communities.  Eventually the Local 
Government Act of 1888 gave responsibility for maintaining main roads to county 
councils and to borough councils. 
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Prior to 1827, public monies of a non-charitable nature,
151
 were not protected 
by the courts.  This is confirmed by two cases in which the eminent Lord Chancellor 
Eldon was involved. In AG v Carmarthen Corporation,
152
 his lordship declined to 
intervene in the council’s non-charitable affairs and again stated very emphatically in 
Colchester Corporation v Lowten
153
  
In the course of my experience in this court, of my present Researches, and of my 
Examination of Authorities,…nothing has occurred, shewing, that there was ever a 
Case, in which the court attached the Doctrine of Trust, as applied under the words 
‘Corporate Purposes’ to the Alienation of a Civil Corporation   
 
To a large extent, the landed classes controlled local affairs; this, coupled with 
the secret nature of local parish proceedings, meant that legal restraints or the will to 
exercise control or even advance ideas to protect non charitable assets was not 
prominent. 
A corner was turned in the seminal case of AG V Dublin Corporation
154
. In 
this case the distinction between charitable and non-charitable forms of trust was 
removed.  In Dublin Corporation the court recognised that bodies controlling public 
monies were just as accountable to the public as they would be in administering a 
trust which had charitable objects. Henceforth, accountability at law would not turn 
on the legal classification of the trust.  There was full argument in this case of a 
trustee’s role in the public sphere and the extent to which the court had jurisdiction in 
such matters. 
The Irish Attorney General filed an information in the Irish Chancery on 
behalf of relators arguing that the Corporation ‘might be declared trustees of the 
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rates….for the statutory uses…and that the trusts thereof might be carried into 
execution’.  They were met with the reply that they were not trustees and in any event 
had done all they could and had filed, as required, appropriate accounts with the Lord 
Lieutenant.  The case was lost in the lower courts on a jurisdictional point, but the 
Attorney General succeeded on appeal to the House of Lords, where the eminent Lord 
Redesdale commented on the inadequacy of remedies available in cases of 
misapplication of public finances.  He concluded that equity had jurisdiction over 
trusts of a public nature, whether charitable or non-charitable.  The fundamental 
principle was that Courts of Equity had an inherent jurisdiction to right a wrong; Lord 
Redesdale said that: ‘it is expedient, in such cases, that there should be a remedy, and 
highly important that persons in the receipt of public money should know, that they 
are liable to account, in a Court of Equity, as well for the misapplication of, as for 
withholding, the funds.’155  
Accountability was a very evident central theme in his delivered judgment. 
The court ordered members of the Dublin Corporation to refund the misappropriated 
income from their own pockets.  Equity had now firmly established its jurisdiction in 
the field of public administration with particular reference to guardianship and use of 
‘public monies’.  That is not to say that since 1827 there was no further confusion of 
charitable and non-charitable issues as succinctly referred to in John Barratt’s article 
entitled ‘Public Trusts.’156 Judicial precedent began to develop in the matter of public 
funds and their misapplication. In Attorney Gen v Carlisle Corporation,
157
 the Dublin 
ratio was applied. In Carlisle, Sir L Shadwell V C confirmed that; ‘….a Court of 
Equity had, by its original jurisdiction, a right to see to the application of the fund, 
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although the application of it might not happen to be one of the purposes mentioned 
in the Statute of Charitable Uses’.   
Despite these judicial inroads, local authorities still insisted on a division of 
their assets: those they acknowledged as being held in trust, others that could be used 
and applied as they wished, just like an ordinary person.  An example given by S and 
B Webb is the use of borough funds for political affiliations.  This resulted in 
legislation
158
 which made it a criminal offence for public officers, including borough 
officers to use corporate property to gain electoral advantage in Parliamentary 
elections.  Corporate property was to be used for the welfare of local citizens, and not 
for the furtherance of a local authority’s political aims.  The remedies for breach were 
severe, involving the repayment of abused funds, a criminal record and being 
disqualified from holding future office. 
The fundamental idea of a trust of municipal assets by a local authority was  
established, with local citizens as beneficiaries.  This was a highly significant 
development from the class size limitation in private trusts.  In addition Acts of 
Parliament, regarding local authorities (for example, the Municipal Corporations 
Regulation Act 1882) specifically referred to trustees and their role using terms such 
as ‘public duty’: For example in the MCRA Act the interpretation clause read: ‘the 
word Trustee shall be construed to mean Trustees, Commissioners or Directors or the 
Persons charged with the Execution of a Trust or public duty, by whatever Name they 
are designated….’ 
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4.6.2.1 The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 
The importance of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 cannot be over 
emphasised.
159
  The municipal corporation had become a personification of the local 
community.  It formed the essential foundation of our modern local government 
structure, by providing for councils to be elected by local ratepayers, their meetings to 
be held in public and accounts audited annually
160
. 
Importantly for this thesis, the Act imposed on the corporation the duty to use 
their revenue ‘for the public benefit and improvement of the borough.’ 161A public 
trust doctrine with an ethos of accountability and based on a trusteeship paradigm was 
emerging. This was further emphasised by section 71 of the MCA 1835, which 
compelled local authorities to keep charitable funds and other funds in separate 
designated accounts with separate trustees.  Such accounting mechanisms meant 
greater protection, and made it easier to police potential abuse of public funds.  
Because public trusts now provided a means of confining public expenditure to that 
which was lawful, statutes were increasingly promoted to act as a form of trust 
instrument. As with trust deeds in private trust law statutes were consulted to 
ascertain intention and clarify areas of doubt.  
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The House of Lords decision in Parr v Attorney General 
162
 is extremely 
important, since it declared in plain and precise language that the Municipal 
Corporations Regulations Act 1835 created a trust of the property of municipal 
corporations. Lord Lyndhurst said: ‘…we are of opinion that this is a public trust, that 
these funds are held by the Corporation subject to a trust, so as to give a Court of 
Equity jurisdiction over the subject matter.’ 163  Lord Cottenham 164 concurred, 
stating: ‘This statute creates a trust in the corporation of the Borough fund, I have had 
in other cases to decide, particularly in the case of the AG v Aspinall 
165
 and seeing no 
reason to alter that opinion,  I shall for present purposes, consider this as a settled 
point.’ 
Parr involved a compensation payment of £4500 by the borough of Poole, 
Dorset, to their town Clerk Robert Parr on his voluntary resignation.  The 
compensation was secured by a bond that covered not only the office of town clerk, 
but other offices carried on by him outside of the Council, such as coroner, from 
which he had not resigned.  A number of ratepayers, including Mr William Ponsonby, 
complained of rates being levied to meet the bond payment, but they were refused an 
Order of Mandamus in the Court of Queen’s Bench; they enlisted the help of the 
Attorney General, who filed an information in the Chancery Division.  The payment 
was declared unlawful as being a breach of trust.  Their Lordships were unanimous in 
their judgments that there was a public trust in existence, and the payment of the bond 
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by the local authority was an unlawful application of borough funds that were clearly 
subject to a trust. Control over ultra vires spending had started. 
Lord Campbell identified the beneficiaries of the trust as the town itself; thus 
identifying a public trust concept with characteristics of that of a private trust.  His 
lordship summed up the effect of the Municipal Corporation Regulations Act by 
saying ‘ 
 I see no ground for any difficulty upon the subject.’ Before the Municipal 
Corporation Regulations Act passed, certainly the corporation property was not 
subject to any trust: the corporation might do with it whatever they chose; and, 
generally speaking no relief could be obtained either at law or in equity for any 
misapplication of that property.  The Municipal Corporations Act creates a trust for 
corporation purposes   
 
Lord Cottenham identified the borough fund as held for public purposes and 
constituting a trust fund.
166
  The Court unanimously held that chancery jurisdiction 
extended to such matters as preventing breaches of trust and ‘abuses of that sort of 
confidence’ (per Lord Cottenham).167 Similar statements are found in Att Gen v 
Belfast Corporation
168
 where the Irish Chancellor made the important statement that:  
‘Boroughs are now mere functionary institutions-trustees of public funds, constituted 
by Act of Parliament.’ (Emphasis added).  He also thought the case ‘to be about as 
free of legal difficulties as almost any case I have had to consider.’169  
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4.6.3 The Public Trust Doctrine halted 
 
Progress was altered by two factors, identified by John Barrett.
170
 One factor was the 
increase in statutory audit systems; the other was the fusion of equity and the 
common law by the Judicature Act of 1873 which allowed the Queen’s Bench 
Division of the High Court to apply the same equitable remedies to prevent unlawful 
actions by public authorities.  
A more robust centralised audit system led to decline in the use of the public 
trust doctrine.  Audit was not a new mechanism used to control local authority 
spending, because it had been used in the Poor Law legislation, but it now took on a 
more robust and authoritative approach.  District auditors could disallow any 
unlawful expenditure, and could recover from those who defaulted and caused losses 
resulting from illegality, negligence or misconduct.
171
  Under the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1882, 
172
 all grant-aided borough expenditures became subject to 
district audit.  The audit system was understandably more attractive than relying on 
courts and the courts process which was discretionary and was certainly cheaper.  As 
local governance expanded to wider service provision, such as housing and public 
health, it was necessary for central government to keep some restraint on the use of 
public funds by local authorities. 
173
 In addition to public audits, there was the 
internal audit system instituted by each council.  This, coupled with the district 
auditors’ statutory powers meant that there was a double system of check on items of 
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public expenditure, of amounts involved, and for what purpose(s) the money had been 
allocated or spent.  
The operation of these audit schemes greatly reduced the need for 
development of public trusts concepts, and its benefits were neatly summed up by 
Wickens VC 
174
who said: ‘as a publicly funded service, statutory audit disallowances 
and surcharges deliberately and successfully provided for those involved a less costly 
process than litigation for identifying unlawful payments and making good any loss.’ 
Thus the importance of the public trust metaphor diminished with the rise of 
specific mechanisms enabling oversight and accountability; mechanisms that included 
greater parliamentary scrutiny of official action and statutory regulation of the public 
service, for example, the increase in the auditor’s powers.  
Alongside this increase in statutory audit systems, the fusion of equity and the 
common law under Judicature Act 1873-5 undoubtedly had an effect on the frequency 
of use of equitable principles in public law.  After fusion by the Judicature Acts 1873-
1875
175
 the monopoly of courts of Equity in dispensing equitable remedies ceased 
and the Queen’s Bench Division assumed a greater role.   
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Fusion of Equity and the Common law did not extinguish equity’s light 
completely, as is shown by a number of early 20
th
 century guardianship cases. 
176
 In 
addition, the concept of fiduciary duty was extended to employees of local authorities 
who had a significant public role- such as the Council’s borough treasurer in 
Attorney-General v De Winton.
177
  De Winton is important because in this case, the 
court emphasised that the defendant was not merely a servant of the council (albeit a 
statutory officer with statutory duties) but, as he dealt with public funds, he was a 
custodian of those monies.  He therefore stood in a fiduciary position to the burgesses 
as a body, and could not plead the orders of the council for his unlawful act. Farwell J 
referred to the borough funds as ‘a trust fund.’178 Significantly, the court said that the 
remedy for the ratepayers for improper payments was against the council and not 
against the treasurer, ‘who owes no duty to the ratepayers’.179 Accountability was 
squarely on the shoulders of the local authority.  
In a similar vein the Government Officers Security Act 1810 
180
 (now 
repealed) 
181
 required government officers to provide an indemnity bond for the due 
performance of the trust reposed in them and for the due accounting of ‘all public 
monies entrusted to (them) or placed under (their) control.’  This was an interesting 
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external non judicial mechanism by the use of insurance fidelity bonds. Use of the 
word ’entrusted’ in this context is particularly noteworthy. 
The success of the audit mechanism led to it being extended to include power 
to surcharge an offending local authority and/ or the public officer concerned.
182
 This 
remedy clearly recognised the seriousness of a breach of public duty in the form of a 
trust and resembled, in some ways, disgorgement of profits by an errant trustee for 
breach of fiduciary duty in private law proceedings.  
 Revival of an almost forgotten equitable jurisdiction183 came about due to 
statutory surcharge powers that came under specific review in Porter v Magill, where 
a public trust notion of public service was resurrected.  This case illustrates the 
potential for the application of principles derived by analogy from equitable doctrines 
relating to private trust arrangements. Porter v Magill 
184
 concerned ‘homes for 
votes’, where ‘trust’ and its concept in a public context was very much the central 
theme.  Before the abolition of audit surcharge
185
 the external auditor had certified 
that there had been unlawful application of council powers by three councillors and 
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Lord Hope held that whilst the Local Government Finance Act 1982 did enable the auditor to 
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See case comment by Rebecca Williams, ‘Wilful Misconduct - The House of Lords decision 
in Porter v Magill’ (2002) 61(2) Cambridge Law Journal 239, 249-252 and John Barratt’s 
case comment, ‘The Public Trust Revived’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal 540 
See also Michael Supperstone, ‘Local Authorities and Audits; challenges to auditors; new 
frontiers’ (2003) Journal of Local Government, which provides a useful commentary on 
fiscal aspects of the case from a senior local government officer. 
This case is also significant in the way it dealt with issues of bias in a political setting; thus 
involving the operation of notions of loyalty in a local government framework. Bias is 
outside the terms of reference of this thesis, save it is mentioned because of its relationship 
with a core indicia of a fiduciary relationship, namely loyalty  
185
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two senior officers of Westminster City Council to promote their own electoral 
success ( to the tune of approximately £31m).  
The council had introduced a policy in 1972 whereby 300 council dwellings 
were designated. When these properties became vacant, they were to be offered for 
sale to an approved applicant.  The reasoning was that home owners were more likely 
to vote Conservative, and therefore increase the party’s votes in key marginal wards.  
The overriding interest of Dame Shirley Porter and Mr Weeks was achieving electoral 
success.  Westminster Council pursued Lady Porter in the Chancery division for its 
monetary loss on the grounds of breach of trust. 
The House of Lords confirmed the Divisional Court’s finding of liability 
against the former Council Leader Dame Shirley Porter and Deputy Leader Mr 
Weeks.  The decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed (Kennedy and Schiemann 
LJJ., Robert Walker L.J. dissenting).  The lawfulness of such charges was upheld, 
both in the House of Lords and in the European Court of Human Rights.  Our concern 
here is with the concept of a public trust and not human rights as such, save to state 
that the House of Lords found no breach of procedural fairness and no breach of 
Article 6(1) ECHR. 
The judgment of Lord Bingham is of particular importance to the theme of 
this thesis because his lordship endorsed a public trust approach - the bedrock of his 
decision.  He stated: ‘Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it 
were upon trust, not absolutely.’186 (Emphasis added).  The use of ‘as it were’ was 
not expanded upon, but he continued this trust analogy by stating that: ‘those who 
exercise powers in a manner inconsistent with the public purpose for which the 
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powers were conferred betray the trust and so misconduct themselves. (Emphasis 
added) 
187
  
These words are highlighted by this author because they emphasis the core 
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship of loyalty.  Political power over the use of 
public assets, seen through such a fiduciary prism, means that such powers must be 
used for the public good and not for motives of self-interest. Lord Bingham was 
consistent in his review of the ratio decidendi of old precedents such as Attorney 
General v Belfast Corporation 
188
 and Attorney General v Wilson, 
189
 where 
councillors were described respectively as trustees and agents. As Chief Justice 
French states: ‘ The concept of the public trust and more particularly the notion of a 
fiduciary obligation, although metaphorical and analogical rather than an application 
of trust law, did foreshadow more contemporary ideas of administrative justice.’190  
The next chapter continues the discussion of public trusts and asks the specific 
question whether under this trust notion of accountability there can be a continuing 
influence in public law by reference to the so called ‘local authority fiduciary duty to 
ratepayers’ approach?  Do local authorities owe a fiduciary duty to their ratepayers? 
The comment of Barratt is acknowledged where he states that current textbooks take 
matters only so far ‘… specified in a different way whether this fiduciary duty 
enabled wider judicial evaluation of local authority financial decisions than would 
otherwise be the case.’  This author agrees with this statement, save that the comment 
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appears to restrict the scope of fiduciary obligation only to fiscal areas;  the natural 
response is to ask why cannot it be used to span all local authority discretionary 
decisions, whether involving financial considerations or not? 
4.7 Summary-Public Trusts  
The concept of a public trust is that there are some societal interests that impose a 
more rigorous trust like obligation on government, whether central or local.  Perhaps 
the most specific examples are when the requirement of a public trust imposes 
restrictions on the use of certain land, such as parkland.  These restrictions are often 
that the public use must be maintained and not sold, even for a fair price.  This is a 
controversial approach, since it means that the public right goes further than any 
restraining right seen before in English law.  This is a common objection and is based 
on the notion of property ownership.  In the context of this thesis, it would mean that 
each and every local citizen would have a property right in local authority assets. In 
respect of a trust it would mean that legal title is held by the local authority and the 
beneficial interests of local citizens would operate ‘behind the curtain.’ This author 
considers this to be a false approach, since the assets of a local authority are not, in 
the main derived from ratepayer sources, but from an amalgam of monies 
supplemented by central government grants and subsidies. In some instances grants 
are conditional and monies have to be returned to central government if there is a 
breach by the local authority of the terms on which the monies were sent (in practice 
express undertakings have to be given to central government). The trust fund is 
therefore a mixture of ownership, making a strict conceptualisation of a division of 
title (legal and equitable) very difficult.  This exercise whilst necessary in private trust 
law would not seem to benefit any discussion on public trusts in the twenty first 
century and in particular local government activity.  The works of such authors as 
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Professors Paul Finn, 
191
  Lorne L Sossin 
192
, Evan J Criddle
193
 Ethan J Leib, David 
Ponet and Michael Serota  
194
 provide ways of understanding the concept of public 
authority, as a form of political trust and administrative entrustment.  There is no need 
to abandon the trust concept, particularly the public trust model. However, what is 
needed is to fashion a conceptual tool that is practical and easily understood. This 
author espouses a stewardship approach. 
A STEWARDSHIP MODEL 
4.8 A Stewardship perspective-a better ‘fit’ 
 
The concept of stewardship is not new. It was a common feature in feudal times. It 
involved the management of property for other people and there were many situations 
in which a relationship of stewardship might arise. For example, the day to day 
running of a manor was entrusted to a reeve, and a common feature of stewardship 
was liability to account to their principal. This author considers that stewardship is as 
relevant today as in our past history. 
This author considers that there are four aspects of stewardship which need to 
be considered in greater depth: stewardship of property, place and person, and an 
overarching stewardship of purpose. Each will be discussed separately. 
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4.8.1 Stewardship of property 
We have already seen that local authorities have immense responsibility over a 
diverse asset range, including land, buildings and investments. Stewardship of 
property entails not only looking after the interests of the present service users, but 
also looking after the interests of future generations. On proposals to dispose of or 
keep, assets, or in the context of property maintenance, stewardship of property is 
paramount. Stewardship of assets was very much in the news a few years ago when a 
number of Icelandic banks went under, a bank in which many local authorities had 
invested due to the high interest rates the bank was offering.
195
 Budgetary 
stewardship can lead to significant benefit to the whole local community, as well as 
for persons who are vulnerable. For example, a dilapidated council building can be 
brought back to life by a lease granted to a voluntary organisation that cares for those 
suffering drug or alcohol addiction, or for use as a women’s refuge. The terms of the 
lease can be structured to include a rent free period during which time the lessee can 
use the rent that would otherwise have been paid to the council to repair the structure 
of the building and bring it back into a fit state of repair for occupational use. An 
additional community benefit is that, from a safety aspect, a dangerous building, 
where children and other persons could have sustained serious injury is repaired at 
minimal cost to the local authority.  
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4.8.2 Stewardship of place 
Local authorities exist to deal with the welfare of their local communities and 
stewardship of place is very important in this context. The environment in respect of 
parks and open spaces, as well as environmental issues, should be part of a 
stewardship vision of a local authority. For example, some local authorities recycle 
the garden waste they collect into compost, which is offered for sale to the general 
public. This not only generates a small amount of income but also contributes to a 
‘green’ environmental approach.  
The importance of stewardship of place was recognised by Sir Michael Lyons 
in his evidence to the ODPM Committee
196
 prior to the release of his report on local 
government. Stewardship of place is of course not a new concept
197
. In fact the Lyons 
inquiry in 2006 also endorsed such a place-shaping role for local government.
198
 He 
recognised that, although much of the debate had centred on local government as a 
provider of services, there was another dimension: that when  
you get down to the level of the individual council and the community it represents 
there is a whole set of things that local government does that are not summarised in 
the provision of services  
 
Sir Michael uses the term ‘place-shaping’, the responsibility for stewardship 
of place, the people who are living in it today and the people who will be living in it 
in the future. He gave as an example of place shaping the activity of Gateshead & 
Tyneside Council who, following the decline of the ship building industry in the 
                                                             
196
 Evidence EV.95-19
th
 June 2006. Memorandum submitted by Sir Michael Lyons, The 
Lyons Inquiry into Local Government, Select Committee on Transport minutes of Evidence, 
www.parliament.uk, publication and records. 
197
 Sharpe LJ, ‘Theories and Values of Local Government Political Studies’ (1970), Vol. 18, 
Issue 2 Political Studies,153 
198 Sir Michael Lyons, Lyons Inquiry into Local Government: Place-shaping: a shared 
ambition for the future of local government (Final report, The Stationery Office 21 March 
2007) 
204 
 
North East and anxieties about the economic future of Tyneside, shaped the local 
economy by working with local people, businesses and building a coalition of 
interests in the interest of Gateshead itself. As Sir Michael states: ‘This is a way of 
trying to decide that role of stewardship and leadership in the community that goes 
beyond, but includes, the provision of local services.’ 
Stewardship was seen as important whatever the size of the local authority 
involved; the same approach was adopted for the big city council, as for the small 
parish council. 
Local governments are the closest administration to citizens and to land issues 
within their administrative boundaries. Taking care of the land should be one of their 
top priorities. Local authorities can play an active stewardship role, acting as public 
landowners that reach agreement with the users of the land, as well as conservation 
organisations. They are also able to create conditions for land stewardship 
agreements.  
4.8.3 Stewardship of person 
The service user is of paramount concern and should be a key focus of a local 
authority’s activities, and should be engaged at all levels of decision making. In this 
respect a local authority needs to have in place adequate communication tools so that 
it has detailed feedback on its service levels or any projected spending or changes in 
infrastructure.  The communication dialogue will, of course, be aided by true 
transparency.  
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4.8.4 Stewardship of Purpose 
As stated previously a local authority is a creature of stature. It does no harm to 
remind ourselves that a local authority can only do that which is permitted by statute. 
Statutes have a purpose which is often stated in the enabling statute. This means that a 
local authority must maintain the boundaries of that statutory purpose, or ‘mandate’ if 
preferred, for to stray outside these boundaries would be ultra vires. Where a 
discretionary purpose is in doubt, it is the function of the court to interpret the spirit 
and intent of the relevant legislation.  
In recent years there has been much debate on various approaches of local 
authority service delivery.
199
 There has been a move from service delivery by a local 
authority, to a trend of outsourcing services, with the correlative move to emphasising 
marketization of such services.  The term used is ‘enabling’, and it has become 
associated with outsourcing.  This Maelstrom of competing institutional designs has 
triggered yet another round of enquiries and self-examinations into the future role of 
local government. 
With the infusion of new ideas has come a danger that the service ethos, 
historically the core identity of a local authority, is becoming subsumed in a culture 
of commercial management.  This leads to practical ethical concerns. In recent times, 
local authorities have been under increasing pressure to run along commercial lines, 
the rationale being that they are now multi-million pound organisations.  Stewardship 
is an important criterion, not only for assessing the performance of a local authority, 
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but also because it introduces an ethical dimension.  Principles of stewardship are 
recognised by governments as good governance.
200
 
To re-iterate, the concern of this author is to identify the legal relationship 
between local authorities and their service users.  In proposing the adoption of 
‘stewardship’ this author seeks to make an important and distinctive contribution to 
institutional design from a legal standpoint.  It is argued that adopting the concept of 
a local authority as a steward of local resources better reflects the activity of a local 
authority within its regulatory space, than trusteeship or any other fiduciary 
relationship.  The notion of stewardship is linked to the concept of local authorities as 
‘ensuring’ bodies.  An ‘Ensuring Council’ is one in which stewardship and values are 
paramount, involving application of a ‘logic of care’ in local authority decision-
making.  Professor Helen Sullivan sets out the importance of a ‘logic of care’ in the 
structuring of relations in the public sector.
201
 She states ‘A ‘logic of care’ starts from 
the assumption that individuals are nearly always situated in communities or 
networks, which demand collaborative, interdependent relationships between public 
authorities and local authorities.’  An ethic of care changes the dynamics from a local 
authority resting upon market involvement alone in public services. Borrowing from 
the language of Anthony Giddens
202
 , a report by The Association for Public Service 
Excellence (‘APSE’) states: 
the vision of an ‘Ensuring Council’ builds upon the responsibility of local authorities 
as stewards of their local authorities ( operationalising in part Sullivan’s logic of 
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care), whilst bringing to the fore its leading role in local representative democracy 
over that of the market economy
203
 
 
The APSE report 
204
 on the role and value of local authority assets in town 
centres states that ‘the Ensuring Council’ privileges an active strategic role for local 
government in the stewardship of local social, economic and environmental well-
being and enhances social justice.’  The report emphasises the stewardship role, 
stating: Local authorities are stewards of their localities.205 
4. 9   A definition of Stewardship 
Stewardship can be described as ‘exercising the duties of a steward’ or ‘as a person 
employed to manage another’s property.’206 It is argued that this emphasis on 
management as opposed to ownership is key: the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users fits well with the ethos of stewardship, with its 
emphasis on community service, locality wellbeing and the management of 
community assets for current and future generations. 
This thesis is not suggesting that the use of the private and social voluntary 
sectors in service delivery is a bad thing.  In fact, there are examples
207
 of the 
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successful blend of private and public service provision. A plurality of service can be 
a good thing, but not at the expense of loss of sovereignty, in the sense of control and 
risk management and the ability to maintain direct democratic accountability over the 
quality of services provided. Professor Neil McInroy states:   ‘Stewardship is about the 
qualities and values of public service. It is the ability to ensure a sense of fairness, and 
equality of access to services.’ 208  
Local authorities are democratically accountable stewards of their local 
populations’ wellbeing and understand the crucial importance of ‘place’ in promoting 
wellbeing. Economic, social and environmental space is important for local jobs, 
parks and green spaces for leisure and good local housing to live in. Local authorities 
are responsible for a diverse range of assets-including theatres, cinemas, airports and 
sports stadia as well as civic centres, schools, parks, care homes and leisure 
centres.
209
. A local authority must manage its resources, regulate and monitor 
budgets, revenue, expenses and reserves, but they cannot and should not focus only 
on financial assets.  
The notion of stewardship offers a useful window into a broader 
understanding of local authority governance. Stewardship depends on a willingness to 
be accountable for results without using control as a means to reach them. 
Stewardship is different from trusteeship since it does not depend upon property 
ownership; neither does it require identification or quantification of interest(s) held by 
service users. Instead, it has a wider remit, which enables local authorities to factor a 
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broader public (communitarian) interest into their decision making. Stewardship 
involves balancing competing influences and demands, and includes establishing 
effective mechanisms for accountability. Stewardship as a broader concept of 
governance better reflects the notions of trust verses control and service versus power 
in a local authority setting. 
Whilst the scope for exercising stewardship functions is greatest at the 
national level, the concept can also encompass the steering and ethical service 
delivery role of local authorities in ensuring the social, economic and environmental 
well-being of a local area. Each local authority is different in size, composition, 
economic, social and cultural make-up and a stewardship theory of place in a local 
government context could accommodate differing needs and aspirations in a way that 
central government cannot.  A local authority is best positioned to tailor services to its 
local space and to the service users who live in visit their locality.  Adopting the 
concept of stewardship has advantages over concepts of ‘trusteeship’ or ‘fiduciary’ in 
relation to the relationship between local authorities and their service users.  The ‘fit’ 
is better, and is far more descriptive of the true role of a local authority with its 
service using public and public-facing context.  In fact, some local authorities 
themselves are already adopting the use of a stewardship label.
210
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4.10       CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the various models advanced as identifying the legal status 
between local authorities and their service users.  It has, however, proved that 
whatever model is adopted there are serious obstacles to overcome.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES BY REFERENCE 
TO A JUDICIAL CASE TRILOGY 
This thesis now proceeds to an examination of three seminal public law cases 
involving local authorities.  The aim is to discover seeds of judicial thinking of the 
nature of the public trust doctrine that was evident in Porter.  There is a need to 
understand and evaluate what is exactly meant by the public trust doctrine for it to 
have practical application to local authorities.  An examination of the following case 
trilogy will help us do so. 
5.1 Introduction  
As we have seen in chapter four the fiduciary principle became prominent from the 
middle of the nineteenth century, but as Paul Finn observed in his seminal work  ‘Yet 
much more so than in the private sector, it was - and is - in the realms of government 
that fiduciary power is the most persuasive, the most intense.’ 1  
It is argued that public trust doctrine found expression and development in 
obligations of a fiduciary nature and valuable therefore to look at three leading 
English cases where fiduciary duties arose in a public context.  The aim is not to 
simply provide a descriptive account of the cases, but provide an analysis and 
evaluation of how judges understand fiduciary duties in the local authority context 
and, how this understanding has changed (if at all) over time.  The analysis also 
enables us to identify more clearly the limitations of the fiduciary duty in the public 
law context.  
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The three cases selected are significant for a number of reasons.  First, they 
show the relevance of the fiduciary obligation to local authorities over a fifty year 
span. Second, and perhaps more significantly for the purpose of this thesis they 
illustrate very graphically that some judges continued to adopt an extremely tentative 
approach to understanding the obligations of local authorities in terms of fiduciary 
duties. In the author’s view there are valid reasons for this approach as discussed in 
chapter 4 dealing with concept transferability and whether fiduciary government is a 
real possibility or a false promise.  Third, and self-evidently the cases illustrate that 
local authorities must act in the public interest, which may be different from the 
specific interests of a beneficiary of a public service.  Fiduciaries must act in what 
they determine to be the best interests of the ‘beneficiary class’ as a whole.   
Professor David Feldman states ‘In the public sphere, the public good is a far 
weightier matter than in relation to private trusts or companies. If we forget this, we 
fall into serious error’.2 He refers to the Poplar and Bromley cases as falling within an 
error category by treating public officers simply as if they were private fiduciaries.
3
 
Fourthly, these three cases can of course be confined to their own facts, but in the 
author’s opinion they are each examples of broader judicial approaches in relation to 
the imposition of obligations of a fiduciary nature upon local authorities. They centre 
on the ratepayers as the ‘beneficiary’ class, as opposed to a wider service user class. 
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5.2 CASE TRILOGY 
5.2.1 Roberts   v   Hopwood (‘Poplar’) 
The seminal case of Roberts v Hopwood 
4
  involved the extent of the discretionary 
power conferred on local authorities by s 62 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855, 
whereby a metropolitan borough council, as the successor of the Board of works was 
able to – ‘…employ..  such.. .servants as may be necessary, and may allow to 
such…servants…such wages as (the council) may think fit.’ 
Issues 
The Council in the year ending 31
st
 March 1922 paid its lowest grade of workers, 
whether men or women a minimum wage of 80 shillings per week, notwithstanding 
that the cost of living had fallen during that year from 176% to 82% above the pre 
First World War level.  The council considered that acting as a ‘model’ employer the 
80 shillings each week was a correct figure to pay for adult labour, and passed a 
resolution which meant an increase of 16 shillings per week for men and 30s.3 pence 
for women.  The District Auditor, Mr Carson Roberts
5
 had power
6
 to disallow any 
items of account contrary to law and surcharge the body or person(s) responsible.  He 
found that payments made to various classes of workers by Poplar Borough Council 
to be excessive and therefore unlawful.    
 
 
                                                             
4
 [1925] A.C. 578, 138; [1925] All ER 24 
5
 Referred to as ‘the doyen of district auditors during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century’ by Hugh Coombs and J R Edwards, in Accounting Innovation: Municipal 
Corporations, 1835-1935 (1996) 50 
6
 Public Health Act 1875, s 247(7) 
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Brief history of the litigation-divergence of judicial data 
The Divisional Court’s decision was that section 62 of the Metropolis Act 1855 did 
not confer on Poplar council an absolute discretion to pay their employees any 
salaries and wages they thought fit. Borough Councils are in a fiduciary relation 
towards the whole body of ratepayers, and must confine the exercise of their 
discretion in regard to such payments within the law.  This decision was reversed by 
the Court of Appeal, but reinstated by the House of Lords.  The House of Lords 
unanimously held that the wages were fixed arbitrarily without regard to existing 
labour conditions and therefore the council had not lawfully exercised its discretion. 
They further held that expenditure on a lawful object might be so excessive as to 
result in it being declared unlawful. A great deal of academic literature was spawned 
by this case.
7
 
The Court therefore agreed that the disallowance and surcharge of £5000 upon 
the Poplar Councillors and Aldermen was lawful, as the use of public funds by the 
council was contrary to law.  Prior to the House of Lords decision the Council had 
lost at first instance before the Divisional Court of the Kings Bench Division (Lord 
Hewart C.J., Sankey and Salter J.J)
8
 who discharged the rule nisi for a writ of 
Certiorari, but had won in the Court of Appeal by a majority decision, of Scrutton and 
                                                             
7
 The political climate of this case and the branch of politics it spawned as ‘Poplarism’ – see 
generally Noreen Branson, ‘Poplarism 1919-1925; George Lansbury and the Councillor’s 
Revolt’ (Lawrence & Wishart 1979) and for a background of the case, B Keith-Lucas, 
‘Poplarism’ [1962] Pub L 52. For a discussion whether this decision marks a limitation in a 
local authority’s discretionary decision-making see Phil Fennel, ‘Roberts v Hopwood; the 
Rule against socialism’ (1986) 13(3) Journal of Law and Society 401; Harold J Laski, 
‘Judicial Review of Social Policy in England: A Study of Roberts v Hopwood’ (1925-26) 39 
Harv L Rev 832, 842-843. He states: ‘The Poplar Council is a body of persons chosen to 
carry out certain functions delegated to them by Parliament. There are various ways of 
carrying out those functions, and each way, ultimately, expresses a philosophy of life. Those 
who are chosen by the electorate are chosen, presumably, because the electorate prefers their 
view of those functions to that of their opponents.’ 
8
  The King v Roberts, Ex parte Scurr and Others [1924] 1 514, Sankey J read the judgment 
of the Court 
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Atkin L.JJ. (Bankes L.J dissenting) and the rule was made absolute.  The judgements 
of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords are now examined more closely in the 
context of fiduciary duty and a public trust concept of the powers of a local authority. 
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning
9
 
The Court of Appeal had focussed on the ‘power’ element of both the auditor and the 
council itself. Atkin LJ said ‘The auditor’s power appears to me to be strictly limited 
to surcharging such payments as are beyond the powers of the council to make.’ 10  
He therefore relied on pure statutory construction and gave the term ‘wages’ a plain 
and unrestricted meaning.  They were not to be ‘as dole or as a bribe or with any 
other object than that of fairly remunerating the servant.’11 Scrutton L J12 took a 
similar power view, but related to the statutory power given by Parliament and stated 
‘It is for the Poplar Borough Council to fix these wages.’  He considered that they 
should have a wide margin of discretion that was only to be interfered with if the 
council used its discretionary power excessively, which on the facts, whilst the 
figures were near the line he could not find had been reached. 
13
   
Interestingly for the theme of this thesis Atkin L J dismissed the proposition 
that there were any equitable rights in the ratepayers as such and did not consider the 
                                                             
9
  The King v Roberts Ex parte Scurr and Others[1924] 2 KB 695, (CA) 
10
  ibid  p. 722 ‘the auditor’s power in the part of the section…appears to me to be strictly 
limited to surcharging such payments as are beyond the powers of the council to make.’ 
(Lord Atkin) p. [722] 
11
  ibid 725 (Lord Atkin) 
12
  The King v Roberts, ex parte Scurr and Others [1924]2 695, Scrutton LJ judgment found 
on pp.716-721 
13
  The King v Roberts, ex parte Scurr and Others [1924] 2 KB 721 ‘it is for the Poplar 
borough council to fix these wages, which are not to be interfered with unless they are so 
excessive as to pass the reasonable limits of discretion in a representative body.’ [Scrutton L 
J] 
 ‘I think that it is not made out that the wages are paid are so unreasonable as to be ultra vires 
the council.’[Lord Atkin] 
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trust analogy appropriate and stated:  ’If it is sought to impose upon the councillors 
the liability of trustees to their cestuis que trust, the analogy fails.’14  
The dissenting judgment of Bankes L J
15
 is also a useful reference, and whilst 
not mentioning directly fiduciary duty Bankes L J concentrated on what is involved in 
public stewardship of public monies.  He did this by showing how considerations on 
the level of payment of wages are different from the perspective of a private employer 
compared to a public employer and stated: 
a private employer can of course, disregard all standard rates of wages in the sense 
that he can pay his employees as much above the standard rate as he pleases.  His 
money is his own.  He can employ it as he likes, and no one has any authority, 
statutory or otherwise, to complain if what he is in substance doing is making gifts to 
those he employs in addition to their wages. Not so, however, the public authority 
entrusted with the duty of the expenditure of public money16 (Emphasis added).   
 
His Lordship considered that disregarding what other employers were paying 
for similar services was unlawful; the council had therefore ignored a valid 
extraneous consideration.  Stewardship was also a relevant factor in the judgement of 
Lord Sumner in the House of Lords 
They have settled with their employees, but they are accountable employers still, for 
they administer public funds, which have been raised by levying rates, and they must 
give an account of their stewardship 17 (Emphasis added). 
 
 A stewardship concept of local authorities will be examined further in chapter 
six of this thesis as a means of alternative accountability where public trusteeship and 
fiduciary duty may not exactly fit. 
                                                             
14
 ibid, 726 (Atkin J) prior Justice Atkin had stated: ’I venture to doubt the legal value of the 
proposition of the Court below that ‘the council are in a fiduciary position not merely towards 
a majority who have elected them but towards the whole of the ratepayers.’ 
15
 The King v Roberts Ex parte Scurr and Others[1924] 2 695, Bankes L J judgment is found 
at pp.706-716 
16 R v Roberts ex parte Scurr and Others [1924] 2 KB 695 (CA) at 712 (Bankes LJ)- Note use 
again of ‘entrustment’ 
17
 Roberts v Hopwood [1925] ALL E R 24 (HL) (Lord Sumner) [37D] 
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The reasoning of the House of Lords 18 
There is little by way of specific reference to public trusts and fiduciary duties in the 
five opinions delivered in the House of Lords. In fact there is none in the short 
opinion of Lord Carson or Lord Buckmaster.  Lord Atkinson does not specifically use 
the word fiduciary, but he does say that the council ‘…stands somewhat in the 
position of trustees or managers of the property of others’: a clear judicial 
acknowledgement of the public trust concept as applied to local politicians who have 
stewardship over public assets.  He regarded that relationship to be based on both a 
legal duty, as well as a moral one.  Interestingly, he commented that the duty was 
owed towards the electors, and not towards the large ratepayer group who lived 
outside the district.  This author considers this a very confined view of what 
constitutes the composition of the ‘beneficiary’ class.19  
Lord Sumner also made no direct reference to fiduciary obligations, simply 
saying that ‘persons who hold public office have a legal responsibility towards those 
they represent and not merely towards those who vote for them’.20  He concentrated 
more on dealing with the statutory provision of a duty coupled with a discretionary 
power and the scope of the words, such as ‘they may think fit.’  Lord Sumner gave 
little credence to the effect that equitable concepts, such as, trusts and fiduciary 
obligations could have.  He made general reference to a local authority’s 
responsibilities by saying ‘It has great responsibilities, but the limits of its powers and 
of its independence are such as the law, mostly statutory, may have laid down., and 
                                                             
18
 Composition of House of Lords: Lord Buckmaster, Lord Carson, Lord Atkinson, Lord 
Sumner and Lord Wrenbury. 
House of Lords references- [1925] AC 578; [1925] ALL E R.24 
19 See Chapter four where the composition of the beneficiary class in a local government 
context is discussed 
20
 [1925] AC (Lord Sumner) [603] His Lordships judgment is found on pp.600-610 
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there is no presumption against the accountability of the authority’21 Importantly for 
the theme of this thesis he did, as we have seen apply an overlay of stewardship 
principles regarding council assets.
22
  Lord Wrenbury
23
 also concentrated on what 
were the limits of the Council’s statutory discretion and also made no reference to a 
trust or fiduciary status on the part of Poplar Borough Council or its councillors. 
Barratt 
24
 significantly considers that ‘there was nothing in any judgment 
creating a distinctive, prioritising, special ratepayers trust.’  This is a narrow 
interpretation of the case, and whilst a correct interpretation of the majority approach, 
it is wrong to say there is ‘nothing in any of the judgments’.  For example, it is 
possible to discover a public trust ethos in the judgments, particularly in Lord 
Atkinson’s, albeit not specifically categorised as confined to ratepayers only, which 
in the author’s view is a good thing and leaves open further development of the public 
trust doctrine on an incremental basis. 
25
  There is also the stewardship reference by 
Lord Sumner referred to above which clearly directs the enquiry to a public trust 
concept, where stewardship is the core element. In addition the Divisional Court’s 
judgment does have public trust doctrine and fiduciary references, but as some 
Victorian cases had previously done, restricted it to fit the factual circumstances of 
the case. His Lordship stated: ‘The Council are in a fiduciary position, not merely 
towards a majority who have elected them, but towards the whole of the ratepayers.’ 
                                                             
21
 [1925] ALL E R (Lord Sumner) [para 39E] 
22
 [1925] A.C. 578 (Lord Sumner) [603] ‘…for they administer public funds, which have 
been raised by levying rates, and they must give anccount of their stewardship’ (my 
emphasis) 
23
 [1925] A.C. 578 (Lord Wrenbury) [613] ‘A person in whom is vested a discretion must 
exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do 
what he likes merely because he is minded to do so-he must in the exercise of his discretion 
do not what he likes but what he ought.’ Lord Wenbury’s judgment is found on pp.611-616. 
24 John Barrett, ‘The public trust revived’ [2004] Cambridge Law Journal 531 
25
 Applying judicial incrementalism is supported by the author and is a main theme advocated 
by Jeff King, ‘Judging Social Rights’ (CUP 2012). See Part III, Chapter 10, 287 
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26
 Atkin L.J. in the Court of Appeal qualified the Divisional Court’s reference to a 
fiduciary duty to ratepayers by concluding it was of wider ambit ‘to protect all the 
inhabitants of his borough
27
, thus implying that all local citizens were protected, not 
just the body who voted for the political shade of council concerned.  
Sir David Williams QC 
28
 deals with the Poplar case from the perspective of 
discretion, but does have some useful points to make concerning fiduciary issues.  He 
felt that ‘it may have been a lurking awareness of their political leanings that led 
some of the majority judges in Roberts v Hopwood to seek an additional factor to 
shore up or re-inforce their ruling on abuse of discretion’.  Williams goes on to 
identify that additional factor as ‘the so called fiduciary duty’.29  He clearly saw the 
fiduciary doctrine as a ‘security blanket’ for courts uneasy and uncertain in the 
control of administrative discretion at the local level’.30  Interestingly, Williams went 
on to state an alternative dislike of using fiduciary obligations 
It is at best an ill-considered and inappropriate doctrine, as one of the minority judges 
in Roberts v Hopwood recognised (the King v Roberts, ex parte Scurr (1924) 2 K.B. 
695, 726), not least because of its effect in exemplifying misuse of discretion in the 
expenditure of money rather than recognising that there can also be misuse through 
what counsel described as ‘cheeseparing or undue economy’ 31  
 
 This author agrees with the later part of this statement, since both positive 
action and inaction is caught within the net of fiduciary obligation, if one applies both 
                                                             
26
 The King v Roberts ,Ex parte Scurr and Others [1924] 1 KB 514, [522] Sankey J   
Compare the interpretation of ‘wages’ by Lord Goddard in Re Decision of Walker [1944] KB 
644, where the Court of Appeal considered that the payment of a children’s allowance of 2s 
6d for each child of a non-manual worker as lawful 
27
 The King v Roberts [1924 2 K.B. 695 at 726 [Atkin L J ) ‘ The duty of the Council is to the 
local community as a whole. It must be inadvertence which suggested any special fiduciary 
relation to the majority which elects them.’ 
28
 Sir David Williams QC, ‘Law and Discretion’ 1994 Vol.2: Iss1, Article 13 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies, 191-212, at pp. 198-9 
29
 ibid, 199 ‘For many years it provided a security blanket for courts uneasy and uncertain in 
the control of administrative discretion at the local level.’ 
30 ibid, p199 
31
 Sir David Williams QC, ‘Law and Discretion’ 1994 Vol.2: Iss1, Article 13 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies, 191-21 p.199 
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a proscriptive and prescriptive fiduciary duty, which was discussed in chapter three.  
The reality is the cases that reach court, often not only involve allegations of misuse 
of spending powers, but challenges to withdrawal of services in order to save money 
in a difficult economic climate.  Principles of stewardship can be argued in both 
contexts.  The key is striking the right balance for community well-being, between 
over spending and undue economy. 
This author concludes this analysis of Poplar by commenting on the regretted 
fact that their Lordships did not specifically refer to the public trust principles, as 
neither Aspinall
32
 nor Wilson 
33
referred to in chapter four were cited.  
Notwithstanding Poplar some 58 years later was approved both by the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords in the case of Bromley v GLC, to be discussed shortly. 
Despite criticism
34
 it still remains sound law. 
                                                             
32
 Att General v Aspinall  [1837] 2 My & Cr 613 
33
 Att General v Wilson    [1840] Cr & Ph 1 
34
 Ian Loveland, ‘Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights: A critical 
Introduction’ (7th ed, Oxford University Press 2015) 
See, Professor David Feldman, ‘the idea that local authorities had a fiduciary obligation to 
ratepayers was used to justify elevating individual over collective goods, ignoring the fact 
that public bodies exist for the collective good rather than individual good.’ David Feldman, 
‘Equity in the Administrative state: a commentary’ in P G Turner, ‘Equity and 
Administration’ (Cambridge University Press 2016) 319. Professor Feldman considered both 
Poplar and the Bromley cases as serious errors, because ‘they remind us what can go wrong if 
we treat public officers, simply as if they were private fiduciaries 
Professor Timothy Endicott refers to the Poplar decision as a mistake, stating ‘The mistake 
reflects the unhelpfulness of fiduciary law as a general model for administrative 
law.’Timothy Endicott, ‘Equity and Administrative behaviour’ chapter 19 in P G Turner, 
‘Equity and Administration’ (Cambridge University Press 2016) 373. He goes on to state at 
p.374, referring to the Poplar case, ‘The decision vividly illustrates the dangers of what 
Professor Henry E Smith calls a general fix-it equity: the judges imposed on local governance 
their fix for an ill that they saw, and the reason for counting it as an ill did not lie in the law, 
but in the judges own model of local governance … the result was to require local 
governments to act in the private interests of the ratepayers rather than in the public interest 
of their localities.’ (Emphasis added) 
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5.2.2 Prescott v Birmingham Corporation (‘Prescott’) 35  
This case is important for the theme being developed in this thesis, because some 
twenty five years on from Poplar we see fiduciary duty being developed as a notion 
of quasi-trust status of a local authority.  In Prescott, Jenkins LJ did consider that 
fiduciary duty was a factor.  
Issue 
Birmingham Corporation obtained consent from the licensing authority under the 
Road Traffic Act 1930 and passed a resolution to introduce a concessionary bus 
scheme, whereby a certain class of elderly persons could travel on certain specified 
days at set times on their buses free of charge.  Funding for the scheme was from the 
general rate fund.  Thus all ratepayers contributed.  An aggrieved ratepayer of 
Birmingham Corporation, Gregory Vincent Prescott, asked the court for a declaration 
that the scheme was illegal and ultra vires the powers of the council.  He succeeded in 
the Court of Appeal (Evershed M.R., Jenkins and Birkett L.JJ) who affirmed the first 
instance decision of Vaisey J. whose decision was founded on the fact that the council 
owed a fiduciary duty, analogous to that of a trustee, to their ratepayers. 
First instance 
Like their Lordships in Poplar Vaisey J considered that the concessionary fares 
amounted in effect to a gift to a certain section of the locality, at the expense of the 
general body of ratepayers.  This approach conformed to precedent as illustrated by 
                                                             
35 [1955] 1 Ch 210 (CA) 227 (note report contains both first instance and Court of appeal 
judgment). Concessionary conditions - women over 65 and men over 70 in receipt of old age 
pension able to use the transport between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. on every day except Saturdays 
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Lord Greene MR‘s reasoning in Hurle – Hobbs Decision, Re 36 The Court of Appeal 
did so on the basis that local authorities owed a fiduciary duty, analogous to that of a 
trustee, to their ratepayers and that the scheme represented a gift ‘in money’s worth to 
a particular section of the community at the expense of the general body of the 
ratepayers’ and ‘that the scheme of free travel was wholly beyond the powers of the 
corporation’.  It was considered that ‘welfare’ schemes or subsidising of particular 
classes of society is ‘I think a matter for Parliament… and for Parliament alone’. 
Policies were not the province of the courts; they are a no go area.  In a later case 
37
 
Lord Hoffman continued on the same lines. 
Vaisey J explored the power source of the corporation, but saw no distinction 
between a corporation incorporated by Royal Charter (as here) and therefore  prima 
facie having more powers bestowed on it, than one created by statute.  He preferred, 
however to base his judgment on the fact that the fares scheme was a matter for 
Parliament. He stated: ‘the corporation seems to me to be attempting to usurp the 
functions of the legislature, and to redress what they consider to be a nationwide 
grievance by local administrative methods.’ 38   
                                                             
36
 [1944] 2 All ER 261, where Lord Greene M R considered that a local authority must direct 
its decision making to the interests of the ratepayers, and on the facts of that case not the 
contractor who was paid over the contractual rate. Lord Greene used the term fiduciary when 
he stated ‘they would not be acting in a proper way having regard to the fiduciary position 
they occupy.’36 The Borough of Lambeth had made a bad bargain and the district auditor had 
correctly disallowed their expenditure and affirmed the King’s Bench Division-[1944] 1 
ALL.E.R. 249 
37
 R (on the application of Pro-Life Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185, 
Lord Hoffman followed the traditional approach that courts are the forum for principle and 
that policy is to be decided by democratically elected accountable bodies. This distinction is 
very formalist, because it advocates a rigid distinction between the legislature and the courts. 
Courts are only concerned with issues of legality and not the merits or otherwise of local 
authority policy decisions, such as whether fare subsidies to one group are merited. 
See, Jeff King, ‘Judging Social Rights’ (CUP 2012) 125, for a discussion under formalist 
approaches of the principle/policy distinction 
38 [1955] Ch 210, Vaisey J’s judgment can be found on pp.222-230. 
‘The subsidising of particular classes of society, is, I think a matter for Parliament, and for 
Parliament alone’(Vaisey J ) [225] 
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He did however, concede that travel schemes for the blind and disabled were 
distinguishable from the general pensioners’ schemes, by the former category’s 
special need for travel and obtaining it’.39  
Court of Appeal 40 
 Birmingham Corporation appealed  against the decision of Vaisey J that their scheme 
was illegal and ultra vires the corporation to put into operation  free travel for certain 
classes of old persons, but the decision of Vaisey J was upheld. On the exempted 
category point the Court of Appeal stated ‘the practice of allowing free travel to blind 
and disabled persons, may or may not be strictly justifiable, but may perhaps be 
classed as a minor act of elementary charity to which no reasonable ratepayer would 
be likely to object.’41  There was however no continuing analysis of this important 
exempted category and what ‘beneficiaries’ it would be comprised of and the author 
concludes with Loughlin who states; ‘ A local authority is not, in law, an 
eleemosynary institution; and the appeal to ordinary business principles provides little 
guidance on the legitimate limits to acts of philanthropy.’42 
In Prescott it was estimated that the beneficiaries would be around 65,925 in 
the city itself to which should be added approx. 5500 persons who qualified by reason 
of being in receipt of national assistance payable by order book.  The scheme would 
cost £90,000 and be dealt with by an internal book keeping transfer from the general 
rate fund. Counsel for the ratepayer, Mr. Blennerhassett argued that the Council were 
‘trustees for the public.’ 
                                                             
39
 [1955] Ch 210, 216 ‘the granting of special facilities to children, cripples, invalids, 
wounded servicemen and others seems to me to be permissible by reason of the special need 
for transport and the special difficulties of obtaining it which such travellers can plead owing 
to their tender years or physical difficulties.’ 
40 Comprised of Evershed MR, and Jenkins and Birkett LJJ. 
41
 ibid. [CA citation] (CA) (Jenkins LJ) [236] 
42
 Martin Loughlin, ‘Legality & Locality’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996) 216 
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Jenkins. L.J. read the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
43
  Significantly he said 
that local authorities are not trustees for their ratepayers, but ‘they do we think owe an 
analogous fiduciary duty to their ratepayers in relation to the application of funds 
contributed by the latter.’ 44 (Emphasis added). 
 In his Lordship’s view the Council’s obligation notably arose from some 
monetary connection (i.e. the rate monies contributed) and not by some equitable 
relationship, whether fiduciary or otherwise. Regrettably he did not expand on his 
reasoning, which seemed based more on a subsidy for a particular group taken from 
the pockets of the total body of the ratepayers.  The relationship between the 
Corporation and their wider service users was not explored.  The emphasis was on the 
discriminatory nature of focusing on one group of citizens to the disadvantage of 
another. Martin Loughlin refers to this discriminatory principle and states ‘In so far as 
it may be assumed to exist, it is best understood as an aspect of fiduciary duty and is 
analogous to a trustee unduly favouring one beneficiary at the expense of the general 
group of beneficiaries.’45  This author agrees with Loughlin’s view that some form of 
discriminatory aspect is triggered when a local authority seeks to benefit a small 
group disproportionately and at the expense of the general body.   Lord Loreburn 
considered these issues in Board of Education v Rice
46
  where the right of a local 
authority to differentiate between schools regarding the scale of salaries or the 
standard of efficiency, in the absence of special circumstances appropriate to the 
                                                             
43
   Prescott v Birmingham Corporation  [1955] Ch 210, Judgment by Jenkins L J.pp.230-237 
44
   ibid. 235-6 
45
   Martin Loughlin, ‘Legality & Locality ‘(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996) 203-263. 
Chapter 4 Fiduciary duty in Public Law 
46
   [1955] 1 Ch 210 (Lord Loreburn LC, Earl of Halsbury, Lord Atkinson, Lord Shaw of 
Dumfermline and Lord Mersey) 
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differentiation was discussed.
47
 Impartiality in decision making was confirmed, the 
Earl of Halsbury stated: ‘it is clear that the local education authority ought to be as 
impartial as the rate collector who demands the rate without reference to the peculiar 
views of the ratepayer’.48 
Whilst of course other funding provision and provider/stakeholder interests 
were not in issue in this case it is interesting to speculate whether his lordship would 
have restricted the beneficiary class to that of the ratepayer only, if subsidies and 
government grants were involved.  This feature is relevant in the Bromley case the 
last of the trilogy to be discussed.  No other trust or fiduciary references were made, 
nor was the nature of the fiduciary obligation being proposed explored or explained, 
and how it related in the context of local government administrative powers and 
decision making.  Regrettably there had been a lost opportunity.  The corporation had 
recognised their public law duties, in that discretionary decision making meant not 
acting arbitrary or capriciously, but argued that they had not done so, nor was their 
scheme mala fides.
49
  Their further argument (which was to no avail) that if 
concessionary fare schemes were declared unlawful then so would similar schemes 
for children, or blind or disabled persons who were allowed to travel free on local 
transport.  Vaisey J identified that problem, but was concerned at implications of the 
                                                             
47
 The case involved a protracted dispute between the Swansea Local Education Authority 
and the managers of the Oxford Street voluntary schools, termed ‘non-provided’ schools. 
Teachers in the ‘provided’ schools were paid higher salaries. The Managers claimed that by 
this inequality of salary levels between the type of school they had failed to discharge its 
statutory duty of maintaining and keeping the Oxford Street Schools efficient. The decision 
of the Court of Appeal was affirmed and was a proper case for orders of certiorari and 
mandamus  
48
 [1955] 1 Ch 210 (Earl of Halsbury) 5 
49
 Counsel for the Corporation, Michael Rowe QC and Harold Lightman argued 
unsuccessfully that there was ample authority to support the proposition that a person or body 
levying tolls or rates is not obliged to treat all persons alike, and that therefore, therefore, it is 
entitled to charge some persons more than others, and indeed remit the charge of toll together 
in some cases. They quoted in support Hungerford Market Co v City Steam-boat Co [1860] 3 
E. & E.365, Duke of Newcastle v Worksop Urban Council [1902] 2 Ch.145; 18. T.L.R..472 ;  
Northampton Corporation v Ellen [1904] 1 K.B. 299; 20 T.L.R.168 
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fares scheme and asked where ‘in the process of discrimination or favouritism to stop 
if limited classes of persons were given free transport.’  He concluded that the 
subsidising of particular classes of society is a matter for Parliament and Parliament 
alone.
50
  
Accounting evidence of the transport undertaking showed substantial losses, 
amounting to £700,000 and therefore in this author’s opinion the court could have 
adjudicated on the grounds that the trustees were in breach of public trust by 
continuing to run a scheme at a loss and at the expense of their beneficiaries - a 
straightforward breach of due diligence and undue risk taking in a trustee stewardship 
context.  The argument advanced by this thesis is that this case could have been 
looked at from a social context of adjudication; there is room for this argument, since 
many of the residents who would have benefited were on national assistance benefits 
and therefore a disadvantaged group; instead the local taxpayer interests were 
accented. 
Jenkins L J regrettably did not explain why local authorities in general are not 
trustees for the ratepayers.  Toward the end of his judgement he did consider due 
diligence considerations when he stated ‘the defendants owe a duty to their ratepayers 
to operate their transport undertaking substantially on business lines.’51  
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 Prescott v Birmingham Corporation  [1955] Ch 210, (Vaisey J) [225] 
51
 ibid.(Jenkins LJ) [238] Jenkins LJ had previously emphasised commercial considerations 
when at para 237 he stated ‘… the undertaking was to be run as a business venture, or, in 
other words, that fares fixed by the defendants at their discretion, in accordance with ordinary 
business principles, were to be charged.’ 
Parliament was forced to act because of the decision’s impact on both the public transport 
system nationally as well as locally, and following a Private Member’s Bill enacted the 
Public Service Vehicles (Travel Concessions) Act 1955 which effectively nullified the effect 
of the Prescott judgment 
See Harman J (as he then was) with reference to interpretation of s 1(4) of that statute in 
Litherland UDC v Liverpool Corporation (1958) 1 WLR 913, 915, where he stated ‘The 
statute gives a kind of indemnity for past legal acts and provides … that any local authority 
operating a public service vehicle undertaking ‘may make arrangements’ for the granting of 
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This case may be seen through a loyalty prism, since the duty of loyalty may 
manifest itself not as a prohibition against self-dealing, (the original foundational 
basis of fiduciary duty in early cases), but rather as a non-discrimination norm (as 
here). Absent statutory authorisation, agencies such as local government may not 
exercise their discretion in a manner that arbitrarily advances or undermines the 
interests of one faction vis-à-vis another.  To summarise - trustees cannot indulge in a 
redistributive process between trust beneficiaries.
52
  This discriminatory norm 
provides another prism from which to analyse both the Poplar and Prescott cases.  
This marks a fundamental difference to the application of trusts in private law where 
a settlor may specify and even direct in the trust instrument that one beneficiary be 
treated differently to another, as would be the case where part of an inheritance was 
placed on protective trust, due to the known financial troubles of a beneficiary.
53
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
concessionary fares’. The Corporation had operated for some time a bus service which 
travelled through various urban districts, including Litherland. The case arose because of a 
dispute between the Liverpool Corporation and Litherland UDC as to the method of 
assessment of the district council’s contribution to the fare concessions introduced by the 
Corporation. Free travel concessions were in operation for blind persons, ex-servicemen and 
others suffering from certain disabilities, and OAP’s over 70. The cost of the service fell on 
the ratepayers of the Corporation not on the urban district ratepayers. Harman J, making 
reference to the Prescott judgment stated, ‘It was therefore right for Parliament, when 
legalising these concessionary fares, to legalise also contributions made by authorities outside 
the operating area by way of contribution, as a matter of fairness and equity’. 
52
 Prescott v Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch 210,  ‘ .if the case is to be regarded as 
turning upon the question whether the decision to adopt the scheme was a proper exercise of 
a discretion conferred on the defendants with respect to the differential treatment of 
passengers in the matter of fares, the answer , in our opinion, must be that it was not a proper 
exercise of such discretion.’ We think some support for this view is to be derived from the 
speeches in the House of Lords in Roberts v Hopwood. per Jenkins L J [ 238] 
53
 Protective trusts developed in the nineteenth century where a settlor was concerned to 
protect the interests of a spendthrift child, or protect those who were involved in a risky 
business. Trust funds would usually be settled on A for life, determinable on A’s bankruptcy 
or attempted alienation of that life interest. In the event of these matters being triggered the 
trust funds would pass over to beneficiaries named in default and not to A’s creditors. 
228 
 
5.2.3 Bromley LBC v GLC 
54
 (‘Bromley’) - Opportunity grasped! 
The opportunity to consider local authority decisions through the fiduciary lens did 
however occur again in the final case of our trilogy and some of their lordships were 
not found wanting.  Bromley illustrates greater support for the principle of a fiduciary 
approach in administrative law cases involving local authorities.  ‘Bromley represents 
a high water mark of the fiduciary characterisation of local authorities’ relations with 
their ratepayers.’55  John Griffiths in his case summary 56 reminds us of the 
complexity judicial review proceedings can trigger, but regrettably limits the courts’ 
review function to ‘applying common law heads of review’.  This thesis shows that 
equitable principles can have a meaningful role in public law.  His remark does 
however focus our attention on issues thrown up by this case, namely how intensive 
should the level of scrutiny be in local government challenges and perhaps the more 
fundamental and controversial constitutional question of whether and to what extent 
should an unelected judiciary review decisions of an elected body 
Bromley was another fares subsidy case and involved the GLC trying to keep 
its electoral promises to reduce London Transport fares by 25 per cent.  Unexpected 
cuts in Central Government grant to the GLC meant a shortfall, and thus the GLC 
issued a supplementary rate precept on their constituent boroughs to finance the 
increased cost.  The proposed fare cut alone was estimated to require at least £30 
million in revenue support.  This burden, coupled with changes to a new block grant 
mechanism, meant that the loss to the GLC was far greater.  The Transport (London) 
Act 1969 had devolved control over transport fares and pricing levels to the GLC.  In 
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 [1983] 1 A.C. 768 (CA and HL) 
55 ‘Fiduciary Duty and The Atmospheric Trust’ Ken Coghill, Tim Smith and Charles 
Sampford (eds), (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2013) 83 
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 See also, John Griffiths, Fares Fair or Fiduciary Foul’ (1982) CLJ 216, 216-219 
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the GLC elections of May 1981 fare reductions was a major part of the Labour 
party’s manifesto.  The combined effect of these measures meant that the 
supplementary rate issued in 1981 by the GLC was twice the amount actually 
required for the fares reduction. 
57
  One constituent, the Conservative controlled 
London Borough Council Bromley, who was not served by an underground station 
had to collect the additional revenue from its ratepayers and applied for certiorari, 
based primarily on breach of fiduciary duty.  This was refused by the Divisional 
Court which felt that these were matters for the authority to decide and eventually the 
electors and not for the court to determine. 
58
The Court of Appeal, however, did not 
take a deferential approach to local administration and unanimously overturned the 
decision and quashed the supplementary precept, supported on appeal by an 
undivided House of Lords.  
The Court of Appeal 
In their judgements neither Lord Denning MR nor Watkins L.J. made any reference 
to the notion of a fiduciary duty to ratepayers, but the third member of the Court of 
Appeal, Oliver L.J. in his influential and valuable judgement did and stated: ‘a breach 
of the fiduciary duty which, it is accepted the council owes to the ratepayers from 
whom it derives its funds.’ 59 His Lordship went further and spoke of the beneficiary 
class and thought that this fiduciary duty extended to all electors as well as 
ratepayers.  Lord Denning preferred to accent ‘reasonableness’ of rate charges and 
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 231. Factual details taken from the case judgement 
58
  R v Greater London Council, ex parte Bromley LBC (Divisional Court) (unreported 3 
November 1981) Lexis transcript of judgement 
59
  [1983] 1 A.C. 768 (CA and HL, (Oliver LJ) [787 G-b.] 
Oliver L J’s judgement is found on pp.778-796 
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scoped the duty to include the travelling public as well as ratepayers. 
60
 His Lordship 
considered that the GLC had exceeded their statutory powers and therefore had acted 
ultra vires.  Their actions were null and void, but went on to say that if this conclusion 
was wrong it was necessary to look at how the GLC had arrived at their decision. He 
concluded that the GLC had given undue weight to the interests of the travelling 
public as compared to the interests of the ratepayers.  He considered that two duties 
were imposed on the GLC- ‘Its duty to the travelling public to provide an integrated, 
efficient and economic service at reasonable fares.  A duty to the ratepayers is to 
charge them as much as is reasonable and no more.’ 61   
He concluded that the GLC had balanced those interests
62
 unfairly and given 
undue weight to the interests of the travel users.  ‘It is a gift to the travelling public at 
the expense of the general body of ratepayers.’  Fairness was a central theme of his 
judgement.
63
  He stated ‘But nevertheless the majority of the council determined to go 
ahead with the cut of 25 per cent irrespective of the penalising hardship on the 
ratepayers.’ 64Further, for example, in the short ten line penultimate paragraph of his 
judgement Lord Denning used the word ‘fair’ no less than five times. 
                                                             
60
 supra (note 58), (Lord Denning) [771H-776] 
‘ in carrying out these duties, the members of the GLC have to balance two conflicting 
interests-the interest of the travelling public in cheap fares-and the interest of the ratepayers 
in not being overcharged. The members of the GLC hold the balance between these 
conflicting interests’ per Denning L J [p 776A] 
Denning L J’s judgment is found on pp.771-777 
61
 [1983] 1 A.C. 768 .per Denning L J p.[ 776 A] 
62
 The interest of the travelling public in cheap fares and the interest of the ratepayers not 
being overcharged 
63
 Bromley LBC v GLC Lord Denning: [777 E] ‘The 25% was more fair to the travelling 
public and less fair to the ratepayers. Millions of passengers on the buses and tubes come 
from outside the London area. They come every day. They get the benefit of the 25% cut in 
fares without paying a penny increase in their rates at home. That is more fair to them. It is a 
gift indeed to them without paying a penny for it.’ (my emphasis) 
64
 [1983] 1 A.C. 768 (Lord Denning) [777 E] ’It is positively penal. It is not fair to make 
these ratepayers pay for these gifts to people who come from far afield.’ 
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Lord Denning referred to the Poplar case, where as we have seen the court 
held that too much weight was given by the local authority to their employees’ wage 
levels than the interests of the Poplar ratepayers and also Prescott where the 
Birmingham Corporation gave undue weight to giving free travel to the elderly and 
insufficient weight to the interests of the ratepayer.
65
 Denning also referred to Luby v 
Newcastle-under-Lyme Corporation
66
 where he considered the local authority had got 
the balance correct between the interests of their tenants as a whole and their 
individual tenants in particular.  In this author’s opinion that case was not relevant, as 
it did not deal with the existence of a statutory power, but its exercise as pointed out 
by Oliver L.J.
67
 
Oliver L.J. 
Oliver L.J. in a very detailed judgement concentrated on the respective roles of the 
GLC
68
 and the London Transport Executive (‘LTE’) as an operating body, 
particularly their statutory authority.  He considered that the GLC’s actions were 
‘ultra vires because they proceeded with total disregard of the statutory procedures 
which the Act envisaged, and thus, from the inception lacked any statutory 
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 ibid (Lord Denning) ‘… Poplar councillors gave undue weight to giving their workers a 
minimum wage and insufficient weight to the interests of the ratepayers.’ Also refer Prescott 
v Birmingham Corporation (1955) Ch 210, [578] where the Birmingham Corporation gave 
undue weight to giving travel to the elderly and insufficient weight to the interests of the 
ratepayers.’ 
Lord Denning had further considered the weight the GLC had incorrectly placed on the 
promises of fare reduction that had been made in the Labour Party’s election manifesto, 
which he considered not a binding promise 
66
 Luby v Newcastle-under-Lyme Corporation [1964] 2 QB 64 
67
 [1983] 1 A.C. 768 (Lord Oliver) [780]‘The Luby case was concerned with the Housing Act 
1957 and since that Act contains express provisions which demonstrate beyond a  
peradventure that the housing authority is not obliged to charge a proper economic rent, it 
really does not help in the least in consulting the Transport (London) Act 1969.’ 
68
 See Part 1 of the Act - the role being one of a general nature, section 1 states ‘to develop 
policies, and to encourage, organise and, where appropriate, carry out measures, which will 
promote the provision of integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services 
for Greater London.’ 
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legitimacy.’69 His Lordship therefore did not consider it necessary to consider the 
subsidiary question of the exercise of the discretion, but did address Bromley’s 
second ground of argument based on a breach of fiduciary duty of the GLC which it 
owed to the ratepayers whose money was to be utilised for the new fare scheme.  His 
Lordship agreed and stated: ‘…the rigid application of a policy simply as a matter of 
political commitment to a section of the local government electorate and without 
regard to the purpose for which the statutory powers are given by itself demonstrates 
a breach of the fiduciary duty.’ 70  
Importantly for the purposes of this thesis Oliver L J stated ‘That duty is owed 
not simply to electors but to the whole body of ratepayers, including a large and 
important number who have no voice at all in choosing local councillors.’71  The 
latter is a reference to commercial ratepayers.  His definition is however somewhat 
narrow and may be argued as not including all service users. 
House of Lords  
The GLC appealed to the House of Lords where four of their Lordships, namely 
Wilberforce, Diplock, Scarman and Brandon referred expressly to fiduciary duties 
and relied on trust concepts.
72
 Lord Keith mentioned fiduciary duty, but only with 
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  [1983] 1 A.C. 768 [780] 
70
 Bromley LBC v Greater London Council [1983] 1 A.C.768 (Lord Oliver) [793A]  
71
 Ibid.(Lord Oliver) [793A] 
72
 Lee Bridges, Chris Game et al, ‘Legality and Local Politics’ (Gower Publishing Limited 
1987) 83. ‘Fiduciary duty featured in the House of Lords decision in the GLC case, in two 
distinct ways. Firstly, expressly or by implication, the concept influenced four of the five 
judges (save, Lord Diplock) in their interpretation of the GLC and LTE’s statutory power and 
in their finding that the latter was obliged to operate, as far as possible on ordinary business 
principles. This was either because the provisions of the Act had to be interpreted in a way 
which was consistent with the GLC’s fiduciary duty, or that the duty was reflected in the 
provisions themselves, particularly those which imposed the financial duties and constraints 
on the LTE, and indirectly therefore, the GLC. In either case, by breaching its fiduciary duty, 
the GLC was seen as having exceeded its statutory powers. The reasoning here, owed much 
to the Prescott case and the words of Lord Justice Jenkins.’   
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reference of approval of that principle and its application to the Prescott case.
73
  He 
construed Section 1 of the Transport (London) Act 1969 through a fiduciary duty lens 
and concluded that the Act did not empower the GLC to adopt a fares policy which 
unduly benefited transport users at the expense of ratepayers.
74
  Lord Keith agreed 
with Lord Brandon that Parliament had evinced an ‘overriding intention in the 1969 
Act that the GLC should have regard to ‘ordinary business principles’ in carrying on 
the undertaking.’75  They considered that business principles had not been followed 
and the interests of the travelling public and the cost to ratepayers were so badly 
aligned.
76
    
A commercial approach was adopted. Unlawful extravagance seemed a key 
issue; public funds should be used wisely and in a considered business-like manner 
i.e. not with a view to making a financial loss. With reference to the word ‘economic’ 
Lord Keith emphasised that ‘it conveys the ideal of careful use of resources, so as to 
get the best out of them.  The resources of the executive include the revenue capacity 
of its undertaking, and thus support is lent to the concept of running the undertaking 
on ordinary business principles’. 77 The message from the courts is loud and clear that 
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 Bromley LBC v GLC [1983] A.C. 768 (Lord Keith) [832F] ‘So far, the executive would 
appear to be in no different position than were Birmingham Corporation in Prescott [1955] 
Ch 210 … so that the principle of that case would apply to it.’ 
Lord Keith’s judgment is found on pp.831-835 
74
 ibid. Lord Keith [834E-F] His Lordship rejected the argument that the executive were 
allowed to disregard ordinary business principles, whether the revenue mix was between fare 
revenue and grant revenue. 
75
 Bromley LBC v GLC [1983] A.C. 768 (Lord Keith) 834-5A, ‘There is nothing in these 
provisions, in my opinion, which is inconsistent with the executive being required to operate 
its transport undertaking in accordance with ordinary business principles…’ 
76
 Ken Coghill, Tim Smith and Charles Sampford (eds), ‘Fiduciary Duty and The 
Atmospheric Trust’ (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2013) 82 
77
 Bromley LBC v GLC 1 A.C.  768, (Lord Keith) [831 D] with reference to the Court of 
Appeal judgment in Prescott, Lord Keith stated ‘the scheme was ultra vires on the ground 
that the Corporation which owed a fiduciary duty to its ratepayers was not entitled at their 
expense to confer a gift of free travel on certain classes of persons, and on the further ground 
that the Corporation’s statutory powers impliedly required the transport undertaking to be run 
as a business venture, the fares being fixed in accordance with ordinary business principles.’ 
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public altruism is acceptable, but has limits.  The underlying theme being that the 
assets are not the local authority’s, but in the public domain and therefore 
encumbered by public trust limitations. This author identifies this approach as an 
extravagance criterion.  This judicial approach confirms the author’s view that 
stewardship principles are very much a key element to consider when assessing 
whether a local authority decision is open to challenge. 
Lord Scarman accepted the ratio in Prescott and astonishingly said that: 
the principle of fiduciary duty had never been doubted.  Certainly, I do not doubt it. It 
is no more than common justice in employing where, as in the case under the existing 
law, those who provide the greater part of the rates have no vote in local government 
elections 
78
   
 
He construed the provisions of the Act of 1969 in the light of a fiduciary duty 
owing by the GLC to its ratepayers.
79
  He also made an obiter remark that it was 
unfair that those persons who provide the bulk of the rate income should not have a 
vote.  This statement was a direct reference to the fact that the local business 
community of shopkeepers and other business entities have no democratic vote in 
local elections. It therefore behoves a public trust concept based on stewardship 
principles to include such beneficiaries.  
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 Bromley LBC v GLC [1983] A.C. 768 (Lord Scarman) [838G-839A]  
Lord Scarman said with reference to commercial activities of a local authority ‘business 
principles can be as applicable to a public service undertaking as to a commercial venture. 
The avoidance of a deficit which falls to be made good out of rates is important to ratepayers 
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engaged in a commercial venture.’ 
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 Bromley LBC v GLC [1983] A.C. 768 (Lord Scarman) [839C] ‘I turn therefore to consider 
the provisions of the Act of 1969, bearing in mind the existence of the fiduciary duty owed by 
the GLC to the ratepayers of London.’ 
Lord Scarman’s judgment is found on pp.835-846 
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Conflicts of loyalty of each statutory body - An ignored aspect  
 This case was primarily about construction of a statutory power under the Transport 
(London) Act 1969. Lords Wilberforce
80
 and Scarman
81
 emphasised that under 
section 1 of the Transport (London) Act 1969 the GLC had a statutory duty to provide 
‘integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities.’ 82They both interpreted that 
section in the light of a fiduciary duty and concluded that the disproportion between 
the levy raised and the benefit invalidated the proposal. 
In this author’s opinion one aspect of this case was unaddressed, namely the 
clash of fiduciary responsibilities; each local authority had not only duties to its 
respective beneficiaries (i.e. GLC to the whole body of London ratepayers and 
Bromley to its confined group of local ratepayers), but between each other.  The GLC  
had a fiduciary role in respect of all the boroughs and whilst it may have been 
admirable in a political context for them to try and keep electoral promises, it did not 
satisfy their stewardship role to the individual London boroughs faced with levying 
additional taxes on their local inhabitants, whether those citizens were fare paying 
passengers or not.  
The GLC were viewing their beneficiary group as all the users of the London 
transport facility, but failed to balance their fiduciary duty to others, such as 
ratepayers.  Lord Wilberforce said that the statutory provision conferring power on 
the GLC to fund London Transport could not be read in isolation to their duty to 
transport users on the one hand and the duty of a fiduciary character to ratepayers on 
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 ibid (Lord Diplock) [814-5] 
81
 Ibid (Lord Scarman) [837] 
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 ibid (Lord Diplock) ‘The crucial question is section 1 , which Lord Wilberforce has already 
cited;  the crucial phrase is ‘to develop policies and to encourage, organise and, where 
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Lord Diplock’s judgment is found on pp. 820-831 
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the other, both of which had to be fairly balanced.
83
  Lord Diplock also usefully 
identified what he saw as the beneficiary class, to whom the GLC owed a fiduciary 
duty as, potential passengers, residents of Greater London who would benefit from a 
better transport system, and ratepayers (both domestic and commercial). 
84
 This clash 
of interests between interested parties was referred to in chapter four when the impact 
of fiduciary principles was addressed in relation to who constitutes the ‘beneficiary 
class’ in a translation of fiduciary principles into a local government context.  The 
conflict of interest lay between the passengers and the ratepayers. Lord Diplock 
emphasised that the GLC was like other local authorities in receipt of funding from 
the levying of rates (62 per cent of the total rate income raised from ratepayers 
engaged in industry, business or commerce) and government grants. 
Lord Diplock the champion of the legality approach
85
 interestingly 
concentrated on fiduciary concepts, elevating them to the status of a quasi-
constitutional principle. The existence of the fiduciary duty cast light on the true 
construction of the legislation. 
86
  He thought that the proposed fare increase would 
lead to a grant loss, and as a consequence a double burden placed upon the shoulders 
of the ratepayers. He concluded that this was a thriftless use of public monies by the 
GLC and a deliberate failure to employ financial resources in the best way and 
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 ibid (Lord Wilberforce) 814H- 815C, 819-820; (Lord Diplock) 829-830; (Lord Scarman) 
838-839, 882 
84
 ibid (Lord Diplock) [825 C-D], ‘I agree that the person’s whose needs the L.T.E’s public 
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 ibid (Lord Diplock) ‘ It cannot be emphatically stated that your Lordships in this appeal are 
not concerned with the wisdom, or indeed the fairness of the GLC’s decision to reduce by 
25% the fares charged in Greater London..…All that your Lordships are concerned with is 
the legality of that decision: was it within the limited powers that Parliament has conferred by 
statute upon the GLC?’ [817] 
86
 ibid [830A] 
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therefore a breach of fiduciary duty.  The GLC had failed in their stewardship role. 
Lord Diplock said:  
A local authority owes a fiduciary duty to the ratepayers from whom it obtains 
money needed to carry out its statutory functions and this includes a duty not 
to expend these money’s thriftlessly, but to deploy the full financial resources 
available to its best advantage…being…the rate fund…and the grants from 
central government respectively 
87
 
 
His judgment has been the subject of criticism,
88
 especially by Martin 
Loughlin 
89
 who considered that Lord Diplock came to his conclusion without 
examining and understanding the complexities of the block grant system.  He states 
‘On the issue of conflict of interest between service beneficiaries and ratepayers Lord 
Diplock’s analysis is both formalistic and incomplete.’90  He also had harsh words for 
all their lordships, including the fiduciary concept itself ‘by ignoring such obvious 
signposts to interpretation as the legislative history and by utilising an anachronistic 
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 Fares subsidy in disarray (Local Government Chronicle 22 January 1982) 65 
Judge aids fares confusion (Local Government Chronicle 29 January 1982) 95 
The GLC controller of Finance Mr M F Stonefrost, commented ‘It is difficult to avoid the 
reaction that a judge is substituting his or her ‘balance’ between collective ‘good’ and 
individual ‘good’ for that of the elected body’ in An Administrator’s viewpoint on R v GLC ex 
parte Bromley LBC (unpublished paper presented to Oxford University Faculty of Law on 3 
March 1983) 3 
Maurice Stonefrost was concerned that the House of Lords judgment gave no real guidance in 
grey areas and felt that there was a danger that there was likely to be a tendency for legal 
challenges to be made and to the danger that the courts become the decision-makers. In this 
way, fiduciary duty became, in his words, ‘whatever a particular court decides it is.’ As Lee 
Bridges states ‘Whilst, a fiduciary duty before the GLC case was, at most, a ‘long stop’ 
whose main value was its existence rather than its use, he feared that it would be seen as 
much than just a reminder of this kind.’ Lee Bridges, Chris Game et al, ‘Legality and Local 
Politics’ (Gower Publishing Company Limited 1987) 85 
89
 Martin Loughlin, ‘Legality and Locality’: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government 
Relations (Clarendon Press 1996) 237-242, sub-section headed ‘Fiduciary Duty and Urban 
Public Transport Policy’ 
90
 ibid, 235.Professor Martin Loughlan, to re-inforce his comment, states that the one third 
loss of grant through penalties was not mentioned 
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concept as their guide, the Law Lords effectively succeeded in turning sense into 
nonsense.’91   
The Bromley decision caused shock throughout local government with a 
scurry for counsel’s opinions on schemes in the ‘pipe-line’.  One such opinion was 
obtained by West Midlands County Council concerning a supplementary precept on 
26
th
 January 1982 with reference to the Transport Act 1968 ( Bromley had involved 
the Transport (London) Act 1969).  Counsel stated the 1968 Act ‘puts on a local 
authority a duty to provide an integrated and efficient system.  That is the purpose of 
the Act and cannot be used as a tool for general social policy unconnected with the 
attainment of that purpose.’92 
5.2.4 A social welfare lens 
Bromley highlights the speck in the judicial lens, because the court could have looked 
at the actions of the GLC from a positive prescriptive fiduciary duty, not restricted 
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 Martin Loughlin, ‘Legality & Locality’: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government 
Relations (Clarendon Press 1996) 343 
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 Joint Opinion by William Glover QC and Robert Griffiths, In the Matter of a 
Supplementary Precept of the West Midlands County Council, 26 January 1982 
West Midlands County Council had been the first council to announce fare reductions, and on 
18 January the first council to abandon its cheap fares policy, less than 24 hours before the 
challenge would be heard by Woolf J. In an unreported judgement, R v West Midlands 
County Council, ex p. Solihull Borough Council, Woolf J granted applications by Solihull and 
industrial giants, Guest, Keen & Nettlefords Ltd for an order quashing the County Council’s 
supplementary precept of 14p which was declared, ‘null and void’, that the council had 
already decided to abandon 
Lee Bridges, Chris Game et al, ‘Legality and Local Politics’ (Gower Publishing Limited 
1987) 41 Lee Bridges states: ‘Some reference to this use of counsel’s opinion appeared in the 
national and local government press at the time. Sir Frank Layfield QC, for example, was 
reported as having been consulted by both Greater Manchester and South Yorkshire Councils 
(Local Government Chronicle, 22 January 1982; Municipal Journal, 5 February 1982; the 
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Schiemann QC and Charles Cross, (Stephen Marks, ‘Law and Local Authorities: Counsels 
Opinion on Budgets and Rents’ (Public Money, 19 June 1982) 49-56) 
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solely to an economic perspective, but also from a social welfare viewpoint asserting 
that subsidising public trust would have tremendous benefits; reduction of the costs of 
road maintenance and improvement.  Therefore, in the long term ultimately saving 
the GLC, the individual boroughs and their taxpayers money; a clear example of 
public stewardship.  In addition there were other long term benefits.  For example, the 
environmental aspect of reducing carbon emission, exhibiting stewardship of place 
and person, not only for the service users of public transport, but air quality for all 
visitors to London and its environs and significantly for future generations.  The court 
however appeared to refuse to look at the bigger picture of sociological and 
environmental desirability, holding the underground subsidy ultra vires. 
Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council
93
 regarded the financial 
burden between taxpayers and ratepayers as fundamentally one of politics and that 
such matters were for the Secretary of State and Parliament, not the courts.  Bromley 
was however subsequently distinguished in a number of cases in the Divisional 
Court.
94
 One such case was R v Merseyside County Council, ex p. Great Universal 
Stores Ltd,
95
where Merseyside had reduced its fares initially by only 10% compared 
to the West Midlands of 25% and by the time GUS obtained permission from 
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 See, S H Bailey, Jones & Mowbray, ‘Cases, Materials & Commentary on Administrative 
Law ‘(4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 
The Merseyside case is particularly instructive because it was Woolf J again and he seems to 
have attached even ‘more importance to the manner in which the key decisions were taken 
than to the substance of those decisions.’ Lee Bridges et al, ‘Legality and Locality’ (Gower 
Publishing Company Limited 1987) 49 
 See further, pp.49-52 where the case is discussed and its impact assessed. 
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Hodgson J to challenge the Council’s policy, Members had already taken the decision 
not to make the planned reductions of 10% over the following two years. Also 
significantly Merseyside did not lose Rate support Grant (in the form of grant 
holdback) as well as a different Transport Act, 1968 applying to local authorities 
outside London. Apart from these differences, for purposes of this thesis it is 
important to analyse the way Woolf J dealt with matters: It is possible to interpret a 
stewardship approach. For example, in support of this contention, Woolf J with 
reference to an affidavit submitted by Keva Coombs
96
, said there was more extensive 
and ‘temperate consideration given to the desirability and consequences of ‘putting 
into effect’ the Merseyside policy than there had been in the GLC or, presumably the 
West Midland case.’ The affidavit clearly included factors of a stewardship nature, 
such as decline in passenger numbers; factors of a social nature, such as low level of 
car ownership and the hardship caused by the high cost of public transport to a 
sizeable proportion of the County population who were on state benefits and the 
increasing sense of isolation of many people in the outer areas of the County.
97
 
5.3 Trilogy Case Summary 
The three above cases vividly illustrate that sometimes judicial review is involved in 
local authority decisions that have a political and national dimension.  These cases 
confirmed (as did Lord Bingham in the later Porter case, where he spoke of a 
‘routinely applied’ principle) a fixed judicial opinion that all statutory powers are 
conferred upon trust and must be exercised for the public purpose for which the 
powers were conferred. 
                                                             
96  The Chairman of the Passenger Transport Committee, himself a solicitor 
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  See, Lee Bridges et al, ‘Legality and Local Politics’ (Gower Publishing Company Limited 
1987) 50, where full details of the affidavit are recorded 
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These cases illustrate a number of common features.  First, a local government 
fiduciary duty (‘LGFD’) is owed to a class rather than to individuals. The judgments 
treated local ratepayers as the relevant class. This is despite the fact; that, as we have 
seen local taxpayers are not the only, or necessarily the main, contributors to local 
government funds. Second, the duty of local authorities to act in the interests of local 
taxpayers is to deploy their resources in an economic
98
, thrifty,
99
 business-like 
manner
100
 , ensuring value for money 
101
 Third, gifts or subsidies came under 
particular attack when perceived as particularistic - benefiting one group over and 
above the local ratepayer class, or discriminatory - benefiting a class within a class, 
such as the pensioners using public transport in Prescott. Yet, not all discrimination 
was deemed problematic. For example, in Cummings v Birkenhead Corporation
102
 
(parents were unsuccessful when they complained of discrimination because children 
from Roman Catholic primary schools, were only offered places in Roman Catholic- 
secondary schools). Ungoed-Thomas J’s decision is interesting. He argues that 
although there was discrimination between classes of parents and children in the 
exercise of the local authority’s ‘statutory duties and powers’, this was independent of 
the application of the rates, and therefore not a matter of fiduciary duty (cf Earl of 
Hanbury in Board of Education v Rice).
103
 
Fourth, these judgments eschewed a ‘power/vulnerability’ model of fiduciary 
duty, deploying instead a commercial paradigm, analogous to those of a trustee in 
charge of a trust fund (eg, Roberts, Prescott, Cummings, Pickwell). The fiduciary 
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model employed reinforces the court’s interpretation of ‘taxpayer’s interests’ with  
trusts and fiduciary duty being conceptualised in ways that advance an economic 
property based model of government. Professor Davina Cooper states ‘Courts assume 
a set of interests; namely, that taxpayers want efficient, business-like services, with 
no reallocation of resources on the basis of philanthropic ideology, and importantly 
further states ‘by the combining of fiduciary duty and trust law….the rights of those 
who fund council services through taxation are emphasised, while the redistributive 
aspects of trusts (at least formally), and the non-or quasi property basis of many 
fiduciary relationships are ignored.’104  
Griffiths in his article 
105
 is critical of the fiduciary reasoning approach in 
Bromley, as an example of judge-made principle that local authorities owe a fiduciary 
duty to their ratepayers.  He makes five points of objection, some of which have now 
been taken over by judicial developments, since the date of his article some 34 years 
ago.  One objection does still have merit, namely the composition and size of the 
beneficiary class, which was discussed in chapter four. Griffiths asked: ‘is it not 
becoming unrealistic to regard ratepayers in general as sole beneficiaries in a 
fiduciary relationship with their councils in view of the fact that some councils obtain 
approximately 70% of their revenue from central government grants’?   
This author also emphasises the multitude of interests, not only of service 
users, but other stakeholders. Professor Finn states referring to Bromley: ‘Interests of 
passengers and ratepayers arguably needed to be balanced rather than prioritised. 
Equitable doctrines are unequal to the task.  For fiduciary law to achieve fairness, it 
                                                             
104
 Davina Cooper, ‘Fiduciary Government ; Decentring Property and Taxpayer’s interests’ 
(1977) 6(2) Social & Legal Studies 235, 249 
105
 Griffiths J, ‘Fares Fair or Fiduciary Foul’ [1982] CLJ 216, p. 
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could be proved only by (unhelpfully) assuming that fiduciary obligations were owed 
to all interested parties.’ 106  
 With respect this misinterprets what is being argued, namely that loyalty to 
the person will always cause problems, but not where the loyalty under a public 
stewardship concept is applied to a statutory purpose. Achievement of the statutory 
goal is the paramount concern of the local authority, albeit that at the end of the day 
individuals, groups or others benefit. The statutory purpose was to achieve an 
efficient transport system. 
Griffiths in advocating a limited role for fiduciary duties in a local 
government setting is supported by a powerful ally, namely Ormrod L J’s judgement 
in Pickwell v Camden London Borough Council and others. 
107
  His lordship stated 
that ‘some reliance was also placed on the fiduciary duty owed by Camden to its 
ratepayers, but this line of attack must have a very limited application’. Ormrod L J 
did not expressly explain what his limitation meant, but notwithstanding clearly saw 
Camden in a fiduciary role and considered:  ‘it arises because councillors are 
entrusted with ratepayers’ money to use it for duly, that is legally authorised purposes 
and not otherwise, much as trustees hold the trust fund, to apply it for the purposes 
authorised by the trust instrument or by statute, as the case may be.’108  (Emphasis 
added). This is an explicit analogy to private trust law, and the use of the indicia of 
‘entrustment’, a central part of the fiduciary relationship definition by Tamar Frankel 
referred to in chapter two.  
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 1999 pp. 56-63 
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 [1983] QB 1, 962; 2 WLR 583; [1983] 1 All ER 602, (hereafter ‘Pickwell ’) (Ormrod LJ 
and Forbes J)  
This case involved a strike by local authority manual workers nationally. Camden negotiated 
a settlement with its union branch at a settlement above what was eventually agreed 
nationally. The increase cost of raising the minimum earning level of its workers to £60 for a 
revised 35 hour week was £950,000 over the three years to 1980/1. 
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  ibid, (Ormrod LJ) 35 
244 
 
 Ormrod L J, sitting with Forbes J ,  at first instance considered ‘the existence 
of this duty (meaning fiduciary) ‘a relevant factor to be taken into account in 
determining the ambit of statutory powers of discretion ’109, but applied the traditional 
Wednesbury principle in reaching his decision and refusing to grant the Declaration 
sought by the District Auditor.  Fiduciary duty was simply seen as a relevant factor in 
the exercise to determine whether the act complained of was unreasonable.
110
 
Pickwell is valuable on at least four counts.  Firstly, because it emphasised 
that even in a political climate of a national strike and wage settlement in a ‘winter of 
discontent’ that the court did have a role to play in deciding whether items of 
expenditure were lawful or not, although as Ormrod L J stated ‘it is not for the court 
to pass judgement on the wisdom or un-wisdom of the wage settlement of March 
1979’.  The court maintained a correct constitutional balance by not entering into the 
merits or otherwise of council staff action.  Second, the changing role of the district 
auditor was emphasised.
111
  Third, and importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the 
court donned Camden Council with a fiduciary mantle
112
 and looked at the 
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110
 A common judicial approach then developed, whereby the interest of the ratepayers was 
one factor and was to be balanced with other interests and not to be over-emphasised or over-
protected 
See further, Lee Bridges, Chris Game et al, ‘Legality and Local Politics’ (Gower Publishing 
Limited 1987) 82, where it states ‘Dicta of this kind seem to make it clear that that it is wrong 
to see fiduciary duty as standing apart from the principles laid down in Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation and operating as an overriding 
consideration dictating a certain course of action which, if it is not followed, will 
automatically render a decision unlawful. Rather, as a relevant condition, it is something 
which must be taken into account but which does not assume paramount importance, except 
in the rare case in which to treat it otherwise would be to act so unreasonably that no 
reasonable authority could have acted that way (i.e. the Wednesbury test of 
unreasonableness).’ 
111
 [1983] QB 1, 962; 2 WLR 583; [1983] 1 All ER 602 Local Government Act 1972, s 61 
applied whereby the District Auditor ceased to be the person with power to disallow the 
surcharge and became the applicant. The court is no longer an appellate court, but one of first 
instance who decides 
112
 ibid. (Forbes J) [603] ‘Of course it is plain that a local authority owes a fiduciary duty to 
its ratepayers; it also owes a duty laid on it specifically by parliament, to provide a wide 
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discretionary decision made in response to the situation facing them. Forbes J 
distinguished the Poplar case by saying ‘it seems to me that in this climate we are 
worlds away from Poplar in the 1920’s where a calm and deliberate decision to 
indulge in what then passed for philanthropy was being taken.’ 
This author favours looking at Pickwell from a stewardship lens. The strike 
had serious effects on Camden’s inhabitants, workers and visitors alike to the locality 
and the whole administrative machine of the borough was breaking down.  Rubbish 
was piling up in the streets and public health hazards were a concern.  Council staff 
were in unheated administrative buildings and bodies were waiting to be buried and a 
further 30 bodies in mortuaries.  The council had acted like a responsible steward by 
protecting all its beneficiaries, and taking into account other relevant considerations 
of a social welfare nature, including public health; an example of fiduciary obligation 
being used in a prescriptive positive stewardship way for community benefit.  This 
case illustrates how a local authority should balance potentially competing interests of 
different beneficiary groups. Forbes J recognised that although the council was under 
an implied fiduciary duty to wisely use public funds, that fiduciary duty must be read 
in conjunction with another implicit, but equally pervasive obligation ‘to provide a 
wide range of services to its inhabitants.  If high payments were needed to secure that 
objective then those payments could defensively be construed as wages.’113 This 
observation is highly relevant, since it focuses attention on the contextual nature of 
fiduciary obligations. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
range of services to its inhabitants, be they ratepayers, electors or neither … it must therefore 
often be involved in balancing fairly those interests which may frequently conflict.’ 
113
 Pickwell v Camden London Borough Council [1983]1 ALL.E.R 602, (Forbes J) [603] 
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Non-discrimination and efficient management 
An important lesson to learn from our case trilogy is that they all in some way 
involved local authorities using their discretionary power in a discriminatory way. 
Choices would affect others in some way.  The polycentric effect of decision making 
was discussed in chapter four. In Poplar it was the wage levels of their work force, in 
Prescott concessions to travel users in a defined disabled or elderly person’s category 
and in Bromley discrimination in favour of objectives of a transport policy.  If we are 
to conclude that local authorities are sometimes in a fiduciary relationship with their 
service users and therefore subject to complying with fiduciary obligations, it is 
fundamentally important to ask whether it can ever be right for a local authority to 
exercise discretion in favour of one group to the disadvantage of the other.  This 
discriminatory aspect of fiduciary duty was also noted by Loughlin. He states ‘…the 
discriminatory principle seems analogous to the responsibility of a trustee not unduly 
to favour one beneficiary at the expense of the general group of beneficiaries.’114 It is 
possible to view the previous case trilogy through a stewardship lens. In each case, 
stewardship of local authority assets was central.  In fact Lord Justice Sumner 
referred to stewardship in the Poplar case stating: ‘..they have settled with their 
employees, but they are accountable employers still for they administer public funds, 
which have been raised by levying rates, and they must give an account of their 
stewardship.’ 115 (Emphasis added)  
A key issue for this author is seeking to reconcile benefiting a small group 
disproportionately at the expense of the general body that is unlawful.  For example, a 
local authority providing funds to a women’s welfare centre, as opposed to extra 
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Relations’ (Clarendon Press 1996) 214 
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 Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578 (Lord Sumner) 
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funding for a local drug preventive initiative inevitably involve discriminatory 
questions.  Difficult interests are at play; both are worthy causes, but so long as the 
council’s decision is made in an informed way with a review of all pertinent factors 
(including impact studies) and compliance with public law principles, including a 
reasonableness overview it would seem to be lawful.  There must also be no element 
of a gift to a particular section of the locality: public funds are not to be gifted or 
frittered away, but to be used for performance by the local authority of its statutory 
purposes.  
Two basic dimensions of the concept of fiduciary duty may be distinguished; 
an efficient management principle and a non-discrimination principle.
116
  Each 
dimension of the duty enables the courts when reviewing a council’s administrative 
decision to conduct a more searching enquiry and not one just limited to facets of 
exercise of power.  The potential problem of applying fiduciary obligation in 
situations where different interests clash and a balancing approach necessary is 
illustrated by a little known case of Giddens v Harlow District Auditor, 
117
 cited in 
Pickwell .
118
  
                                                             
116
 ibid, 217 
117
 [1972] 70 LGR 485, this case records tests to be applied on grounds of intervention by 
district auditor 
G a ratepayer objected to H’s use of council funds on two counts. Firstly, the local authority 
had deferred rent increases for council house tenants and made good the deficit out of the 
general rate fund, and secondly had purchased Parndon Wood as a nature reserve. His 
challenge was on the twin grounds that H had not spent the money for the general wellbeing 
of the ratepayers, and that it was politically motivated. The borough auditor dismissed these 
objections and G appealed to the Divisional Court. His appeal was dismissed on the basis that 
the auditor had applied the correct decision-making principles in accordance with the 
Wednesbury formula. It is easy to understand the element of the decision relating to the 
purchase of the Parndon Wood green space that all could enjoy and fitted the original vision 
of architect and master planner Sir Frederick Gibbard when Harlow New Town was 
conceived in a rural area. The use of public funds, however for rent decreases to council 
tenants, is more controversial and difficult to reconcile with the discriminatory focus in the 
fares fair cases discussed above, as a defined part of the Harlow’s inhabitants were selected 
for separate beneficial financial treatment at the expense of others; public sector housing 
tenants were favoured over private house owners 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to shed light on the concept of a public trust and how it 
could be used in a public law sphere.  That concept has found its niche in relation to 
protection of natural resources and the rights of indigenous peoples.  In addition 
Canadian law recognises that the Crown owes fiduciary duties to disabled veterans 
whose pension funds the Crown manages.
119
  It may be that a public trust concept 
finds expression in fiduciary principles, whereby a local authority is conceived as 
entrusted with wide discretionary power
120
 by its citizens, over property and interests, 
for the specific purpose of welfare of their ‘public’, meaning all the service users in 
their locality and not confined to the council taxpayer class only.  That power is held, 
as it were encumbered by a form of trust; the trust relationship is triggered as a result 
of a conditional delegation of power by the citizen.  There is trust that local 
authorities will perform their statutory powers lawfully and for community benefit. 
In a sense the fiduciary concept is the oldest and most familiar model of 
administrative law.  Chapter four gave a brief sketch of the genesis of the public trust 
concept from Cicero to John Locke and then referred to the part played by the 
turnpike trusts, a form of public trust mechanism concerning road repair and 
maintenance in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries.  The discussion then proceeded to show 
the emergence of the public trust as a useful vehicle in administrative law to curtail 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 This case is at variance with the reasoning of Vaisey J in Prescott, p.225, where he stated, 
‘The subsidising of particular classes of society is a matter for Parliament and for Parliament 
alone.’ 
118
 (1972) 7 LGR 485, 1.01 (Divisional Court) 
119
 Authorson v Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 58 OR (3rd) 417, [73-74]; 215 DLR (4th) 
496 (CA) reversed on other grounds. 2003 SCC 39; [2003] 2 SCR 40 (at the Supreme Court 
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abuse of power by local authorities.  In this way a foundation was laid for the case 
analysis in this chapter.    
This chapter concentrated on a case review of three seminal administrative 
law cases, involving exercise of discretionary decision making power by local 
authorities.  The main purpose of the review was to explore whether there was 
uniformity in judicial thinking on the subject of fiduciary principles in administrative 
law.  Over a fifty year span we saw judicial consistency in use of techniques of 
statutory interpretation and acceptance by judges on varying levels of fiduciary 
application.  For example, it was only the Bromley judgments that addressed issues of 
use of fiduciary principles and concerns of discrete beneficiaries. Hitherto, as we have 
seen the interests of the local taxpayer class was paramount. 
The case review reaffirmed the author’s belief that fiduciary principles are 
only one tool (limited) in the judicial armoury to be used against abuse of power by a 
local authority. Equitable concepts are powerful strands in the English legal system, 
which is stronger when meshed with established public law principles developed by 
the courts in administrative law.
121
  As illustrated, a major problem in using fiduciary 
duty in public law is its central characteristic of a duty of loyalty, which is difficult to 
apply in the relationship between local authorities and their service users.  A local 
authority’s broad responsibility to act in the public interest means that situations 
where it is shown to owe a duty of loyalty to a particular person or group will be rare.  
In ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Atmospheric Trust’ there is a valuable section 
which states: ‘using fiduciary relationships to resolve local government problems 
may be that too one-sided a range of interests is consulted. Parties protected by the 
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fiduciary relationship are privileged inconsistently with the proper exercise of 
discretions conferred by statute on public bodies.’  122  
Those authors use Bromley as an example of where fiduciary categories 
overrode the discretion the GLC had under section 1 of the Transport (London) Act 
1969, and the democratic mandate they had won in the preceding years GLC elections 
and that the interests of passengers and ratepayers arguably needed to be balanced 
rather than prioritised.  They concluded ‘that equitable doctrines are unequal to the 
task.  For fiduciary law to achieve fairness, it could be proved only by (unhelpfully) 
assuming that fiduciary obligations were owed all interested parties.’123  This is a 
misunderstanding of fiduciary duty, and arises because notions of loyalty are applied 
to individuals or groups and not, loyalty to statutory purpose.  It is correct that 
academic commentators have been unenthusiastic
124
 and critical
125
 of using the 
fiduciary concept in the public sphere. 
With reference to Poplar, and Bromley, Conaglen states ‘although it is not 
clear that fiduciary doctrine was the true basis of the decisions; they could easily be 
rationalised on grounds of irrationality or unreasonableness.’126 
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Professor Fox-Decent is critical of a general judicial unwillingness to expand 
public fiduciary duties beyond traditional property holding arrangements.  He 
identifies it as a fundamental mistake to assume that ‘the content of the fiduciary 
obligation is necessarily the private law duty of loyalty in which the fiduciary acts 
solely on behalf of a discrete beneficiary.’ 127 Fox-Decent draws on the trustees’ role 
in private trust law where a decision sometimes has to be made between beneficiaries 
of different classes and mentions that the decision must be made fairly and 
impartially, with due regard for each beneficiary within the discretionary power 
concerned.  In Fox-Decent’s view fiduciary obligations are not concerned with  
‘loyalty per se’, but with an obligation to act fairly and reasonably ‘in accordance 
with the other-regarding purposes for which fiduciary power is held or conferred.’128  
The author, whilst agreeing with much of Professor Fox-Decent’s work cannot 
support this statement, since it waters down the central loyalty core of fiduciary duty, 
into one of a duty of care; it is the loyalty factor which supports the negation of self 
by the fiduciary to not get involved with conflict of interest situations. 
It seems more sensible to concentrate on the actual nature of a public fiduciary 
duty or public trust, which are often cast in metaphorical terms.  Frederick Maitland 
considered public trusts and stated ‘There is metaphor here.  Those who speak thus of 
public trusts would admit that the trust was not one which any court could enforce, 
and might say that it was only a ‘moral’ trust’. 129  In a similar vein Megarry VC130 
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 Tito & Others v Waddell & Others (No 2) (1977) 1 Ch 106, 216, this case dealt with a 
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drew a distinction between what he called  trusts in the ‘strict’ or ‘lower’ sense 
(conventional trusts) and trusts in the ‘higher’ sense ( imposing political or moral 
obligations) and stated ‘the term ‘trust’ is one which may properly be used to describe 
not only relationships which are enforceable by the courts in their equitable 
jurisdiction, but also other relationships such as the discharge …of the duties or 
functions belonging to the prerogative and the authority of the Crown.’  The problem 
however of identifying an unenforceable trust relationship was acknowledged by him 
and caused ‘certain awkwardness in describing as a trust a relationship which is not 
enforceable by the courts.’ 131  
The next chapter will explore the feasibility of using stewardship principles as 
outlined in chapter four and does so by emphasising the practical essence of the 
stewardship concept by local authorities when exercising their statutory powers of 
land disposal under section 123 of the Local Government Act 1972 and the courts’ 
interpretation of that power.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
enforceable trust or fiduciary obligation. The claim therefore by the Parabans for breach of 
trust or fiduciary duty failed. Kinlock v Secretary of State for India in Council [1882] 7 App 
Cas 619 Hl applied. 
See, ‘Harsh but fair?’ (2007) 86(May) TEL & TJ 17-20 
131
 ibid, Tito & Others v Waddell & Others (No 2) (1977) 1 Ch 106,  Megarry VC  
See pp 235-238, where Megarry VC examines whether there was a fiduciary relationship 
under the 1937 Ordinance and questions of whether an innominate statutory relationship in 
the nature of a trust. He stated: ‘The categories of fiduciary obligation are not closed, and I 
see no reason why statute should not create a relationship which carries with it obligations of 
a fiduciary nature.’ [235B-G] 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
STEWARDSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 123 of the LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT ACT 1972 (Land Disposal) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to explore practical stewardship in the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users’, and further to 
demonstrate the value of fiduciary duty in the context of local government with 
particular reference to section 123 of the Local Government Act 1972.
1
 Section 123 
of the Local Government Act 1972 deals with the discretionary power of sale by local 
authorities of their land or interests therein (eg. grant of easements or options).  In 
such circumstances, the fiduciary duty is not limited by constraints of loyalty, because 
compliance with the statutory purpose of obtaining ‘best consideration ’is the key 
objective; an objective which is not focussed on any individual or group to which 
loyalty may be owed.  
This chapter continues to explore the potential use of concepts of trust and 
fiduciary duty in a local authority setting, but does so in the specific context of land 
disposal by virtue of powers conferred on local authorities by section 123 of the Local 
Government Act 1972.  Concepts cannot exist in a vacuum; they must have some 
practical beneficial use and purpose for society and the way in which it functions. 
Fiduciary duty has been found to arise in an extraordinary broad range of ad hoc 
circumstances and the results reached by the courts are sometimes contradictory.  The 
case law on section 123 is equally contradictory, and therefore illustrates issues which 
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are typical of many areas. 
Focussing on a distinct area of local government decision making provides a 
useful framework.  The justification for selecting an analysis of case law on section 
123 is that it vividly demonstrates that fiduciary duty has a role to play in 
administrative law where judges are able to impose such an equitable obligation.  In 
doing so social welfare objectives can be achieved. It also illustrates judicial 
recognition of a stewardship of community assets.  The chapter will adopt an ethical 
stewardship framework, to explore the case law in order to assess whether the use of 
concepts based on fiduciary duties can be developed by judges to achieve socially 
responsible outcomes. 
The courts have clearly found the equitable principle of fiduciary duty of 
benefit when construing section 123.  They have implied a fiduciary duty on the part 
of local authorities when disposing of their land.  Such judicial interpretation vividly 
illustrates not only the practical value of equitable principles, such as public 
trusteeship or fiduciary duty, but also the way equity, by performing its traditional 
historical role, can complement or work alongside public law principles to achieve 
just outcomes.  Judicial interpretation of that section can also be seen as a distinct aim 
by judges to achieve outcomes similar to those implied by the concept.  
In addition Parliamentary Circulars, such as Circular 06/03 also reaffirm a 
fiduciary approach.  That circular states ‘when disposing of land at an undervalue 
authorities must remain aware of the need to fulfil their fiduciary duty in a way which 
is accountable to local people.’2 (Emphasis added) 
At this stage it is necessary to refer briefly to the recently introduced general 
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power of competence (‘GPC’) by section 1 of the Localism Act 2011.3   Under that 
provision local authorities are now able to do anything that an ‘individual may 
generally do.’  Thus local authorities now have very wide discretionary powers vested 
in them by statute and it remains to be seen how that power will be used and the way 
in which the courts will interpret those powers.  It appears initially that the general 
power of competence has reversed the ultra vires doctrine,
4
 but we shall of course have 
to await judicial enlightenment in this respect and in the meantime can only offer 
conjecture based on case law and previous judicial approaches.  As section 123 is still 
in force it must strictly be adhered to.
5
 Notwithstanding these powers, a local 
authority, in certain circumstances has a fiduciary duty to its service users and must 
fulfil that duty in a way that is accountable to local people. 
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Devolving Democracy or the End of Accountability? Matrix Chambers, Public Law 
Conference, 14
th
 October 2012 
Chris Sear, Local authorities: the general power of competence, House of Commons Library, 
15
th
 March 2012 
5
 Alec Samuels, Local authority disposals: best price reasonably obtainable (The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 2012). As Alec Samuels states ‘the power of general 
competence cannot displace any specific statutory enactment or binding judicial decision, 
such as the obligation to obtain the best consideration reasonably obtainable.’ 
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6.2. Statutory Framework 
6.2.1. Section 123 of the Local Government Act 1972 
Section 123 of the Local Government Act 1972(C.70) (‘the LGA’) provides a general 
dispositive power for a principal council.
6
  It allows a local authority to dispose of an 
interest in land on such terms as it considers appropriate subject to it obtaining the best 
consideration that can reasonably be obtained for that land or interest. Section 123 of 
the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended) provides as follows: ’Subject to the 
following provisions of this section, and to those of the Playing Fields (Community 
Involvement in Disposal Decisions) (Wales) Measure 2010 a principal council may 
dispose of land held by them in any manner they wish.. Except with the consent of the 
Secretary of State, a council shall not dispose of land under this section, otherwise than 
by way of a short tenancy, for a consideration less than the best that can be reasonably 
obtained. (Emphasis added)              
                   The use of the words 'can reasonably be obtained' obviously take 
cognisance of land that is subject, to some physical defect, such as a form of 
environmental pollution or repair defect.  
7
 Sub-section two is mandatory and uses the 
word 'shall' and it is only the specific written prior approval of the Minister that can 
override this requirement of best consideration.
8
  In this way the Minister acts as an 
overseer or guardian as protective of the general interests of society and specifically for 
                                                             
6
 A principal council is defined as a County Council, District Council or London Borough 
council. Section 127 makes identical provision to section 123 in respect of parish or 
community councils, or the parish trustees of a parish 
7
 R v Pembrokeshire CC, ex parte Coker [1999] 4 All ER 1007, where Council land had been 
valued at -£600K, where the land was vandalised and the adjoining sea wall was in a severe 
dilapidated state  
8
 Short tenancies are an exempted category and there are also special procedural provisions 
that need not concern us here where the nature of the land being disposed of is an open space 
(advertising requirements - notice of intention to dispose of an open space and consider 
objections). Exception to best value-under subsection (7) a short tenancy is defined as a term 
granted for less than 7 years or on an assignment where the residue is not more than seven 
years to run 
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a local authority’s inhabitants.  
6.2.2 State Aid Rules 
All disposals must comply with the European Commission’s State Aid Rules (‘SAR’).9  
The rationale is that when disposing of land at less than best consideration the council 
is in effect providing a subsidy to the occupier of the land. In such cases the council 
must ensure that the nature and the amount of the subsidy comply with the SAR.  
Failure to comply means that the aid is unlawful and may result in the benefit being 
recovered with interest from the recipient (unless the de minimis principle applies).
10
  
6.2.3 General Disposal Consent 
Circular 06/03: Local Government Act 1972:  General Disposal Consent (England) 
2003 gives authorities consent to a land disposal subject to the circumstances 
specified in paragraph 2 and provides guidance to authorities exercising this duty.  
The specified circumstances are: 
The local authority considers that the purpose for which the land is to be disposed is 
likely to contribute to the achievement or any one or more of the following objects 
in respect of the whole or part of its area or of all or any persons resident or present 
in its area - (Emphasis added) that parliament considers other service users who 
come into a local authority area, whether for work or leisure count as ‘beneficiaries’, 
whose needs must be taken into account. 
The promotion or improvement of economic well-being; 
The promotion or improvement of social well-being; 
The promotion or improvement of environmental well-being; 
 
                                                             
9
 The Commission Communication on State aid elements in sales of land and buildings by 
public authorities (97/c 209/03) provides general guidance on this issue 
10 If, however, the occupier receives less than approx. £155,000 (200,000 euros) in state aid 
over a three year period the de minimis principle will apply. The rationale being that small 
amounts of aid are unlikely to distort competition 
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And 
 
      a) The difference between the unrestricted value ( i. e. The best price reasonable 
obtainable for the property on terms that are intended to maximise the consideration) 
of the land to be disposed of and the consideration for the disposal does not exceed 
£2,000,000 (two million pounds). The General Consent Order gives automatic consent 
for disposals under £2 million pounds to be carried out without the minister’s consent. 
It is for the local authority to decide whether a disposal requires specific 
consent under the 1972 Act, as the Secretary of State has no statutory powers to advise 
a local authority that consent is required in a particular case. Clearly the Guide
11
 
envisages a marriage between established public law principles and principles of 
equity.  This is illustrative of a prescriptive approach to exercising fiduciary duty 
which was discussed in chapter 3, as it imposes upon a local authority to do something 
i. e: achieve ‘best consideration’ on land disposals. 
6.3   Mode of sale 
Sub section (1) deals with the manner of sale and is couched in discretionary 
language ‘in any manner they wish.’12  The phrase ‘any manner’ was explored in R 
(on the application of Salford Estates) v Salford City Council
13
 where, judge 
                                                             
11
 Incorporated in circular 06/03 is a Technical appendix which gives helpful advice on a 
number of valuation aspects, for determining whether proposed land disposals fall within the 
Circular, and importantly reference to in the Circular content to the Appendix states ‘By 
following this advice an authority will be able to demonstrate that it has adopted a consistent 
approach to decisions about land disposals by carrying out the same step by step valuation 
process on each occasion. Such supporting documents will provide evidence, should the need 
arise, that an authority has acted reasonably and with regard to its fiduciary duty.’ 
12
 Thus a local authority may choose to sell by private treaty, on the open market, or by public 
auction (with or without a reserve) formal tender, informal negotiated tender or exchange of 
land. These choices are, of course, subject to exercises of due diligence, such as impact 
studies on the disposal, future needs of the community and expert valuations. All procedures 
and a robust audit trail that a dutiful council as trustee would be expected to follow 
13
 [2011] EWHC 2135 (Admin), Salford Estates sought a judicial review of the council’s 
decision to sell land to Tesco on the basis of an independent valuation, rather than go out to 
the open market. Tesco owned land in the middle of a larger site owned by the council. The 
additional land purchase would enable Tesco to build a large superstore. The court ruled that 
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Waksman QC although considering the application to be out of time for judicial 
review did provide some useful obiter remarks.  The council sold the land on the 
basis of an independent valuation, rather than test the land value by going out to the 
open market. Section 123 does not prescribe a particular process.  Rather, it 
underscores the treatment or if preferred, acknowledgment by the legislature that 
elements of trusteeship/stewardship of public assets are at the core of the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users.  
The wording of section 123 (2) by implication recognises a duty that is 
analogous to a fiduciary duty of a local authority.  This continues the theme of this 
thesis that assets are part of the public purse and not for the local authority to do 
with them as they will.  There is an overriding stewardship factor which demands 
accountability.  While parliament has not directly used such relational words the 
judiciary have nevertheless overlaid such equitable principles of analogous trust and 
fiduciary duties directly onto the statutory construction of sub-section 2.  
6.4 Tensions between ‘best consideration’ and social 
considerations  
Financial considerations play a significant part in a local authority’s service delivery 
decisions, but there is interplay of other factors, including local environmental and 
social care concerns that need to be considered.  This tension and delicate public 
interest balance is no more evident than on the disposal of council land.  We now 
consider case law with the prime aim of examining how the courts have interpreted 
section 123. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the method of achieving the ‘best price’ did not matter, and the council was under no 
obligation to follow set procedures and therefore had complied with its section 123 duty. 
There was no prescribed route to achieving the best price reasonably obtainable 
See further, R v Bolsover District Council, ex parte Pepper [2000] EGCS 107; (2001) LGR 
43, where it was held that there is no obligation on the council to dispose of land, if it does 
not wish to do so, even after an advertising and procurement process has commenced 
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The question asked is how (if at all) a public trust conception of fiduciary duty 
affects both the actions of a local authority and when challenged the judge’s approach?  
Lemon  illustrates judicial thinking and reasoning on what is meant by the phrase ‘best 
consideration’ in the context of additional social factors, such as employment that are 
often ‘add ons’ to an agreed sale price.  It should be noted that best consideration is not 
the same as best price available. 
As a general observation section 123 cases
14
 are inevitably fact-sensitive. 
Local authorities have a legal onus upon them to show both that they have 
discharged their statutory functions by compliance with public law principles and 
their fiduciary duties in respect to the disposal of land. Failure to satisfy either of 
these requirements may lead to the disposal transaction being set aside by the court. 
6.4.1 The Lemon case
15
- social value of Job creation 
Lemon concerned the definition of ‘consideration’ under section 123 and 
specifically whether ‘consideration’ could include social objectives, such as job 
creation.  Lemon Land limited (‘L’) and the London Development Agency (‘LDA’) 
were rival bidders for land in the London Borough of Hackney.  Hackney had 
obtained an open market valuation which valued the land at £2.2 million, a value 
accepted as correct by the council’s regeneration committee.  The two bids were 
                                                             
14
 See generally, Sarah Lines, ‘Navigating s.123 and land disposal duties’ Local Government 
Lawyer, 13th June 2013 
Karen Schuman, ‘Development Disposals: Ensuring Best Value’ 24 January 2013, Barrister 1 
Chancery Lane, London 
Both articles review recent case law 
15
  Lemon Land Ltd, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hackney [2001] EWHC 
Admin 336; (2002) 1 EGLR 81 
See generally, ‘Chitty on Contracts’ (31st ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2012) chapter 3, 
Consideration and chapter 4, The concept of valuable consideration 
Encyclopaedia of Local Government Law, chapter 2-282-Local Government Act 1972; 
disposal of land by principal councils 
‘Cross on Local Government Law’, London: Sweet & Maxwell, chapter 5 Acquisition, 
Appropriation, Disposal and Development of land.( Loose Leaf version, last updated October 
2016) 
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very similar in monetary terms. Lemon offered £2.064 million increased later to 
£2.45 million, including a contractual obligation to continue to accommodate a 
charity on the land.  The LDA offered £1.65 million on the basis of existing usage of 
no residential use or allowance for ‘hope value’ for the prospect of planning 
permission for change of use, including residential use and on a vacant possession 
basis.  Although Lemon’s bid was greater in monetary terms by £800,000, Hackney 
and the LDA were however anxious to ensure that the use and development of the 
property would generate employment opportunities within Hackney.  As a result the 
Council accepted the LDA’s offer on the basis that whilst Lemon’s proposals would 
create 160 and 200 jobs respectively, the LDA’s proposals would create 322 jobs.  
Thus an additional social employment factor was brought into the equation. 
The Council had calculated that the value of each job equated in money terms to a 
total of £732,000 (each job being valued at £6000) and that by adding the value of 
those non-monetary benefits to the 1.65 million offered by the LDA those proposals 
seemed the better consideration.  
The scenario in the case is typical of the type that often faces local 
authorities when considering the disposal of land when supplementary social issues 
are involved.  This case illustrates that local authority land disposal is not isolated 
from other concerns, such as welfare, community and social issues. Lemon 
challenged Hackney’s decision and succeeded at first instance before Lightman J 
who having construed section 123(2) of the Local Government Act 1972 held that it 
did not allow the Council to treat any part of the sum attributable to job creation as 
part of the purchase consideration.  The learned judge emphasised the trustee role of 
the Council and their consequent responsibility to be able to prove effective use of 
resources by means of an audit trail. 
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It followed from this judgement that for section 123 purposes any element of 
consideration taken into account must be capable of having a commercial or 
monetary value to the local authority itself.  Lightman J said: 
 The requirement that the elements in the consideration should be capable of having 
a commercial or monetary value to the local authority reposes on the local authority 
the responsibilities of a trustee of its land and enables its stewardship to be 
effectively audited  
16
 (Emphasis added)  
 
In this respect we need to consider the phrase ‘having a monetary value’ and 
the methods used to give value to non-monetary benefits that are often involved in 
the ‘mix’ when land is sold by local authorities for development.  
6.4.2 Non-monetary benefits 
 Lemon is authority that non-monetary factors (or socially desirable projects) 
influencing a local authority’s decision when selling land must be financially 
auditable and capable of having an assessable monetary value for section 123 
purposes.  This author considers this somewhat of a narrow view and that stewardship 
obligations should have a wider remit to further social goals.  It should be noted that 
here is a major exception to the best value rule by virtue of General Disposal 
Consents where a disposal by the Council is to a registered social landlord of land for 
development for provision of social and affordable housing purposes. In this way 
social objectives are achieved, but are of course limited by the status of the purchaser 
concerned.  On a sale by a local authority of a prime development site the competing 
purchasers will usually be major supermarkets.  If so, the social landlord exemption 
does not apply and the full rigour of section 123 ‘best consideration’ applies. 
This section specifically addresses whether a perceived social value can 
lawfully be taken into account and form part of the consideration for the purposes of 
compliance with the statutory provision of section 123 and its insistence on ‘best 
                                                             
16
 Lemon Land Ltd R v Hackney London Borough Council [2001] EWHC Admin 336, [11] 
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consideration.’  It is useful to discuss the different judicial approach by reference to 
the case of Structadene. 
6.4.3.1 Employment 
There have been inconsistent first instance decisions shown by contrasting Lemon 
with the earlier case (co-incidentally also involving Hackney Borough Council) of 
Structadene.
17
  The defendant council owned a site in Tilia Road, London E.5 where 
business units were let to twelve tenants.  The council proposed to sell the land at 
public auction, but then decided to deal with the incumbent tenants and eventually 
sold it to them for £400,000.  Structadene immediately prior to the auction offered 
£450,000, later increased to £500,000.  Hackney refused to deal with the new bids 
and informed the company that the proposed sale to the tenants was irreversible.  An 
injunction restrained Hackney from completing the sale and the matter went to 
judicial review.  Elias. J construed section 123 as follows: ‘I accept that in an 
appropriate case, it is possible for a council successfully to contend that there are 
social or other benefits to the local community that outweigh the loss from the failure 
to obtain the best price.’  Interestingly, he went on to say that ‘the interests of local 
taxpayers are not decisive but must be taken into account.’18 Regrettably, Elias J did 
not expand on precisely what he meant by ‘social or other benefits. 
 It appears therefore that the outcome may have been different had the council 
produced such cogent evidence.  Referring to the paucity of the witness statements, 
Elias J said: ‘The statement suggests, but does not state in terms, that the council may 
have been intending to comply with one of its Standing Orders which give 
                                                             
17 R (on the application of Structadene Ltd) v Hackney LBC [2000] EGL 168; [2001] 2 All 
ER 225 
18
 ibid, (Elias J) [173] 
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commercial tenants the first opportunity to purchase the property.  It maybe, that the 
council wished to help small businesses, but again this would be speculation.’ 19  
 Clearly Elias J had a favourable disposition to such matters, but on the 
evidence presented the applicant’s grounds of challenge (based on breach of section 
123, and Wednesbury unreasonableness) significantly, in the context of this thesis, 
also argued that the council were in breach of their fiduciary duty to the ratepayers 
and this argument was upheld.  The council’s decision to sell to the tenants was 
quashed and their contract declared invalid. Elias J said ‘ It will be a breach of the 
fiduciary duty if the council fails to obtain the best price for the local taxpayer and 
referred in support to Lord Diplock’s statement  in Bromley20 a case  analysed in 
chapter five. 
As we have seen quite the opposite conclusion was reached in Lemon.  
Lightman.  J observed that ‘the policy behind s.123 (2) is that in a sale of land by a 
local authority a distinction must be drawn between commercial and non-commercial 
transactions; If there is any element of discount or grant in a transaction, then the 
consent of the Secretary of State is necessary.’ 21 The decision in Lemon was reached 
without any reference to Structadene or an earlier case of R v Darlington Borough 
Council, ex parte Indescon Ltd,
22
where Kennedy J  said in summary, that: ‘a court 
should be very reluctant to question a local authority’s decision as to a s 123 
disposition unless it breached public law principles of failure to take proper advice, 
accepted erroneous advice or in following advice must have known it was acting 
unreasonably.’   
                                                             
19
 ibid, (Elias J)    
20 Bromley v GLC [1983] AC 768, [829H] (the ‘fares fair’ case) 
21
 R (on the application of Lemon Land Ltd) v Hackney LBC [2001] EWHC 336, [6] 
22
 [1990] 1 EGLR 278 
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This is of course the standard approach of deference taken by the courts on 
judicial review.  Loveland states: ‘the ratio of the judgment provides no support at all 
for the proposition that LGA 1972, s 123 dispositions must be for the highest price 
offered, nor that an authority’s discretion under s 123 can be exercised only in 
accordance with monetary or commercial considerations.’ 23 
Underlying the discussion on best consideration obtainable has important 
stewardship implications for the achievement by local authorities of schemes 
involving social purposes and locality improvement.  Often, in major land sales a 
Council will want to achieve some local benefit, for example social housing.  To 
reiterate, section 123 relates only to an ascertainable and auditable monetary 
commercial value.  Job creation as we have seen in Lemon is a non-commercial 
aspect.  It does not form part of the contractual consideration, because consideration 
intrinsically involved detriment and there would be none to the buyer in that regard 
because he would have had to have created jobs and incur the employment costs 
anyway.  It cannot be a price for the purposes of section 123 consideration.  
6.4.3.2   Nomination rights 
However, nomination rights do seem to have received judicial approval as 
representing a commercial value that may be quantified.  They are of direct and 
tangible benefit to the authority.  It is difficult to place monetary value on nomination 
rights.  The formula could be based on the cost to the authority of providing private 
sector temporary accommodation multiplied by the number of nomination rights
24
the 
council reserves to itself under the development sale agreements.  Nomination rights 
                                                             
23
 Ian Loveland, ‘Local Authority Land Sales: are councils under a fiduciary duty to accept 
the ‘highest offer’?’ [2002] JPL 257 
24
 By ‘nomination rights’ is meant an agreement securing the council’s right to nominate 
persons from their housing register to whom affordable housing will be occupied 
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are extremely valuable to a local authority in the exercise of its statutory housing 
duties, for not only do they help to free up those waiting on the housing list, but are 
an example of stewardship.  
6.4.3.3 Overage payments and Section 106 Agreements 
Section 123 challenges continue to emphasise the difficult balancing process that a 
local authority has when selecting its land purchaser.  The recent case of R (on the 
application of London Jewish Girls High Ltd) v Barnet LBC 
25
 illustrates this. Mitting 
J made some interesting obiter remarks.  This case does graphically illustrate how 
what appears initially to be a bipolar decision i.e. a disposal of land to a developer can 
generate polycentric issues - housing needs versus educational needs.  The council 
had decided to sell a former Council vacant development site, previously occupied 
under a long lease by Hendon FC.  The shares in that football club, including the 
assignment of the lease term residue of the ground was purchased by a development 
company.  The rival bidder was a girls High school that had to vacate its present 
premises (operating its school from a synagogue) by 2013.  The council’s resources 
committee, following the advice from the district valuer, concluded that they would 
accept a cash offer of £2.8 million from the developer plus overage payments per 
habitable room of private housing that the developer obtained permission to build 
over a certain figure.  In addition certain payments were to be made to the council 
under a section 106 agreement
26
, such as contributions to other local service 
                                                             
25
 [2013] EWHC 523 (Admin); [2013] B.L.G.R.387 
26
 Planning obligations are created under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1990. They are legally binding obligations that are attached to a piece of land and are 
registered as a local land charge against that parcel of land. They enable councils to secure 
contributions to services, infrastructure and amenities in order to support and facilitate a 
proposed development 
‘overage’ is a term used in property transactions to mean a sum which a vendor may be 
entitled after completion if a specified condition is satisfied; the condition may be 
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infrastructure, including schools and highways.  The scheme also included at least 
100 units for residential development. The developer’s offer was however dependent 
upon a successful planning application.  Meanwhile, the school discovered the 
council’s intention to sell to the developer and submitted a bid of £3.5 million, 
expressed without reference to ‘subject to contract’ and could therefore have 
constituted an unconditional offer which the council could have accepted as it stood, 
but the council preferred their original decision.  The school brought proceedings for 
judicial review and an interim injunction was granted to stop the sale.  They 
submitted that the local authority decision to sell to the developer would breach 
section 123(2) of the Local Government Act 1972.  In essence they argued that 
perceived benefits which could not lawfully form part of the consideration had been 
wrongly taken into account by the council.  
Mitting J opined that there was no problem with the overage payments, but 
did state: 
benefits that could not be taken into account in assessing the consideration were the 
creation of affordable housing units and payments promised under the section 106 
agreement to offset the costs to the local authority created by the completion of any 
development, as they represented payments to offset the costs of development, not 
elements that related to the sale of the land.  
 
 Mitting J also made obiter remarks concerning nomination rights
27
 reserved 
to the council
28
 over affordable housing and considered that such benefits could be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 the grant of a planning permission for a new use that makes the land more valuable; or 
 the construction of more than a specified number of houses on the development site; or 
 the on-sale of the land in its present condition where the vendor fears that the buyer will take 
advantage of any uplift in price of the sold land, especially in a rising market 
27
 Nomination rights mean the contractual right of a local authority to nominate nominees for 
housing by a registered social landlord when a unit becomes empty, sometimes up to 75 per 
cent 
28 [2013] EWHC 523 Mitting J ‘ Rights reserved to the local authority in any sale to a 
registered social landlord to nominate tenants of the housing units was likely to be a benefit 
that could be taken into account. {paras 23,26] 
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taken into account, as they could be financially quantifiable by experts and were 
benefits accruing to the council from the use of the land that were of a commercial 
and monetary value to the council.  He further said ‘this case does serve as a timely 
reminder that obtaining the ‘best consideration’ does not necessarily entail selecting 
the highest offer in pure cash terms.’ 29 
6.5 The Court’s approach 
Who decides the legality of the ‘benefits’?  The courts will be reluctant to interfere 
with a local authority decision in keeping with the general judicial public law 
approach that the local authority is assumed to have detailed knowledge of what is 
best in and for their local situation.  Deference is a huge topic and outside the remit of 
this thesis.
30
 
6.5.1 Role of Equity 
 Does the problem of a narrow judicial approach to non-monetary benefits hinder 
progress in areas such as, local social housing or regeneration projects?  The 
requirements of local authorities’ ordinary common law duties are well understood in 
the need to exercise due diligence and good faith and get the land valued.
31
  These 
may be seen more as general legal duties of care covered by tort law, rather than 
specifically fiduciary in nature.  
                                                             
29
 [2013] EWHC 523 (Admin) (Mitting J)  
30
 See for further discussion of deference, J Jowell ‘Judicial deference: servility, civility or 
institutional capacity? (2003) PL 592; Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and democratic 
dialogue: the legitimacy of judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 
PL 33; Lord Steyn, ‘Deference, a Tangled Story’ (2005) PL 346; The Hon Michael J Beloff 
QC, ‘The Concept of Deference in Public Law’ (2006) JR 213 
31 The District Valuers’ office can assist here as does HM Treasury Guidelines ‘Managing 
Public Money’ and reference to the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors ‘Red Book’ by 
independent professional valuation and or in addition market testing 
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Land disposals also illustrate in a graphic and understandable way how a 
fiduciary relationship between local authorities and their service users may arise, and 
the core element of being loyal to the beneficiary’s interest can find expression in the 
way a council disposes and handles the sale of surplus land. Loyalty can be directed 
to achieving the statutory purpose - ‘best consideration’.  It can also represent an 
exercise in polycentric management, as there will be no shortage of interested voices 
when a major local authority land sale is proposed, such as those who object to the 
sale itself, its terms or the proposed development generally.   
6.5.2 Must the best price always be obtained?  
In our analysis it is important to recognise that Section 123(2) refers to best 
consideration rather than best price - the two are not the same.  However Roch J in R 
v Middlesborough B C, ex parte Frostree Ltd
32
 held that the best value principle 
meant simply the highest monetary value to the exclusion of all other considerations. 
The Council had accepted a bid of £73,000 for land to be used by the purchaser for 
recreational purposes, a purpose the council strongly supported.  The Council rejected 
a bid from Frostree of £85,000 who intended to use the land for purposes which the 
council regarded as less satisfactory.  Roch J Stated: ‘The Council should have 
reached its decision solely by reference to the respective amounts that were on offer. 
The applicant’s offer was clearly the better offer, and the Council’s statutory duty 
required it to have accepted that offer.’ 33 
                                                             
32
 R v Middlesborough B C, ex parte Frostree Ltd (Unreported, 16 December 1988) (QBD); 
(1988) EG 180 (CS) 
See further Thomas Jefferies, Barrister, Landmark Chambers, ‘The Duty to get the best price 
on the sale of land’ < 
http://www.landmarkchambers.co.uk/userfiles/documents/resources/THE_DUTY_TO_GET_
THE_BEST_PRICE_ON_THE_SALE_OF_LAND.pdf> accessed 29 September 2016. 
33
 ibid, (Unreported 16 December 1988) (QBD), brief report on Lawtell at TLT 12/1/89 
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This definition was however usefully extended and clarified by Lightman J in 
R v Pembrokeshire CC, Ex parte Coker
34
 where he confirmed that it was acceptable 
for a council to take cognisance of ‘non-monetary’ factors.  Lightman J it will be 
remembered was also the judge in Lemon.  
There has been no appellate decision on section 123 – all the case law is at 
first instance.  It is possible however to state with assurance certain factors emanating 
from case law.  Thus a covenant by the tenant to use its best endeavours to employ a 
specified number of people will not be a part of best consideration – this was again a 
decision by Lightman J in R V Pembrokeshire CC Ex parte Coker
35
, nor will the 
desire  of a council to retain a particular use which will create jobs – the Lemon case , 
or the desirability favoured by the local authority of the proposed use of the property 
as a health and fitness club by Roch J in Frostree Ltd.
36
 It is further accepted that the 
sale price for a parcel of land may be dictated by its physical characteristics.  For 
example, where it has been contaminated or in some way its true value is affected by 
disrepair there must obviously be a price adjustment for clean-up costs to remove the 
contaminated source by the purchaser, or price adjustment for repair contributions, 
otherwise the land or property may be unsaleable. Early disposal in such situations is 
clearly in the interests of all interested stakeholders, the local authority, its ratepayer, 
service users and central government.  
                                                             
34
 [1999] 4 All ER 1007 
Further comment see, ‘Best Price Reasonably Obtainable’ (2003) 6(2) JLGL 38 
35
 R v Pembrokeshire County Council ex parte Coker [1999] All ER (D) 713, the purchaser 
covenanted in a disposal of a commercial lease that it would use its best endeavours to 
employ a specified number of individuals. The council had preferred that bidder on the 
ground that it would mean the creation of extra jobs for the area. They obtained planning 
permission for a steel rolling mill. An aggrieved party C challenged on the basis that its offer 
(£100K for a 99 year lease) had bettered that put forward by the other party, a subsidiary of a 
plc, because it had the effect of creating jobs and that consent should have been obtained 
from the Secretary of State. The application for judicial review was refused. 
36
 R v Middlesborough BC, ex parte Frostree Ltd (Unreported, 16 December 1988) 
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6.5.3 ‘Chalk and Cheese’ bids 
The difficulty is trying to place a monetary value on ‘benefits’ that a local authority 
may derive from say a new playground, skate park or nursery as opposed to a cluster 
of new executive homes.  Professor Loveland discusses this dilemma, by what he 
calls ‘chalk and cheese’ bids.  He uses an illustration of a sale by a local authority of a 
piece of derelict land situated in an area deprived of any leisure and child care 
facilities.  It has no resources to develop the land itself.  Two rival bids are submitted, 
one from a small charity who want to create a day nursery, a park with a children’s 
playground incorporated.  This bid enjoys local support.  
The other bid is from a property company who want to develop the land for 
construction of high value executive housing.  Loveland states; 
 ‘If the Lemon/Coker interpretation of s.123 is correct, the authority may not 
sell the land to the charity even if the authority reasonably concluded - entirely 
sensibly - that the needs of the community would be much better served by a park and 
a nursery than by an expensive new housing development.  In effect the property 
company has bought out the authority’s capacity to administer its community in 
accordance with (its perception of) the wishes of the inhabitants.’37   
In this author’s opinion Professor Loveland makes a valid and very important 
critique, for if councils are frustrated in this way from achieving what they believe to 
be in the best interests of their community, harm is caused in a reverse way by the 
application of fiduciary principles, which strangely was why they were applied in the 
first place, namely to prevent harm - the prophylactic nature of fiduciary obligation 
has been defeated.  
                                                             
37
 Ian Loveland, ‘Local Authority Land Sales: are councils under a fiduciary duty to accept 
the ‘highest offer’?’ (2002) JPL. 257. 9  
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There must be judicial balance in the way the courts apply s 123 when faced 
with ‘chalk and cheese’ bids.  The author considers the approach of Lord Russell 
correct when some 119 years ago in Kruse v Johnston
38
 he said: 
 Surely it is not too much to say that, in matters which directly and mainly 
concern the people of the county who have the right to choose those whom they think 
best fitted to represent them in their local government bodies, such representatives 
may be trusted to understand their own requirements better than the judges. 
6.5.4 ‘Bird in hand’ principle 
The phrase, a ‘bird in hand’ was used by Wynn Parry J in the private law trust case of 
Buttle v Saunders
39
 where taking a practical approach he said that a bird in hand is 
accepted: on the grounds of common sense a council is expected to accept a firm bid, 
rather than a higher bid that may be speculative and have no substance, other than be 
a ‘spoiler’ bid.  It also represents good stewardship.  Thus a local authority will not 
breach section 123 or its overriding fiduciary duty if it prefers to accept a bid at a 
lower price than that of a last-minute ‘spoiling’ bid.  In R (on the application of Lidl) 
UK (GMBH) v Swale BC and Aldi Stores Limited
40
 the court determined that ‘The 
Council is in the position of a trustee in relation to the land which it holds on behalf 
of the community.’ 
 
 
                                                             
38
 [1898] 2 QB 91, 99 
39
 [1950] 2 All ER 193; (1950) 2 Ch 193 
40
 [2001] EWHC Admin 405 This case was brought as a result of a bid by Lidl on a site Aldi 
had been assembling with the council’s approval and Lidl tried to delay while they sought 
their own planning consent, on another site in the same town. Lidl’s bid was regarded as a 
spoiling tactic 
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 6.5.5 Focussing on stewardship of community interests 
In R (Island Farm Developments Ltd) v Bridgend B.C.
41
 (Admin) Collins J noted the 
context of section 123 and acknowledged that the council in reaching its decision, 
immediate financial benefits were not the only consideration and had to be balanced 
with what were the best interests of the council and its inhabitants of Bridgend .
42
  
Importantly for the purposes of this thesis Collins J said ‘The loss of the development 
potential for the whole of the land designated in the unitary development plan were to 
go ahead, would result in a loss of a considerable number of potential jobs.’43  He 
therefore viewed the exercise to be carried out by a local authority proposing a 
section 123 disposition wider than simply fiscal concerns, but also included economic 
and social considerations; future local employment conditions is a relevant rational 
factor. This approach accords with the ethical principle of stewardship espoused by 
this author and discussed in chapter four.  Lightman J in Lemon when referring to the 
need for benefits to have a commercial value said that it ‘….reposes on the local 
authority the responsibilities of a trustee of its land and enables its stewardship to be 
effectively audited’. (Emphasis added) 
6.5.6 Public Law approach 
The public law approach is summed up by Kennedy J in R V Darlington BC ex parte 
Indescon 
44
 in this case Kennedy J enunciated what are referred to as  ‘ the Indescon 
principles’: 
                                                             
41
 [2006] EWHC 2189, the claimants sought judicial review of a council resolution to refuse 
to sell a Science Park to them. The claimants owned adjoining land and had obtained 
planning permission for development. The redevelopment was very controversial locally and 
following an election and change of political leadership the negotiations were discontinued. 
42   ibid, [52] 
43
 . [2006] EWHC 2189.para 44 
44
   [1990] 1 EGLR 278 (Kennedy J) 
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‘….a court is only likely to find a breach or an intended breach by a council of 
the provisions of section 123 (2) of the (LGA) 1972 if the council has 
(a) failed to take proper advice or 
(b) failed to follow proper advice for reasons which cannot be justified or 
(c) although following proper advice, followed advice which was so plainly 
erroneous that in accepting it the council must have known, or at least 
ought to have known, that it was acting unreasonably’ 45 
In this way a combination of public law principles and equity can achieve a better 
decision outcome. 
Case law is represented only by first instance decisions.  There is no appellate 
authority of whether or not section 123 imputes a fiduciary duty onto the disposal by 
a council of its land, and if so how exacting that duty might be represented.  On 
examination of the cases on section 123 it is abundantly clear there is a common 
judicial approach, albeit differing in emphasis from time to time on what non-
monetary factors may be taken into account. Statutory interpretation seems to indicate 
a favourable promotion of social objectives, provided those social orientations are 
capable of a monetary valuation and therefore auditable in nature.  It may be 
considered as Loveland does that ‘the approach taken by Elias J in Structadene and 
Kennedy J in Indesco is much more satisfactory in terms of constitutional principle 
than that favoured by Lightman J in Coker and in Lemon’.46 
6.6 Conclusion 
The courts will undoubtedly be faced in the future with application or otherwise of 
overriding fiduciary considerations, especially in very difficult factual situations of 
trying to perform some juggling act with sectional interests, often of a diverse and 
conflicting nature, where the competing claims may be of comparable community 
                                                             
45
   [1990] 1 EGLR 278, [282H] 
46 Ian Loveland, ‘Local Authority Land Sales: are councils under a fiduciary duty to accept 
the ‘highest offer’?’ (2002) JPL 257, 5 
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legitimacy, as illustrated by Lemon.  With an increasing emphasis on regeneration and 
renewal of ‘run down’ urban areas there is an added pressure on local authorities to 
explore options on how to achieve their socio-economic welfare objectives, while still 
complying with their statutory duties under section 123, including their overall 
stewardship role of community funds. Case law has however clarified a few key 
issues regarding a council’s compliance with their section 123 obligations.  There will 
however always be the overarching question of how do you assess fairly ‘community 
value’ for the ‘community good.’ 
The judicial interpretation of section 123 emphasises that the important 
consideration on disposal of land by a local authority is the outcome to achieve the 
best consideration, rather than its process and that monetary value is the best 
consideration in whatever form, whether overage, sale price upfront or deferred. 
However, social and economic benefits may justify a disposal at undervalue, but only 
in certain defined statutory circumstances or when that benefit is financially 
quantifiable and can be audited. Professor Alec Samuels, however, has expressed 
doubts and stated: ‘A discount for social or economic benefits is dubious, arguably 
unlawful, even if it can be proved to be a quantifiable commercial or monetary 
benefit to the local authority and local community, without which the land would 
have gone for a higher price.’ 47   
If there is uncertainty, the safest practice is to obtain the prior consent of the 
Secretary of State. This protection may be preferred; its value was spoken of by Elias 
J in the London Jewish Girls school case
48
 as it cannot be said that the case law is 
                                                             
47
 ‘Local authority disposals: best price reasonably obtainable’ (2012), 5 Conv 405, 407 
48
  R (on the application of London Jewish Girls High Ltd) v Barnet LBC [2013] 
EWHC 523 (Admin); B.L.G.R. 387 ‘It seems to me that the Secretary of State has a wide 
discretion to give his consent and can do so even if the Council has struck a balance between 
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consistent. A practical solution for local authorities to avoid the risk of challenge by 
judicial review of the lawfulness of discounts or ‘trade-offs’ and breach of fiduciary 
duty, may be to appropriate the land for planning purposes (if the land was not 
originally acquired for that purpose) and then effect the disposition through the 
planning legislation.
49
 This route is however, only available where those ‘social 
issues’ can properly be regarded as raising ’planning considerations.’ 
For Lieber
50
, Constitutional Law was a branch of the law of trusts. All of us as 
citizens are, in his view, fiduciaries.  We have no rights, he repeatedly affirms, that 
are not linked to duties, especially those exercising power or influence on public 
affairs who have duties to their fellow citizens.  As Professor Paul D Carrington states 
‘For Lieber the principles of interpretation and construction are an important part of 
the standard of public ethics, dictates as to how those who apply the lash of power, 
conform to the common understanding of texts to which their actions give meaning. 
Both construction and interpretation are to be guided by considerations of the public 
interest as seen through the spectacles of the community to be served’.51  
The judicial green light for freedom for a local authority to have regard to 
considerations of a non-commercial or monetary value on any of their property 
disposals, subject to the qualifications mentioned, should be highly prized as a 
powerful tool in a time of restraints of local government finances and pressure to 
come up with imaginative schemes to meet social welfare needs.  Therefore such a 
purposive judicial interpretation of section 123 is to be welcomed.  This approach 
                                                                                                                                                                              
non-economic or social benefits on the one hand, and financial benefits on the other, which 
would put it in breach of its fiduciary duty at common law.’ Mitting J (my emphasis). 
49
  Town & Country Planning Act 1990
 
 
50
  Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics in William G Hammond (ed), (F H 
Thomas 1880) 195.This work was first published in 1838 
Legal and Political Hermeneutics, publisher: The Legal Classics Library, 1994 
51
 ‘Meaning and Professionalism in American Law’ (1993) 10, Constitutional Commentary, 
Duke Law School, 297 
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also highlights that where public funds are involved there is more judicial support to 
impose a fiduciary obligation as an accountability mechanism, alongside established 
public law grounds.
52
  Some cynics might argue more as a judicial comfort blanket 
than a social engineering exercise.  Nevertheless, a local authority’s fiduciary duty 
under section 123 will be strictly interpreted and discounts, trade-offs or benefits in 
return for a lower price will be open to challenge. 
Equity’s influence once again appears constrained by the court’s failure to 
appreciate the scope of fiduciary duty and limit it to an economic duty only.  
Notwithstanding, it should be noted that many of the section 123 cases invoked Buttle 
v Saunders, 
53
 illustrating as Alex Samuels states: ‘ the easy transferability that many 
courts have assumed exists between trusts law in relation to private trusts and local 
authority action.’ 54   
The use of the word ‘easy’ may be challenged for as we saw in chapter four 
translating equitable principles into the public law field raises difficult obstacles. 
Nevertheless, the cross reference to private trust law cases does illustrate that in some 
instances cross fertilisation between equity and common law can combine to assist 
judges in their task of statutory interpretation.  
                                                             
52
 See, R (on the application of Galaxy Land Ltd v Durham County Council [2015] EWHC 16 
(Admin). The case involved a decision by the local authority to transfer land to an external 
body for the purpose of residential development. The decision to transfer the land was 
successfully challenged in the High Court on several grounds, where Cranston J, at [49] 
stated that ‘a purported discharge of a duty under the section can be impugned on ordinary 
public law principles.’ The Cabinet decision was legally flawed for a number of reasons, 
including the officers had not taken fully into account the strategic nature of the council’s 
landowning interests and that should have fed through to the Cabinet 
See case comment by Nathan Holden, Section 123 Local Government Act 1972 … again! 
(Local Government Lawyer 26 March 2015) 
53 Buttle v Saunders [1950] 2 All ER 193, 16 
54
 Alec Samuels, Local authority disposals: best price reasonably obtainable (The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 2012) 411 
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There may however, be areas of public law that are far less accommodating to 
equitable principles, where the overriding need for public law is to focus on what is in 
the public interest, a factor that can prevent individual justice, especially where courts 
have to decide whether to uphold a legitimate substantive expectation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FAIRNESS IN PUBLIC LAW 
An analysis of the concept of Substantive Legitimate Expectation 
 From time to time –lawyers and judges have tried to define what constitutes fairness.  
Like defining an elephant, it is not easy to do, although fairness in practice has the 
elephantine quality of being easy to recognise….for the purposes of my judgment I intend to 
ask myself this single question: did the (decision-maker) act fairly towards the plaintiff 
1
   
     
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is in two parts.  The first part considers a preliminary question that is 
perhaps basic to whether equitable notions of fairness are applicable in public law, 
namely the extent to which public law is fundamentally concerned with fairness.  The 
second part looks at notions of fairness with particular reference to substantive 
legitimate expectations in local government. 
The first question considered may appear naïve, as it is widely assumed that 
securing fairness is a fundamental goal of public law.
2
 In truth this assumption is not 
                                                             
1
 Maxwell v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] 2 All ER 129 (Lawton LJ), this case 
did not involve legitimate expectation, but broad aspects of fairness concerning the work of 
inspectors, who Denning LJ said did their work with ‘conspicuous fairness.’ 
2
 See frequently cited statement of principles governing standards of fairness by Lord Mustill 
in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Doody [1994] AC 941: 
(1) Where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption 
that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. 
(2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of 
time, both in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type. 
(3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. 
What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be 
taken into account in all its aspects. 
(4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as 
regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within 
which the decision is taken. 
(5) Fairness will very often require that a person may be adversely affected by the 
decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either 
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universally accepted. In particular what may be described as the imperium model of 
judicial review presents the role of the court in public law judicial proceedings to be 
concerned with ensuring that public bodies act in accordance with the powers 
conferred upon them by parliament.  They may be able to do this without any 
discussion of fairness.
3
  For example a pure construction of a local authority’s 
statutory duties or powers need not involve any consideration of fairness.  
Some argue that this is a very thin view of judicial review, and that the 
common law is fundamentally about rights and fairness and that it would be an abuse 
of power for a public body to act unfairly.  They point to the extension of principles 
of natural justice and fairness and to the extension of judicial review from matters of 
process to matters of substance, a prime example being in the context of legitimate 
expectation.
4
 This view is adopted in this thesis, save that it exhorts greater use of the 
tools of equity (where doctrinally appropriate) alongside existing public law tools. 
The two conceptions of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as ‘power constraining’ 
                                                                                                                                                                              
before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result, or after it is 
taken, with a view to procuring its modification, or both 
(6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without 
knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require 
that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer 
3
 See Sedley J, Dixon [1998] Env L R 111: ‘Public law is not at base about rights, even 
though abuses of power may and often do invade private rights; it is about wrongs - that is to 
say misuses of public power.’ 
See further, Wade & Forsyth, ‘Administrative Law’, Oxford University Press 11th ed, 2014, 
‘The system of judicial review is radically different from the system of appeals. When 
hearing an appeal the court is concerned with the merits of the decision: is it correct? When 
subjecting some administrative act or order to judicial review the court is concerned with its 
legality: is it within the limits of the power granted?’ ( Emphasis added) 
4
 See, Abhijit Pandya, ‘Legitimate Expectations in English Law’: Too Deferential an 
Approach’ [2009] JR 170. ‘The doctrine of legitimate expectations in English Law protects 
individuals from changes to representations made by government bodies. This protection can 
arise by giving individuals either due process rights or substantive rights.’ (Emphasis added) 
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or as a ‘right-conferring’ have been succinctly recorded in a recent work by Joanna 
Bell.
5
 
This chapter aims to give a general overview of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation, its origin and development including its anatomy, with the case of 
Coughlan
6
 used as a central pivot.  That case assists the author’s overall argument 
that equity has a role to play in public law, albeit limited where the concept of 
substantive legitimate expectation is concerned.  That role, it will be argued, is rooted 
in public law’s emphasis on protecting the public interest against abuse of power by 
public bodies, such as local authorities.  This author argues that there is a public 
interest in fair treatment by public bodies of citizens, which must be protected against 
abuse.  Abuse can occur where local authorities resile from a procedural or 
substantive promise.  The court only allows such promises to be thwarted if a local 
authority can justify that doing so is necessary and proportionate.  In this way it is 
evident that these public law principles are infused with notions rooted in equity.  
Notwithstanding, equity would be unable to prevent an injustice to an individual, 
even where a substantive legitimate expectation is proved to the court’s satisfaction, 
if the public interest is accorded greater weight.
7
   
 
 
 
                                                             
5
 Joanna Bell, ‘The doctrine of legitimate expectations; power-constraining or right-
conferring legal standard?’ (2016) PL 437 
6
 R v North East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2000] 3 All ER 850 
7
 See the so called prisoner cases of Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, applied in R (on the 
application of Khatil) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] EWHC 606 (Admin). A prisoner 
applied for judicial review against his escape risk classification 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 All ER 397 
Prisoners whose expectations of home leave and early release were not to be fulfilled by 
reason of a change of prison policy 
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As Schonberg remarks: ‘There is a growing recognition in Britain that legality 
and administration in the public interest must be limited or balanced against, 
requirements of morality or fairness, and that it is incumbent on the courts to enforce 
such limits through principles of judicial review.’ 8 
Lord Justice Lawton’s comment cited at the beginning of this chapter 
identifies the key problem in examining notions of fairness - its ability to mean 
different things to different people.  Practical expressions of fairness are much easier 
to identify in procedural terms than instances involving substantive unfairness.  This 
chapter continues to explore and exhort the potential influence equity can have in 
public law in a practical sense.  The difference between procedural and substantive 
legitimate expectation will only briefly be sketched, on the basis that to a large extent 
procedural legitimate expectation is settled, whereas substantive legitimate 
expectation is not.  It still greatly exercises judicial and academic minds, because it 
draws the court into a more merits weighing review and therefore goes to the heart of 
our understanding of fairness in a legal sense. 
Procedural legitimate expectation and substantive legitimate expectation are 
very different.  Procedural legitimate expectation deals with matters of process, such 
as a right to consultation, a hearing or representation, whereas substantive legitimate 
expectation is more problematic because it enables the court to stand in the shoes of 
the public body, which is constitutionally questionable. 
                                                             
8 Soren J Schonberg, Expectations, Fairness and Lawful Administration in the Public Interest, 
chapter 1 in ‘Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law ‘, eds, Soren Schonberg, Sren J 
Schnberg and S Ren Sch berg (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) 
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This author’s view is that legitimate expectation is very analogous to the 
private law doctrine of estoppel.  In fact Cameron Stewart 
9
argues that estoppel and 
substantive legitimate expectation are synonymous.  There are resemblances of the 
equitable concept of estoppel,
10
 which must of course be read into the public law 
context, where estoppel as such is not recognised.  This apparent similarity between 
estoppel and legitimate expectation in public law raises the possibility that private 
trust law concepts would have a role in this area of public law.  This chapter explores 
whether this is the case.  However, on closer examination it appears clear that 
estoppel and legitimate expectation are not as similar as some might assume, because 
public interests can always defeat expectations.  Despite the potential relevance of 
equity in relation to certain matters, for example, the force of the promise
11
 and 
establishment of the expectation engendered, equity’s role is very limited when it 
comes to the court’s willingness to protect a legitimate expectation against a public 
interest.  However, this does not mean that equity has no role, rather that its role has 
been subsumed into the common law, especially in relation to the test the courts will 
apply when considering whether an authority can thwart a promise.  This is evident in 
the Coughlan case where the Court of Appeal went further than had previous courts 
to protect a substantive legitimate expectation and to require clear justification from 
the public body. 
                                                             
9
 Cameron Stewart, ‘Substantive Unfairness: A New Species of Abuse of Power?’ (2000) 28 
Fed L Rev 617, citing Simon Brown LJ’s comments in R v Devon County Council, ex parte 
Baker (1995) 1 All ER 73 
10
 The familiar triptych of representation, reliance and detriment is common to both private 
law estoppel and legitimate expectation 
11
 See, Alastair Hudson, ‘Equity & Trusts’ (Cavendish Publishing Limited 2003) 491. 
‘Estoppel achieves justice by preventing a person from going back on his word. The 
difference between an ordinary promise and a promise giving rise to an estoppel is that it is a 
requirement of the latter that the claimant must have suffered some detriment in reliance on 
that promise.’ 
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Exploring legitimate expectation in relation to estoppel by representation 
clearly distinguishes the different emphasis of the courts.  In private law estoppel the 
court’s focus is on whether there has been unconscionable behaviour by the promisor, 
resulting in detriment to the promisee, whereas public law focusses on the public 
body itself i.e. have they legally justified breaking their promise?  It must not be 
forgotten that equity is based on conscience.  Estoppel developed in private law 
transactions by one person with another. It is not surprising therefore, that where one 
party seeks to have a court apply estoppel in public law that new and different 
considerations arise. The judicial review proceedings will involve not just the citizen 
and the local authority whose official has made the promise, but numerous other 
citizens who may be affected by anything done or said by the council official. 
Fairness expressed in consistent conduct 
Consistency has a strong intuitive appeal to our sense of justice (or injustice if a 
decision maker is being consistently unfair) and is intertwined with the notion of 
fairness that demands that like cases be treated alike.  Consistency, as a principle is 
supportive of the values of the rule of law in the sense that it aids predictable conduct.  
The term ‘consistency’ is however not easy to define. Inconsistency may however be 
more desirable than fixed rigidity.  It may, for example, flow from the desire on the 
part of the administrator to look in more detail at the individual merits of the matters 
being processed, rather than applying a fixed rule. In that way justice is 
individualised
12
.  Thus consistency can be arbitrary and inconsistency can be fair to 
the individual.  The challenge then is to achieve an appropriate balance between 
                                                             
12 Sir Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The Rule of Law and its Underlying Values’ in, ‘The Changing 
Constitution’ Sir Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver QC (eds) (7th ed, Oxford : Oxford 
University Press 2011) 
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consistency and flexibility and the ability of local authorities to respond to changing 
circumstances. 
Lord Denning said: 
 it was the duty of the Price Commission to act with fairness and consistency in their 
dealing with manufacturers and traders……It is not permissible for them to depart 
from their previous interpretation and application when it would not be fair or just for 
them to do so….it is a misuse of power for (the Commission) to act unfairly or 
unjustly to a private citizen when there is no public interest to warrant  
13
  
 
Implicit in Lord Denning’s remarks is that public bodies can change their 
policies even if unfairness results, subject to an overriding public interest being 
present, as illustrated later by reference to the application of legitimate expectation in 
the clutch of prisoner cases
14
.  Richard Clayton QC would agree that unfairness that 
results from departures by a local authority from its declared policy is difficult to 
defend on two grounds.  Firstly, because of the injustice afforded to particular 
individuals, and secondly because such departures offend established general 
principles of good administration.
15
  Therefore the onus upon the local authority is a 
substantial one. 
                                                             
13 HTV v Price Commission [1976] ICR 170 (CA) 185 
 See also Lord Scarman in the same case at 851-852 extolling the virtues of consistency        
Policy making through case-by-case adjudication may be described as conforming to an 
incremental model of policy creation by ‘muddling through’ - see Charles Lindboom, ‘The 
Science of Muddling Through’ (1959) 19 Public Ad Rev 79 
14
 See for example In re Findlay [1985] 1 AC 318; R v Secretary of State for the Home [1997] 
1 WLR 906; R (Vary) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 2251 
(Admin); R (Lowe) v Governor HMP Liverpool [2008] EWHC 2167 (Admin); (2009) Prison 
L R 197 
15 Richard Clayton, ‘Legitimate Expectations, Policy and the Principles of Consistency’ 
(2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal, 93, Clayton’s main thesis is that where expectations are 
generated by policy promises they should be treated differently from personal promises and 
analysed as illustrations of the principle of consistency rather than under the substantive 
legitimate expectation doctrine. 
See further, Professor Mark Elliott, ‘Legitimate Expectation, Consistency and Abuse of 
Power’ (2005) JR 281 
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The defence to consistency as illustrative of a fairness argument by supporters 
of the imperium viewpoint may require that public bodies give effect to public 
interest, rather than be obliged to ensure consistent treatment to individuals. They 
might argue that fairness to the individual may lead to discrimination and partial 
treatment of groups. By contrast from this perspective the rights based approach is 
discriminatory, because fairness is always to be towards the persons or groups 
affected. 
16
  A rights based approach sees the public interest as secondary to 
individual’s interests.  The imperium model is fundamentally different, because it 
assumes that parliament decides what is in the public’s interest, whereas the 
community rights based approach assumes that the courts have a greater role. In 
general terms it is desirable for public authorities to do what they have declared they 
will do.  That assists citizens to plan their affairs and fosters trust and confidence in 
the administrative authorities’.  The fundamental problem however, as we saw in 
chapter four is not so simplistic, given the ongoing need for public bodies to be able 
to respond to change when complex and often contradictory demands are made upon 
them by a multi-cultural society where issues are often polycentric. Sedley J (as he 
then was) 
17
 upheld the argument that a policy or practice could create legitimate 
expectations that are protectable by administrative law.  He emphasised that there 
                                                             
16 Philip Sales (ALBA 7th March 2006) 4, Sales captures the practical essence of 
administrative benefits that consistent decision-making brings 
17 R v Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries [1995] 
2 All ER 714, this case concerned change of existing policy regards issue of fishing licences 
Tax cases seem to have fared better than the prison case law. There is a line of authority 
which casts doubt on the application of substantive legitimate expectation in such 
circumstances as illustrated by Findlay and Hargreaves (24) cited with approval in R v 
Gaming Board ex p Kingsley [1996] COD 241, 242. It may be that in cases involving 
challenges of legitimate expectation in prisoner case that the public interest factor weighs 
heavier in judicial thinking than in private tax litigation  
Steve Foster, Legitimate Expectation and prisoner Rights; the right to get what you are given’ 
60(5) MLR 727 states; ‘There is little primary legislation guaranteeing prisoner rights who 
have to rely on either secondary legislation in the form of Prison Rules, or on administrative 
regulations.’ Steve Foster, Legitimate Expectation and prisoner Rights; the right to get what 
you are given’ 60(5) MLR 727  
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must be quality of a settled practice and enumerated some essential characteristics 
which would guide the court when considering the creation of legitimate 
expectations.  The test he used was not bare irrationality, but Sedley J said that the 
courts could intervene if in all the circumstances of the case, the expectation ‘has a 
legitimacy which in fairness outcrops the policy choice’. 18 
Consistency is therefore a value of great importance for bureaucratic 
institutions and agencies, but as a value it needs to be balanced against other 
competing values, and in particular, administrative flexibility and efficiency.
19
  Thus 
consistency must not be applied for its own sake or by rote, which approach 
ultimately could lead to unfairness, not fairness. It is vital to note that this ambiguity 
is not necessarily present in equity, for example the settlor is not concerned as such 
with the public interest but the interests of the trust’s beneficiaries. 
Changes of, and departures from, general policies 
Coughlan straddles both a personalised assurance and a variation or total change in 
policy and there is often such a spill over.
20
  One such case was the Liverpool Taxis 
                                                             
18 ibid, 731 
19 Yoav Dotan, ‘Why Administrators should be Bound by their Policies’ (1997) 17 OJLS 
1063 
20
 Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 is one such case, Hong 
Kong had operated a ‘reached base’ policy whereby illegal immigrants were not deported if 
without being arrested they had reached an urban area. There was a great influx from China 
and the policy was changed, resulting in illegal immigrants from China being deported. Ng 
Yuen Shiu was an illegal immigrant from Macau who was prior to deportation given no 
opportunity to present a case on humanitarian grounds that the deportation discretion should 
be exercised in his favour. The Privy Council considered that the government had breached 
their undertaking when it failed to give Ng Yuen Shiu an opportunity to put his case before 
deportation. Their Lordships used legitimate expectation reasoning, holding that an 
expectation could be based on an undertaking by or on behalf of a public body that it would 
follow a certain procedure. ‘The justification for it is primarily that, when a public authority 
has promised to follow a certain procedure, it is in the interests of good administration that it 
should act fairly and should implement its promise, so long as implementation does not 
interfere with its statutory duty.’  
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Owner’s Association challenge to Liverpool Corporation 21over reneging on its 
recommendation that there would be a graduated increase in the number of licensed 
taxi cabs.  The committee chairman had given an undertaking that the increase would 
not take place until legislation controlling private hire cars had been passed.  Due to 
uncertainty about the legality of such an undertaking the sub-committee met and 
rescinded the previous recommendation.  The taxi owners were not informed that the 
original decision had been re-visited and withdrawn and were only given notice the 
day before the sub-committee proposal came up for consideration by the full council. 
This was clearly insufficient time to make submissions. Lord Denning said that the 
local authority was under a duty to act fairly and hear submissions before coming to a 
decision adverse to the taxi owners’ interests.  He recognised the principle that a 
corporation cannot contract itself out of its statutory duties, but said that in this case, 
the undertaking was compatible with their public duty.
22
 Dean R. Knight states:
23
  
Liverpool Taxis is one of the cases which can be seen to fit uncomfortably in the 
individualised representation class.  On the one hand, it was an assurance made to a 
discrete group whose interests were essentially homogeneous.  On the other hand, the 
assurance was of a broad policy nature.  Equally, it could be treated as involving a 
general change of policy-again highlighting the limitations of the distinction 
 
This section briefly examines the different emphasis of equity compared to the 
common law and the way each system has in practice dealt with promise breaking in 
the context of local authorities and their service users.  It involves examining the 
private law concept of estoppel, before we proceed to review the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation in public law.  The solution of equity is to emphasise the 
important binding nature of the promise itself on the conscience of the promisor, who 
                                                             
21
 R v Liverpool Corporation, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 
299 
22
 R v Liverpool Corporation, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 
299, 308 
23
 Dean R Knight, ‘Estoppel (principles?) in public law: the substantive protection of 
legitimate expectations’ (LLM dissertation, The University of British Columbia 2004) 20 
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will be estopped from breaking his promise.  Once an estoppel is proved the court 
may grant various discretionary remedies, and is only concerned with the parties 
involved in the litigation.  There is no need to regard the public interest.  This is a 
very important point, as private law estoppel is not prevented from achieving 
individualised justice by considerations of the public interest.  In public law the 
situation is crucially different because there is always the need for the interest of the 
public to be taken into account.  If A argues that local authority B should keep to its 
promise made to him or where a policy, new or revised contains an assurance, A will 
be met with the argument that the local authority must have the flexibility to 
withdraw its promise or change its policy in regard to further public interests.  As 
Sales and Steyn state ‘the basis for the claim must be correspondingly stronger , 
because he is asking for the fair balance between the general interest of the 
community and the individual interest to be struck more favourably to himself.’24 
7.2. THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION   
7.2.1 Scope and Nature of Legitimate Expectation 
The principle of legitimate expectation in English Law is a principle of 
fairness in the decision-making process  
25
 
 
Resiling from a legitimate expectation is only one, but a very important example of 
application of unfairness which can amount to a public abuse of power.  The doctrine 
of legitimate expectation in public law 
26
 graphically illustrates the part that fairness 
can play where a local authority has induced a person to place their trust that the 
                                                             
24
 Philip Sales and Karen Steyn, ‘Legitimate Expectations in English Public Law: An 
Analysis’ (2004) PL 9. 
25 R v Secretary for State for the Home Department ex parte Ahmed [1999] Imm AR 22 (CA) 
(Hobhouse LJ) 
26 There are two classes of legitimate expectation i. procedural and ii. substantive 
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decision maker will not break lawful promises made.  Two types of substantive 
expectation were identified by Simon Brown LJ 
27
 when referring to two cases 
involving the Home Office 
28
  
29
 in which clear and unambiguous representations 
were made and a preference expressed for the use of a language of ‘rights’.  He said 
‘Then the administrator or public body will be held in fairness by the representation.’ 
Scope 
As the Rt Hon Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell QC and Professor Le Sueur state the scope 
of legitimate expectation has been the subject of intensive discussion, both judicially 
and academically and is still in the process of evolution.
30
  For purposes of this 
chapter it is sufficient to adopt a brief description of the two classes of legitimate 
expectation, namely (a) procedural
31
 and (b) substantive.
32
  A substantive legitimate 
expectation protects a person or body’s interest in a substantive right, the best known 
example being the Coughlan case which will be analysed in detail.  There are two 
types of procedural legitimate expectation. These protect: 
                                                             
27 R v Devon CC ex parte Baker [1984] 1 WLR 1337 
28 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337 cited 
with approval in Chundawa v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1988] Imm AR 161 
29 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482 
See also, ‘Legitimate expectations: an overview’ 15(4) JR 388 
Soren Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford University Press 
2000). This book begins by explaining why administrative law should protect expectations at 
all, by linking expectations to fairness, trust in administration and the rule of law with its 
requirements of legal certainty and formal equality 
C J S Knight, ‘Expectations in transit; recent developments in legitimate expectation’ [2009] 
PL 15  
30
 See, Woolf, Jowell and Le Sueur et al, (eds), ‘De Smith’s Judicial Review’ (7th ed, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2015) 294 (fn 86), where extensive literature reference is made by the authors in 
support of their statement 
31
  See, Robert E Riggs, ‘Legitimate Expectation and Procedural Fairness in English Law’ 
(1988) 36(3) Am J Comp L 395 
32 In R (Bhatt Murphy) v Independent Assessor [2008] EWCA Civ 755, Laws LJ drew a 
distinction between procedural legitimate expectations and substantive legitimate 
expectations 
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a) ‘an interest in the continuance or acquisition of a benefit; the law requires 
a public body to adopt a fair procedure before making a decision about 
such a benefit; 
b) an expectation that a particular procedure which has been followed in the 
past, or promised for the future will be followed.’33 
 
Both types of representation directly engage issues of equity and fairness.  It 
can be argued that the doctrine of legitimate expectation provides greater fairness 
than the private law doctrine of estoppel, with which it is often compared, because it 
can apply in a broader mandate to prevent abuse of power.  For example, unlike 
estoppel it does not insist on reliance upon the representation.  This may be, fairer, 
not least to someone who through no fault of their own is unaware that a 
representation has been thwarted or even made.  There are of course similarities with 
the estoppel doctrine, such as the making of a clear unambiguous promise by one 
party to another, who then relies and acts upon that promise to their detriment.  There 
are however differences and in the context of public law the justification for the 
enforcement of legitimate expectations may be a broader principle of fairness and the 
prevention of abuse of power by public bodies.  The concept of legitimate 
expectation, in both forms, acts as a protection to the public from unfairness by a 
public body of which the public may have been unaware. 
The doctrine has a functional aspect.  It operates as a control over the exercise 
of discretionary power conferred upon a public body and in that sense is part of a 
imperium negative approach; it stops public bodies breaking their promises, (unless 
they can justify their actions in the courts) whereas a rights theorist may consider it 
positive, enabling the courts to coerce the public body to be more circumspect of a 
citizen’s rights and put in proper procedures to prevent future breaches of trust 
                                                             
33
 Elizabeth Laing QC, ‘Legitimate Expectation’ (2013) JR 159 
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occurring-a positive approach. In GCHQ Lord Roskill described legitimate 
expectation as a ‘manifestation of the duty to act fairly’.34  
7.2.2 Discovering the underlying rationale  
Case law initially appears to show that the principles behind the concept of 
substantive legitimate expectation are rooted in trust and protection.  However, when 
subjected to deeper analysis valuable academic work has shown that this viewpoint 
may need correction.  There is of course trust by the recipient in the assurance made 
by a public body or its official and the law affords protection from breach of that 
promise. Observance of promises is good for society and fosters interaction between 
the State and its organs of change, such as councils with its local inhabitants and 
service users. Professor Forsyth conducted a thorough review of legitimate 
expectation and found to his surprise that there were other stronger candidates than 
trust for its core principle. 
The doctrine seeks to resolve the basic conflict between the desire to protect 
the individual’s confidence and reliance in expectations raised by administrative 
conduct and the need for administrators to be able to get on with their job in pursuing 
declared policy objectives.
35
  Promises and expectations are inexplicably linked. A 
                                                             
34
 Roskill LJ and Sir Gordon Willmer treated the Council’s representation (in the Liverpool 
Taxi’s case [1972] 2 QB 299, 311 and 313) as going to the council’s duty to act fairly 
35 Robert Thomas, ‘Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law’, 
(Hart Publishing 2000) 42 
In respect of the qualities of trust and the courts protection of this virtue it is interesting to 
note the similarity, between legitimate expectation and principles of fiduciary obligation 
which civil obligation this thesis argues should be a major prism in judicial review through 
which the relationship between a local authority and its service users is perceived by the 
judiciary 
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promise creates an expectation.  Why people or public bodies keep their promises has 
engendered diverse views which are outside of this thesis.
36
 
Contribution of Professors C. Forsyth and Mark Elliott 
  In ‘Legitimate Expectations Revisited’ 37 Professor Forsyth who first wrote a 
previous article some 23 years earlier 
38
 identified the simple idea (yet profound in 
practice and consequence) that the law should protect expectations on the basis of the 
trust reposed in a promise made by a public official.  He states: ‘Good government 
depends upon trust between the governed and the governor.  Unless that trust is 
sustained and protected, officials will not be believed and individuals will not order 
their affairs on that assumption.  Good government becomes a choice between chaos 
and coercion.’  39  
 Under this approach good governance is identified as a key feature.  For 
Forsyth, the doctrine’s central roots are derived from a positive practical approach of 
principles of good administration.  Trust as a general principle would be rarely 
contested as being of a considerable aid to individual relationships and society as a 
whole but, how can it be protected in the context of specific local authority 
administrative decisions?  The trust we are talking about has two applications: 
specific, trust in one’s local council or its official(s), not trust in a local authority that 
is located miles away from where we live and work and with whom we have no 
contact and in a general sense trust in the national government.  
                                                             
36 See, Florian Ederer and Alexander Stremitzer, ‘Promises and Expectations’ (Yale 
University, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No: 1931, December 2013, updated 
September 2014) where it is suggested three main reasons apply 1. existence of a third party 
mechanism, 2. reputational concerns and 3. the moral force of promise keeping. 
37
 ALBA BEG, paper May 2011 
38 Christopher Forsyth, ‘The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectation’ (1998) 47 
CLJ 238 
39 ibid 
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Forsyth explored his central theme of trust as an essence of legitimate 
expectation, but found little in case law to support his view.  This author’s view is 
that trust is fundamental to the doctrine of legitimate expectation and is not negated 
by the advancement of good administration argument.  On the contrary, this author 
like Forsyth found that the protective nature of the concept came from a variety of 
principles derived from an overarching concept of ‘fairness’ namely,  
a) advancement of ‘good administration’  
This is a practical consequence of legitimate expectation that was championed by 
Laws LJ 
40
 presumably on the basis that honouring one’s promises is good sound 
administrative practice.  His lordship concluded that it stemmed from the broader one, 
‘grounded in fairness’ and that public bodies should deal straightforwardly with the 
public.  Laws L J further said: ‘Generally speaking the discipline of reasons and 
fairness which the law imposes on public decision-makers obliges them to apply a 
stated policy to those whom it is directed.’ 41  
 This author supports that approach. Honouring assurances, promises and 
commitments whatever form they take is a facet of good administration and will lead, 
not only to practices of due diligence in the administrative sphere, but also makes a 
valuable contribution to the well-being of relationships in society. 
         b. ‘abuse of power’   
 
This phrase was used in R v Secretary for State for Education ex p Begbie. 
42
 
Professor Forsyth points out correctly ‘it is commonplace for a judge to ask whether 
the dashing of a legitimate expectation was ‘so unfair’ as to amount to an abuse of 
                                                             
40 Abdi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 
41 ibid, [38] 
42 [2000] 1 WLR (CA) 1115, 1129 
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power. Abuse of power is now an accepted administrative law principle.’ Reference 
to abuse of power was referred to in a similar vein by Lord Carswell who said; 
43
  
‘The basis of the jurisdiction (to protect legitimate expectation) is abuse of power and 
unfairness to the citizen on the part of a public authority.’  Notions of unfairness and 
abuse of power are linked. It should be noted that in successful court challenges the 
word ‘unfair’ is often prefaced by the adjective ‘so’.  When used in such a way the 
dictionary meaning is ‘to such an extent’, thus indicating that there must be a very 
high level of unfairness before there is a finding of abuse of power.  
In his short, but detailed analysis of the search of a core principle of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation, Dr Elliott (now Professor Elliott) 
44
 considers the 
way the phrase is often used in contradictory ways.  Sometimes, as a form of comfort 
blanket that gives legitimacy to a decision that does not fit tightly within any concept 
of legitimate expectation, whilst in others simply as a weighting factor, where the 
court takes the view that on balance the justification advanced by the public authority 
is insufficient to outweigh the detriment occasioned to the claimant or lastly, used as 
an ex post tool for justifying a decision that seems instinctively correct.  Elliott’s 
conclusion, like this author’s is that there is still no certainty of the relationship 
between concepts of reasonableness, fairness, breach of legitimate expectation and 
abuse of power and asks the question whether they are distinct or interchangeable.  
                                                             
43 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs No 2 [2008] 
UKHL 61, 135 
44 Professor Mark Elliott, ‘Legitimate Expectation and the Search for the Principle: 
Reflections on Abdi and Narararjah’ (2006) 11 JR pp.281-288 
See, R v (Abdi & Nararajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA 
1363. (no protection) and statement by Laws LJ ‘principle is not in my judgment supplied by 
the call to arms of abuse of power. Abuse of power is a name for any act of a public authority 
that is not legally justified. It is a useful name, for it catches the moral impetus of the rule of 
law. It may be, as I ventured to put it in Begbie, ‘the root concept which governs and 
conditions our general principles of public law’. But it goes no distance to tell you, case by 
case, what is lawful and what is not.’ 
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Case law on substantive legitimate expectation also illustrates divergent 
judicial opinion on the subject.  For example Pill LJ in Rashid 
45
 viewed the 
claimant’s case as one of unfairness amounting to abuse of power; Munby J (as he 
then was)
46
 said abuse of power was ‘the overriding test’; Laws LJ observed in 
Coughlan 
47
 that:  ‘an abiding principle which underpins the legitimate expectation 
doctrine is the courts insistence that public power should not be abused.’ 
 
48
For sake of clarity it must be stated that Laws LJ was keen in advancing the 
proportionality test in all matters of legitimate expectation whether founded on 
procedural or substantive grounds. In the author’s view the term’ abuse of power’ is a 
nebulous concept and seems to add little to the doctrinal tools available to the court 
when reviewing administrative decision, and operates purely as a form of umbrella 
device, under which it is convenient to summarise a decision.  The words of 
Carnwath L J seem apt ‘abuse of power is however not ‘a magic ingredient able to 
achieve remedial results which other forms of illegality cannot match.’49 
 
 
                                                             
45
 R (Rashid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 744; [2005] 
Imm AR 608. Here the Home Office had refused an Iraqi Kurd’s application for asylum on 
the ground that he might safely relocate to the Kurdish Autonomous Zone. (Discussed by 
Professor Mark Elliott, 2005 10 JR 281) 
cf R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Urmaza (The Times, 23 July 
1996) 
46 R (Parents of Legal Action Limited) v Northumberland County Council [2006] EWHC 
1081 (Admin), 68, consideration of the consultation process embarked upon by a local 
authority adopting a revised tier of schooling 
47
 R v North East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2000] 3 All ER 850; 2 WLR 
622, abuse of power is much relied on in this case ‘a distinct application of the concept of 
power’ 
48 Ibid  
49 R (S) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA 546, 68 
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7.3 Unconscionability - Relationship with private law doctrine of 
estoppel 
This author considers that there is a third rationale for the legitimate expectation 
doctrine. Are there links with equitable concepts?  Robert Thomas
50
 remarks: 
Lord Templeman has stated that unfairness by a public authority would amount to an 
abuse of power if it were equivalent to a breach of contract or a breach of 
representation’,51, while Stuart-Smith LJ has remarked that the principle of legitimate 
expectations has many similarities with the private law principle of estoppel 
52
 
 
This author argues that the essence of legitimate expectation is the notion of 
unconscionability - not keeping ones promises.  Fifteenth century equity enforced 
promise keeping, so far as this accorded with ‘reason and conscience.’53 
Both common law and equity have developed estoppel doctrines to give effect 
to not keeping a promise.  Estoppel is an equitable concept that emphasises equity’s 
core nature of concentrating on conscience.  The public law doctrine of legitimate 
expectations undoubtedly has correlations with the private law doctrine of estoppel.  
This author considers that a different language of description does not alter the basic 
root of both doctrines, which is to prevent unconscionability. An unfair or abusive 
promise has no legitimacy and therefore is not to be respected. 
The origin of legitimate expectation in English Law may appear to be unclear, 
but it may assist in helping to understand the true essence of the legitimate 
expectation doctrine to briefly explore the origins of the doctrine.  Many have 
attributed the concept of legitimate expectation in English jurisprudence, particularly 
                                                             
50
 Robert Thomas, ‘Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law’ 
(Hart Publishing, 2000) 
51
 In Re Preston [1985] AC 835, 866H-7A 
52 R v Jockey Club, ex parte RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225, 236h-j 
53
 Paul Vinogradoff,  ‘Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-century Jurisprudence’ (Stevens 
& Sons 1908) 
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to Lord Denning, whereas Forsyth refers to the German concept of Vertrauenschutz 
54
 
and its emphasis on the protection of trust and felt that its use in English 
administrative law was a good example of cross fertilisation between different legal 
systems.  The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be seen as the outcome of 
synthesis between the administrative principles of administrative fairness (a 
component of the principles of natural justice) and the rule of estoppel.  It has paved 
the way for the development of a broader and more flexible doctrine of fairness.  
Attribution to Lord Denning is disputed by some
55
.  However, whether the origins of 
the concept of legitimate expectation came from the fertile legal mind of Lord 
Denning in Schmidt 
56
 or a continental source, what is important is that the concept is 
rooted in principles of trust, and has great potential to protect the rights of vulnerable 
citizens, especially in the field of public law, which touches many aspects of human 
rights and social law.  
  There are of course major limitations of applying private law estoppel 
reasoning in public law litigation acknowledged by the fact that an estoppel could not 
                                                             
54 This concept seeks to ensure that everyone who trusts the legality of public administrative 
decision making should be protected  
See further, George Notte, ‘General Principles of German and European Administrative Law 
- A comparison in Historical Perspective’ (1994) 57 MLR 191, 195 and 203 
55
 See, Sir Thomas Bingham when writing extra-judicially considered that the Schmidt case 
may not amount to parentage of the legitimate expectation doctrine. Sir John Laws was of 
like opinion ‘the Schmidt case cannot be said to have established the doctrine in England.’ In 
fact upon reference to the Schmidt judgment there appears no authority stated concerning 
legitimate expectation, whether judicial, or otherwise upon which the doctrine could be 
founded 
Robert Thomas comments, ‘The passing reference to the phrase ‘legitimate expectation’ 
shines out from the judgment. It had not been mentioned in argument before the court and no 
authority was cited in support of it.’ Robert Thomas, ‘Legitimate Expectations and 
Proportionality in Administrative Law’, (Hart Publishing, 2000) 47 
56 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 
 Two US citizens had travelled to the UK for study purposes. The time limit on their permits 
had expired and an extension was refused by the Home Secretary without affording them a 
hearing and to make representations. The Court of Appeal held that it was unnecessary for a 
hearing to have been given. During his judgment Lord Denning referred to ‘some legitimate 
expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.’ 
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be raised to hinder the performance of a statutory duty.
57
  Estoppels were said by 
Professor Margaret Allars to offend the rule against fettering discretion.
58
  This rule 
goes back to an 1883 English case
59
 that established that an administrator cannot 
enter into an agreement or give an undertaking that fetters the future exercise of a 
discretionary power or the performance of a statutory duty.  This author terms this the 
‘traditional’ approach whereby local authorities must exercise a statutory power for 
the public’s benefit and not an individual’s benefit.  To do so would force a public 
body by estoppel to exercise a power for the benefit of the person asserting the 
estoppel, rather than the general public, and this is impermissible.
60
  The ambit of this 
traditional approach is seen in Southend-on-Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) 
Ltd.
61
  The author agrees with Joshua Thomson who states: ‘If the traditional rule is 
given full credit, then it suffocates all estoppel by representation in public law.  
However, such authority as exits seems to indicate that public law estoppel extends 
upon or is analogous to private law estoppel.’ 62  
                                                             
57
  See, Maritime Electric Co Ltd v General Dairies Limited [1937] AC 610; Minster of 
Agriculture and Fisheries v Mathews [1950] 1 KB 148; Southend-on-Sea Corporation v 
Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 416; Cambridgeshire and Isle of Ely County Council v 
Rust [1972] 2 QB 426 
58
 Margaret Allars, Introduction to Australian Administrative Law, (Butterworths 1990) 206 
59 Ayr Harbour Trustees v Oswald [1883] 8 App Cas 623 
 The statutory duty of the trustees was to acquire land to be used as the need arose for the 
construction of works on the coastline of the harbour. In order to save money on a 
compulsory purchase acquisition they agreed a perpetual covenant not to construct their 
works on the land acquired, so as to cut off the seller from access to the harbour waters. Lord 
Blackburn held the covenant to be void as ultra vires. He stated ‘whether that body be one 
which is seeking to make a profit from shareholders, or, as in the present case, a body of 
trustees acting solely for the public good … a contract purporting to bind them and their 
successors not to use their powers was void.’ 
See further, York Corporation v Henry Leetham & Sons [1924] 1 Ch 557 where a fixed 
annual sum to carry traffic was held ultra vires - it tied the hands of successors 
60
 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977)] 1 QB 643, 707 (Lord Denning MR) 
61
 (1962) 1 QB 417 
62
 Joshua Thomson, ‘Estoppel by Representation in Administrative Law’ (1998), 26 Federal 
Law Review 88  
Thompson quotes in support the implicit assumption of the extension of private law estoppel 
by representation to public law by some Commonwealth cases including the English case of 
Robertson v Minster of Pensions [1949] 1 KB 227, 231 (Denning J) 
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In Capital Care Services UK Ltd v The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department
63
 the appellants, as part of their argument referred to the doctrines of 
estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, to which Laws LJ replied: 
‘whatever the scope of application of these doctrines to the exercise of public 
functions by public authorities, they cannot confer any greater rights on the appellants 
than they might enjoy by force of the public law principles of legitimate expectation. 
64’ 
There has however been no attempt (thus far) to draw out a general principle 
from the various forms of private law estoppel that can itself be applied directly and 
independently in public law.  Lord Denning 
65
 spoke of the estoppel doctrine, as one 
with many rooms and that ‘each room is used differently from the others’.  This 
author’s opinion is that there is a clear link however between estoppel and legitimate 
expectation on the basis that the bedrock of the principle is that it would be 
unconscionable or inequitable for the representor to go back on his word and deny 
what he has represented or agreed.  Whether it is a private law or public law action it 
is basically unfair to break promises, albeit that unfairness may be justified by strict 
proof of public interest considerations.  Under English law estoppel can be used as a 
                                                             
63
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1151 (Laws and Toulson LJJ and Sir Robin Jacob) 
 The case concerned revocation by the Secretary of State of the appellant’s licence to operate 
as a sponsor under Tier 2 of the points based system (operated by the UK border Agency) for 
migrant health workers and argument that there had been legitimate expectations given in 
literature. 
64
 ibid, (Laws LJ) [15] 
65 Mcllkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] 2 QB 283, 316-317, (estoppel 
per rem judicatum) 
Also see, S Atrill, ‘The End of Estoppel in Public Law’ (2003) 42 CLJ 3; M Purdue, ‘The end 
of Estoppel in public law’ [2002] JPL 509; N Bamford, ‘Legitimate Expectation and 
Estoppel’ (1998) JR 196 
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basis for a cause of action, provided the factors found by Michael Spence
66
 are 
present.  Those determinates differ little from what is required to launch a challenge 
based on substantive legitimate expectation. 
It is argued that there is nothing inherent in the nature of estoppel that should 
tie it exclusively to a private law function, and that public law estoppel must be based 
on analogous private law principles and not on some unique public law doctrine.  In 
fact private law estoppel by representation is based on considerations of justice and 
fairness; such considerations are as equally valid in public law, unless as we shall see 
public policy or the interest of the public necessitates adjustment.  The basic purpose 
of private law estoppel is to prevent a person unconsciously departing from a 
representation upon which another had relied, where departure from this 
representation would cause detriment to the other party.  It is however acknowledged 
that the focus in private law is on protecting the individual from unconscionable 
conduct, whereas in public law it is, after a judicial balancing exercise, ultimately to 
protect the public interest.  
A ‘balancing view’ of estoppel balances the harm to the public against the 
harm to the individual. It has been suggested
67
 that estoppel can be allowed to fetter 
the exercise of a ‘public’ power, where to do so would occasion little harm to the 
                                                             
66
 Michael Spence, ‘Protecting reliance: the Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel ‘(Hart 
1999) 60-66 
 How the promise/reliance was induced 
 The content of the promise 
 Parties relevant interest in the subject of the reliance 
 Nature, context and history of the parties relationship 
 Parties relative strength of position 
 Steps taken (if any) taken by the promisor to prevent harm. 
67
 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] 1 QB 643 (Lord Denning), 707, who 
considered that an administrative body, and therefore local authorities, can be estopped ‘when 
it us not properly exercising its powers, but is misusing them; and it does misuse them in 
circumstances which work injustice or unfairness to the individual without any countervailing 
benefit for the public.’ There is also supportive dicta for this approach in Attorney-General 
(NSW) v Quin [1990] 170 CLR 18 (Mason CJ) 
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public interest, and not to allow estoppel would cause greater detriment to the 
individual.  This approach obviously has potential problems as highlighted by 
Thomson: 
the balancing view involves the court engaging in policy judgments.  The court 
would have to weigh the harm caused to an individual if estoppel were not allowed, 
against the public detriment if it were allowed.  A court is ill equipped to do this. It 
would have to make a decision without being aware of the full extent of the injustice 
estoppel would cause to the public; because the public would not, and probably could 
not, be heard by the court.  This is a practical reason against the balancing approach 
68
   
 
This author understands the merit of this argument but, does not consider 
producing evidence of the effect on the public insurmountable, especially where 
individual rights are concerned.  It may be that it is incorrect to weigh a private 
expectation against the public interest in legal certainty in the overall pursuit of 
fairness. Paul Reynolds states; ‘we are balancing the representee’s trust against legal 
certainty, and we will be aware that deciding against substantive protection may mean 
that trust gets damaged.’69 
However, it is acknowledge that its application in public law suffered a severe 
blow in the Reprotech case. 
70
  That case was a clear recognition that acting in the 
wider public interest is not unconscionable or unfair.  In planning applications to a 
local authority there are often multi layered interests involved and replies (oral and 
                                                             
68
 Joshua Thomson, ‘Estoppel by Representation in Administrative Law’ (1998), 26 Federal 
Law Review 88, 98 
69
 Paul Reynolds, ‘Legal Expectations and the Protection of Trust in Public Officials’ [2011] 
PL 330, See particularly section headed the trust conception of the doctrine, at 347. 
70 R v East Sussesx CC, ex parte Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 58 where it was 
observed that public law had absorbed what moral values underpinned the private law of 
estoppel and that it was now time for it to stand on its own feet 
See Professor Mark Elliott, ‘Unlawful representations, legitimate expectations and estoppel in 
public law’ (2003) 8(2) JR 71.This article discusses the implication of this House of Lords 
decision. The Sweet & Maxwell journal note states ‘He reviews the extent to which legality 
has traditionally determined the limits of legitimacy, policy arguments supporting the 
protection of certain expectations raised by unlawful representations and the role of estoppel 
in balancing legality with fairness.’ 
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written) given by planning officers in the course of the planning process may 
constitute a substantive legitimate expectation arising.  This area has generated a lot 
of litigation against local authorities.
71
 
We might now legitimately ask whether we have arrived at a conclusion, 
where, as Steele puts it: ‘this concocted legitimate expectation expands the doctrines 
boundaries to the point where it simply collapses into an unrestricted principle of 
fairness: the doctrine ceases to add anything in its own right - it is denuded…of any 
utility.’ 72  
In other words the continuum is distorted.  Does the court’s adjudication in 
some substantive legitimate expectation (including human rights) claims mean that 
we are moving towards a merits review approach, leaving the decision-maker no (or 
little) margin of appreciation or discretion on matters of fact or public policy?  The 
answer is in general no; Judges are not free to second-guess administrators on the 
merits of their policies.  The respective roles of judges and administrators in a 
democratic society, and their competences are fundamentally distinct.  Stricter 
scrutiny and the suggested abandonment of the Wednesbury principle need not mean 
that the courts will be entitled to ignore the limitations in competence of their own 
role.  
 
 
 
                                                             
71
 See, Paul Brown QC, Legitimate Expectation, Consultation & Fairness in Planning Law 
(Landmark Chambers, 18 September 2013), reviews in section B a range of latest planning 
cases against local authorities and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government 
72 Iain Steele, ‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations: Striking the Right Balance?’ (2005)12 
LQR 300, 309 
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7.4   SUBSTANTIVE UNFAIRNESS 73 
 
In terms of exploring the issue of fairness in this chapter, more potential may lie in 
the expansion of notions of fairness to include substantive unfairness.  Sedley J 
identified perhaps a different approach applied to procedural fairness and substantive 
fairness in public law when he stated: ‘It is difficult to see why it is any less unfair to 
frustrate a legitimate expectation that something will or will not be done by the 
decision-maker than it is to frustrate a legitimate expectation that the applicant will be 
listened to before the decision-maker decides whether to take a particular step.’ 74 
 In administrative cases the traditional public law grounds are normally 
sufficient to allow a court to make a decision, but where a substantive legitimate 
expectation challenge is made the court is drawn into a more detailed examination of 
the competing interests of certainty and fairness to the individual as against the public 
interest in allowing public bodies to exercise their discretion as they see fit. 
Recognition of the public interest and its potential to defeat a substantive legitimate 
expectation claim will be dealt with later in this chapter.  It may be that we are 
incorrect to weigh a private expectation against the public interest in legal certainty in 
the overall pursuit of fairness.  Paul Reynolds states 
75
 ‘we are balancing the 
                                                             
73
 For general academic comment see, J McLachlan, ‘Substantive Unfairness: Elephantine 
Review or Guiding Concept?’ (1991) 2 PLR 12; J McLachlan, ‘Part II PLR’ (1991) 2 PLR 
109;  A Abadee, ‘Keeping Government Accountable for its Promises: The Role of 
Administrative Law’ (1998) 5 AJAL 191; R Cooke, ‘Fairness’ (1989) 19 VUWLR 421. 
See also, P Finn, and K J Smith, ‘The Citizen, the Government and Reasonable Expectations’ 
(1992) 66 ALJ 139 
74 R v Secretary of State, ex p Hamble (offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1999] 2 All ER 714, 729 
75
 Paul Reynolds, ‘Legitimate Expectation and the Protection of Trust in Public Officials,’ 
(2011) PL 330 
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representee’s trust against legal certainty, and we will be aware that deciding against 
substantive protection may mean that trust gets damaged.’ 
7.4.1 The essential Ingredients of a Substantive Legitimate Expectation 
It is acknowledged that not every expectation can be met in legal term and fairness by 
the public body if one recognises the amount and levels of administrative decisions 
local authorities have to take each day - this factor dictates that some boundaries to 
the doctrine must apply.  One such delineation is that the law will only protect those 
expectations which have arisen through administrative conduct, and not those which 
have arisen as a result of an individual’s subjective hopes. As Professor Kuklin states: 
‘they are to be distinguished from conative inclinations such as desire, hope, want and 
wish.
76
  Administrative law ‘is concerned with upholding trust in the administration, 
rather than protecting expectations which the individual has decided to entertain at his 
own risk.’ 77  
A pious hope, even leading to a moral obligation, cannot amount to a 
legitimate expectation. Conceptualising ‘lawful’ promises is therefore essential.  The 
courts have therefore decided that a representation must have a ‘character of a 
contract’ about it.  What do the Courts mean by this expression?  They mean that the 
expectation must be legitimate and therefore do not cover ultra vires representations. 
If consideration is required clearly none was provided in Coughlan, unless 
one includes suffering detriment, under that term, although in this respect Lord Woolf 
writing extra judicially with Jeffrey Jowell 
78
 have argued that substantive unfairness 
                                                             
76
  Bailey H Kuklin, ‘The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations’ (1997) 
32 Valparaiso University L R 22 
77 ibid 
78 Lord Woolf, Jowell Jeffrey, Andrew Le Sueur,’ De Smith’s Judicial Review’ (6th ed Sweet 
& Maxwell 2007), 609-650 ‘Legitimate Expectation’ 
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doctrine does not require proof of detriment, but rather its presence proves additional 
evidence as to the nature of the representation.  Stuart-Smith J in a recent case 
79
 
quoting Lord Hoffman in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (No: 2) 
80
 confirmed what now seems to be the accepted 
position of the necessity of a contractual type representation: ‘where a person asserts 
a legitimate expectation to enforce what amounts to a substantive right based upon a 
promise or assurance by a public authority, the authority’s statement must be clear, 
unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification.’ 81 
In Zequiri v Secretary of State 
82
 Lord Hoffman articulated that a 
representations’ clarity must be considered in the context in which it is made.  The 
author considers this to be a much fairer approach than insisting upon a very rigid 
formalistic approach that requires a neatly packaged contractual law framework.  
Zequiri illustrated a move away from this rigid requirement suggested in R v Board of 
Inland Revenue ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd (‘MFK’) 83 that an expectation 
based on an individual promise must originate in a clear and unambiguous way, 
although one may confine this to the context of a tax case.  Lord Hoffman said:’ The 
question is not whether it would have founded an estoppel in private law, but the 
broader question of whether …….a public authority acting contrary to the 
                                                             
79 R v (on the application of Alansi) v Newham London Borough Council [2013] EWHC 3722 
(Admin) 
  In this housing allocation case the applicant lost her home seeking priority status as a result 
of a change of policy. The representation made by Newham Council was clear, unambiguous 
and unconditional, but it was proportional and therefore not an abuse of power. 400 
households were made the same assurance - all householders on the list were affected by 
movement on the housing ladder. 
80 [2008] UKHL 61; [2009] AC 443, 60  
See also authorities collected in ‘Fordham’s Judicial Review Handbook’, 6th ed, para 41.2.7. 
81 [2000] UKHL 3; [2002] Imm AR 296 Lord Hoffman 
82 [2000] UKHL 3; [2002] Imm AR 296 
83 [1990] 1 All ER 91 
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representation would be acting with conspicuous unfairness and in that sense be 
abusing power.’   
Munby J in R (Charlton) v Secretary of State
84
 made the same point that a 
representation for the purposes of a legitimate expectation claim need not be of the 
same ‘high degree’ of clarity contemplated by Bingham LJ in MFK. 85  Justice 
Munby’s remarks may however be considered obiter, since the court held that there 
was no clear or unequivocal statement that the relevant policy (about adopting 
children from Cambodia) would not be suspended.  
7.4.1.1 Promises 
An unlawful representation in public law will not bind the local authority.
86
 Unlike 
private estoppel law there is no room to save the representation on the basis of an 
agency argument of actual, implied or ostensible authority.  Promises or assurances 
are of course very much part of a contractual set up. Charles Fried, 
87
 argued that a 
promisor was morally bound to keep his promise and by extension his contract 
                                                             
84 [2005] EWHC 1378 (Admin) 
See Zahir Chowdhury, ‘ The Doctrine of legitimate expectation and the concepts of fairness 
and abuse of power in immigration cases’ (2010) 16(1) ILD 15, where he discusses the 
doctrine itself, abuse of power as a feature of legitimate expectation and leading case law 
within the framework of immigration law 
85 R v Inland Revenue commissioners, ex parte MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 
1545, [156] 
86
 For example, Shinowa Mosekari v The London Borough of Lewisham [2014] EWHC 3617 
(Admin),  
This case involved a school science teacher who had not completed his statutory induction 
period, but had been employed successfully by the council at the same school for eleven 
years. On his application for a teaching post outside of that borough the absence of the error 
came to light. Dr Mosekari applied for judicial review of the council’s decision not to grant 
such an exemption from the requirement. One of the claimant’s arguments was based on 
legitimate expectation in that he was led to believe that the required statutory induction 
period had been met. This was rejected by The Hon Mrs Justice McGowan on the basis that 
the council had no statutory discretion in the matter and therefore followed that there could be 
no legitimate expectation created to grant something which was not within the Borough’s 
power. 
87 Charles Fried, ‘Contract as Promise’: a Theory of Contractual Obligations’, Harvard 
University Press, (1982) 16 
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because he has ‘intentionally invoked a convention whose function is to give 
grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised performance.’  
For the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation to be triggered there 
must be some form of promise or undertaking.  The promise may take different 
forms, 
88
 but it must contain a clear and unequivocal statement.  This is an area of 
great uncertainty. Court judgments place emphasis on the need to look at the whole of 
the communication, whether a letter, circular or internal guidance memos in 
construing the assurance.
89
   Guidance may be from an internal or external source.  
Construing promises in internal guidance also illustrates a similar lack of uniformity 
in judicial approach, as illustrated by two cases in 2011.  In The Queen (on the 
application of Elayathamb) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department 
90
 
Sales J construed a Home office circular as giving general guidance as to how the 
system works, rather than creating specific expectations.  
91
  As Daniel Kolinsky 
states ‘The relevant issue may be whether the guidance contains a prescriptive 
                                                             
88 Either or a combination of an express assurance, a public announcement, policy guidelines, 
explanatory leaflets or settled working practices 
89
 For example, Lord Wilson expressing a majority view in a tax case R (Davies) v Revenue 
and Customs Commissioner [2012] 1 ALL E R 1048 involving UK residence for tax 
purposes, stated that the tax booklet must be construed ‘in the light  of all relevant statements 
in the booklet when they are read as a whole….’  
90 [2011] EWHC 2182 (Admin) [29] 
 The claimant had relied on a statement in the Secretary of State’s mandate refugees policy 
which stated that if a mandate refugee made an application for resettlement in the UK his 
claim had to be considered under the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. The 
claimant contended that in accordance with the statement in the mandate refugee policy, he 
was entitled to have his asylum claim considered. This was rejected. 
91 Compare, R (Jackson) v DEFRA [2011] EWHC 956 (Admin) [67]-[69], where McCombe J 
held that an internal instruction to staff not to mix samples did give rise to a legitimate 
expectation on the basis that ‘the public might reasonably expect, that to apply the principles 
of good administration, an instruction requiring them not to mix samples, expressly stated as 
being for the avoidance of possible contamination, would be observed unless good reason to 
the contrary exists.’ 
Samarkand Film Partnership No 3 v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2015] UKUT 
211 (TCC) (UT (TAX) 
See, Jeanette Zaman and Owen Williams, ‘Samarkand: illegitimate expectations?’ [2015] Tax 
J 1263, 8-9, which considers whether published HMRC guidance could found a legitimate 
expectation for tax relief 
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instruction as opposed to a general explanation.  But much will depend on how the 
judge in question characterises the statement.’92 
Often the recipient of the ‘promise’ by local authorities falls within a socially 
deprived class and involves, for example, welfare and housing benefits.  This type of 
beneficiary is vulnerable to excessive state power and we shall observe that the 
doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation can offer protection to such deprived 
sections of a community, with the acknowledged caveat that the judging of social 
rights is often a contentious exercise.  For local authorities, therefore what they say in 
their communications is of paramount importance, if litigation is to be avoided on the 
grounds of the promise of a substantive benefit. Information to service users must be 
presented in a clear and unambiguous way
93
.  Dissemination of information must be 
done in such a way that the widest service user audience is reached, including those 
who may suffer some form of disability, which presents them receiving such 
knowledge. 
The courts insistence on a ‘clear and unambiguous representation’ has 
received scholarly criticism by Jack Watson.  The motive of the representor is not a 
                                                             
92 Daniel Kolinsky (ALBA Seminar 18th January 2012) 
93
 See, [2008] EWHC 630 (Admin); [2009] HLR 1 (QBD) 
 During the council’s voluntary large scale disposal of its properties, usually to registered 
social landlords various representations were made in consultation documents, newsletters, 
press releases and resolutions that the net capital receipts from the house sales would be used 
to address the housing needs of North Somerset. The Council decided that it would only 
earmark around 8 million of the total received of £22 million for housing purposes. Mrs Bath 
was a secure tenant of the local authority, who maintained that she and other voters all voted 
support for the proposals on the basis of those representations, which had generated a 
substantive legitimate expectation that all the net sale proceeds would be used in a specific 
way. Sir Robin Auld dismissed her claim concluding the statements did not amount to 
unequivocal representations. He said ‘Neither the Council’s decision of November 18 th 2003 
to embark on the transfer process nor the 2004/2005 consultation document amounted to a 
clear or firm representation to anyone that all, or indeed any of the anticipated net capital 
receipt would be spent on housing.’ He further considered that the nature of the decision was 
very much at the ‘macro’ end of the political spectrum. This case is significant for this thesis 
on at least three counts. 1/ it involved a local authority, 2/ the extent of the beneficiary class 
and 3/ how careful local authorities must be in the way they present material in their 
communication process  
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material factor - what counts is the reaction of the promisee.  Jack Watson 
94
 argues 
that the underlying principle is the voluntary assumption of responsibility that comes 
from analysing a promise as a social convention, presumably, on the basis that 
keeping one’s promises is good for society in general and not just on a personal level.  
Whilst promises and their construction are important they are not the end of the 
matter in a substantive legitimate expectation challenge for it is clear that the size of 
the beneficiary class to whom the assurance is directed is also of major importance. 
7.4.1.2 Size of the beneficiary class 
Case law indicates that in the context of decision making in public law the size of 
class/beneficiary numbers appears to be extremely important factor, since it raises the 
question whether a statement contained in council literature could ever be relied upon 
by a group class of council tax payers/service users or will the class be considered too 
large?  On strict moral grounds it is hard to see why there should be any such 
distinction, if the core of the concept of legitimate expectation is considered to be 
trust and protection of persons from public bodies resiling on their promises.  More to 
the point from a legal aspect the breadth of the class affected by a decision, arguably, 
is not necessarily correlated to the question whether the public body has abused its 
powers when making the decision. Indeed, if the courts are concerned with abuse of 
public power then surely the wider the class adversely affected the more serious is the 
abuse.  Coughlan however indicated that the class size is a highly relevant factor in 
                                                             
94 Jack Watson, ‘Clarity and ambiguity: a new approach to the test of legitimacy in the law of 
legitimate expectations’ (2010) 30(4) Legal Studies 633 
(Lord Brown SCJ in Paponette & Ors v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 
[2010] UKPC 32; 3 WLR 2019; [2012] 1 AC 1 [61] expressed approval of this article). 
Watson argues that the current ‘clear unambiguous representation’ test is insufficiently 
certain and instead advocates a three-stage test centred around the courts ability to make an 
order, the objective construction of the promise and the decision makers intent’. This test it is 
argued, explains the decided cases, as well as providing a robust structure for future decisions 
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English law, where substantive legitimate expectation challenges are made.  Laws LJ 
said in Niazi 
95
 ‘the number of beneficiaries of a promise for the purpose of such an 
expectation, in reality it is likely to be small, if the court is to make the expectation 
good.’ 
Why this limitation applies from an equitable perspective is difficult to 
understand outside of line drawing by the courts.  Whilst this statement may be 
correct in a large number of actions, there is precedent for class numbers to be 
significantly high.  In Shui’ 96 the size of the group affected played a role (discussed 
by scholars)
97
 where the Privy Council acknowledged that a statement which is 
published can enable the benefit to be claimed by the class of people specifically 
affected by the statement, albeit large in number.  The Courts do seem to view class 
size as a form of concept boundary control in their adjudication process.  It appears 
you are less likely to win your case if the class size is too large, despite there being 
some contrary precedents.
98
  This enables the court to draw a distinction between 
traditional public law approach and a rights based one. 
That size of class matters seems to indicate that the distinction is not about 
fairness as such, otherwise the bigger the class the greater the unfairness.  On an 
equitable rationale, if unconscionability is the core of legitimate expectation doctrine 
                                                             
95 R (Niazi) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755, [46]                                      
96 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 A representation made 
to the population of Hong Kong. See further Ng Siu Tong v Director of Immigration 
(Unreported, 10 January 2002) where the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decided that a 
successful claim could be made by over 1000 claimants who had relied on pro forma replies 
from the Legal aid Board 
See also, Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (representation made via 
a statute that an airways licence would not be withdrawn) 
97 Professor C. Forsyth and Williams, (2002) Asia Pacific Review, 29 
98
  In R (Bibi) v Newham LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR 237, 37, the Court was 
aware of polycentric issues concerning allocation of suitable housing accommodation 
because it was a scare resource and by fulfilling the claimants legitimate expectation might 
involve denying permanent housing to someone else 
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then the extent of the number of persons affected should not be a consideration, 
unless line drawing and public interest factors demand attention.  Further, 
concentrating on the number of individuals affected by the expectation is in the 
author’s opinion a very uncertain yardstick.   
An additional factor is the constitutional position of the courts, who must 
comply with the boundaries between the roles of the legislature, executive and 
judiciary.  This overlap was recognised in R (Bibi) v Newham LBC 
99
 where Lord 
Justice Schiemann stated: 
The court, even where it finds that the applicant has a legitimate expectation of some 
benefit, will not order the authority to honour its promise where to do so would be to 
assume the powers of the executive.  Once the court has established….an abuse of 
power in the sense of a failure to consider a legitimate expectation it may ask the 
decision maker to take the legitimate expectation properly into account in the 
decision making process   
 
It is this aspect of deference, the courts not assuming the powers of the 
executive that has received increasing disapproval.  Bibi is difficult to reconcile with 
precedent and an approach based on the balancing test, because it implies that all that 
is required by a local authority is to consider the expectation before deciding to 
frustrate it.
100
 
The paradigm case
101
 involves a clear and unambiguous lawful promise 
relating to a defined and limited subject matter that is directed to a limited and 
                                                             
99
  [2001] EWCA Civ 607 
  The defendant council had promised the claimants permanent housing, which did not 
materialise. The Court of Appeal held that ‘the law requires that any legitimate expectations 
be properly taken into account in the decision making process and that it had not been in the 
present case and therefore Newham BC had acted unlawfully. 
100
 See Professor Mark Elliot, ‘From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate 
Expectations in the United Kingdom’ in Mathew Groves and Greg Weeks (eds), ‘Legitimate 
Expectation in the Common Law World ‘(Hart Publishing 2017) chapter 10, pp.217-244          
101    See, Jason N E Varuhas, ‘In search of a doctrine: Mapping the Law of Legitimate 
Expectations’ in Groves and Weeks (eds) ‘Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law 
World ‘(Hart Publishing 2017) chapter 2, pp.17-52 
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identifiable class of persons, who are directly and peculiarly affected by the subject 
matter of that promise, having relied upon that promise to their detriment. 
7.5.1 Reneging on individualised assurances 
The author agrees with Professor Lorne Sossin 
102
 who suggests that administrative 
law in general has been focussed on elaborating the rule of law and the corresponding 
jurisdictional boundaries of public decision making that has had a profound effect of 
overshadowing the development of public law duties based on equitable principles. 
The Coughlan case is used as a pivotal focus, to explore whether the doctrine’s 
operation in public law has identifiable roots in equity jurisprudence or whether it 
rests purely on common law principles.  This author supports re-visitation of seminal 
cases.
103
  Coughlan is of jurisprudential value for a number of reasons, including its 
discussion of general administrative law and open acknowledgement of substantive 
legitimate expectation as a ground of judicial review. The case also illustrates the way 
a personal assurance can be intertwined with policy change or revision by a public 
body.  
7.5.2 R v North & East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan 104 
In Coughlan the Court of Appeal for the first time accepted that a substantive 
legitimate expectation could be established in English law; this was a radical 
development, although key elements of the doctrine had been developed by the House 
of Lords in the tax case of Re Preston (‘Preston’).105 The words of Lord Templeman 
                                                             
102  Professor Lorne Sossin, ‘Public Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts and the Equitable 
Duty of Reasonableness in Administrative Law’, 66 Saskatchewan Law Review, 129 
103
   For example, the analysis in chapter five of the 1925 Poplar case- seminal case re-
visitation is also a theme of Jeff King 
104
   [2001] QB 213 (CA) 
105  [1985] A.C. 835, 866 
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are crucial, because they illustrate the way judges in the early development of the 
doctrine viewed representations, as being equivalent to a breach of contract, with such 
breach in administrative law elevated to the status of an ‘abuse of power’;- 
in principle I can see no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to judicial 
review…if the decision is unfair to the taxpayer because the conduct of the 
commissioners is equivalent to a breach of contract or a breach of representation such 
a decision falls within the ambit of an abuse of power.  I consider that the taxpayer is 
entitled to relief by way of judicial review for ‘unfairness’ amounting to an abuse of 
power.   106 (Emphasis added)  
 
Preston is important from a fairness perspective, since their lordships placed 
no reliance upon the requirements of natural justice, which suggest that they saw 
‘fairness’ as something quite distinct from natural justice. Other tax cases raised 
issues of the operation of executive discretion and the creation of legitimate 
expectations through the issue of written guidance.
107
  
                                                                                                                                                                              
 Preston is one of a number of tax cases dealing with substantive legitimate expectation 
claims where the courts seem to take a non-imperium approach to their judicial review 
function and focus more on the individual and his rights. Arguments may be put forward that 
tax cases involving substantive benefits are treated differently but such a study is outside the 
remit of this thesis save with reference to aspects of fairness. 
106 ibid, 866 
107 R (on the application of Davies and another) v HMRC; R (on the application of Gaines-
Cooper) v HMRC) [2011] UKSC 47; [2011] 1 WLR 2625 
A useful article is Judith Freeman and John Vella, ‘Revenue Guidance: The Limits of 
Discretion and Legitimate Expectations’ (2012) 128 LQR 192 
See, R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p Matrix Securities Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 334, 
where the House of Lords accepted that in certain circumstances a legitimate expectation can 
give rise to substantive protection and that it may be an abuse of power for the Revenue 
Authorities to seek to extract tax contrary to an advance clearing given by them. 
See generally, R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever Plc [1996] STC 681. 
This case is now recognised as one of the foundation stones of the doctrine of substantive 
legitimate expectation; see for example the Court of Appeal’s reliance, on ex parte Unilever 
in Coughlan, [78]-[81] 
Unilever [76]-[78] was applied in the recent case of R (on the application of City Shoes 
Wholesale Ltd v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2016] EWHC 107 (Admin), where it 
was held that HMR had not acted unfairly in inviting taxpayers operating employee benefit 
trust schemes to participate in a special disclosure facility, but later changing its policy to 
limit the benefits available, where the taxpayers had applied under the facility but had not 
been registered 
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Prior to the Coughlan case which will now be discussed in depth, substantive 
legitimate expectations was sometimes doubted or openly disapproved.
108
  Whilst 
Preston was important, it was not until Coughlan that the courts accepted the 
possibility of a substantive legitimate expectation.  Coughlan is a highly useful 
precedent for the theme of this thesis, since it addresses a number of important issues, 
including the circumstances in which substantive legitimate expectations may arise; 
equity and the public interest come face to face and questions of judicial boundary 
setting.  
Miss Pamela Coughlan had been rendered tetraplegic by a severe road 
accident. She lived in a care facility operated by the NHS acting through the Exeter 
Health authority.  She and a small group (a significant factor as we shall see later in 
substantive challenges) had agreed to move from their current home in Newcourt 
Hospital, Exeter (where she had lived for 21 years) to Mardon House, which was a 
purpose built facility for disabled persons on the basis of a number of direct specific 
representations by senior officials of the local health authority that they could live at 
Mardon House ‘for as long as they chose.’  The health authority eventually decided to 
close Mardon House for practical, clinical and financial reasons and sell it and to 
move the patients into community care facilities.  The decisions were made against 
the backdrop of a new care policy that preferred to move patients away from 
institutional care and into community care.  She sought a review of the decision to 
close Mardon House and succeeded.  The Court of Appeal in a unanimous judgment 
to which all members contributed,
109
 upheld Miss Coughlan’s challenge. 
                                                             
108
 For example, see R v Secretary of State for Transport; Ex parte Richmond upon Thames 
London Borough Council [1994] 1 All ER 577, 596 (Laws LJ) and R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department; ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 All ER 397, 412 (Hirst LJ) 
109
 Lord Woolf MR and Mummery and Sedley LJJ 
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The court noted that the health authority had failed to appreciate the essence 
of the expectation Miss Coughlan had relied upon, which was not the continuing 
funding aspect, but rather to be able to stay at Mardon House, as a home for life.  The 
authority had commissioned a report which acknowledged the existence of the 
assurances given and thus this promise factor was weighed by them in their decision-
making process, alongside their other legitimate considerations.          
Hidden J, at first instance based his decision on the fact that the health 
authority had treated its undertaking merely as a promise to provide care, whereas he 
construed it as a specific promise to provide care specifically at Mardon House.  
Coughlan illustrates both the importance of the precise terms of the ‘promise’, to 
whom it is made and the context within which it is made. These elements are of 
paramount significance:-  
i. the importance of the content of the promise to Miss Coughlan 
ii. the particular promise was limited to a few people only  
iii. keeping to their promise only involved the health authority in fiscal 
aspects.  
Professor Christopher Forsyth considers ground iii suspect. 
110
  The essence of 
the judgment was that the local health authority had not established an overriding 
public interest to justify thwarting the promise. Their failure to do so constituted 
unfairness amounting to an abuse of power. 
The counter public interest argument being that an assurance to a small 
number of residents should not be allowed to inhibit sensible and lawful adjustments 
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to welfare provision, if new service ideas or financial stringency made that necessary.  
This is a powerful argument regards local authority service delivery and questions of 
resource allocation, especially today where alternative business models are 
formulated to alleviate serious cuts to services and reductions in funding revenue.  
The Court of Appeal, in Coughlan gave a clear signal that it was judicially 
permissible to weigh public and private interests in a way which could open up 
illegitimate infringement of the separation of powers principle.  This case 
undoubtedly pushed the boundaries of the substantive legitimate expectation concept, 
because it drew the court directly toward the final stage of decision-making and 
therefore its substance.  Deciding the degree or level of unfairness and a tipping point 
is a difficult exercise.  Once the claimant establishes the legality of the expectation a 
local authority must identify any overriding interests on which it can rely to frustrate 
that expectation.  The court will then weigh the requirements of fairness against the 
overriding interest (s) and demand objective justification that the measures used were 
proportionate in the circumstances. Counsel, Robert Gordon structured his argument 
on the basis that fairness is not merely aspirational, but operates as a clear limit on 
executive action. The court will show deference where the local authority provides 
evidence that its refusal or failure to honour the expectation was justified in the public 
interest and that it had carefully considered both the substance of the issue and 
fairness concerns as high relevant factors in its decision-making process. 
7.5.3 Post Coughlan developments 
Professor Elliott may be correct to remark that: 
The Court in Coughlan thus overreached by taking upon itself to determine a highly 
polycentric matter concerning the allocation of scarce financial resources whilst 
failing to acknowledge either its institutional capacity (not least on account of its 
ignorance of the many knock-on effects that would ensue if public funds were 
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diverted in order to uphold the claimant’s expectation) or pertinent constitutional 
inhibitions (given that measuring the relative worth of upholding the expectation and 
spending money on other things required the balancing of two incommensurable 
values) 
111
  
  
Notwithstanding Professor Elliott’s comments, Coughlan’s value as a 
precedent has been acknowledged by the House of Lords.  Lord Hobhouse has 
described the reasoning in Coughlan as ‘valuable’ 112 and it has also been mentioned 
in other instances by the House of Lords either with tacit approval or without adverse 
comment. 
113
 Coughlan has also been discussed, but not applied in a case involving 
similar phrases, such as ‘at least you know that they will never have to move again’, 
and words ‘homes for life’ were used on huge presentation boards by a health 
authority at consultation meetings.
114
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 Katie, a 35 year old woman with severe learning difficulties caused by cerebral palsy 
brought proceedings through her mother and litigation friend. She challenged the decision of 
the Lincolnshire Health authority to cease to provide long stay care for her at Long Leys. The 
authority proposed that Katie and 14 other long term patients living at Long Leys should live 
in the community. One of the grounds of challenge was that the authority had breached a 
promise that she and the other residents at Long Leys would have a home for life. Katie’s 
counsel argued unsuccessfully that resiling on the promise was an abuse of power and an 
abuse of Katie’s human rights. The hearing was before Mr David Pannick QC who 
distinguished Coughlan in the following terms: ‘There is in my judgment, a fundamental 
difference between this case and Miss Coughlan’s case. Here the authority is not acting for 
financial reasons in relation to someone who continues to require health care. Here the 
authority is acting in what it properly regards as the best interests of Katie, supported by the 
general thrust of the policy guidance … that it is desirable to move persons with learning 
difficulties out of care and into the community where there are no health reasons for them to 
live in NHS accommodation’. 
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7.5.4. Re-visiting Coughlan - An equitable perspective 
This author suggests applying an equitable perspective to Coughlan by application of 
a fiduciary duty in the circumstances of the relationship between the health authority 
and Miss Coughlan and her colleagues.  Sossin compares by contrast the fiduciary 
model that begins with the premise that an equitable relationship exists between a 
decision maker and vulnerable groups affected by their decisions.  He states: 
‘Questions such as fairness, reasonableness and justice are more properly viewed 
through the prism of this relationship, than through the one dimensional lens of 
legality.’ 115 
Before this author sets out an alternative equitable approach to the Coughlan 
judgment from an equitable perspective and argues for greater use of fiduciary duty in 
substantive legitimate expectation challenges, it is helpful to present the latest 
academic thinking on the development of substantive legitimate expectation with 
reference to Coughlan and others.  The focus is primarily on a recent article by 
Professor Mark Elliott.
116
  In that article he charts the development of the doctrine 
over the last 20 years and uses as his focus the cases of Hamble Fisheries and 
Coughlan.  Whilst he does not mention equity, his object is to show that Coughlan 
can ‘be understood in terms more subtle and less uncompromising than those implied 
in Coughlan, such that the doctrine can be conceptualised in a form that is more 
palatable from an orthodox perspective.’117  Elliott considers that the development of 
substantive legitimate expectation reflects the journey of administrative law itself, 
especially the struggle mainly involved with the protection of rights, as opposed to an 
                                                             
115 ‘Public Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts and the Equitable Duty of Reasonableness 
in Administrative Law’, 66 Saskatchewan Law Review, 131 [50] 
116   Professor Mark Elliott, From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations 
in English Public Law (University of Cambridge Paper No. 5/2016, January 2016) 
117
   ibid, 1 
320 
 
 
imperium approach.  The purpose of this chapter is not to enter that affray, save that 
the author considers that equity brings to the table a more nuanced and contextual 
approach.  
Elliott’s approach is to dismantle rigid distinctions and replace them with 
more subtle tools for the purposes of calibrating the nature and intensity of 
administrative review.
118
  This author’s retort is that equity has those subtle tools, 
such as fiduciary principles, albeit different, that are flexible enough to be applied in 
contextual situations found in public law.  The challenge is to blend equitable and 
common law principles to achieve outcomes of justice. 
This author considers that Coughlan can be approached from an equitable 
perspective.  This approach has a number of advantages.  Firstly, by the courts 
examining the legal relationship between Miss Coughlan and her health authority, 
leading on to an acknowledgment in the early stages of the adjudication process that 
the health authority was in a fiduciary relationship with its service users, including the 
small promissory group of which Miss Coughlan was one.  We saw in chapter two 
that judges and academics use a number of relational indicators to determine whether 
a fiduciary relationship arises in any given situation, including entrustment, power 
imbalance and vulnerability.  All these factors were present in the relationship 
between the health authority and Miss Coughlan and her residence group.  Secondly, 
applying a fiduciary context provides a safer and sounder jurisprudential conceptual 
understanding than the public law approach taken in Coughlan, and further would 
offer the judges a sounder basis for their reasoning process, because it would enable 
judges to point to a specific obligation that has been broken, rather than resorting to 
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general notions of fairness, expressed in equally difficult and widely definable terms 
as ‘abuse of power’ or ‘conspicuous abuse of power’.  It is an example of equity 
being employed in defined contextual circumstances.  The Court as we saw in chapter 
three would then proceed to stage two and examine the content of the fiduciary 
obligation and whether the health authority had breached that duty.  Thirdly, a finding 
of breach of a fiduciary duty may be seen as more satisfactory compliance with 
certainty principles of the rule of law, rather than as Cameron Stewart states ‘to treat 
it as a case of public law estoppel.’119  He refers to the work of others where it is said 
that the idea of public law estoppel is directly analogous to the private law concept of 
estoppel by representation and the findings in Coughlan bear this out.
120
 
Are there however, serious limitations to applying a fiduciary context to cases 
like Coughlan?  Do aspects of loyalty, which we saw in chapter 3 was the core 
characteristic of fiduciary duty, rear their head again where there are multiplicity of 
interests involved?  As a fiduciary the health authority owed a duty of loyalty and 
trust not only to Miss Coughlan, but also the wider users of the local health authority. 
We had seen that using fiduciary obligations in a public law setting presented real 
problems because of applying loyalty norms over a wide beneficiary class.
121
. 
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The wider concerns of the health authority is implicitly acknowledged by 
Professor C Forsyth
122
  ‘The money that would be saved by the closure of Mardon 
House was not to be frittered away on a fact finding trip to the Caribbean for the 
members of the authority or something similar; it was to be spent on the health needs 
of others in the East and North Devon Health Authority.’ 123   The decision to move 
the patients concerned was driven by many considerations and finance was only one.  
Seen in the context of fiduciary duty the health authority had a duty of loyalty not 
only to Miss Coughlan and her small group of colleagues, but also the wider local 
health service users - keeping their promises was only one aspect of that fiduciary 
relationship.  That relational approach maintains a balanced focus by treating 
legitimate expectations as one consideration, perhaps among many, rather than as a 
sole determinate factor. 
7.5.5 Polycentric issues-Coughlan and Bibi 
From a polycentric perspective it is valuable to compare the Coughlan and Bibi 
case
124
.  As Elliott states: ‘the court in Bibi appeared to be alive – in a way that the 
Court in Coughlan was not–to the polycentric nature of the issue facing it.’125  
 Bibi involved a promise by a local authority to the claimant that permanent 
housing would be available.  That promise was broken and the matter went to judicial 
review on the ground that a substantive legitimate expectation was generated.  The 
court was aware that if they fulfilled their promise to the claimant it may mean that 
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others on the housing waiting list would be disappointed.
126
  There was recognition 
that residential housing in inner London borough was scarce.
127
  Notwithstanding, 
Newham was held to have acted unlawfully because they had not, as required by law 
taken into account the legitimate expectation in their decision making process.
128
  
This author agrees with Professor Elliott who states ‘since this case was decided 
nearly two years after Coughlan, the Court of Appeal might have been expected to 
hold that permanent accommodation had to be supplied absent an overriding policy 
justification.’129  In this author’s view, if all that is required from a local authority is 
to provide evidence to the court that it included consideration of any promise made in 
its decision making process, then the value of substantive legitimate expectation as a 
ground of challenge to an individual who has suffered detriment is significantly 
watered down and of less value.
130
  
7.6 The Overriding Public Interest  
7.6.1 A countervailing public interest 
Lord Denning stated: 
The underlying principle is that the Crown cannot be estopped from exercising its 
powers…when it is doing so in the proper exercise of its duty to act for the public 
good, even though this may work some injustice or unfairness to the private 
individual…it can however be estopped when it is not properly exercising its powers, 
but in misusing them; and it does misuse them if it exercises them in circumstances 
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which work injustice or unfairness to the individual without any countervailing 
benefit for the public 
131
   
Lord Denning’s quote emphasises not only the balancing role of the court, but 
also the tension between protecting individual rights and the protection of the public 
interest. 
A fundamental principle of public law is that the public interest be protected 
in the realm of discretionary decision making by public bodies.  Decision makers 
must pay heed to the public interest.  Local authorities, unlike private parties are 
entitled to weigh up the public interest against that of the individual.  This leads Sales 
and Steyn to conclude that: ‘there is no scope for the simple transposition of private 
law estoppel rules into the public law field.’ 132  
 If a public body can successfully plead the public interest then it will trump 
any legitimate expectation claim whether procedural or substantive.  This effectively 
limits the roving commission of equity, for even where a legitimate expectation 
arises, it can always be defeated by the public interest.  There are however limitations 
placed on the use of justification of the public interest in not keeping promises made 
by a public body.  In Niazi/Bhatt Murphy 
133
 Laws LJ delivered the leading opinion in 
the Court’s judgment and stated that whilst a court will recognise and respect the right 
of a public body (thus including a local authority) to override whichever type of 
legitimate expectation may exist in the public interest, nevertheless in exercising that 
prerogative a public body must respect the requirement of proportionality.  By 
proportionality Laws L J meant that a public body had to give ‘a proportionate 
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response (of which the court is the judge, or the last judge) having regard to a 
legitimate aim pursued by the public body in the public interest’.   134 
The concept of ‘public interest’ at general law is an amorphous concept, wide 
ranging and expansive.  Its overriding effect is graphically illustrated by its operation 
in legitimate expectation claims, where it has the power to defeat even a legitimate 
expectation.  The administration acts in the public interest and the law must recognise 
its purposes.  As Robert Thomas states quoting Maxime Letourneur, a former 
member of the Conseil d’Etat, ‘administrative law is by its very nature, an unequal 
law; for the general interest must be accorded supremacy over private rights.’135  The 
underlying purpose of judicial control of the administration is to recognise the 
different needs of the state and the individual, and to balance them accordingly. 
136
  
As Robert Thomas states: 
137
 
In general, the public interest represented by respect for legality prevails; the only 
exception is where the administrative decision so interferes with private interests that 
the public interest cannot justify the incursion.  The purpose of the balancing exercise 
is therefore to ensure that in the exercise of its powers a local authority does not act 
arbitrarily towards individuals 
 
The use of the notion of the public interest concept evokes several important 
and challenging questions that are not easy to answer definitively. 
i. what do we mean by the public interest? 
ii. what guidance can the courts give to administrative decision makers and 
the citizen on how the public interest factor will be assessed? 
The following can be said with certainty:-  
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 Categories of what come within the term ‘public interest’ are not closed. 138 
This approach allows flexibility and is intentional on the part of the judges, 
because it recognises that legislatures and policy makers have to deal with 
changes over time and according to the circumstances in each situation- 
society’s perception of what is in the public interest changes. 
  The term does not mean that which gratifies curiosity or merely provided 
information or amusement.
139
  Similarly, ‘there is a world of difference 
between what is in the public interest and what is of interest to know.’ 
Griffiths LJ stated: ‘‘The public interest is a term embracing matters ,among 
others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government 
and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for 
the good order of society and for the wellbeing of its members.’140 
 The Privy Council held in Paponnette 141 that once a legitimate expectation 
has been established by a claimant then the burden of proving that the 
expectation should be defeated by reference to the overriding public interest 
shifts to the defendant.  The court will examine the public interest argument, 
which must be presented succinctly and accurately.  In the absence of any 
cogent reasons it is unlikely that the public body’s position will prevail. 
According to Advocate-General Lagrange it forms ‘one of the fundamental 
concepts of administrative law, and  is …without doubt the chief justification for the 
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very existence of administrative courts’142  The courts have made it clear that a public 
authority can resile from what has been a procedural or substantive legitimate 
expectation (It would seem harder to resile from a procedural legitimate expectation 
than a substantive one), but there must be ‘a sufficient overriding interest’ that 
‘outweighs’ the representation relied upon or which justifies a new or reversal of 
established policy.  Sedley L.J. stated ‘relevant and overriding policy imperatives’143 
and his lordship again in Niazi 
144
 ‘sufficiently powerful supervening factors.’ 
This begs the question of what is meant by the ‘public interest?’  Is it easily 
definable or can it have different meanings within a different factual context?  The 
term ‘public interest’ is an amorphous concept and its inability to resist tight 
definition gives it an intentional flexibility.  Legislators, policy makers and judges 
have all recognised that the conception of what is in the public interest will change 
over time and according to the circumstances of each situation. In the same way, the 
law does not try to define categorically what is ‘reasonable’.  Jonathan Moffett 
145states ‘Plainly by importing concepts such as ‘overriding’ and ‘outweighing’, the 
court abrogates to itself at least an element of the decision-making function that is 
normally the preserve of the public authority’.  This theme also impregnates the views 
of J. A G. Griffith who states, ‘judges differ in their view of where the public interest 
lies.’146 
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Tamberlin J 
147
 in McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury in the 
author’s view succinctly summaries the judicial process when public interest concerns 
are raised.  He states: 
This ultimate evaluation of the public interest will involve a determination of what 
are the relevant facets of the public interest that are competing and the comparative 
importance that ought to be given to them so that ‘the public interest’ can be 
ascertained and served.  In some circumstances, one or more considerations will be of 
such overriding significance that they will prevail over all others.  In other 
circumstances, the competing considerations will be more finely balanced so that the 
outcome is not so clearly predictable.  For example, in some contexts, interests such 
as public health, national security, risks of serious sexual or elderly persons’ abuse, 
anti-terrorism or international obligations may be of overriding significance when 
compared with other considerations 
  
This authors conclusion is that the more a local authority can show that it has 
acted carefully in weighing up its decision to override the expectation by considering 
the substance of the issue and considerations of fairness, and it satisfies the test of 
proportionality the more likely that the court will uphold the local authority’s 
decision to override the legitimate expectation.  
R (Cheshire East Borough and others) v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
148
 provides a recent example where the public 
authority succeeded in frustrating the legitimate expectation on grounds of overriding 
public interest. The claimant local authority lost its judicial review application against 
the defendant Secretary of State that Private Finance Initiative (PFI) funding would 
be provided for their waste diversion project.  The Executive Board of the Waste 
Infrastructure Delivery Programme were broadly sympathetic to proposals and set 
aside £30 million PFI credits, but later changed its methodology and did not make the 
grant available. During negotiations it had been stated by the Department for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) who were also involved that the issue 
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of the PFI credits were not guaranteed, and remained subject to approval of a final 
business plan.  The challenge was on the basis of breach of both procedural and 
substantive legitimate expectation.  Each ground failed. Langstaff J held that there 
was an overriding public interest that would have frustrated any legitimate 
expectation.  He considered that a broad approach to selecting projects to secure the 
savings was permissible.  His comments are very important for local authorities and 
their service users in a period of economic restraint and what has been said about the 
nature of a fiduciary obligation to council tax payers, Langstaff J stated:  
The Government decided on a macro-political and macro-economic basis that 
spending had to be cut significantly and quickly.  A plan for deficit reduction was to 
be set out in an emergency budget within 50 days.  The Spending Review itself 
recorded that the Government saw it as an urgent priority to secure economic 
stability. Choices were required, as a result of which departmental budgets were to be 
cut by ‘an average of 19 % over four years’.  In that context, I accept that a decision 
maker in an individual department of State must be accorded a very wide margin of 
appreciation, and a court must be reluctant to interfere with technical expert 
judgments such as are in issue here: as Lord Millett said in Southwark LBC v Mills 
(2001) 1 A.C. 1 at 26, priority in the allocation of resources must be resolved by the 
democratic process, national and local, and the Courts are ill-equipped to resolve 
such issues 
149
 
 
This author considers that a major difference between public law adjudication 
and that of equity is that English courts have recognised that ‘public administration 
extends not to a single case but the management of a continuing regime.’150  As 
Robert Thomas states ‘they have not adequately considered whether their own task 
extends merely to the single case or to the management of a continuing regime.’151 
Thomas rightly concludes ‘how can the courts effectively protect expectations if they 
maintain the distinction between adjudication and administration?’152   
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7.7 Conclusion 
 It seems we have reached a stage where we can safely say that fairness does play a 
role in public law, but mainly the emphasis is on procedural illegality and rarely on 
the merits of the case.  The Coughlan case and others dealing with substantive 
legitimate expectations claims will always draw the court into a review of merits, and 
by implication issues of fairness.  However, unfairness has to be such a high degree 
that it warrants adjectives of ‘conspicuous’ or ‘super unfairness’ and leads to court 
adjudication of abuse of power by a public body. 
We must however not lose sight of the fact that local authorities, whether we 
like it or not, do not always have to be fair.  A famous statement of the distillation 
governing standards of fairness was made by Lord Mustill and his endorsement of 
fairness is still a powerful one 
153
 and can be illustrated by the fact that even councils 
do not have to be fair to each other. 
154
  Paul Reynolds has stated there has not been 
enough research on the underlying principles of the doctrine of legitimate expectation 
155
 ‘there has been a lack of conceptual exploration of the doctrine: it has been 
assimilated into administrative law without any real attempt to explain its purpose 
and to sufficiently identify principles which underpin this purpose’.  This may be a 
correct perspective of the nature of the doctrine itself, but there is certainly no 
argument over the protective rationale behind the doctrine which can summarised as 
protection against public abuse of power’ (Laws L J in Begbie156), protection 
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allowing individuals to plan their life with legal certainty and protection of trust that 
the citizen has reposed in promises of a public body that such assurances will be kept. 
Substantive legitimate expectation remains uncertain in its scope and 
application. This was touched upon by Laws L J in Niazi 
157
where he suggested that 
the doctrine might benefit from having what he termed ‘sharper edges.’  Despite this 
lack of a detailed analytical framework within which to assess claims of substantive 
legitimate expectation the doctrine has emerged over recent years as a significant 
feature of a public authority’s duty of fairness.  Development has taken place 
incrementally on a case-by-case basis.  Case law graphically represents the tension, 
on the one hand, of the need for public authorities to have the flexibility to formulate 
and change their policies (and the bar on fettering their discretion) and, on the other 
hand, the degree of certainty inherent in the fair exercise of public authority power.  
This tension makes the real-world application of the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation often a complex and uncertain task.  
Judith Farbey QC 
158
 asks rhetorically ‘what then, of the future development 
of the doctrine?  Case outcomes are likely to remain fact-sensitive and dependent on 
context: while legitimate expectation is not co-extensive with fairness in public law, it 
is likely that outcomes will continue to be driven by judicial conceptions of what is 
fair in the circumstances and context of a particular case.’  We are still left with the 
dilemma of the relationship (if any) of notions of fairness and ‘abuse of power’. 
While public authorities are required to adopt fair procedures and actions, what will 
be considered to be fair in each case will depend on the circumstances and the range 
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of conflicting interests which the authority has to balance, including the public 
interest.   
This chapter has demonstrated that judges have seen the utility of promoting 
fairness in public law adjudication, both in a procedural and substantive sense.  The 
use of the doctrine of legitimate expectation that is clearly rooted in fairness is an 
example of that approach.  That approach however is undoubtedly restricted, for as 
Robert Thomas states, ‘courts cannot allow themselves to be seen to be openly 
making new law for fear of offending the democratic arm of government.’159 Further, 
some judges have suggested that the doctrine has a limited role in providing a 
sufficient interest to challenge a decision of a public body.
160
 
What would equity have achieved in Coughlan that the common law did not?  
After all, Miss Coughlan did ultimately receive fairness.  Principles of equity could 
have been considered, either on grounds of fiduciary duty or a public trust concept, 
based on an ethic of stewardship.  Their Lordships could have viewed the relationship 
between the Area Health Authority and Miss Coughlan as fiduciary, with its core 
content of loyalty. Loyalty would have been easier to have applied, as Miss Coughlan 
and her colleagues were small in number.  By holding breach of fiduciary duty would 
have avoided a journey into questions of substantive legitimate expectation, 
particularly the critical area of the vexed question of courts trespassing outside their 
constitutional domain into executive decision making.  This reasoning however, has a 
fundamental flaw, since rightfully understood Miss Coughlan and her group were not 
the only ‘beneficiaries’ - there were the wider users of the health authority to 
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    Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law 
(Hart Publishing 2000) 51 
160
    See, O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, 275E; Findlay v Secretary for State of the 
Home Department [1985] AC 318, 338D 
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consider. Certainly Coughlan was played out ‘on a much smaller stage with far fewer 
players.’161  Equitably based arguments would have confronted similar issues of 
polycentricism, which are an often a feature of local authority challenges.  With 
reference to Coughlan, Professor Elliott states: ‘the balancing test was applied in a 
way that was insufficiently sensitive to the polycentric value-laden nature of the 
issues at stake and the limits of the Court’s capacity to assess such matters.’ 162 
The failures of the health authority were considered to amount to unfairness 
and an abuse of power and as such are compatible with this thesis argument in 
relation to stewardship, although this concept was not expressly referred to. It is 
possible to view Coughlan from a stewardship lens, particularly stewardship of 
person, as the health authority had not identified an alternative placement for Miss 
Coughlan and her seven colleagues - their stewardship of person based on an ethic of 
care was absent. 
The ultimate conclusion drawn from examining fairness and the role of equity 
in public law is that equity does not have complete freedom to act.  Its roving 
commission to bring justice is thwarted. It becomes a limited instrument.  This 
conclusion is due in part to three major reasons.  First, the countervailing public law 
doctrines of ultra vires jurisdiction
163
 and second, that a statutory duty or discretion 
should not be fettered. A public body will be absolved from giving effect to a 
legitimate expectation if it is required by statute to act contrary to the legitimate 
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 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [2000] WLR 1115 
(CA), 1131 
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 Professor Mark Elliott, From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations 
in English Public Law (University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No 5/2016) 
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 Professor Mark Elliott, ‘when the rule of law and separation of powers doctrines are 
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expectation.
164
 This rule has, however, been the subject of judicial criticism. 
165
 Third, 
the very nature of equity itself acts as an inhibitor.  Equity operates on ‘conscience’.  
This element is difficult to apply in a public law setting. This chapter has 
demonstrated and reaffirmed conclusions drawn in earlier chapters, that if we 
attribute a core element of loyalty in fiduciary duty, it prevents it having effect, where 
the class size is wide and involves conflicting polycentric interests, which is usually 
the decision making environment in local government.  It may be that the moral basis 
of fiduciary relationships needs to be re-emphasised regards aspects of trust, 
especially where there is marked power dependency and vulnerability between the 
parties, as is the case between local authorities and their service users.
166
  It is 
certainly difficult on the current state of case law to justify a different judicial 
approach where it may be ‘that where a promise is made to a category of individuals 
who have the same interest (for example Coughlan 
167
, Liverpool Taxis case
168
- my 
case insertion) it is more likely to be considered to have binding effect than a promise 
which is made generally or to a diverse class, when the interests of those to whom the 
promise is made may differ, or indeed conflict.’169 It would however, be hard to 
justify such a distinction between policy promises and direct personal assurances, 
especially on the grounds of fairness. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis by proving an overview of the thesis, an analysis of its 
main research findings and suggestions for further research. 
Equity does continue to have a roving commission, but in respect of public law this is limited. 
The limitation is due in part to the inherent nature of these two bodies of law. Whilst both 
strive for fairness, there are fundamental differences.  Equity emphasises   personal 
obligations based on conscience, whereas public law is concerned with abuse of power by 
public bodies, such as local authorities. Placing a lens over the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users emphasises these differences. It is, therefore not a simple 
exercise to translate private law equitable principles over to the public sphere. For example, 
local authorities are not fiduciaries per se, but may in very limited circumstances be a sui 
generis fiduciary of the public. For a fiduciary relationship to arise there must be a degree of 
direct control over a person’s or group’s interests, for example a local authority appointed 
guardian. In such a situation a local authority has a form of representative power similar to 
that of a private fiduciary - both hold that power for and on behalf of another and in their 
interests alone. Apart from such instances local authorities will not be in a fiduciary 
relationship with their service users, otherwise they would be unable to carry out their day to 
day decision making, serving a diverse group with complex needs. It is the polycentric nature 
of local authority’s administrative duties that prevent a fiduciary obligation being triggered, 
with its core emphasis on beneficiary loyalty. The beneficiary class is constantly shifting and 
impossible to identify with precision, which further means that a cardinal principle of private 
trust law, of certainty of objects, is missing. These very real obstacles to translating equitable 
principles of trust and fiduciary duty to public law meant that a search was necessary for a 
concept which was a better fit for the relationship between local authorities and their service 
users - a principle of stewardship, based on an ethic of care was advanced. A stewardship 
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concept better identified the status and functions of local authorities as primarily one of 
service to their local community. 
8.1 An Overview 
 
This thesis has argued that Equity and its principles continues to be alive and relevant in 
English law today, albeit that it is limited in some instances when applied to the sphere of 
public law. These limitations were explored with particular reference to the relationship 
between local authorities and their service users. This is an area where little research has been 
carried out to determine the exact legal status of that relationship. This thesis reaffirms the 
general conclusion that Equity is concerned with individuals and their rights, whereas public 
law’s emphasis is on combatting abuse or misuse of public power by public bodies, including 
local authorities, when exercising administrative decisions. Obviously, if in judicial review 
proceedings a local authority’s decision is quashed or a declaration of unlawfulness is made, 
an individual or group may ultimately benefit, but conferring rights to individuals is not the 
central aim of public law. 
Equity is not concerned, nor does it have to be with issues of the public interest; in 
comparison the public interest is central to the character of a local authority as a public 
corporation, where the interest of the public is paramount. The public interest factor must be 
part of any local authority’s decision making process. In Equity, and particularly obligations 
of a fiduciary or trust nature the fiduciary, trustee or settlor is not concerned with public 
interest considerations (save making sure that any trust terms do not offend public policy, 
otherwise they would be void),
1
 but it is a fundamental rule of trust law that the sole interests 
of the beneficiary(s) are paramount in complying with the fiduciary mandate or trust terms. 
                                                             
1
 See, Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC.38, 
discusses anti-deprivation rules, where a clause is worded to switch a property interest to 
another on that person’s bankruptcy - those clauses are void on grounds of public policy. 
Reference is made to Sir William Page Wood VC’s statement in Holmes v Penney [1863] 3 
K&J 90, 102: ‘a trader cannot, even for valuable consideration, settle his own property in 
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Thus the role of Equity was particularly focussed in this thesis on the institutional 
relationship between local authorities and their service users. This author regarded this 
relational enquiry as relevant and current, on a number of grounds. Local authorities have 
immense administrative power, over a diverse range of subject matter, from care for the 
elderly, infirm and vulnerable, to road maintenance and refuse collection. Local authorities 
also play a prominent part in the economy and are responsible for large budgets, consisting of 
revenue not only from council tax payers (domestic and commercial), but also from 
government grants and subsidies. They deal with a variety of stakeholders, including the 
private sector and voluntary bodies, and also collaborative working agreements with other 
local authorities.  These factors combine to make administrative decision making a complex 
task, especially now where the focus is on trimming service budgets in a fragile economic 
climate. The political pressure for privatisation of government services over several decades 
has created an entirely new field of public contracting and has spawned significant evolution 
of non-profit and for-profit public delivery-service organisations. Decision-making often 
involves complex polycentric issues with no easy solutions: for example, if budgets were 
reduced on a local drug/alcohol dependency unit there would be more money to apply 
elsewhere, perhaps on play group provision; however, such savings could lead to increased 
costs elsewhere such as in relation to homelessness or adult care.  Decision making also has 
to recognise the diversity of its service user group. This is not only comprised of persons and 
groups from different, racial, cultural, ethnic, political, educational, economic and social 
backgrounds, but also persons who live in a local authority area and, those persons who come 
to work or , visit or use leisure facilities in the area, including those who find themselves in 
the area as seeking protection and asylum. 
Local authorities then, are not just political institutions, but have a major economic 
and social role to play in their own localities: the needs and well-being of which will differ. A 
town in a prosperous area will have needs different to those in a locality suffering from past 
                                                                                                                                                                              
such a manner as that he should take an interest in it until his bankruptcy, and afterwards, it 
should be held in trust for his wife and children’ (emphasis in original case) 
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or present economic decline. The challenge of this thesis was to identify the legal status that 
could be applied to the relationship between a local authorities and the diversity of their 
service users (whether the organisation was a county council, district council or metropolitan 
borough council). 
It is tempting to answer this question of identification by simply categorising the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users in terms of contract or tort. This 
would solve the problem in situations where a service user is a tenant of a local authority and, 
under contract, pays monthly rent or where an inhabitant or visitor has tripped over a 
pavement flagstone, and allegations of negligence are made. This categorisation is however, 
too simplistic and in some instances does not fit the situation. For example, a local authority 
may wish to take part of a village school playing field to build low cost affordable houses to 
meet housing demand. This decision will no doubt be highly contentious, complex and 
polycentric. Many persons and groups will wish to comment - there is clearly no contractual 
nexus between the parties or issues of tortious liability, yet those persons have a right to 
challenge the decision making process of their local authority. Some may argue there have 
been procedural defects, claiming that they have had no opportunity to be heard, whilst others 
may contend that the local authority had promised that the school playing fields would 
always be maintained for educational and/or recreational use. In such circumstances, both 
groups would feel that their trust in the local administration has been breached, one for 
procedural and the other for substantive reasons. Given that, in such cases, neither contract 
nor tort provides ready solutions, those aggrieved may turn to public law by way of judicial 
review. Yet public law as indicated will not concentrate on individual rights and may offer 
only limited opportunity for individuals to have their grievances addressed. The core question 
on this thesis is whether equity can be of assistance in meeting the deficiencies of the 
common law in particular in judicial review proceedings. 
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8.2 Main Research Findings 
This thesis looked at various models by which the relationship between local 
authorities and their service users may be conceptualised from the perspective of equity. A 
starting point was to address whether this relationship could give rise to an equitable 
fiduciary relationship. Chapter two was therefore devoted to examining the various theories 
advanced by judges and academics to determine whether a fiduciary relationship existed. This 
involved, exploring a wide range of ‘signposts’ or indicia, used to establish whether the 
relationship under review was fiduciary or not.  
This author applied each relational indicator to the local authority service user 
relationship to test whether any or all of the theories were appropriate. Undoubtedly, power, 
dependency and vulnerability resonated with some non-economic services, such as youth 
offending counselling schemes, but were not present in all aspects of the relationship between 
local authorities and their services users. As scholars before have concluded, this thesis 
confirmed that, just because a particular relationship between a local authority and their 
service users is fiduciary in one context, does not automatically mean that all relationships 
entered into by a local authority are thereafter fiduciary in nature. 
The concept of entrustment, as espoused by Professor Tamar Frankel, appeared both 
in a number of court judgments and academic literature. This relational element was 
particularly relevant to the relationship of local authorities and their service users. 
Entrustment occurred on a number of levels. There was institutional entrustment between 
Parliament and local authorities on the basis that local authorities would abide by their 
delegated statutory duties and powers and not abuse such power. There was also entrustment 
by the local electorate, in exercising their democratic local voting right to elect their local 
council. The entrustment was on the implied understanding that the local authority would act 
for the economic, social and environmental, ‘well-being’ of their locality. Fiduciary 
relationships were based on a substitutionary principle - the fiduciary was empowered to act 
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for the beneficiary. Nearly all fiduciaries (including agents, doctors, lawyers, partners and 
trustees) acquire their authority through a consensual delegation from dependants such as, 
principals, patients, clients, co-partners and beneficiaries. There are of course instances where 
there cannot be ordinary or consensual delegation, for example where a minor or someone 
suffering mental illness is involved. In such circumstances the courts will superimpose the 
fiduciary concept (Court of Protection procedure), for the beneficiary’s protection.  
A broad classification of fiduciary relationships, between fiduciary relationships per 
se (doctor/patient, trustee/beneficiary, principal /agent) or a contextual approach was helpful 
in part. Judicial reasoning was applied on an analogical or contextual basis. It was clear that if 
the relationship between local authorities and their service users was to be categorised as 
‘fiduciary’, then it could only be on the basis of a ‘sui-generis’ categorisation. This author 
concluded that the relationship between local authorities and their service user falls within a 
grey area, leading some legal scholars to contend that fiduciary government offers a false 
promise
2
 ; because the concept is too incoherent and uncertain to be workable.  The 
importance of taking seriously the objections raised to translating fiduciary principles to 
administrative law was recognised in chapter four.  
Apart from difficulties in fixing a firm categorisation of ‘fiduciary’ to the relationship 
under review, there was the added problem of determining the scope of the fiduciary duty. 
This thesis demonstrated that there is an ongoing dispute as to whether fiduciary duty is 
proscriptive, prescriptive, or both. This author considered that the proscriptive view of 
fiduciary duty better accorded with the historical genesis of the fiduciary concept, because it 
focuses on the prophylactic and deterrent nature of fiduciary duty, and acts to prevent 
conflicts of interest. In this author’s opinion a proscriptive approach better reflects the 
traditional moral role of fiduciary obligation, but does not however, fully adapt to the 
relationship between local authorities’ and their service users, because it is negative in 
outlook-its function is to prevent ‘conflicts of interest’. The prescriptive approach is positive 
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and therefore, better applies to the activity of a local authority. This author acknowledged the 
practical value of the prescriptive approach of fiduciary obligation, where it could be easily 
applied, as was seen in land disposal by local authorities under section 123 of the Local 
Government Act 1972. 
The ongoing debate over whether fiduciary duties are proscriptive or prescriptive 
only takes us so far in exploring the relationship between local authorities and their service 
users. What is needed is an analysis of the core content of fiduciary obligation and this was 
addressed in Chapter two. The purpose here was to see whether; and, if so, what extent, a 
concept of fiduciary obligations could be applied in a local government context. Two major 
candidates for the root of fiduciary duty emerged, that of loyalty and of trust. Fiduciary duty 
clearly had associations with good administration and conscionability, but the consensus of 
judicial and academic opinion was that loyalty occupied the central position. Other 
contenders, such as good faith and duty of care were put forward, but this author considers 
that they are stand-alone principles, and only apply in fiduciary law as part or component of a 
general fiduciary duty of loyalty: to contend otherwise weakens fiduciary duty. 
Identifying loyalty as a central core of fiduciary doctrine, however, causes problems 
in the context of a local authority. With such a diverse grouping of service users, often of a 
shifting nature, it is extremely difficult to identify at any given time the beneficiary class 
involved, and therefore to whom loyalty is owed. In any event loyalty to one person or group 
would inevitably mean disloyalty to the other. There was also, of course, loyalty to the public 
interest, (including loyalty to the authority’s statutory purpose) which may have been 
unrepresented in court. It was seen that using notions of loyalty in the decision-making 
framework of a local authority presents significant challenges. The nature of the duty of 
loyalty suggests that loyalty must take the form of fairness in settings where beneficiaries 
have competing claims against the same fiduciary, as is the case between service users and 
their local authorities.   
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Mindful of such difficulties, this author explored private trust concepts. Chapter four 
specifically examined what type of trust (if any) would be appropriate, and considered that a 
discretionary trust model resembled the relationship under review. There were, however a 
number of identifiable problems of validity under basic private trust law.  Further, the 
traditional division of trust property between legal and equitable interests does not easily ‘fit’ 
the local authority context. It was difficult to pinpoint any beneficial interest that could be 
claimed by service users, even local tax or ratepayers: individuals may pay their council tax, 
but they do so in consideration for services received. Further, there were other stakeholders 
who could lawfully claim to beneficially ‘own’ part of a local authority’s assets, including the 
national taxpayer and central government itself who fund grants and subsidies to local 
authorities.  
This analysis clearly showed that the private trust model could not apply to the 
relationship between local authorities and their service users in general, and that an answer 
might lie in a wider public trust concept, such as that used in respect of the turnpike trust 
might provide an adequate framework .Historically, the turnpike trust represented a form of 
community public trust, and an early example of localism. The public trust doctrine is, 
however, difficult to define; case law illustrates that a property- centred approach is taken. 
It became clear that what was needed was a new legal duty that is not tied to existing 
models of trust, and fiduciary obligation, and yet was able to embody the service ethic that is 
so much a part of those concepts. This author, therefore, presented as an alternative a  
stewardship model based on an ethic of care. Its essence is service to others. In this way it 
echoes fiduciary duty, but is not restricted by considerations of loyalty. From an historical 
perspective as stewards for trust beneficiaries, trustees were expected to manage assets or 
perform other services in a conscientious manner, manifesting unqualified fidelity to their 
beneficiary’s interests. The stewardship model accepts common law legal ownership by the 
trustee, but regards it as against conscience for that trustee to exercise legal ownership other 
than for the benefit of the cestui que trust-equity engrafts an equitable obligation upon him.  
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An aim of this author was to complement the theoretical analysis of equitable 
principles with a practical approach, advocating that equity is not outdated or sterile, rather, it 
can have a utilitarian function, even in the complexity of modern arrangements, whether 
domestically, in the commercial world or the relationship between local authorities and their 
service users. A stewardship concept was therefore identified as the most appropriate vehicle 
to use for the relationship of local authorities and their service users. From this, a number of 
advantages accrue: public administration stands to gain because it adds diversity to the forms 
of law at its disposal. It thereby increases the stock of tools and practices needed by public 
administrators to make wise and lawful decisions at all stages of policy development, as well 
as adding to the judicial tool bag. Thus, chapter four explored the four dimensions of 
stewardship; stewardship of person, place, property and purpose. Practical expression of 
stewardship was specifically explored (see chapter six) by reference to the statutory power of 
disposal of land or interests therein by local authorities and applications of an overriding duty 
of a fiduciary nature superimposed over the duty to obtain ‘best consideration.’ 
Judicial views on the relationship between local authorities and their service users 
were considered highly important, and it was with this purpose in mind that chapter 5 
specifically dealt with three seminal cases, involving challenge to administrative decisions 
made against three local authorities.  Whilst stewardship was only mentioned by one judge, 
namely Sumner L J in the Poplar case, it was evident in other judgments that as well as 
having abided by the terms of their statutory authority local authorities are accountable for 
the management and control of property belonging to others and must deal with such property 
responsibly: such assets were not their own. A stewardship theme was clearly present, as 
further illustrated in Pickwell 3 and the need for Camden council to balance the interests and 
well-being of all its inhabitants and visitors to the area with potential health hazards looming, 
where the employees’ strike had caused rubbish to pile up in the streets, bodies remained 
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unburied and fellow council workers housed in unheated buildings; financial stewardship was 
only one aspect. Pickwell demonstrates that stewardship must be exercised in context.4 
Changes in local government service delivery and the range of services now offered 
together with the number of parties in the delivery chain raise further issues. A current theme 
is to encourage development of bigger local authorities with regional assemblies on the 
agenda.
5
 These are of course political decisions, but issues of a legal nature also arise. The 
‘rights’ of the service user can be in danger of being overlooked in matters of institutional 
design. It is essential therefore that a public service ethic is not lost, but is protected. Having 
notions of ethical principles of stewardship on the agenda will ensure that ‘commodification’ 
does not swamp dialogue and that instances of abuse or misuse of power do not go 
undetected.  
Benefits of applying stewardship principles 
Stewardship better reflects the ethical dimension of the service element which is 
central to the relationship between local authorities and their service users than 
concepts associated with fiduciary duties and trusteeship. Stewardship principles are 
                                                             
4
 ibid, 995 See evidence of Mr Unwin the Director of Social Services who stated: ‘The 
withdrawal of services precipitated by the strike caused dismay (to Camden’s disables and 
elderly residents) that a life-line had been cut. The under-provision was at a serious level and 
people having to contend with severe handicaps were placed at risk.’ 
5
 The basic idea behind regional assemblies is that government in England is too centralised. 
People who support regional assemblies believe the regions of England differ in terms of 
what they want and need. A regional assembly would be elected by people in the area In 
order to take on significant powers from central government, it is generally agreed that these 
regions would need to be quite large. For example, for Assembly North, the region that is 
normally suggested is the whole of Yorkshire. The population of Yorkshire and the Humber 
in 2011 was 5.3 million people – the same as the population of Scotland. There are many 
options for the powers that a regional assembly could have. The overall goal of such 
proposals is to bring politics closer to the people, tailor policy decisions to fit local needs and 
wishes, and encourage regional development. The regional assembly would appoint a First 
Minister and a cabinet who would be responsible for devising a policy programme and 
putting it into effect. The assembly would form committees to represent local interests and 
policy areas and hold the cabinet to account. The regional assemblies would sit below central 
government and above local councils. There are two main criticisms – firstly, they would 
create another layer of government, with more politicians and more bureaucracy; secondly, it 
would diminish the importance of common standards for services across the country, rather 
than different standards depending on where you happen to live,  
345 
 
 
wide enough to embrace issues that are not confined to a fiscal subject matter. By 
asking questions of the decision maker whether stewardship, whether of person, 
property, place or purpose was achieved in their outcome enables a thorough review 
of the evidence and submissions presented before the court. Stewardship also 
provides a structured substantive judicial review test, robust enough to provide 
effective practical supervision of local authority action. 
Application of stewardship principles also acknowledges as Lord Diplock said 
in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside M B C that ‘the very 
concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between more than one 
possible courses of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold 
differing opinions as to which is to be preferred.’6 
The role of local authorities and their relationship to their service users is, as 
we have seen, in certain respects analogous to the relationship of a trustee and 
beneficiary in private law. Fundamentally local authorities manage assets, as would 
the steward of old. The stewardship label better identifies, than does the trustee 
model, both the practical and ethical relationship between local authorities and the 
wide service using public with its uncertain reach.. 
Adopting a principle of stewardship would improve the way administrative 
decisions by local authorities are assessed – particularly with reference to substantive 
review. It can be another tool in the substantive judicial review toolbag. Stewardship 
is a generic standard and can operate as an umbrella concept - as a standard of 
governance and can apply whether the standards of review used is the old 
Wednesbury test or the increasingly used proportionality test.  Stewardship principles 
enable the court to concentrate on what has gone wrong with a decision- is it over or 
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   [1977 ] AC 1014   
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under inclusive? bizarre and illogical? A stewardship focus is not tied down to either 
a rationality test or proportionality standard of review, which seems to be the present 
approach in judicial review proceedings.  
A stewardship approach fits in with a contextual approach when substantive 
review takes place. By ‘contextualism’ this author means the notion that the standard 
of review should vary according to the circumstances of the case. The author agrees 
with Professor Mark Elliott, who states: ‘that substantive judicial review is to be 
understood as a contextualist endeavour that cannot be undertaken by reference to 
crude distinctions.’7 There are of course risks to adopting a contextualist approach 
which can ‘produce a chaotic regime of single instances that render substantive 
review little more than a vehicle for dispensing palm – tree justice in an unpredictable 
fashion.’ 8This risk can only be overcome by judges applying wisdom as to when the 
extent of intrusiveness of substantive review is moderated by recourse to deference. 
Within a stewardship approach there is room for both Wednesbury and 
proportionality substantive review tests - the ultimate goal is to root out abuse of 
power. Assistant Professor Rebecca Williams in a recent article
9
 notes that ‘what is 
vital across substantive review, is not categorical distinctions between proportionality 
and Wednesbury, or a final duel of the two before the Supreme Court, but rather the 
recognition that in all instances it is necessary to specify the content of the substantive 
review.’ The current tests may be insufficient and stewardship adds additional 
freedom to the judges and provides a clearer basis for substantive review of local 
authority decisions. 
                                                             
7
  Professor Mark Elliott, Proportionality and contextualism in common – law review: The 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Pham, blog 17th April 2015, publiclawforeveryone.com 
8
  ibid 
9
  Structuring Substantive Review , Public Law 2017, pp.105-122,  p.122 
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Substantive review has suffered from rigid distinctions, particularly regards 
the Wednesbury and proportionality tests: they are often seen as distinct. The recent 
case of Pham
10
 has changed the judicial landscape because as Professor Elliott states 
it: ‘reconceives the way in which the toolbox is organised-it rejects 
compartmentalism - according to which Wednesbury and proportionality are viewed 
as rigidly separate.’11 Pham further eschews rigid distinctions between ‘domestic’ and 
‘European’ cases, and between ‘rights’ and ‘non-rights’ cases. 
This author firmly believes that a stewardship principle belongs in the 
administrative substantive review tool box, and can be extremely useful where local 
authority decisions are under challenge. 
Different case outcomes 
It is relevant to ask what difference application of a stewardship model would have 
made to the decisions in previous case law. This author tested his stewardship theory 
on the cases referred to in this thesis, with the result that it was possible to interpret 
those case outcomes in the light of a stewardship review standard. For example, in 
Poplar
12
, the local authority clearly exercised poor stewardship of public finds by 
paying wages without regard to the standards generally used when fixing wage levels 
– i.e. above the national average at a time when the cost of living index was going 
down. A stewardship approach would have avoided the criticisms met that the judges 
were overstepping the mark and impinging on the autonomy of local authorities to 
make their own discretionary decisions. Similar reasoning can be applied to 
                                                             
10
  Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 
11  Professor Mark Elliott ‘Proportionality and contextualism in common – law review: The 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Pham,  
12
  Roberts v Hopwood [1925]A.C 578 
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Bromley
13
 where it was hardly financial stewardship to lower fares which triggered a 
grant loss and meant increased local taxation on out of London boroughs. An 
alternative stewardship argument is possible on the grounds of the public interest by 
arguing environmental benefits – better air quality - as a result of potentially less cars/ 
vehicles being used if a subsidised transport system was in place. Hazell
14
, the swaps 
case was a clear example of a breach of cardinal trustee principles of not putting ‘all 
ones eggs in the same basket.’ 
Pickwell
15
, represents the use of practical stewardship by the local authority 
concerned in a number of ways, because whilst at face value to settle at a wage level 
with its employees at a figure above that agreed with the national union concerned 
seemed irresponsible and in today’s substantive review terms disproportionate. 
However, applying a stewardship lens takes cognisance of the situations developing 
in Camden at the time (the winter of discontent), including public welfare concerns 
for the elderly and infirm and major health hazards with rubbish piling up in the 
streets having been uncollected for weeks due to the strike. 
Prescott
16
 represents a set of facts, where it is hard to justify the decision if 
one applies a stewardship lens. It was true that the cost of subsidising the elderly who 
would receive free travel was a costly exercise nevertheless, it can be strongly argued 
that Birmingham Corporation was displaying stewardship to a vulnerable and needy 
section of their local population and that financial considerations were only one side 
of the coin. The local authority was later justified by an Act of Parliament allowing 
                                                             
13
  Bromley LB v GLC [1983] A.C 768 
14  Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [1982] A.C 1 (HL) 
15
 Pickwell v Camden LBC and Others [1983] QB 1 962 
16
 Prescott v Birmingham Corporation [1955] 1 Ch 210 (CA) 
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concessionary fare structures to the elderly, infirm and school children within a 
locality. 
It is acknowledged that by applying a stewardship substantive standard of 
review the outcome arrived at in some of these decisions may have been the same: - 
in other different. Nevertheless, the major advantage of applying a stewardship test is 
preferable, because it provides a clearer and more transparent approach which may 
help to protect judges from criticism that unelected judges are making executive 
decisions, and thus exceeding their constitutional powers under the separation of 
powers. This is the central criticism of substantive review in legitimate expectation 
challenges. Those cases as we saw draw the courts into a merits review, as 
exemplified by Coughlan.
17
 
Coughlan is extremely important, for it shows that even if a public body 
(including local authorities) evidentially demonstrate that it has complied with its 
stewardship obligations, none the less if their decision making process involves a 
promise that satisfies certain defined judicial criteria then reneging without proper 
justification from that definite promise will be an abuse of power and thus override 
any considerations of stewardship. Fairness is a principle that overrides other 
considerations, and depending on the degree of unfairness involved, even the public 
interest. For example, in Coughlan the health authority wanted to improve the 
provision of reablement services and considered that the mix of a long - stay 
residential service and a reablement service at Mardon House was inappropriate and 
detrimental to the interests of both users of the service. The acute reablement service 
could not be supported without an uneconomic investment which would have 
produced a second class reablement service. The health authority tendered evidence 
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 R v North & East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 
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that Mardon House had contrary to expectations become a prohibitively expensive 
white elephant and its continued operation did not represent value for money and left 
fewer resources for other services. 
It would seem that the health authority in Coughlan would have passed both 
the rationality test and a stewardship test. This author however, submits that the 
Coughlan outcome will rarely arise in the future due to the boundaries placed around 
the substantive legitimate expectation doctrine. This conclusion is borne out by the 
few successful substantive legitimate expectation challenges since Coughlan. 
Judicial Review deficiencies-Wednesbury and proportionality 
Substantive review continues to provoke much debate, both within the 
courts
18
 and amongst academics
19
, especially whether Wednesbury review should be 
consigned to the dustbin of legal history and replaced with a proportionality doctrine. 
The Wednesbury doctrine has had its critics. Lord Cooke in Daly
20
 said 
Wednesbury was an ‘unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative 
law.’ In ABCIFER21  Dyson LJ (as he then was) had ‘difficulty in seeing what 
justification there is now for retaining the Wednesbury test’, and felt that it was for 
the House of Lords, not the Court of Appeal to perform ‘its burial rites’. 
                                                             
18
  R (on the application of Keyu) v Secretary of State for foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2015] UKSC 69 
19
  For example, J King, ‘Proportionality: a Halfway House’ (2010) New Zealand Law 
Review 327;  J Goodwin ‘The Last Defence of Wednesbury’ 2012 PL 445; P Daly, 
‘Wednesbury’s reasons and structure, 2016 PL 238; Mark Elliott, ‘Proportionality and 
deference: the importance of a structured approach in’ in F Forsyth (ed) Effective Judicial 
Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, chapter 
16; M Elliott and H Wilberg (eds), ‘The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review’ Oxford, 
Hart Publishing 2015. 
20  R (Daly) v Secretary of State [2001] 1 AC 532. 
21
  R (Association of British Civilian Internees (Far East Region) v Secretary of State for 
Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473 
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Lord Carnwath states: ‘By 2000 the courts recognised the concept of a 
‘sliding scale’ of rationality review depending on the nature and gravity of the case.                  
At the same time the Human rights Act 1998 required judges to apply a test of 
‘proportionality’, derived from the European Court of Human Rights. There is now 
little to choose between the two principles. The actual decision in Wednesbury would 
be difficult to justify under the modern law, and its days as an authority may be 
numbered.’22 At the end of his lecture his Lordship again commenting on the end of 
his future judicial tenure states: ‘I will be interested to see whether by the end of that 
period we have not finally consigned Wednesbury to history.’23 Laws L J has also 
criticised the rationality test, stating as unacceptable ‘monolithic’, equating it with ‘a 
crude duty not to emulate the brute beasts that have no understanding.’24  
It is however, possible to produce evidence for the view that the rationality 
test is still useful. For example, Professor Andrew Le Sueur, found that out of 41 
judicial review cases between January 2000 and July 2003 the success rate on 
challenges on grounds of unreasonableness was 18 out of 41.
25
 Importantly, 
Wednesbury has not been overruled. 
Lord Carnwath stated:  ‘Thus in Begbie26 Laws L J redefined the Wednesbury 
principle as ‘a sliding scale of review more or less intrusive according to the nature 
and gravity of what is at stake.’ 
 
                                                             
22  Lord Carnwath, From Rationality to Proportionality In the Modern Law , 14th April 2014 
at the joint UCL-HKU conference ‘Judicial Review in a Changing Society’ at Hong Kong 
University, p.1 
23
   ibid p.17 
24
   Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights? (1993) PL 
59,69,74 
25   Professor Andrew L Sueur, The Rise and Ruin of Reasonableness? (2004) 
http//www.adminlaw.org.uk/docs/ALBA 
26
   R v Department of Education ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 111, at 1130 
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The problem with sliding scales 
This author finds agreement with Lord Carnwath when he states: ‘Sliding 27scales 
only work if one has measurable standards to which they can be applied; otherwise it 
is a matter less of sliding scales than (to quote Professor Le Sueur once more) of 
‘slithering about in grey areas.’28 
This author argues that there is considerable merit in having a range of 
judicial review tools - a spectrum of substantive review standards, none more so than 
keeping the Wednesbury and proportionality tests, which can operate alongside a 
stewardship test: neither cancels each other out and each have merit in being able to 
apply in a different situation. For example, the proportionality test has been proven to 
be of value in human rights cases, where a proportionality test insists that any 
restriction must be a proportionate response, and be no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the legitimate purpose in question. Mike Taggart’s29 bifurcation thesis 
argued that proportionality should be reserved for rights – based challenges with low 
intensity review being used in non – rights based cases. Professor Paul Craig 
maintains a different position to bifurcation insisting that bifurcation should be 
resisted 
30
and that proportionality should be a general head of judicial review 
Rebecca Williams when dealing with the difference between Wednesbury and 
proportionality  states: There is an obvious contrast in that Wednesbury simply asks 
about the ‘unreasonableness’ of the decision, while proportionality asks more 
specifically about, whether the decision was suitable, necessary or proportionate in 
                                                             
27
   Supra 22, p.12 
28   Supra 25 
29
   Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury (2008) NZ L Rev 423 
30
   Professor Craig is  joined in this camp by Murray Hunt and Philip Joseph 
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the sense of striking a ‘fair balance’ overall ( proportionality ‘stricto sensus’).’31  
Thus the proportionality test is considered more structured than common law 
rationality review-a conclusion confirmed by the cases of Kennedy 
32
and Pham.
33
 It is 
extremely important has pointed out by Lord Mance in Pham and supported by this 
author and the work of Mark Elliott that the intensity of proportionality is not 
determined by its structure ,but by the degree of judicial restraint produced by 
applying it. 
There is no doubt that proportionality will continue to be used as a substantive 
review tool. This author argues that it can operate alongside principles of stewardship. 
A recent Court of appeal case involving Wandsworth LBC
34
 illustrates this point. It 
concerned an unmarried person and a condition in the Housing Act 1985 s. 87(b) 
which required, up until 1st April 2012 that the long – term partner of a secure tenant 
had to have resided with the secure tenant throughout the 12 – month period prior to 
the secure tenant’s death. She fell within the definition of a ‘family member’ but 
could not satisfy the 12 – month rule. It was held that even if the situations of 
common law spouses and married or civil partnership spouses were analogous for the 
purposes of ECHR art.14, the difference in treatment between them was justified and 
proportionate. The imposition of the 12- month rule was the best available objective 
demonstration that a relationship had the necessary permanence and constancy 
required by the legislation. In the judgment reference was made to local authority 
secure tenancies and whilst their lordships did not specifically use the phrase 
‘stewardship, it was clear that this was what they had in mind when they stated: 
                                                             
31
   Supra 4 p 100 
32   Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2014] UKSC 20 
33
   Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 
34
   R (on the application of Turley) v Wandsworth LBC [2017] EWCA Civ 189 
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‘Although it had long been policy to grant a limited right of succession to 
family members for whom the property had also been their home, regard had also to 
be had to the interests of those on the waiting list and of local authorities in making 
the best use of housing stock.’ (Emphasis added) 
In conclusion it is suggested that stewardship as a substantive review tool 
would aid decision making both from the aspect of day to day practical decision 
making by local authorities at the ‘coal face’ in their relationship with service users, 
but also in judicial review proceedings. Old doctrinal structures, such as Wednesbury 
need not be abandoned: application of stewardship principles provide a tool that can 
be used alongside Wednesbury and newer forms of proportionality review (if the 
context demands) and does not expose itself to a specific accusation of opening the 
door to unprincipled and unpredictable decision making.  
The term equity in its wider application has come to be associated with justice and 
fairness. A central aim of this thesis was therefore to explore the bigger picture of fairness in 
the context of administrative law, and to consider whether fairness in this context is in 
anyway different from its application in equity. It was abundantly clear that equity does not 
have a monopoly on fairness in the adjudication process. There are plenty of examples of a 
fairness approach in administrative law, such as natural justice and procedural rules, as well 
as in public law principles themselves. There was, however the issue of substantive justice -
those times when the administrative court considers itself compelled in effect to examine the 
merits of a case. This enquiry inevitably led to considering the emerging doctrine of 
substantive legitimate expectation in chapter seven.  The seminal Coughlan case (see section 
7.3) was selected ( because, while that case involved a health authority and not a local 
authority, the issue of keeping promises by a public body was present) and provided a 
platform from which an analysis of equitable estoppel could be compared with legitimate 
expectations in administrative law- pre and post the decision.  
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It was useful to compare the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel with the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation in order to continue to explore if, and to what extent equity 
could be of use in public law. There were however, major differences, none more so than that 
estoppel was based on a ‘right’, whereas legitimate expectation was, as the name conveys a 
mere ‘expectation’, albeit that it had to be lawful. As Jonathan Moffatt identified, early 
legitimate expectation cases recognised the fact that legitimate expectations fall short of  
‘private law’ - rights, identifying them more as ‘moral obligations’35. As a result, public law 
struggles with this concept, and unfairness can seem to result when a local authority resiles 
from a promise it has made. Research showed that in some instances administrative law 
extended beyond equity, to cover a situation where a local authority had a policy and a 
promise had been made to an individual even if he was totally unaware of it.
36
 
On grounds of practical rationality local authorities must of course be allowed to get 
on with local administration, by amending policies or introducing new ones - a necessary 
consequence of good stewardship, tailoring and attending to changing needs in a local 
environment. The court may consider that although a local authority has triggered a 
legitimate expectation, nevertheless cogent evidence of the weight of the public interest factor 
outbids the individual’s interest. A straight transition of estoppel rules from equity to 
administrative law would not help the aggrieved promisee.  
The development of principles relating to substantive legitimate expectations 
generated by a local authority is an example of an area which owes much to equity. These 
principles include a mix of common law and equity and equity continues to add significant 
distinctive features which strengthen legal accountability. This author considers that a 
successful outcome, as in Coughlan will be rare; but that a clear distinction should be drawn 
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 Jonathan Moffett, ‘Resiling from Legitimate Expectations’ (Counsel’s note, 23 July, 2008) 
36
 See, Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] Imm AR 22, 40 
(Hobhouse LJ); R (S) v Secretary for State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 546, 
[34] (Carnwath LJ); R (Niazi) v Secretary for State of the Home Office [2008] EWCA Civ 
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between promises made in the context of changes of general policy and promises of a direct 
personal nature of the quality of the promise made to Miss Coughlan. Such an approach 
would soften the blow to the claimant where hardship has been suffered and new remedies 
developed. 
8.3 Methodology  
This thesis has used a mixed methodology drawing on traditional doctrinal analysis, 
together with historical and, philosophical approaches.  Traditional doctrinal analysis 
has helped us to identify the current state of the law on private trusts and fiduciary 
obligations-and to draw out how judges have approached the potential benefits of 
applying equitable concepts to administrative law, and the challenges presented by 
doing so.  The interaction between local authorities and their service users was the 
central focus. 
The historical approach was applied in two instances.  Firstly, an historical 
perspective on the origin, development and composition of the tollgate trusts (see 
chapter four, section 4.3) demonstrated that there was an early workable form of 
community public trust. Secondly, re-visiting three seminal public law cases (see 
Chapter five), spanning a fifty year period, demonstrated that there was continuity of 
judicial thought of a stewardship concept applied to local authorities and the way they 
deal with and should be accountable for their use of public funds and assets. Those 
cases demonstrated an underlying tension shown throughout by this research of the 
difficult task faced by local authorities of balancing a range of conflicting interests. 
The philosophical approach asked a basic, but a very important question:  
what is the nature of ‘loyalty’ and how (if at all) can it be applied in the context of 
local authorities and their service users?  This thesis demonstrated that loyalty is a 
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major obstacle to transposing concepts of fiduciary duty to the public sphere.  This is 
because the core nature of fiduciary obligation is loyalty between fiduciary and 
beneficiary and therefore by the very nature of the diverse homogenous nature of 
local authority service users presents problems.  This thesis found that fiduciary duty 
could have a role where loyalty was applied to the statutory purpose and not directly 
towards specific individuals. 
8.4 Limitations of Research 
This research has been limited by the nature of the methodology used, which was 
based on reference to a number of sources of case law, judicial and academic works, 
rather than the product of empirical research conducted by this author. Such empirical 
research would have centred on the significance of the fiduciary nature of local 
government and the practical relevance of public law remedies, such as declaratory 
relief for the aggrieved service user, and recognition (or otherwise) of those at the 
front line of local service delivery of ethics, such as stewardship. Such empirical 
research was considered to be of limited value, unless conducted to a greater length 
and over a longer research period, and is suggested for further research below. 
8. 5 Areas for further research 
It is clear that equity in relation to administrative law is a neglected research area. 
This section suggests a few areas for further research. 
8.5.1 Remedial questions 
One of the grounds of opposition used by those scholars who oppose the transition of 
fiduciary - like principles to government is that present private law remedies, such as 
damages or an account for profits, do not easily ‘fit’ the sphere of administrative law. 
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There is no reason however, when considering cases of a local authority resiling from 
a promise made and injustice caused, for example in legitimate expectation 
challenges that the debate be widened to include some form of new relief, such as 
equitable damages. It is acknowledged that this is a controversial area, but future 
research could explore the use of a ‘benefit exercise of discretion’ adopted by May 
LJ
37, and building on the ‘theory of entitlement’ presented by D Cohen and J Smith 38 
and the extent to which a compensatory damages award is feasible.  
8.5.2 Joint collaboration working agreements 
The changing face of local authority service delivery with its greater emphasis on 
collaborative working, not only with the private sector, but also between local 
authorities is an area that would greatly benefit from further research.  It is extremely 
important that the arrangements made between local authorities are properly 
classified and are not left whether there is a contractual nexus, but only mere 
declarations of intent between parties.  A pertinent question is whether such 
collaborative arrangements lead to a fiduciary relationship and if so what will the 
fiduciary duties comprise?  This area of research is all the more pressing since there 
have been recent government announcements concerning local government 
devolution and suggestions of county councils merging with each other or their own 
district councils.
39
  It is a mistake not to include discussions about the legal 
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 Rowland v Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885; [2005] Ch 1 
38
 D Cohen and J Smith, ‘Entitlement and the Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public 
Law’ (1986) 64 Can Bar Rev 1, 30. See further, M Fordham, ‘Monetary Awards in Judicial 
Review’ [2009] PL1; Law Commission, Administrative Redress; Public Bodies and the 
Citizen (Law Com Consultation Paper No 187, 2008); P Hogg, ‘Compensation for Damage 
Caused by Government’ (1995) 6 NJCL 7 
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 For example, seven councils in North Yorkshire have spoken out against proposals to 
merge them into a single authority. North Yorkshire council have voted in favour of merger 
with their seven district councils. Instead of district councils running some services and the 
county council controlling others, it would mean just one authority doing everything. But, the 
district councils have said the move would create a body ‘too big to deliver the local services 
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relationship between proposed larger councils and their service users. The 
stewardship principle based on an ethic of care should not be obscured in the search 
for greater economies of scale. 
8.5.3 Identifying Equity’s social role and contribution to a changing 
local government landscape 
Finally, and in the author’s opinion, perhaps the most important area for future 
research is the need to map the social role of equity.  Equity has proved a flexible 
device able to deal with many problems in society ranging from disputes about 
ownership of the family home to large complex commercial disputes.  The author 
considers that equity is a necessary part of a legal system to achieve social goals and 
to protect the rights of the individual, to ensure fairness through conscionable 
behaviour.  The challenge for future research is to frame coherent legal concepts in 
order to achieve this objective, a task that is all the more urgent because of the change 
in the modus operandi of public administration toward ‘contracting out’. 
One powerful reason in favour of extending the application of equity in 
schemes of public governance, as John Fitzgerald states is because of ‘the absence 
from our legal system of prescribed standards of ethical behaviour unique or peculiar 
to public officials.’40 This author would include public institutions, such as local 
authorities.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
people expect.’ Hambleton district Council Leader Arthur Baker speaking on behalf of the 
affected district authorities, said: We do not believe this is the best way forward. It will create 
remote government not local government.’ North Yorkshire - at over 3,000 square miles in 
size and with over 580,000 residents - is simply too big to be managed by one authority-it 
would not be able to reflect communities and their individual needs.’ 
40 John Fitzgerald, ‘The Role of Equity in Public Law’ in John McMillan (ed), 
‘Administrative Law in the Coalition government’ (Australian Institute of Administrative 
Law Inc 1997) 188-197. He discusses the relationship between a child who is a ward of the 
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The way that administrative courts deal with the conflict between the interests 
of the public body in exercising its discretionary power and the interests of citizens  
when a local authority has resiled on its promise, is worthy of greater research. This is 
particularly important, not only because of the frequency and ease with which such 
substantive expectations may be generated, but also because failing to uphold a 
lawful expectation can create questions of the law’s legitimacy. Case law illustrates 
that often these substantive issues involve social rights, such as welfare and housing 
benefits and difficult polycentric issues of resource allocation. Such research could be 
conducted through the lens of equity, and whether equitable principles would provide 
a greater measure of fairness of outcome, particularly drawing coherent lines between 
policy assurances and those of a direct personalised nature, as in Coughlan, and the 
nature of expectations as opposed to rights. Keeping promises is good stewardship 
and governance. 
Greater emphasis of research could be applied to the historical foundations of 
equity, founded on ‘conscience’ and its relation to early common law, when the Curia 
Regis or Aula Regis (‘King’s Court’) administered both law and equity. If we are to 
conclude that equity has a place in administrative law, then greater research into the 
precise origin and inherent nature of equity needs to be undertaken, rather than simply 
relying on a common perspective of equity as discretionary or a ‘gap filler.’ 41  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
state and the agency which is considered the guardian to which fiduciary responsibilities 
apply 
41
 See , Dr P G Turner, Equity and Administration chapter 1in ‘Equity and 
Administration’(Cambridge University Press 2016), pp.6-15 where an excellent summary of 
perspectives of modern equity are provided, including equity as discretionary, as an alibi or 
subterfuge, equity as obscurity and compulsory 
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8.5.4 The nature of a statutory corporation 
 There is an identifiable need to define with accuracy what is meant by a statutory 
corporation, such as a local authority, because there is uncertainty whether the entity 
is purely service orientated or affected by commercial considerations, and if so, to 
what extent. Such a definition would assist local authorities in polycentric decision 
making, where often economic and social welfare considerations clash.  Statutory 
provisions do not help. In fact it can be robustly argued that the power of competence 
granted to local authorities by the Localism Act
42
 has mudded the water.  
8.5.5 A stewardship concept based on an ethic of care 
Research on application of a stewardship principle in public law would benefit from 
further analysis of know how the three tests of Wednesbury, proportionality and 
stewardship would work and relate in practice, especially when each would be used. 
This research would incorporate whether another substantive review test would only 
add to concerns of additional complexity. 
8.6 A Final reflection 
 To echo Professor Tamar Frankel, Equity brings values and ethical standards without 
which society, its institutions and relationships cannot survive, let alone flourish. 
Such a reflection equally applies to the relationship between local authorities and 
their service users. This author calls for a system of law that is richer and stronger by 
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 The General Power of Competence under the Localism Act 2011 allows local authorities to 
expand their trading activities into areas not related to their existing functions, and removes 
geographical boundaries. It is now possible for local authorities to set up a trading company 
anywhere in the UK or elsewhere. Under previous legislation, the Local Government Act 
2003 local authorities are allowed to establish trading companies (LATCS) particularly for 
income generation. This must be done by a separate trading company limited by shares, a 
company limited by guarantee or an industrial provident society 
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blending principles of equity, common law and statute in its legislative, judicial and 
administrative decision making processes.  
Equity still has a roving commission in English law and never more so than in 
public law. The challenge is to identify those situations and extent that such equitable 
principles could contribute to combating abuse of power that can occur in the often 
complex and diverse decision making relationship between local authorities and their 
service users. 
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